



PNC2017

International Conference on Political Transition, Non-violence and Communication In Conflict Transformation (PNC 2017)



24 - 26 January 2017
Prince of Songkla University,
Pattani Campus, Thailand

**The International Conference on
Political Transition, Non-violence
and Communication
in Conflict Transformation**

**24-26 January 2017
Prince of Songkla University, Pattani Campus, Thailand**

**The International Conference on Political Transition,
Non-violence and Communication in Conflict Transformation**

24-26 January 2017

Prince of Songkla University, Pattani Campus, Thailand

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The International Conference on
**Political Transition, Non-violence
and Communication
in Conflict Transformation**

Welcome

As the first institute of higher education in southern border provinces of Thailand, where violent conflict is still going on, Prince of Songkla University at Pattani campus has many liabilities and responsibilities to take on the significant function as a significant common ground for all parties to find the solutions, scholarly as well as practically. More or less, we have fulfilled that precious mission. The university aims to establish excellence in research and teaching, to provide academic services to communities and fulfil its inspiration of producing internationally recognized institutions. In this context, conflict and peace studies, as the growing international field of academic endeavors, have opened our opportunity to catch up with the globally leading academia by applying the textbook knowledge to our local context. In other words, this is turning crisis into opportunity. Our academics and researchers have developed academic partnerships from local, internal, and international actors amidst the southern conflict and violence. In the process, Prince of Songkla University at Pattani Campus has gone down to the high profile record of the most frequent visiting institute from academics and experts on peace, conflict, insurgency and terrorist studies in the Southern region.

On behalf of Prince of Songkla University, we are honored to host the International Conference on Political Transition, Nonviolence and Communication in Conflict Transformation held at the Faculty of Communication Sciences on January 24-26, 2017. Our proud partnership to organize this event is comprised of Faculty of Communication Sciences, Faculty of Political Science, Center for Conflict Studies and Cultural Diversity (CSCD), Peace Resource Collaborative (PRC / CSCD), Institute of Peace Studies (IPS), Faculty of Management Sciences, and Deep South Watch (DSW). The arrangements of this conference are also partially supported by many donors, including the European Union (EU), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Norwegian Embassy, and the US Embassy. Heartfelt thanks for the gracious efforts of our staff from all partner organizations and generous supports of all donors; the ambitious goals of this conference are realized.

We hope that, eventually, the conference would bring about an environment crucial to explore, develop and nurture effective ways to engage with and the help transform violent political conflicts in the international as well as Thailand's setting. We also hope that all those that participated in this conference found it extremely beneficial and greatly welcomed the opportunity to exchange perspectives and learn from each other's expertise. Welcome to Pattani all dignitaries, guests and participants.

Associate Professor Imjit Lertpongsombat
Vice President of Pattani campus
7 January 2017

Acknowledgement

For over a decade, Thailand's Deep South has witnessed years of violent conflict wrought by different feelings, configurations and rationalizations. Starting with the tumultuous years between 2004 and 2007, the horrific violence prompted a chaotic response from all parties, particularly the Thai state. The consequence of long-term structural and cultural violence, this latent identity-based conflict that had been simmering in the region for over a century finally emerged. With more than 6,000 lives lost and over 200 billion THB spent; the current military regime has to stomach the bitter reality and address the protracted crisis with a new approach, through peace dialogue. However, the military's traditional approach still operates in parallel to the more peaceful endeavor.

Interestingly, on the other side, the political wings of the BRN and other significant movement organizations have come together to form MARA Patani. They have turned towards the peace dialogue process with a view to, in part, transform the conflict from a violent struggle to a non-violent one. This process has been unfolding, with its attendant ups-and-downs, since 2014 and resulted, thus far, in "a small step forward". In real politics, this is fair enough.

January 2017 marks the 13th anniversary of Narathiwat's Choh-I-Rong incident. This event signaled the start of the protracted violence and gave birth to the twists and turns that today shape the region's history. As the conflict continues with no definite end in sight, it is helpful to look to the experiences of other societies that have dealt with violent conflict, to remind us that there remains hope for a more peaceful, political solution. The last few years have seen remarkable progress with respect to transforming some of the most protracted conflicts in Asia. Outstanding are the cases of Nepal and Aceh / Indonesia and promising the ongoing efforts in Mindanao / Philippines and in Myanmar. But these cases also demonstrate that political transition processes require a significant amount of time and can go through several cycles of severe crises and repeated dead-locks, similar to the situation in the Deep South.

All things considered, it is a promising time to hold the International Conference on 'Non-violence, Political Transition, and Communication in Conflict Transformation'. The academic partnership between the conference's co-hosts

- the Center for Conflict Studies and Cultural Diversity (CSCD), the Faculty of Communication Sciences, the Faculty of Management Sciences, Institute for Peace Studies (IPS), the Faculty of Political Science, Deep South Watch (DSW), and Peace Resource Collaborative (PRC) - illustrate that at Prince of Songkla University, it is possible to work together and to forge academic common ground with the aim of building peace not only for the Deep South, but for Thailand as a whole. Moreover, the support and interest shown in this project demonstrate that political transition and non-violence are still burning issues for conflict resolution in this global environment of international threats, regional political crises and increasing radicalization.

In peace we trust, and Peace be upon you.

Assistant Professor Srisompob Jitpiromsri, PhD
Director of Center for Conflict Studies and Cultural Diversity (CSCD)
Prince of Songkla University, Pattani Campus
Chairperson of the Conference Committee
6 January 2017

Introduction

The violent conflict in Thailand's Deep South has become a systemic phenomenon emerging from a host of interrelated factors. Thus, the conflict cannot be fully comprehended by its constituent parts, but has to be considered as a whole. Like many other conflict areas, a combination of socioeconomic, cultural and political factors have led to the protracted and dynamic conflicts. In-depth academic and comparative studies are required to identify reasonable solutions.

Throughout the decade of violence in Thailand's southern border provinces, Prince of Songkla University, Pattani has engaged in attempts to bring about a peaceful settlement through scholarship; a critical arena for promoting communication and a common understanding among concerned parties and stakeholders. Non-violence and political transition are the essence of peace processes and academia has much to contribute through thoughtful engagement.

In August 2014, a network of faculties and institutions at PSU Pattani worked hand in hand to organise the "International Conference on Communication, Conflicts and Peace Processes: Landscapes of Knowledge from Asia and the Deep South of Thailand (CCPP)". It was the first international academic conference in humanities and social science ever to be organised in this conflict region since 2004. It proved that an international conference could take place in a region still considered by some peace experts to be under an ongoing 'armed conflict.'

On 30 September 2015, Prince of Songkla University, Pattani together with other universities in the Deep South and Southeast Asia organised another International Conference entitled, "TriPEACE via ASEAN Muslim Societies: Muslim Societies, Knowledge, and Peacebuilding in Southeast Asia". The conference inaugurated academic partnerships between universities in the Philippines' Mindanao and Aceh in Indonesia, thereby establishing and affirming the significance of a regional network to promote peace in the Southeast Asia region through collaboration and exchange.

Now, even though the peace dialogue between the Thai government and MARA Patani has run into difficulties in the context of national political uncertainty, the academic and civil society peace fields are becoming ever more robust. There has never been a more appropriate time to be assertive

about peace and the politicisation of violent conflict in the region. Academic partnership within Prince of Songkla University continues via the international conference on 'Political Transition, Non-Violence and Communication in Conflict Transformation'. The conference will act as an academic common space to engage and inspire participants and to explore solutions amidst a climate of indeterminate politics now and beyond.

Background

The last few years have seen remarkable progress with respect to transforming some of the most protracted conflicts in Asia. Outstanding are the cases of Nepal and Aceh / Indonesia and promising the ongoing efforts in Mindanao / Philippines and in Myanmar. But these cases also demonstrated that political transition processes require a significant amount of time and can go through several cycles of severe crises and repeated deadlocks. Another example is the case of Southern Thailand / Patani in which two consecutive governments have accepted the need to negotiate with representatives of the resistance movement, but are still struggling to develop an effective mode of political engagement with the opposite side.

Unfortunately, these developments are over-shadowed by a multiplicity of ongoing violent conflicts like in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Libya and elsewhere; the world-wide threat of radicalized religious movement; the retreat of democratic governance in several regions of the world, the humanitarian catastrophies of refugees driven from their homes and various other challenges to human, national and international security. What links both developments is that the world is increasingly forced to develop effective ways to find political and non-violent ways to engage with fundamental, protracted violent conflicts. Another key element is to find effective modes of communication in and on conflicts and their transformation.

In this environment it is crucial to explore, develop and nurture effective ways to engage with and the help transform violent political conflicts. It raises five closely connected questions:

- What are the determining factors which motivate armed movements to shift from violent to primarily or exclusively non-violent strategies in their struggle?
- How can the often fundamentally different political positions and interest of conflicting parties be made negotiable?

- How can the deeply entrenched system of violence and counter-violence be transformed to promote an effective and inclusive settlement of the root causes of the conflict?
- How can communication play a role in peace processes and conflict transformation?
- How can actors from Track-2 and -3 contribute to conflict transformation?

Focus of the Conference & Call for Papers

The conference will have two pre-organized panels, but will mainly rely on papers and panel proposals from scholars from Thailand and other Asian countries. Interested scholars from outside of Asia are welcomed. The main language of the conference will be English, but there will be some panels in Thai.

The conference welcomes single papers and panel proposals relating to Political Transition, Non-violence and Communication in Conflict Transformation, including but not limited to:

- Case studies and comparisons of “politicisations” and shifts from violent to non-violent struggles of resistance and political change movements.
- Theoretical and conceptual investigations of the factors underlying peacebuilding, peace processes and processes of conflict transformation.
- State strategies engaging with violent and non-violent resistance and political change movements.
- Governance, conflict and peace.
- Institutional aspects of peace processes (Infrastructures for Peace Support, Peace Secretariats, Government Structures for conflict transformation etc.)
- The role of international agencies in peace processes.
- Proscription of resistance movements and their implications for peacebuilding and peace processes.
- Public support and resistance to peacebuilding and peace processes.
- Role of CSOs, Women, Youth and communities in peacebuilding and peace processes.
- Religion, conflict transformation and peace processes

- Nationalism, conflict transformation and peace processes
- Peace Journalism
- Roles of communication and media in conflict transformation and peace process
- Conflict and Peace Discourses and Narratives
- Peace Survey Research

Co-hosting Organisations

- Center for Conflict Studies and Cultural Diversity (CSCD), PSU Pattani
- Faculty of Communication Sciences, PSU Pattani
- Faculty of Political Science, PSU Pattani
- Institute of Peace Studies (IPS), PSU, Hat Yai
- Faculty of Management Sciences, PSU, Hat Yai
- Peace Resource Collaborative (PRC), Bangkok
- Deep South Watch (DSW), Pattani

Scientific Committee

Abdulrohning Suetair, Ph.D.

Lecturer, Prince of Songkla University, Thailand

Anders Engvall, Ph.D.

Assistant Professor, Stockholm School of Economics, Sweden

Andrea Katalin Molnar, Ph.D.

Professor, Northern Illinois University, U.S.A.

Bencharat Sae Chua, Ph.D.

Lecturer, Mahidol University, Thailand

Bussabong Chaicharoenwattana, Ph.D.

Assistant Professor, Prince of Songkla University, Thailand

Chantana Wungaeo, Ph.D.

Associate Professor, Chulalongkorn University, Thailand

Christopher M. Joll, Ph.D.

Thammasat University, Thailand

Elin Bjarnegård, Ph.D.

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Erik Melander, Ph.D.

Professor, Uppsala University, Sweden

Janjira Sombatpoonsiri, Ph.D.

Assistant Professor, Thammasat University, Thailand

Jaran Maluleem, Ph.D.

Professor, Thammasat University, Thailand

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Kusuma Kooyai, Ph.D.

Assistant Professor, Prince of Songkla University, Thailand

MD Mahbubul Haque, Ph.D.

Lecturer, Prince of Songkla University, Thailand

Mike Hayes, Ph.D.

Lecturer, Mahidol University, Thailand

Mikio Oishi, Ph.D.

Lecturer, University of Brunei Darussalam, Brunei

Norbert Ropers, Ph.D.

Prince of Songkla University, Thailand
Berghof Foundation, Germany

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Assistant Professor, Payap University, Thailand

Thanet Apornsuwan

Professor, Thammasat University, Thailand

Thitiwut Boonyawongwiwat, Ph.D.

Lecturer, Chiang Mai University, Thailand

Ubonrat Siriyuvasak, Ph.D.

Associate Professor, Thailand

Walakkamol Changkamol, Ph.D.

Assistant Professor, Prince of Songkla University, Thailand

Wichai Kanchanasuwon, Ph.D.

Associate Professor, Prince of Songkla University, Thailand

Program
International Conference on
Political Transition, Non-violence and Communication in
Conflict Transformation (PNC)

24 – 26 January 2017
Faculty of Communication Sciences, Prince of Songkla University.
Pattani Campus, Thailand

Tuesday 24 January, 2017	
Time	Agenda
08.00 – 09.00	Registration
09.00 – 09.10	PNC 2017 Presentation
09.10 – 09.30	Opening Address By Mr. Phichit Rerngsangvatana Vice President, Prince of Songkla University
09.30– 10.00	Keynote Address (1) on “Challenges and Lessons of Moving from an Armed Conflict towards Non-violence” By Harn Yawngghwe Executive Director of Euro-Burma Office
10.00– 10.30	Keynote Address (2) on “Leadership, Political Will and EQ - Armed Group Wisdom in South East Asia” By Dr.Emma Leslie Director of Cambodian Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies
10.30– 10.45	Break
10:45 – 12.15	Paper Presentation Session 1: <u>Political Transition and Transitional Justice</u> 1) The Rewards of Truth Commissions and Other Transitional Justice Processes in an Asian Context Dr.Helen Ware 2) Assessing the Implementation of Democracy in West Africa: Is It a Work-In-Progress for a Pride or Otherwise? A Case of Guinea Ibrahima Lamine Sano, Dr.Ibrahem Narongraksakhet,

	<p>Dr.Sarfee Ardam, and Dr.Abdullai M. Kaba</p> <p>3) Political Transition in Burma/Myanmar: Status of Rohingya and Other Muslim Minorities</p> <p>Dr. MD Mahbubul Haque</p> <p>Discussants</p> <p>1.Dr.Norbert Ropers 2.Dr.Emma Leslie</p> <p>Moderator</p> <p>Dr.Kayanee Chor Boonpan</p>
	<p>Paper Presentation Session 2:</p> <p><u>Southern Thailand Peace Process and Comparative Studies</u></p> <p>1) The Comparative Study on the Participation of Civil Society Organizations on the Peace Process, the Cases of Mindanao and Southern Thailand</p> <p>Fareeda Panjor</p> <p>2) Northern ‘Troubles’ and Southern ‘Fire’: An Examination of Peace Process in Northern Ireland and Southern Thailand</p> <p>Dr.Kenneth Houston</p> <p>3) Peace building Process in Thailand and Myanmar/ Burma: The Dynamic Roles of Muslim Minorities in Conflict Society</p> <p>Dr. Srisompob Jitpiromsri and Dr. Mahbubul Haque</p> <p>Discussants</p> <p>1.Dr.Patrick Barron 2.Dr.Avila Kilmurray</p> <p>Moderator</p> <p>Dr.Thanruedee Taweeakarn</p>
12:15-13:30	Lunch
13:30 – 15:00	<p>Paper Presentation Session 3:</p> <p><u>Communication and Media for Peace and Conflict Transformation</u></p> <p>1) A Stage for the Unknown? - What Theatre Art Can Bring to Peacebuilding</p> <p>Anne Dirnstorfer and Nar Bahadur Saud</p> <p>2) Reporting of Sectarian Conflict in Pakistan: Analysis through the lenses of Peace Journalism (online presentation)</p> <p>Dr.Shabir Hussain</p> <p>Discussants</p> <p>1.Dr.Phansasiri Kularb 2.Dr.Ubonrat Siriyuvasak</p>

	Moderator Dr. Walakkamol Changkamol
	Paper Presentation Session 4: <u>Peacebuilding in South Asia</u> 1) Azadi – Call for Self-determination and Political Transition in Kashmir Ada Dyndo 2) Understanding Grassroots Peacebuilding: Key Lessons from the Chittagong Hill Tracts Anurug Chakma 3) Infrastructures for Peace and the Role of Peace Services in Nepal Dr.Maya Bohem, Babu Ram Poudel, Prakash Mani Sharma, and Jeannie Suurmond Discussants 1.Dr.Mahbubul Haque 2.Dr.Jason McLeod Moderator Dr.Bussabong Chaijaroenwattana
15:00 – 15:15	Break
15.15 – 17:00	Public Forum on “Politicization: How can Political Violence be transformed?” 1) Dr.Véronique Dudouet Programme Director, Agents of Change for Inclusive Conflict Transformation, Berghof Foundation 2) Dr.Ubonrat Siriyuvasak Communication Specialist 3) Dr.Jason McLeod Lecturer, University of Queensland 4) Dr. Avila Kilmurray Former Director of the Community Foundation for Northern Ireland Moderated by Dr. Norbert Ropers, Center for Conflict Studies and Cultural Diversity
18.30 – 21.30	Reception at Pattani CS Hotel
Wednesday 25 January, 2017	
Time	Agenda
08.00 – 09.00	Registration
09.00 – 10.30	Paper Presentation Session 5: <u>Non-violence and Peace Education</u>

	<p>1) Buddhist Theory of Peaceful Co-existence for an Integrated Society Samantha Ilangakoon</p> <p>2) Nonviolence Kingian Principles , Peace Education and Peace Counts for ushering Sustainable Peace in Southern Thailand Dr.Leban Serto</p> <p>3) Role of Education in Building Peaceful Communities: Hizmet Movement’s Educational Approach in Conflict Areas Yusuf Can Bektas</p> <p>Discussants 1.Dr.Suchart Setthamalinee 2.Dr.Veronique Dudouet</p> <p>Moderator Vasapa Wanichwethin</p> <p>Paper Presentation Session 6:</p>
10.30-14.45	<p><u>Politics of Multicultural Society</u></p> <p>1) 20 Years of Frozen Conflict: A Comparative Study of Education in Brčko District and Bosnia-Herzegovina (online presentation) Jusuf Sarancic</p> <p>2) Multiethnic Society in Malaysia: Learning Lesson of Peaceful Coexistences Samart Thongfhuwa and Hassanee Praprutsujarit</p> <p>3) Why Monolingual Mind-sets, Linguistic Justice, and Language Policy are All Central to a Peaceful, Political Resolution to Thailand’s Southern Impasse Dr.Christopher M. Joll</p> <p>Discussants 1.Dr.Erik Melander 2.Dr.Gothom Areeya</p> <p>Moderator Emma Potchapornkul</p> <p>Break</p>
10:45 – 12.15	<p>Paper Presentation Session 7:</p> <p><u>Peace Dialogue and Negotiation in South Sudan, Nepal and Papua</u></p> <p>1) Pedestals for Marginalized Voices: Peaceful Negotiation through Civil Society (online presentation) Dr.Harriet Lewis</p>

	<p>2) The Campaign of Papua Peace Network (PPN) for Papua Peace Land (online presentation) Dr.Cahyo Pamungkas</p> <p>3) Role of Dialogue in Peacebuilding : Promoting Social Harmony and Peace in Nepal Chiranjibi Bhandari</p> <p>Discussants 1. Dr.Eakpant Pidavanija 2. Dr.Anders Engvall</p> <p>Moderator Dr.Wichai Kanchanasuwon</p> <p>Paper Presentation Session 8:</p>
	<p><u>Politics, Conflicts and Transition in the Deep South of Thailand</u></p> <p>1) The Emergence of Political Participation in Thailand's Deep South: The 1975 Pattani Demonstration Daungyewa Utarasint</p> <p>2) The Shifting Battleground: Peace Dialogue in Southern Thailand's Malay-Muslim Conflict Rungrawee Chalernsripinyorat</p> <p>3) Dealing With Dangerous "Peace": Politics of Words in Pa(t)tani "Armed Conflict" Romadon Panjor</p> <p>Discussants 1.Dr.Thanet Arpornsuwan 2.Dr.Mikio Oishi</p> <p>Moderator Dr.Duanghatai Buranajaroenkij</p>
12.15-13.30	Lunch
13.30 - 15:00	<p>Paper Presentation Session 9: <u>Violence Monitoring and Political Economy</u></p> <p>1) Understanding Violence in Southeast Asia: The Contribution of Violent Incidents Monitoring Systems Dr.Patrick Barron, Dr.Anders Engvall and Adrian Morel</p> <p>2) Can Chinese Investments Pacify Conflicts— A Case Study of Tasang (Mong Ton/Mai Dong) Dam, Myanma (online presentation) Yongli Ku</p>

	<p>3) Between Commercialisation and Conflict in Myanmar's Borderlands Dr.David Brenner</p> <p>Discussants 1. Dr.Elin Bjarnegard 2.Dr.Thitiwut Boonyawongwiwat</p> <p>Moderator Apichaya O-In</p> <p>Paper Presentation Session 10: <u>Politics, Conflicts and Transition in the Deep South of Thailand</u></p> <p>1) The Patani Peace Dialogue Process: From TOR(1) to SZ(2) Abu Hafez Al-Hakim</p> <p>2) Southern Border Provinces Conflict Resolution Policies Capt.Jakapong Apimahatham</p> <p>Discussants 1.Dr.Chantana WunGeao Bunpasirichote 2.Dr.Napisa Waitoolkiat</p> <p>Moderator Dr.Norbert Ropers</p>
15:00-15:15	Break
15:15 -17:00	<p>Public Forum on "Knowledge Pathways to Political Transition in Southern Thailand/Patani Conflict" 1) Romadon Panjor, Deep South Watch 2) Wae-ismael Naesae, Director of People's College 3) Mathus Anuwassudom, The Office for Peace and Governance, King Prajadhipok's Institute 4) Arthit Thong-In, Department of Social Science , the College of Social Innovation, Rangsit University Moderated by Samatcha Nilphatama, Faculty of Communication Science, Prince of Songkla University, Pattani Campus</p>
17:00 – 17:15	<p>Closing Remarks by Asst.Prof.Dr.Srisompob Jitpiromsri, Acting Director of Center for Conflict Studies and Cultural Diversity (CSCD)</p>
Thursday 26 January, 2017	
Time	Agenda
09.00 – 15.00	Post-Conference Field Trip in Pattani (Natural and Cultural Attractions)

OPENING ADDRESS

Mr. Pichit Rerngsangvatana
Vice President of Prince of Songkla University
PNC 2017
Prince of Songkla University, Pattani Campus
24 January 2017

Excellencies, Honourable Keynote Speakers and Scholars, Distinguished Guests, Vice President, Deans, Ladies and Gentlemen.

It is my pleasure to preside over this Conference on “Political Transition, Non-violence and Communication in Conflict Transformation – PNC 2017”. First of all, on behalf of Prince of Songkla University, I would like to convey to all of you a warm welcome and sincere thanks for attending this important conference.

I would like to extend my thanks to Mr. Harn Yawngkhwe, Executive Director of the Euro-Burma Office and Ms. Emma Leslie, Director of the Cambodian Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, for agreeing to provide the keynote addresses for this conference.

Prince of Songkla University, Pattani Campus, is one of the higher education institutions based in conflict affected region of the Southern provinces. For years, we have witnessed the ongoing conflict and violence that has plagued the deep south of Thailand on a daily basis. As a part of the community, we intend to resolve this crisis by supporting the peace process and by supporting political transition from violence to non-violence.

This international conference is but one small way in which we can support the process of building peace. I believe that the opportunity that this conference provides to examine the current discourses, exchange knowledge and to build international academic networks will certainly enable us to explore creative ways to think about how to approach the conflict not only in the Southernmost part of Thailand but also in other parts of the world.

Finally, on behalf of Prince of Songkla University, I wish to extend our best wishes for the great success of this Conference. I hope that the conference will help to further strengthen the relations between scholars from Thailand and other countries and open the way to sharing more knowledge and more cooperation in the international arena. Thank you.

Keynote Speakers



Challenges and Lessons of Moving from an Armed Conflict towards Non-violence

Harn Yawngkhwe

Executive Director of Euro-Burma Office

Harn Yawngkhwe is the son of Sao Shwe Thaik, the last hereditary ruler of the Shan principality of Yawngkhwe and the first president of the independent Republic of the Union of Burma. Harn escaped to Thailand in 1963 at the age of fifteen after his father was arrested in a coup by General Ne Win and died eight months later in prison. Harn studied at Chulalongkorn University and migrated to Canada where he earned an engineering degree and an MBA from McGill University. Harn has worked in management and financial positions for international profit and non-profit enterprises in North America and the Asia-Pacific region. From 1988, Harn has been an active member of Burma's democracy movement. He founded the Associates to Develop Democratic Burma; was advisor to Dr. Sein Win, prime minister of the exile National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma; and was managing director of the Democratic Voice of Burma, which was set up to promote democracy and media freedom in Burma. In 1997, Harn founded the Euro-Burma Office in Brussels which originated as a joint project between ADDDB, the European Commission, European Parliament and the German Friedrich Ebert Foundation. It was created to help the democracy movement prepare for a transition to democracy in Burma. In 2011, Harn was asked by the Government of Myanmar to set up the first meetings between the Government and ethnic armed organizations. After 48 years in exile, he returned to Myanmar to facilitate the peace process.



Leadership, Political Will and EQ - Armed Group Wisdom in South East Asia

Dr.Emma Leslie

Director of Cambodian Centre for peace and Conflict Studies

Emma is an Australian–Cambodian who has worked on conflict transformation and peacebuilding throughout Asia since 1993. Since moving to Cambodia in 1997, Emma worked with the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, the Working Group for Weapons Reduction in Cambodia and supported a number of Cambodia peace initiatives – the latest being the launch of Cambodia Peace Museum. In 2005 she launched a Master’s Programme for the Asia region in Applied Conflict Transformation Studies.

In 2008, she established the Centre for Peace & Conflict Studies, which she currently leads as Executive Director. Emma also serves as a consultant for Conciliation Resources on Philippines peace processes, and supported the peace talks between Government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) as a member of the International Contact Group (ICG) since 2011. She observed the Myanmar peace process as an independent observer, in particular supporting the talks of the Karen National Union (KNU) and the All Burma Students Democratic Front (ABSDF).

Emma teaches mediation courses at the Folke Bernadotte Academy in Sweden for the UN Department of Political Affairs. She holds an M.A. in International Development and an Honorary Doctorate in Education.

In 2005, she was one of the 1,000 women nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize. On June 13, 2016 Emma was awarded a Member of the Order of Australia (AM) for “significant service to international relations through the facilitation of a network of conflict transformation and peace practitioners in the Asia-Pacific region”. The Order of Australia recognises Australian citizens and other people for achievements or meritorious service.

Political Transition and Transitional Justice

The Rewards of Truth Commissions and Other Transitional Justice Processes in an Asian Context

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Abstract

Truth Commissions originated in Latin America in a context of Christian religion and the transition from authoritarian regimes to, it was hoped, democracy. Then came the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, in a newly engaged continent and in the unique context of the transition from Apartheid to democracy for all, irrespective of race. However, the South African TRC was still an essentially Christian body. With the movement to Asia, Timor Leste is yet again a country of Christian culture with elements of traditional beliefs and customs. This paper explores the potential for truth and reconciliation in the non-Christian countries of Asia as well as alternative forms of transitional justice investigating the extent to which reconciliation is a specifically Christian concept. It also examines the trade-offs involved in crafting the balance between political realism and the desire for peace and or justice

Keywords: *Truth, Reconciliation, Transitional Justice, Asia, Post-conflict*

The subject of transitional justice for Asian conditions is a massive one even when largely restricted to the potential role for truth and reconciliation commissions (TRCs). This is because, whilst human rights are universal, what the people regard as just and what will contribute to reconciliation is dependent upon the cultural, religious and political contexts. Although the idea of a truth and reconciliation commission is based upon the ideal of social healing, there are cultures where social forgetting is the chosen strategy for dealing with a violent past. Thus it is as misguided as it is ineffectual for donors and civil society lobby groups to attempt to force societies to adopt a model of transitional justice which runs counter to their peoples' religious and cultural beliefs or is simply outside their frame of reference.

There are two kinds of reconciliation: realist and idealist. Realist reconciliation is defined thus by an expatriate NGO worker in Cambodia: ‘my personal ... view of reconciliation is the absolute minimal one, which is to live on without killing each other...in Cambodia, I’ve never heard of people saying that they have openly forgiven others. They tolerate the fact that the other is alive, which has everything to do with the whole tradition of avoiding’ (McGrew 2011, 516). Idealist reconciliation is typified by this quotation from Richard Solomon, former President of the United States’ Institute of Peace (USIP): ‘Sustainable peace requires that long time antagonists not merely lay down their arms but that they achieve profound reconciliation that will endure because it is sustained by a society wide network of relationships and mechanisms that promote justice and address the root causes of enmity before they can regenerate destabilizing tensions’ (Lederach, in Guthrey 2015, 150). Proponents of idealist reconciliation rely heavily upon the untested assertions of conventional wisdom and statements of causality which have not been proven in the field (see the counter case of Mozambique below). This paper will argue that such an ideal represents an unattainable goal and that any realistic approach to that goal requires a context specific understanding of the views of the local culture on reconciliation – if any. The ideal of reconciliation can readily be distorted (Schreiter 1992). There is the ‘hasty peace’ often espoused by the perpetrators of violence and the victors in battle who encourage the victims to let bygones be bygones, urging forgiveness and ignoring the dignity of the poor and down trodden. Then there is reconciliation-instead-of-liberation, frequently promoted by religious leaders who attempt reconciliation between abusers and victims without any efforts to remove the very power structures which allow the evils to continue in a state of perpetuated but unjust truce. It is not necessarily good to reconcile a class struggle. Again, reconciliation by mediation, to persuade all parties that everyone has legitimate interests at stake and that some can only be achieved at the cost of giving up others, can represent a helpful use of technical rationality but does not reunite peoples. Similarly, peaceful coexistence is not yet reconciliation but more of a recognition that many deep rooted conflicts are intractable and that people interacting together in neighbourhoods, schools, hospitals, sports clubs and religious organizations can provide incremental steps on the way to reconciliation (Weiner 1998). Introducing a USIP publication on ‘Reconciliation in the Asia Pacific’, Funabashi (2003) confessed ‘I feel a certain hesitation in using the term reconciliation in the title of this volume. After all, how likely is it that the victims and the victimizers can achieve reconciliation

when even co-existence between them is fraught with difficulties?’ He goes on to demonstrate just how foreign, and therefore unacceptable, the idea of reconciliation is to most Japanese. It is vital not to get carried away by a faith in reconciliation as a cure all for the political ills of divided states. Any discussion of reconciliation needs to examine very carefully the local translation of the term, if any, and the cultural baggage that term carries with it. For example, in Arabic, depending on the context, the word used may be applicable to two brothers who have fallen out over their father’s will but are now reconciled or it may be a much more formal word as used in United Nations translations which implies that the two sides have learnt to understand each other’s point of view. Peter C. Phan, a noted Catholic theologian born in Vietnam, set out to examine ‘Global healing and reconstruction, the gift and task of religion, a Buddhist-Christian perspective’ (2006). In his view reconciliation requires four actions: living justly and doing justice; knowing and acting on the truth; forgiveness and embracing the enemy; and social reconstruction. He compares and contrasts Christianity and Buddhism on all four but it is when he comes to forgiveness that the gap between the two religions is the greatest with Christianity invoking the divine example and the Buddha declaring: ‘hatreds do not ever cease in this world by hating, but by not hating’.

It is also important to accept that ‘nations do not have collective psyches, which can be healed, nor do whole nations suffer post-traumatic stress disorder and to assert otherwise is to psychologise an abstract entity’ (Hamber and Wilson 2003, 145; Larke 2009, 650). For Gloppen (2005,20) ‘Reconciliation refers to processes of different kinds and at various levels. It is about individuals forgiving each other; about societies torn apart by conflict mending their social fabric and reconstructing the desire to live together; it is about peaceful coexistence and social stability. It may refer to an ambitious goal of creating a shared comprehensive vision of a common future or common past; or to a situation where former enemies may continue to disagree, but still respect each other as equal citizens’. Shifting between two sets of cultural expectations, local workers for peace will often talk to donors in English about ‘reconciliation’ but then shift to a different lexicon relating to ‘restoring harmony’ in their Asian mother tongue. Whilst reconciliation requires the two sides to communicate, one side or even one individual can work to restore harmony especially in the context of Buddhist traditions. The discussion here is centred on the experiences of individual states because most Asian states have both a history and a common culture (although inside the state cultural divisions are often

linked to conflict). The paper focuses on reconciliation within states, yet there can also be a need for reconciliation between states. Thus moves towards or away from rapprochement between India and Pakistan provide almost daily headlines in which the word 'reconciliation' appears (Krepon 1996; Sahgal 2013). Further, in part due to India's pressure, transitional justice in Nepal has become a political bargaining chip, both at home and abroad (Baral 2016). This text discusses examples from Korea, Thailand, Nepal, Myanmar, Cambodia, Timor Leste and the Solomon Islands. These countries have been selected for their experience with truth commissions and for their variety of exposures to different forms of violent conflict involving diverse groupings within society.

KOREA: Multiple Truth Commissions

Comparative discussions of transitional justice mechanisms and their impacts in Asia are often constrained by language issues since there are not many academics who can work in a range of Asian languages and translated materials are limited. Thus one highly inclusive discussion of 'when truth commissions improve human rights' (Olsen et al. 2010) has to rely on statistical measures with little by way of political or cultural context for the 74 transitional countries which used 49 trials, 27 truth commissions and 46 amnesties. In the Korean case it is important to distinguish between reconciliation within South Korea and the very different issue of the long distant prospect of reconciliation between South and North, which will not be covered here. In terms of religious factors which influence attitudes to reconciliation, 46% of South Koreans have no religious affiliation, 29% are Christians and 23% are Buddhists. South Korea has had at least ten truth commissions but their impact on international discussions has been restricted by language issues and the difficulties for outsiders of understanding the convolutions of South Korean politics. All of the Korean commissions have been very much concerned to seek out the truth, but their interest in and impact on reconciliation is difficult to measure without an in-depth knowledge of the Korean language, culture and political scene. Kuk Cho (2007) has provided a very useful introduction to 'Transitional justice in Korea: legally coping with past wrongs after democratization' which focuses on the requirement 'to provide a Korean method to deal with past wrongs' and the difficulties of balancing the need for justice against issues relating to creating crimes retrospectively and extending the statute of limitations, matters upon which firm defenders of human rights may honestly disagree. In South Korea 'while liberals including human rights

organizations supported the realization of transitional justice, conservatives, in particular politicians with military backgrounds, objected to it' (Kuk Cho 2007, 580). A national public opinion poll in 2008 found that 36% felt that the truth commission process was necessary; 29% believed that it was unnecessary and deepened the social divisions in the country and 26% thought that it was somewhat necessary but occurred too soon (Olsen et al 2010,54).

Even standing alone, the titles of some of the legislation provide a good introduction to the distinctive nature of Korean approaches to transitional justice. Thus there are the 2004 Act for Restoring the Honour of the Democratization Contributors and Compensation for Their Sacrifice and the 2000 Special Acts for Finding the Truth about Suspicious Deaths. Further legislation also includes the 2004 Special Act for Finding the Truth of Anti-Nation Activities under the Japanese Occupation; the Special Act for Reverting the Property of Those Who Did Pro-Japanese to State; and the 2005 Basic Law for Coping with Past History for Truth and Reconciliation. As well as the inevitable political wrangles as to their mandates and powers, the truth commissions have suffered from difficulties in establishing what happened in the sometimes distant past (back to 1910) especially in a context where perpetrators have minimal incentives to come forward. Generally truth commissions can secure the co-operation of perpetrators either through the carrot of amnesties or the stick of the threat of prosecution: neither was on offer in Korea. The Korean truth commissions were neither investigative nor judicial authorities, so could not search and seize materials nor subpoena witnesses or suspects but could only impose administrative fines in cases of non-compliance. However there have been significant reparations from the state to victims' families. Kuk Cho (2007,603) concludes that despite many difficulties Korea's truth commissions have made 'substantial contributions to (the) advancement of Korean society. Their findings consoled the victims' hurt souls and healed the trauma of the victims' families. They also made Korea people look back on the dark shadow of the painful past and made them determined to maintain democracy in Korean society' although right wingers and others made up the third of the population who were less convinced of this optimistic view.

An interesting NGO initiative stemming from Korean culture was the publication of an Encyclopedia of Anti-Nation Pro-Japanese Collaborators in 2004 following a petition from 10,000 professors in 1999 and public raising of the funding for its publication after the government cut off support. The Korean Constitution provides 'No citizen shall suffer unfavourable treatment on

account of an act not of his own doing but of a relative' but right-wing politicians were deeply concerned not to be labelled as descendants of pro-Japanese collaborators, a concern lessened when liberal politicians were also shown to have collaborator ancestors. In 2005 the Basic Act for Coping with Past History for Truth and Reconciliation was enacted as a compromise between liberals and conservatives. It was not a coincidence that, in a country where only 29% of the population is Christian, 46% are atheists and 23% Buddhists, the appointed Chair was Catholic Father Song Kee-In, a long-term advisor to President Moo-Hyun. The Commission acted on the basis of petitions from individuals and families with close to 90% of petitions relating to cases of unlawful killings for political motives. There were 246 local NGOs working with the Commission on publicity and the creation of petitions. The Commission's legislation provides a duty to recommend reconciliation between offenders and victims or their families based on the offender's repentance and the victims' or their families' forgiveness (Article 39). Recognising possible commonalities and threats to its continued existence, the Commission built an alliance with countries which have similar experiences of civil war and authoritarian dictatorship and thus signed a MOU with Chile.

Hun Joon Kim (2015) has compared and contrasted two of Korea's most prominent truth commissions: the Jeju Commission of 2000 and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of 2005. It is generally agreed that the Jeju Commission was relatively successful in terms of having its recommendations accepted by the government of the day, whereas the TRC came to an abrupt halt in March 2010 when closed by a Government perceiving a lack of sustained public support leaving its recommendations to languish unimplemented. There are two, not necessarily mutually exclusive, sets of explanations given for these differing fates: one relates to a more liberal national government being replaced by more conservative figures and the other to the mass NGO and local support for the Jeju Commission. Opposition to the truth commissions in Korea has largely come from retired military and police and conservative elites and organisations many of whom still believe that the left-wing figures and others who were killed got their just deserts. There is also the possibility of truth commission fatigue, just too many similar stories of unlawful killings and too many names of long dead activists.

The Korean case is of interest because it shows what can happen in a context where there are those who were mistreated on the one side and the government on the other but those who meted out the actual mistreatment and

perpetrated the human rights abuses are almost invisible. Here it is worth noting who provided the apologies. In the Jeju Commission case it was at the highest level. In the TRC case it was largely relatively minor local officials. In neither case did the apologies explicitly come directly from actual perpetrators. There is a lively debate among psychologists as to the impacts of apologies upon victims versus perpetrators (Wohl et al. 2011). There is even a collection of experiments on the impact of various kinds of apologies, but once again these have been conducted in Western countries where it appears that the perpetrators who apologise gain more than the victims (Hornsey 2016). These studies also mostly assume a clear dividing line between perpetrators and victims, ignoring the common reality that there have been grave wrongs committed on all sides. Instances where the government of the day was a major perpetrator represent special cases, usually apologies are only issued after a subsequent change of government, in turn raising the issue of the responsibilities of the ordinary citizens who did not oppose the evils perpetrated by the previous government.

THAILAND: Harmony before Reconciliation

In 2005 Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra created a National Reconciliation Commission (NRC) for Thailand which was supposed to investigate the causes of violence. Its recommendations were largely ignored, although a NRC compensation fund was established to provide one-off payments to victims and their families. From 2004 to 2012 there were also a dozen incident-specific fact finding committees, again with very limited impact upon the public or the ways in which the military and police conducted themselves.

The 2012 Report of the Independent Truth for Reconciliation Commission of Thailand (TRCT) established by the Abhisit Government covered the political violence which occurred in 2010 between state security forces and opposition 'Red Shirts', finding unjustified violence on both sides but predominantly with the security forces, resulting overall in 90 deaths and 2,000 injuries. The report did not name those responsible for abuses and the government moved to announce that soldiers would be fully protected from criminal prosecution. Human Rights Watch (2012) commented: 'For decades in Thailand, the concept of "reconciliation" has been promoted not to bring communities together, but to protect powerful politicians and military leaders from being held accountable for wrongdoing. In the name of "reconciliation" there were no independent investigations into the

crackdowns on students and pro-democracy protesters in 1973 and 1976, which led to the deaths of well over 100 people. The complete findings of a government inquiry into the bloody 1992 repression of protesters calling for an end to military rule have never been released. In each of these cases, in the name of “reconciliation”, amnesty was given to those responsible for abuses.’ This passage is easier to understand in a context of ‘restoring harmony’ rather than the imported concept of reconciliation. The TRCT report argued that amnesty should not be rushed and should not be at the core of peacemaking, which should not deny justice to victims but require accountability of perpetrators, who should be encouraged to publicly take responsibility for their actions and provide reparations.

The Asia Foundation has queried whether transitional justice can bring peace to Thailand’s deep South (Barron 2015). Unsurprisingly, the answer is that it is not possible to put the cart before the horse and that peace is needed before transitional justice can play a significant role. Until then it is only possible to attempt to reform the system to minimize the creation of new grievances. Unusually, in Thailand reparations have to some extent preceded the attainment of the political will to secure peace with the 7.5 million baht being paid per victim being seen by many as an attempt to co-opt dissidents. However, since the May 2014 coup, the government has worked more with local villagers, reducing the number of violent incidents from some 1,300 in 2013 to under 800 in 2014. Should a formal reconciliation body ever be established to deal with the Southern Thai conflict it will face the particular challenge of reconciling two sides largely coming from very different religious traditions. A vital first step would appear to be to establish what each side understands as, and expects to achieve by, reconciliation. Recent issues of the Journal of MCU Peace Studies provide insights into Thai views of reconciliation.

In the context of the fortieth anniversary of the killing of student protestors at Thammasat University, Mong Palatino (2016) has called for a truth and reconciliation commission arguing that ‘an effective way to prevent the people from challenging the present is to control their views about the past. The military rulers of Thailand and Indonesia are aware of this.’ Yet it is difficult to imagine how a TRC under a military government could ever yield a satisfactory outcome. Successful TRCs are usually associated with regime change, so that the Government of the day does not find itself obliged to defend the indefensible actions of its current servants, especially its military and police.

NEPAL: Politics before Reconciliation

In 1990-1991 Nepal held a Commission of Inquiry to Locate the Persons Disappeared during the Panchayat Period to investigate 100 cases but it was so weak it only resolved 35. It would appear that nowhere are political division more of a barrier to reconciliation or even people simply working together than in Nepal. To quote UNDP: 'The experience in Nepal demonstrates the interconnectedness between the political, administrative and technical dimensions of a peace architecture ... (it) reveals a dilemma over how to manage the tension between the need for national peace process ownership and the requirement to achieve the best possible efficiency' or, indeed, any efficiency (Odendaal 2010, 59-62). There is indeed a Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction but its priorities depend on the political party of the Minister of the day.

The November 2006 Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Nepal required the establishment of a TRC alongside a new committee to investigate disappeared persons and a commission to investigate abuses by the armed forces and police during the 2006 democracy protests. The TRC now has some 50,000 cases before it whilst the Commission faces 17,000 death reports and some 1,500 disappeared (Baral 2016). Nepal has seen a range of international players promoting the benefits of a strong TRC, most notably the United States Institute of Peace (USIP 2007) which sponsored showings across the nation of the Nepali sub-title documentary: 'Confronting the Truth: Truth Commissions and Societies in Transition' which showcases the workings of truth commissions in South Africa, Peru, East Timor and Morocco. The film showings were followed by discussions which allowed victims and civil society groups to explore their views on a topic which they knew little about. One concern was that the emphasis upon reconciliation served to obscure the need for prosecutions of major abusers of human rights. The one issue that Nepali politicians appear to be able to agree on is that there should be extensive amnesties for fighters on all sides. According to The Himalayan of October 15, 2016, there are now no fewer than 18 types of reparation schemes proposed for war era crimes.

Giving ordinary people information about TRCs in other cultural contexts is a good way of going beyond the elites who have been responsible for stirring up much of the violence. There will be many controversial issues to be discussed such as timing, amnesties, and reparations. Such discussions should be modified to meet local needs. For example, there have now been very different Truth Commissions in two Muslim countries: Morocco and Tunisia

which could serve as lessons in both the positive and negative senses. It is difficult to find any examples of the creation of truth commissions where the two sides in the violence belonged to different religious faiths. (To date, specialised Truth Commissions in the Philippines have been limited to (1) investigating corruption and (2) the orders leading a single massacre of police commandos at Mamasapano.)

MYANMAR: Too Early for Reconciliation?

There are already suggestions of a TRC in Myanmar although most appear to think that now is too soon (Naing 2012). The Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma, which is a coalition of NGOs based in Chang Mai, Thailand, funded by the George Soros Open Society Foundations, produced a report 'To Recognize and Repair: Unofficial Truth Projects and the Need for Justice in Burma' in 2015. This Report was mostly written by Ben Pattinson Gates with guidance from the ICTJ and puts forward for consideration the experiences of Colombia, South Africa and Peru, none of which appears to be of great relevance to the case of Myanmar. Indeed, the Network appears to be heavily influenced by international players to the point where the question of what constitutes too much outside influence arises. The Report itself acknowledges that : 'The concepts of Transitional Justice are relatively new to Burma and carrying out research in more rural parts of ethnic areas often requires a degree of education and discussion. Many participants are initially reluctant to participate and repeat information that is traumatic and upsetting to them' (2015,25). This raises the issue of how far it is reasonable in pursuing the Network's Mission of 'Collaboration on a common human rights database' to subject the informants to a process which 'often takes several months and visits to achieve' the security necessary for them to talk in a context where their testimony can put them at risk of torture and death, and there are no immediate benefits to them from revisiting their ordeals. The Network's Vision is 'Seeking truth and justice for a peaceful democratic transition in Burma'. However, many would query the linkage between forcing the Government to face previous and indeed ongoing human rights abuses and a peaceful transition to democracy. Most truth processes come after the wrong-doers have left power not when they can still 'disappear' those who might testify against them . The mass of Burmese, even human rights activists, exclude the Rohingyas from consideration. When the time eventually comes to include the

Rohingyas in national discussions of human rights mechanism this will require considerable cross-religious sensitivity (Healey 2012)

CAMBODIA: Truth and/ or Reconciliation ?

The 'National Day of Hatred' was launched in the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) on May 1984 to mark the remembrance of the initiation of mass killings on May 20, 1976. The full title was 'Day of Hatred against genocidal Pol Pot-leng Sary-Khieu Samphan clique and the Sihanouk-Son San reactionary groups'. A closer translation would probably be 'Day of Tying Anger' or 'Day of Maintaining Rage'. Put on hold under the UN administration, the day was revived in the 1990s and renamed 'Day of Remembrance'. The city of Phnom Penh now arranges visits to the Choeung Ek Fields where Buddhist ceremonies are held.

Many activists appear to assume that there is a known, clear and constant relationship between truth and reconciliation. Thus Archbishop Tutu, the Chair of the South African TRC used a powerful medical metaphor in his opening address which has been much quoted (Hamber and Wilson 2002; Shaw 2005). He said: 'We are meant to be a part of the process of the healing of our nation, of our people. All of us, since every South African has to some extent or other been traumatised. We are a wounded people... We all stand in need of healing' However, this author would argue very strongly that the relationship between truth and reconciliation, the latter defined simply as the ability to live peaceably side-by-side, is culturally and psychologically determined and certainly is not constant.

Between 1975 and 1979 close to one fifth of the total Cambodian population was massacred or died of associated starvation and disease. It was not until two decades later, in 2001, that the Cambodian National Assembly passed a law to create a court: the Extraordinary Chambers in the Court of Cambodia (ECCC) to try those charged with the most serious crimes during the Khmer Rouge regime. It was reported that in 1999 Prime Minister Hun Sen suggested holding a truth commission and even inviting Archbishop Tutu to Phnom Pen to explain the process but that the eventual decision was that there were too many Khmer Rouge at large to make this a safe proposition for the general public. (Hayner 2011, 206 ; Ramji 2000) 1999 was the year when some 84,000 Cambodians signed a petition to the UN Secretary-General requesting an international tribunal to try the Khmer Rouge leaders for the mass killings. The ECCC's goals include 'justice, truth and national reconciliation'. This raises

two questions. What is the relationship between justice and truth and national reconciliation? And, indeed, just what is national reconciliation ? If national reconciliation requires victims and perpetrators to reconcile, then so many of the victims are dead and their surviving relatives in many cases occupy ambiguous positions as former potential victims who became perpetrators in order to avoid near certain and lethal victimhood. Just how many of those who were adult at the time of the killing fields have clean hands ? As Hannah Arendt wrote 'where all are guilty, no one is'. In Pailin a journalist recounts a meeting with 'Samrith Phum whose husband was executed by the Khmer Rouge. Phum knows the murderer well. He is her neighbor and he operates a noodle shop across the road from her house. He was never arrested and never charged with her husband's murder. There is no procedure through which he can be sued for damages. Phum must simply get used to the idea that her husband's killer quietly manages the store next door' (Eisikovits 2010,37). In this bare bones form, this story misses much of its potential meaning. For a start, this relationship must have been going on for many years and we do not know what Phum herself actually thinks about it, whether she had any option of moving or what the history of the murderous noodle shop owner was. If we try to imagine inserting some form of reconciliation into the story, just how would this work ? The shop keeper acknowledges what he did, asks for forgiveness and Phum, justifiably, as many would think, refuses to forgive him, given the lapse of time and the lack of prison space, would public shaming be a sufficient punishment?

For many Christians, reconciliation requires forgiveness: just as God forgives sinners, sinners must forgive those who have sinned against them. For many who are not Christians, as well as some who are, the question arises whether there are some acts, notably genocide, which are beyond forgiveness and, if so, whether this makes reconciliation impossible. The author has talked with a Rwandan bishop who had shaken the hand of the man who had killed his father, but such magnanimity is almost certainly beyond the capability of most human beings. After a genocide or mass killings, victims and perpetrators often must go on living side by side, yet how can these people buy and sell at the same market? In Cambodia victims and perpetrators are said to be 'living together, apart'(McGrew 2011b) with individuals choosing a wide range of ways of dealing with the past including ignoring it.

The Khmer term for justice is 'Yuttethor' which implies fairness, honesty and impartiality as carried out by a monk or elder in the local Wat

(Dicklitch and Malik 2010, 519). This is a long way from mass killings but punishment could include restitution to the victim's family and re-incarnation as a lower life form. Traditional punishments could include scarification and execution but not imprisonment. Waldron (1992, 5) queries why we judge the morality of events which occurred in the past and argues: 'The point of doing this is not that we learn new and better standards for our lives from the judgements we make about the past. Unless we had those standards already, we would not make those judgements. But our moral understanding of the past is often a way of bringing to imaginative life the full implications of principles to which we are already in theory committed.' How does this apply to the noodle seller? Is his excuse to himself that those were mad times and that everyone did what was necessary to save themselves and their families? Or did he at that time believe the propaganda that it was necessary and just to execute the enemies of the regime? Is one justification any better than the other? Since it appears to be unlikely that he will go on future killing sprees, what can be done now to improve the situation, especially for Phum who is assumed to have been innocent? Has she been waiting for an acknowledgement of the wrongs done to her or would she rather an amelioration to her economic situation? No one appears to have asked her. Ramji (2000) did ask Cambodians about their priorities and views of trials and a TRC and found that they understandably gave high priority to peace and economic prosperity with trials for the worst offenders and a TRC which would name and shame perpetrators for the lower ranks. Meiririo (2010) also interviewed Cambodians including perpetrators and the Cham Muslim minority (who compared Pol Pot to Herod) about what they thought about transitional justice. Many of his interviewees still lived among perpetrators and harboured bitter resentment, which they saw as being ameliorated by recognition and even token financial reparations from the government (not the perpetrators). Unsurprisingly, those who moved away from where they were known were more likely to be perpetrators than victims. Interestingly, some of these victim villagers saw the greatest responsibility as lying with the actual killers, not with those who gave the orders to kill. Like a number of other writers on Cambodia, Meirio blurs the boundary between his own approval of a TRC and the views of his respondents.

It is difficult to find much discussion of reconciliation in Cambodia by Cambodians themselves. Possibly this is because the term has little local resonance in a predominantly Buddhist country where reconciliation with one's

self is at the core. Youk Chhang, the director of NGO the Documentation Center for Cambodia, says: 'Reconciliation in Khmer terms is reconnecting the broken pieces. It is our obligation to put the broken pieces together, so that we can understand' (McGrew 2011,519). This is a very common theme in interviews with Khmer both the educated in the towns and villagers working in the fields, far more than reconciliation they want to understand 'why Khmer killed Khmer?' Sadly, it may well be that neither trials before the ECCC nor any form of TRC can indeed explain what turned Khmer to kill Khmer in such inconceivable numbers.

Laura McGrew (2011,514) interviewed a varied selection of 134 Cambodians in depth. 'While some observers suggest that Cambodians are already reconciled, I refute that observation, instead finding that many live in an uneasy truce with their neighbours. Much of the past conflict and current feelings of fear and anger are left unaddressed. Most perpetrators are living quite separate lives, apart from their direct victims in states of various stages of coexistence, not in stages of deep reconciliation. In spite of this separation, there is great hope for the future of Cambodia' (McGrew 2011, 520). As an idealist McGrew hopes for 'deep reconciliation', which she defines as including 'confessions, apologies, and forgiveness'; realists might well ask whether it is either reasonable or wise to ask for so much. Inevitably, in the complex landscape of a post-violence state, transitional justice requires compromises and trade-offs. The nation, like a sick patient, should not be required to do too much, to take on and deal with too many burdens in the short term.

One local proposal made by Lao Mong Hay, former head of the NGO Khmer Institute of Democracy and several others would be a large public ceremony with Buddhist monks with a public confession by the Khmer Rouge leaders in the national stadium, presided over by a central figure with the status of the King (McGrew 2011,517). Other Buddhist ceremonies could include water blessing and Pchum Ben, a fortnight long annual series of ceremonies for the ancestors which includes offerings to the 'prett' that is the damned and the deceased who have no neighbours, friends or families to commemorate them and who cannot be reincarnated until ceremonies are performed on their behalf (Daravuth 2004). Doung and Ear (2010) argue for a community-based public forum based on Buddhist principles with involvement from Buddhist monks allowing victims and perpetrators to express their suffering and remorse. 'At the margin, all else being equal .. Cambodia is more likely to benefit from restorative than retributive justice.' Certainly, Cambodia faces

many current problems: led by mass poverty with a GDP per capita of some \$1,020 very inequitably distributed and massive political repression. Three decades have now passed, perhaps the important ambition now should be to ensure that the younger, post massacres generations understand the importance of working towards a more just society where politicians have less power to manipulate the people.

TIMOR LESTE: The Perpetrators have Gone

Xanana Gusmao, as President of Timor Leste, said 'Many Timorese want answers from those who caused their loss and suffering. With answers, people can start the healing process and close this horrible chapter in their lives' (Brahm 2004). In this context, there are at least two kinds of questions: 'what did you do and where are the bodies?' and 'why did you do it and how could you be so cruel and inhuman?'. In Timor there were two distinct groups of perpetrators: the Indonesian military and police who were able to go home without having to answer any questions and the Timorese who had collaborated with the Indonesian occupiers and had to choose whether to leave with their patrons or stay and face the anger and questions of their fellows. Across the world, this situation, where many perpetrators could escape to another country is very rare. President Gusmao could know, because Timorese people had told him so, that people wanted answers, but he, and indeed they, could only take on trust that once people had answers they would be able to start the healing process. Finding out what happened to disappeared loved ones and indeed where the bodies are ('one bone would be enough' as one mother cried) is certainly a significant beginning. However, in Timor, as in many other cases, most people knew or had a good idea as to what had actually happened. Thus a truth process would serve more to provide acknowledgement and recognition than to provide new information.

Timor used one innovative procedure based on local cultural traditions: the Community Reconciliation Process (CRP) launched by Timor Leste's Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in 2002. The CRP was intended to allow those who had only committed lesser crimes (i.e. not murder or rape) to reintegrate into their communities after confessing and asking for forgiveness. To anyone familiar with events in Cambodia or the war-torn states of Africa there is something quite strange, almost quaint, about the emphasis in Timor on reconciliation and reinsertion into society for people who had not killed or tortured any one. Were the true villains all really

hidden across the border ? Such events are described by Babo-Soares (2004) and Larke (2005) when it was still possible to argue that these traditional 'rolling out the mat' ceremonies with the 'direct involvement of the people in this process, with all its philosophical reasons, guarantees that a long and lasting peace can be achieved without undermining the value of justice. Furthermore, apart from being effective, this approach is less costly and less time consuming. Most importantly, for the local people, it does present a compromise and a way to recover, indeed re-establish, the previously devastated social order' (Babo-oares 2004, 31). Then came the violence in 2006-2007 which came close to taking Timor Leste from UN success story to failed state (Scambary 2009). In terms of reconciliation, the principal lesson from the renewed violence was that the village ceremonies had largely been reconciling those already prepared to reconcile. Villagers could accept back their relatives who had supported Indonesia, rural neighbours could reconcile with those close by. The failure was to reconcile the eastern 'lorosa'e' regions with the western 'loromonu' regions. This is a specific example where the interpersonal reconciliation promoted by so many religious groups, was not the level of reconciliation most urgently needed to achieve national reconciliation and peace. Equally townspeople and the military found it hard to accept just how well the elite were doing out of the new regime. Timorese, who had been united in their opposition to Indonesia, needed to develop a new national vision to unite their new country (Trindale 2008).

THE SOLOMON ISLANDS: Truth Too Late?

Timing is a vital issue in transitional justice: too soon and fighting may break out again because it has never really stopped; too late, but whilst many of the participants are still active, and people are taken back to a world they hoped that they had escaped. Leave it until most of those involved are dead or in the ante-room to death and the nature of the enquiry becomes very different (Galvin 2003). Indeed, if matters are left long enough, then the question arises of whether reconciliation is the appropriate concept to describe the coming together of people whose fathers' generation fought each other. If your father killed my father, who had killed his brother, but fighting ceased thirty years ago, what is the reconciliation that is required? The National Human Rights Commission of Indonesia (Komnas Han) in 2012 released the results of its investigations into human rights violations during the events of 1965-1966,

although the Indonesian government did not follow up its recommendations. Prosecutions after almost fifty years would not have been about reconciliation, nor transitional justice so much as about establishing the principle that the military are never beyond the law (Waterson 2009).

The 'tensions' in the Solomon Islands broke out into major fighting in 1998 as Malaitans from a neighbouring island fought the people of Guadalcanal (site of the national capital) on whose land they had settled for over a century, for access to political power, land, jobs and status. The 2000 Townsville Peace Agreement failed, but the arrival of the Regional Assistance Mission (RAMSI) led by Australian troops brought peace in 2003. However, it was not until 2008 that a Truth and Reconciliation Commission Bill was introduced into Parliament by Shemuel Iduri, the Minister for National Unity, Reconciliation and Peace. Hearings did not begin until 2010, which was far too late in the local context to have a meaningful impact and the TRC report has never been officially released because it presents several still politically active leaders in an unfavourable light. Working together, the Solomon Island Christian churches had actively campaigned for a TRC, a claim fully supported by international donors and the TRC was opened by the Chair of the South African TRC, Archbishop Tutu, and chaired by Father Sam Ata, yet it remained a foreign creation little understood by locals or suited to local conditions. Indeed, when a local staff member was asked to write a description of the origins of the Solomon Islands' TRC, so little awareness did he have that he had to resort to Wikipedia. Apart from arriving too late, the Solomon Islands' TRC did far too little to ask how a TRC could make use of local traditions and institutions and relied too much on the quite inappropriate South African model (Vella 2014).

Just one example of how the locals had to find innovative ways to circumvent the foreign requirements of the TRC relates to testimony by women. Local women knew that, since there could be no such thing as private testimony in the highly personalised local culture where everyone has a cousin in the know, they would be subject to 'pay back' for testifying to the TRC, even (were they to testify about sensitive issues such as incestuous rape) from their own families. Their solution was to present a written group testimony from a mixed group of women who would attest to the overall truth of their report but without presenting any separate evidence from named women. Very sensibly, no individual woman gave evidence to the Solomon Islands' TRC about having been raped (Guthrey 2015). The rare women in Timor Leste who

testified about rape were often blamed for the violence they had suffered and treated very badly. Thus this Solomon Islands' group testimony solution was one excellent example of local adaptation, but overall there simply was not enough recognition of the strength of local traditions in very distinctive cultures where ritual head hunting had only ceased around 1900 (Stewart and Strathern 2008).

Letting Sleeping Dogs Lie: SIERRA LEONE, MOZAMBIQUE and INDONESIA

Positive decisions are much more visible than negative ones. Governments that decide to establish a truth commission will make a public announcement and leave a record behind even if the report of the TRC is never officially published as in the Solomon Islands. Governments which make a deliberate decision not to hold a TRC may well not announce this fact, nor leave any bureaucratic record.

There are undoubtedly cases where the promotion of a truth and reconciliation commission as a 'standard part of conflict resolution "first aid kits" '(Shaw 2005,1) represents an ill thought out form of cultural imperialism.

Sierra Leone in West Africa is far distant from Asia, but it provides an important case study for consideration since it provides one of the few recorded accounts of a local cultural fight back against the largely donor imposed creation of a TRC. In Sierra Leone whole village communities made pacts to have nothing to do with the TRC which they believed would reignite former hatreds and possibly open warfare. Local people made a deliberate choice of a "forgive and forget" approach. It is important to understand that in Sierra Leone the fighting was not essentially between different ethnic or religious groups. Some 60% of the population is Muslim and 30% Christian with many religiously mixed marriages including that of President Kabbah. "Tribal differences, greed, corruption and mismanagement all fuelled the conflict, but religious differences did not" wrote a former British High Commissioner (Penfold 2005, 549). Indeed military loyalties were so fluid that there were fighters known as 'sobels' because they fought with the government as soldiers by day and with the opposition as rebels by night. Their loyalties were to their comrades and to those who paid them, not to a faith or a tribe. Many were also forcibly recruited as child soldiers and compelled, at pain of death, to commit heinous crimes, such as murdering their parents, to demonstrate their loyalty to their leaders (with many similarities to recruitment as practiced by the Khmer Rouge). Where child soldiers had come home to their villages

and been accepted back by their parents and the village elders, what possible good was to be served by inviting them to testify and list their crimes? 'In northern Sierra Leone, social forgetting is a cornerstone of established processes of reintegration and healing for child and adult ex-combatants. Speaking of the war in public often undermines these processes, and many believe it encourages violence (Shaw 2005). In Sierra Leone most victims who did testify to the TRC were not hoping to find out what had happened, that they already knew in grim detail, they were looking for reparations, for economic help to live the lives cut off by the deliberate amputation of their hands or the killing of their spouses. It is true that many local NGOs in Sierra Leone did support the TRC, but then they were being paid to run sensitisation programmes to promote the virtues of a TRC. The lesson for Asian countries contemplating holding a TRC is not just to listen to NGOs and other civil society organizations who may have their own barrow to push, but also to consult with traditional leaders and even anthropologists as to local beliefs as to the wisdom or otherwise of disturbing sleeping dogs and ancestors

The Sierra Leone government was persuaded by the international community, and by donors who were funding the majority of its total budget, to hold a TRC alongside trials of those most responsible for the bloodshed. Mozambique and Namibia both made deliberate decisions not to disturb the peaceful status quo by holding a TRC. For Namibia, this was largely because many of the government had far from peaceful pasts. Although this was also true in Mozambique, there were far more important cultural factors at play. Many Mozambicans believe that violence disturbs the ancestors, who will haunt those who leave violence unresolved in many very unpleasant ways. Thus, in rural communities where former soldiers had been reintegrated into society through traditional ceremonies, there was absolutely no desire to reawaken the ire of the ancestors and bring back the spirits of evil to the village. In towns the situation was far more complex. 'Who would retaliate against whom? There wasn't one group against another. Families and communities were put against each other. If it was one ethnic or language group against another then may be you could see it. But it's hard to think of how retaliation would be mobilized. It was the Browns versus the Smiths- but then even families were split. The conflict is so intricate no revenge factor is possible.' In Mozambique it was possible for soldiers who had been fighting each other a week previously to sit down and have a beer together without rancour something which European observers found very difficult to understand. In Indonesia the

rationale for holding a TRC was widely debated, with civil society taking the nature of a TRC to court and the court throwing out the whole idea (Kimura 2014).

Conclusion

This account of truth commissions and what they may have to offer in an Asian context may appear to be negative and pessimistic. This is partly to counteract the positive slant of the great majority of accounts of truth commissions which are written by people from Western cultural traditions who are committed proponents of the institution, who have a strong belief and faith in the healing and cathartic qualities of public truth telling (Summerfield 2002; ICTJ 2016). For them 'revealing is healing', which may well be true for some individual participants, but there is minimal evidence for this being true for whole societies. Many human rights advocates, exemplified by the International Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), maintain that remembering and dealing with the past is a critical element in struggles for human rights and democracy (David 2017). It is a matter of fact whether democracies can survive without addressing past human rights abuses, but lawyers and other human rights activists prefer confident assertions to dispassionate cross country studies of the evidence.

In contrast, it has been argued here that the virtues of exposing the truth as seen by perpetrators and victims (who may be the same individuals at different points in time) are strongly dependent upon the cultural and political context. The decision as to the adoption of any form of truth commission with or without reconciliation should be informed by the local people who were most affected by the events in question, and local NGOs with a potential financial interest in a positive outcome should not be allowed a disproportionate voice. Even where there are many local individuals who support holding a TRC, it could still be a valid political decision that any such transitional justice processes should be postponed until they would no longer pose a serious risk of igniting further outbreaks of violence. Any decision to put truth before peace should only be made by those whose lives may be put at risk, not by comfortable lawyers in Geneva or Washington.

Cultural differences do matter. It is valid to ask why it is acceptable to decree that weeping during a truth commission hearing is an appropriate response, but losing one's temper is not. What is to happen if the victims are not prepared to forgive, since the option of forgetting has been snatched away from them? One person's revenge may be another person's social justice. Indeed

truth commissions' emphasis upon the testimony of individual victims and perpetrators serves, sometimes deliberately, to obscure the role of structural factors in the causation of violent conflicts across the world. Even ethnic and religious groups with long traditions of inter communal conflict rarely fight in the absence of disputes over physical resources such as land, water, employment and the political power to skew the allocation of such resources. Researchers fight shy of asking respondents would they rather a \$100 or the truth because they believe that people have a moral duty to choose the truth.

In Nepal Bhandari, the Secretary of the Conflict Victims Common Platform, regretted that 'The truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Commission of Investigation into enforced Disappearances are unwilling to dig deep and examine the causes of social and economic exclusion that led to the violence in the first place. This will strengthen the security forces by furthering impunity. Ultimately it will sow the seeds of future conflict'. In Sri Lanka K.N. Ruwanpura (2016, 358) argues that 'the space for an ethnically peaceful and harmonious future is not a given... international preoccupations with reconciliation are carried out at the cost of growing class and income inequality and increasing dispossession of local communities across all three ethnic groups'. Proponents of truth commissions would argue that it is possible to move ahead with both the pursuit of truth and the pursuit of economic justice. Yet what tends to happen is that the push for reconciliation, deliberately or otherwise, is allowed to obscure the need for political and economic change, leaving the poor and neglected just as excluded from power as they have always been.

What is needed now is far more consideration of the cultural resources which local societies already possess for dealing with the aftermath of violence. Sadly, one generalisation that applies to all societies is that they do have prior experience of violent conflict. Truth and reconciliation commissions may have much to offer, but it is not possible to know this without considerable familiarity with the local culture and how it works. As the examples from Sierra Leone, Mozambique and the Solomon Islands discussed above demonstrate, even in preponderantly Christian contexts underlying traditions may still have great power for both good and evil in terms of creating sustainable peace. In non-Christian religious traditions not enough is known about how reconciliation works, even if indeed it is a meaningful concept in the local culture. If reconciliation in Arabic and in Islam has a meaning closer to 'understanding' than to 're-befriending' or indeed 'forgiving' it may well be inappropriate to establish a TRC along South African lines in Muslim contexts.

Care must be taken not just to search disparate religious texts for quotations that support similarities between Christian and other views of reconciliation. Many of Mohamed's saying about forgiveness survive, but in the Islamic tradition reconciliation (sulh) can be by compensation, restoration of the dignity of the victims and commitment not to repeat the offense without forgiveness. Muslim authors have suggested that 'insisting on moving through the gates of forgiveness in order to reach a new relationship is an assumption that needs to be examined more carefully by scholars and practitioners, especially among Christian scholars and analysts who suggest forgiveness as a precondition for reconciliation.' Workshops on reconciliation between Shi'a, Sunni and Kurds in Iraq in 2011 showed that the participants favoured moving forward without attempting to deal with 'wounds that are still open' (Abu-Nimer and Nasser 2013). There are many traditional Islamic rituals for cementing reconciliation. One involves the relatives of a murdered man getting to choose between the slaughter of the murderer or of a sheep in his stead (Abu-Nimer 2003). For many of its adherents Buddhism has a world-view in which reconciliation, other than with the individual's inner self, has little significance or meaning.

For proponents of transitional justice, cultural imperialism should have no place. The aim should be to create or restore peace and harmony through paths and means which meld with local culture and maximize social and economic justice to the extent possible.

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Biography

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Southern Thailand Peace Process and Comparative Studies

Northern ‘Troubles’ and Southern ‘Fire’: An Examination of Peace Processes in Northern Ireland and Southern Thailand

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Abstract

Northern Ireland and Southern Thailand share little in common. Even in terms of the political violence that both territories have experienced there is little in the way of a common pattern in terms of how conflict evolved and developed. However, a conflict is still a conflict, and as such its socio-political configuration is amenable to analysis, as is the charting of a resolution process. The Northern Ireland ‘Troubles’ dragged on for nearly four decades and the conflict had its roots deep in the past. Nevertheless, despite the profoundly divided nature of its society a tangible peace has been achieved. The study examines both conflicts comparatively to tease out the points of difference and convergence with respect to the political progress towards securing the end of violent conflict. Southern Thailand is not Northern Ireland, but the latter’s transformation towards a non-violent settlement is instructive from the point of view examining how far ordinary politics had to reckon with – and adapt to – the realities of a violently divided society. The study brings forth the numerous political innovations initiated at various levels that forged the conditions for lasting peace in Northern Ireland and interrogates the context and dynamics of the Southern Thailand situation to determine the possibility of, and scope for, a viable resolution process. Northern Ireland is offered not so much as a model but as an example of the ‘lateral thinking’ that can be utilized to bring a conflict out of its violent phase. The study concludes that, ultimately, there are significant gaps between the prevailing conditions in the Northern Ireland case in the one hand and the Thai case on the other to allow for a similar peace process to take root.

Introduction

In many ways, 'Southern' Thailand and 'Northern' Ireland represent more than merely the antipodes of their respective cardinal geographical indicators. Southern Thailand is one of the most obscure internecine conflicts in the world, while by contrast Northern Ireland – even at its height – was arguably the most accessible and most studied conflict of its time. The road to peace in Thailand's 'Deep South' – if there is ever to be a successful one – is in its very early phases. Northern Ireland and its typically euphemistic 'Troubles' has long dropped off the radar of media attention and has now become both historically obscure and benignly boring. Yet there is some value in comparing both. The Columbian Government – FARC talks were conducted explicitly with the Northern Ireland peace process in mind. As the Thai government reopens talks with some entities who purport to represent southern militants it would be wise to take stock of other previously trodden paths to conflict resolution and transformation, and realize, as we do through the Northern Ireland example, that these state-to-militant talks are but one dimension to a highly complex puzzle. These talks, in spite of the fragile hope that they offer to some who wish for peace, will not achieve that peace by themselves.

In this study the objective is offer illumination of one (Thailand) through the examination of the other (Northern Ireland). There is no small courage required to do this, and the study is necessarily top heavy with examples from the European case. Quite apart from the entirely understandable desire of the Thai authorities (and perhaps wider Thai opinion) to insist that foreigners keep their opinions to themselves on what they may justifiably consider an essentially internal matter, there is the added complication of comparing two conflicts located in different temporal contexts not to mention the fact of them being geographically located on opposite sides of the Eurasian landmass. The cultural differences are significant. The differences and divergences are well taken points. However, in the context of academic discussion the free flow of ideas is a useful, if not unavoidable, exercise.

Northern Ireland's long road to peace began almost as soon as the conflict erupted in the late 1960s (McGarry 2001; McGarry and O'Leary 2004; Mowlam 1999; O'Day 1997; Popliokowski and Cull 2009; Crighton 1998; Fitzduff 2002; Gregory 2013; Irwin 2002; Mallie and McKittrick 1996; McEvoy 2008; Power 2011). There were many false starts and false dawns, even when it was clear that the 'end game' was drawing towards a conclusion from the early 1990s. It must be added, that Northern Ireland's 'peace',

such as it is, is certainly not without its flaws or a sufficient number of critics to point them out (McGarry and O'Leary 2004; Aughey 2005; Houston 2012). Nevertheless, it would be a pity not to consider the obvious parallels between Northern Ireland and Southern Thailand. We can group these parallels into several key nodal points. There are contested territorial claims and issues of self-determination in some form in both conflicts (Askew 2008; Amirell 2014; Harish 2006; McCargo 2009; Power 2009; Joll 2010), which involves a reasonably defined spatial context (Bonura 2008; Croissant 2005; Gregory 2013; Chalk 2008). There are two neighbouring states with an implied relationship between these (Funston 2010). The states function within regional political arrangement in the EU and ASEAN respectively (Sidaway 2002; Nugent 2010; Vatikiotis 2009; Rupprecht 2014; McGarry 2001; Arthur 2010; Buszynski 2014). The tactics of militants – exemplifying the hallmarks of asymmetric warfare – are claiming the lives of civilians (CAIN 2016; Deep South Watch 2016). In both cases the respective government authorities resorted to a primarily security response in the early stages before moving toward some kind of interaction with militant groups or their representatives. In both cases, the resolution of the conflict seems (or seemed) far off; the conflict itself classed as intractable.

It is also important too to point out the major differences. In the Northern Ireland context there was a very clear (if not widely known) structure to the various militant factions. There was a political wing to the militant movements. Demands by militants were clear and political communication was relatively sophisticated. Public statements were frequently released after specific attacks by militants. This is not the case in the Southern Thailand context. Frequently, attacks are never claimed by a specific faction. Factions are fissiparous and command and control structures not apparent. Demands – beyond the broad issue of ending Thai rule in the southern provinces – are unclear and primarily inferred by other actors and observers. The 'Troubles' of Northern Ireland themselves were widely reported in mainstream UK media outlets, along with wider European and US outlets when specific atrocities were significant enough to warrant such attention. The 'southern fire', by contrast, remains mostly out of view – even from the many tourists from around the world who flock to the kingdom each year. Until August 2016 there was no reason to consider the southern conflict as anything other than a contained distraction far away from tourist hotspots. But the attacks in the upper south in that month shook the established consensus. Attacks on visible and high profile targets outside the south were now no longer implausible. In the Northern Ireland context,

the largest and most effective militant group, the Provisional IRA, learned very early in its emerging campaign that exporting their atrocities to England (and later to UK military bases on the European continent) was a highly effective way of positioning their cause at the top of the UK's domestic political agenda. Tactics and targets may have changed throughout the decades, but the IRA haunted British political life for years.

Methodology

The method of analysis deployed here is essentially comparative. However, a clear asymmetry in data access is inevitable given the differences between each case. One conflict is now largely a historical subject and had always been a very accessible conflict in terms of academic study and wider public awareness. A significant archive of documentary material is available and is even open source, to say nothing of the very significant body of secondary literature available. In addition, the language barrier was non-existent to UK and North American scholarship. The Deep South on the other hand is both understudied, under exposed and does suffer from a language barrier issue. Therefore the comparative relationship between both conflicts is not an equal one for these reasons. In this sense, the Northern Ireland example will be used to structure a specific angle of interrogation with respect to the Thailand example. This is both a longitudinal endeavour and a qualitative one, in that the social constructions around 'peace process' in Northern Ireland become the basis for what is essentially a gap analysis of the situation in the Asian context.

In essence, the study offers, through the examination of one case study, an illumination of the conditions that are likely to impact the successful construction of another potential peace process. The analysis concludes that several 'conditions' are required that, while neither exhaustive nor prescriptive to the Thai case in specifics, nevertheless do throw into relief some focus areas, which warrant attention to policy makers and conflict resolution/transformation practitioners.

The conditions discussed below are clustered into two key divisions (see Figure 1 below):

- those within the conflict zone itself and, by implication, the role of the primary state actor relative to substate actors within the conflict area in its jurisdiction
- those conditions that were extraneous to the conflict context but had varying levels of influence upon the peace process




Figure 1: 1st Domain (components relative to the conflict zone itself, including the home state's interaction with those components); 2nd Domain (components relative to the wider context, inclusive of interstate actors, regional and global dynamics).

Table 1: The list of conditions

Condition	Description
1st Domain	
Condition 1	<i>Opportunities for consequential engagement between conflict actor elites (structural and contrived)</i>
Condition 2	<i>Provincial militant group and moderate mainstream interaction</i>
Condition 3	<i>Provincial militant and central government interaction</i>
Condition 4	<i>Mainstream and extremist elite-constituency linkages</i>
2nd Domain	
Condition 5	<i>Opportunities for cross factional grassroots (Track Three) engagement</i>
Condition 6	<i>The evolution of regional politics and globalization</i>
Condition 7	<i>The evolution of regional politics and globalization</i>
Condition 8	<i>De-legitimization of violence as a policy option by actors</i>
Condition 9	<i>Recognition of state failure in policy and practice</i>
Condition 10	<i>Opportunities for political innovation</i>

The conditions outlined are essentially an alignment of factors that permitted the emergence of a pathway towards conflict transformation in the Northern Ireland case. In that sense they present the complex configuration of socio-political components that facilitated the slow emergence of 'peace' in a violently divided society. While some the various were intentional acts pursued

towards the aim of peacemaking, others were not. Intentionality, for example, includes Condition 1, which considers the opportunities for engagement between actor elites within the immediate context of the conflict. The analysis further divides this condition into 'structurally available', that is, those opportunities already in existence in the context through existing political arrangements, and those opportunities that had to be 'contrived' in some way. This latter 'contrived' form of interaction among political representatives forms the bulk of the active peacemaking process. It represents the 'engineered' interactions that lay the groundwork for any peace process to take root. The second condition shifts focus away from the actor elites to the grassroots level. One of the salient features of the Northern Ireland example has been the issue of sectarian division and its manifestation in active (violent) and passive (separatism) form. The study considers the grassroots initiatives and interface work that also contributed to the emergence of peace.

The second domain is concerned with those factors outside of the principle conflict arena but with a tangible relationship to that arena. Condition 3 is the role of state actors as interactive agents, whose actions both inhibited and fostered peacemaking at various stages. This dimension is closely related to Condition 4, the emergence of regional politics and – by extension – the role of globalization as both intentional process and context. On the face of it Condition 5 perhaps seems obvious, but it is arguably one of the most controversial and difficult element to realize: the de-legitimization of violence. Condition 6 ranks also as one of the most difficult conditions, particularly for the state actor involved. The recognition of failed policy and praxis and the concomitant need for reform potentially risks justification of violent campaigns. However, as will be pointed out, the failure to recognize the shortcomings of state actor responses relative to primary parties to conflict is also a justification for violence, if not resistance at least. Condition 7 is also where the key peacemaking efforts can garner results. This is where the accepted political process is augmented by opportunities for some innovation. As will be seen below, this was largely about institution and capacity building and draws heavily on the previous conditions. The key point is the question of adjusting mindsets from one of risk averseness to openness to innovation.

The First Domain: The Locus of the Conflict

Opportunities for consequential engagement between conflict actor elites (structural and contrived)

This condition has a number of sub-elements that make it the most expansive in terms of detail. Despite its fundamentally flawed structure, there was some parliamentary representation for Catholic-Nationalists within the Northern Ireland parliament following the partition of Ireland in 1921-22, albeit a contrived majority-minority dichotomy. The provincial parliament of Northern Ireland (Stormont) did have Catholic-Nationalist representatives, but the gerrymandering of the provincial boundary and the electoral districts within that, the dispersal of Catholic Nationalists and the disenfranchisement through retention of rate paying ensured a permanent parliamentary majority for Protestant Unionist parties and their political representatives. This tended on the whole to extend also down to local and municipal authority level. In spite of this, however, Catholic Nationalist voices did exist and moderate Unionist voices, such as Sir Terrance O'Neill for example, endeavoured throughout the 1960s to rectify some of the more egregious issues of non-representation and discrimination. The Troubles first surfaced when these reforms were not seen to go far enough by those seeking them. As the Northern Ireland Civil Rights movement gathered pace fearful Unionism attempted to suppress the growing popular momentum among Catholic-Nationalists and moderates from outside the Catholic community. As the violent phase of the Troubles intensified the formation of the Social Democratic and Labour Party (in 1970) and the Alliance Party (also 1970) gave voice to the moderate majority of Catholic Nationalists and a segment of moderate Unionist opinion that generally recognized the need to undertake structural reforms. Unionism, on the other hand, tended towards more entrenched and uncompromising Unionism, with the emergence of the Democratic Unionist Party under Ian Paisley (established in 1971).

Notwithstanding this rather bleak summation of matters as they stood up to and following the outbreak of violent conflict, for our purposes it needs to be highlighted that, however poorly represented, however flawed in execution, minority Catholic Nationalists had some recourse to electoral politics. In 1972, after a significant escalation in violent conflict, the Northern Ireland devolved government was suspended and Britain imposed direct rule from Westminster for the first time in over fifty years. Political representation of Northern Ireland to the central government was now undertaken through the assumption of seats in the British House of Commons in London. Both the

devolved political system from 1921 onwards (until its suspension in 1972) and the parallel (and latterly exclusive) representation at national level afforded opportunities for two important things: parliamentary participation by some representatives of the minority community; and mutual engagement between nationalist and unionist representatives in a political context. By and large, the primary benefit of the structural arrangement rested with the question of participation over and above that of engagement. Mutual engagement by nationalist and unionist politicians was not particularly prevalent. Personal relations may have been informal, even warm, but the divide among political actors along sectarian lines severely constrained their ability or willingness to interact seriously to move towards recognition of the flaws in rule, let alone their resolution.

As the violence increased in intensity throughout the early 1970s, and the political atmosphere became exponentially more toxic, engagement among moderate mainstream political parties across the sectarian divide with a view to a political settlement became very difficult if not impossible. Nationalist demands morphed from civil rights into some form of stronger connection with the Irish Republic – articulated usually as ‘re-unification’. In its most explicit form this was a demand by nationalists to break the link with Britain and re-unify the country with the rest of Ireland. Unionists came to see any concession to any nationalist demands as a descent towards a zero sum outcome that would ultimately sever their historical link with Britain. At the outer extreme of Ulster Unionism there were the Loyalist paramilitaries who were prepared to defend that link with Britain by force. During the early stages of the Troubles up until the end of the premiership of Margaret Thatcher in 1990 most influential British politicians preferred to see the problem purely as a sovereign internal matter. The Irish government, at least rhetorically in the early stages of the Troubles, ramped up the narrative of unfinished full independence for the whole island of Ireland from Britain, even while publicly denouncing the militant nationalist campaign of violence.

Mistrust and suspicion, even merely by virtue of being on opposite sides of the divide, became stubbornly entrenched. Early attempts to resolve the conflict through the establishment of power sharing arrangements with reformed structures of political representation to better include Irish/Catholic Nationalist sentiment met stiff, and ultimately fatal, resistance from Protestant Unionists. The Sunningdale Agreement was an effort to bring mainstream parties together to carve out an alternative political arrangement from the

simple permanent majoritarianism of Ulster Unionism. But the Loyalist-led mass strike of 1974 forced the implosion of the initiative and nothing of its kind would resurface until the endgame of the late 1990s.

Throughout this period one urgent task was to get mainstream political representatives from across the divide (those who had rejected violence as a strategy completely) to talk to one another and to try and change mindsets about not only how the province should be governed, but also about those on the other side. Some secret initiatives were undertaken by elected representatives from both sides to explore options for a political response to the conflict. But mistrust and fear usually limited their impact. Even the fact that the talking was taking place was enough to discredit the initiative in the eyes of hardliners from both sides. The Duisburg Talks that took place in 1988, for example, were largely disowned upon their discovery (Gillespie 2009).

However, one initiative was more long lasting and arguably played a minor if important role in the careful construction of trust and parity across the political divide. The Track Two initiatives undertaken from the early 1990s through to the early 2000s represented a particularly useful exercise in building trust (Popiolkowski and Cull, 2009). Essentially, the objective was to draw together tier two level leadership within all mainstream parties to foster personal relationships that would later (hopefully) aid in the reconstruction of relations between party leaders and by extension build the basis of a political settlement. To emphasize, this did not include any leadership drawn from violent factions. These initiatives were painstaking, slow and their benefits not immediately obvious. This is frequently the case with peacemaking. Nevertheless their importance cannot be underestimated. The piercing of the wall of communal and sectarian division needed to start at a level that would have some consequential impact, but not at a high enough level to risk jeopardizing its embryonic and experimental stage through public exposure. Such initiatives were very vulnerable to attack by uncompromising hard line elements on both sides. Secrecy became a mainstay of these initiatives.

Within the Thai context the opportunities for political engagement by the minority population is less clearly obvious. There is no obvious comparison here between the situation in Northern Ireland and that prevailing in the Thai context. There was no 'devolved' institution beyond the administrative system established and administered by the central government in Bangkok. Thailand's politics differ significantly from those of northwest Europe. The core principles of liberal democratic government – however imperfectly realized

– are not strong in the Asian context. In short, we have to question whether any meaningful progress can be made in this context when the structural opportunities for traditionally understood political representation in the south remain absent. Are there extant structural opportunities for mutual engagement between both Thai-Buddhist and Malay Muslim political representatives? It seems that this kind of meaningful structurally embedded engagement is not possible at present. Political participation is tenuous in Thailand in any event. Freedom of association and freedom of speech are both curtailed. The willingness of people to enter public debate at any level is fragile, at best.

What of the possibility of contrived opportunities, outside the official political structures, for engagement between community leaders? The relationship between Muslim-Malay and Thai Buddhists is one that has been explored to a point (Albritton 2010; Harish 2006; Horstmann 2004, 2011; Jerryson 2011; Khareng and Awang 2012; McCargo 2009). The National Reconciliation Commission Report (NRC 2006) makes clear that several levels of engagement need to occur: the agency level, the structural level, and the cultural level. There is at least recognition by the authors of the NRC report that any resolution to the conflict must include engagement at multiple levels, from the grassroots and at the cultural and symbolic level, all the way up to the actors across the political divide. The problem, of course, is that this recognition of complexity appeared not to extend to the executive branch of the government of the day. The prognosis here is bleak. Without the existence of robust structural arrangements – even flawed ones – for both participation and substantive engagement the basis of future interaction and institutionalized problem solving remain remote.

Provincial militant group and moderate mainstream interaction

For much of the period of the Northern Ireland Troubles there was collective revulsion among mainstream political leaders at the atrocities carried out by extremists on all sides. For this reason, and along with long-held standing declarations by mainstream political leaders (publicly at least) that they ‘would not talk to terrorists’, effective contact between moderate and extremist factions was impossible. Nor indeed was there much desire on the part of extremists to be brought into the mainstream, moderate fold, which they saw as compromised and ineffective. For much of the Troubles, therefore, few initiatives evolved that fostered constructive contact between moderate Catholic-Nationalist representatives and militant nationalist leadership. Despite

Unionist rhetoric of a 'pan nationalist front' among all nationalists, there were important and significant distinctions among Irish Catholic-Nationalists in the province. It was not until around two decades into the conflict in 1988, and on foot of some jarring atrocities and escalations in violence, that one initiative began in an effort to bring the largest militant group (the Provisional IRA and its political wing, Sinn Fein) into talks with moderate nationalists, specifically the SDLP. The leaders of both sides of this dialogue, John Hume from the SDLP and Gerry Adams from the militant Sinn Fein party, bestowed their names on what would become known as the Hume-Adams initiative. Quietly, in the background, senior figures from moderate Irish nationalists and militant nationalist republican groups held multiple secret discussions, facilitated by a member of the Catholic clergy, about a possible way out of the quagmire of military stalemate and towards a political process towards achieving broader Nationalist aims. In essence, moderate nationalists attempted to persuade the militant IRA that if Britain could adopt a position of neutrality towards the status of Northern Ireland then the IRA should cease its military operations and enter a political process to bring about their goal of a united Ireland – through exclusively peaceful means and following a renunciation of violence.

What had inadvertently helped to convince some within the militant nationalist camp that politics was an option was an event earlier in the 1980s. The so called 'Hunger Strikes' of the early 1980s had garnered significant political capital (and much media attention) for the IRA. At its height its most prominent hunger striker managed to stand and win a constituency bi-election and was elected as an MP to Westminster, while dying in jail. This success, and Boddy Sands's death shortly after, demonstrated that the ballot box was a highly effective instrument in securing national and international attention. The path, laid now before the militants although still only in outline, was a viable alternative to the armed struggle. For the next decade the IRA pursued both political and military objectives: simultaneously undertaking increasingly sophisticated military operations against the UK security forces, and also laying the groundwork for a political track.

The Hume-Adams initiative was relatively short lived, and ultimately failed to bring about a cessation of militant attacks by the militant Irish Nationalist faction. It did convince a growing number within the IRA and Sinn Fein that the future lay in democratic politics rather than the so called 'long war'. The Hume-Adams initiative essentially flowered and died in 1993, just as the British and Irish governments began to finally improve their levels of

cooperation. In addition, the moderate nationalist leader, John Hume, was subjected to severe criticism by Unionist, British and even some Irish political leaders for effectively granting 'legitimacy' to the position of the IRA and Sinn Féin. Hume defended his stance and continued to develop dialogue with Gerry Adams, even in the face of some truly terrible atrocities in both Northern Ireland and the UK itself.

It is perhaps inevitable that, by its secretive nature, such a parallel initiative in the Thai context is not generally known about. But without question there are individuals of a similar standing to John Hume who could assume the role of one who could challenge, argue and perhaps persuade militant factions to reconsider their campaign of violence and opt instead for a political (and non-violent) strategy of goal achievement. The difference, of course, is the context. Is such an alternative really available? Would it be possible for militant groups to see the political route as viable under the current political configuration in the Kingdom?

Provincial militant and central government interaction

There were more secrets buried in Northern Ireland's long Troubles. Behind the scenes and unknown to all but the highest levels of the political establishment in Britain – and despite public declarations by the UK government to the contrary – the British did in fact have direct contact with the militant nationalist leadership within the IRA for most of the period of the Troubles (Dochartaigh in Popielkowski and Cull 2009; Mallie and McKittrick 1996; BBC 2008). It had always been assumed, not least because of political rhetoric reflecting the position, that the British government would never countenance direct contact with the IRA while their campaign of violence continued. In fact, as revealed in recent years, this assumption is erroneous. From the earliest days of Northern Ireland's Troubles the British government, through its secret intelligence agencies, which simultaneously did everything in their power to undermine the IRA, actually established a secret backchannel contact mechanism with the group. This was known as the 'Derry Link' as the key facilitator of exchanges between MI6 and the leadership of the IRA was located in the Republican heartland of Derry City in the western region of Northern Ireland.

The 'Link' (also sometimes 'the contact') was actually composed of three individuals, but one in particular had a long standing secret connection to a senior MI6 intelligence officer that lasted through the worst of the Troubles

from 1972 all the way through to the mid-1990s. This link became a critical variable in efforts to bring the conflict to an end in the early 1990s, not least when he facilitated a direct meeting between the second most senior IRA commander (Martin McGuinness, the current Northern Ireland Deputy First Minister) and the senior most MI6 officer with responsibility for operations in Northern Ireland, Michael Oatley. The IRA ceasefire announcement in August 1994 did not occur in a vacuum, and it was not all down to role of the Derry Link, but without the Link that ceasefire would have been more difficult to establish. A certain element of choreography was required. The sequencing of steps by each side in the right order and at the right time could only be coordinated through the backchannel 'link'. The Link endured a sclerotic period during the tenure of Margaret Thatcher, who largely did adhere to the rhetoric of not talking to terrorists. However, with the ascension of John Major to premiership in 1990 the link was re-activated and came to be a central plank in negotiating the historic IRA ceasefire in 1994.

The core difficulty in the Thai example, of course, is the lack of any single command structure within militant factions where this strategy would be effective. It might be viable with one group, but not with another, and while attacks continue to go unclaimed, trust would be the inevitable casualty. It is true that the IRA was not the only militant nationalist group in operation in the province, but other groups largely took their cue from the main Provisional IRA movement. In the Thai case there are multiple actors that have an active role in the conflict, many of whom date back to a period prior to the emergence of the current phase in 2004. With the exception of the BRN there has been little articulation of explicit demands by militants upon which to establish a basis for even intermittent communication.

Mainstream and extremist elite-constituency linkages

One of the most intractable issues in resolving asymmetric violence is gauging the extent to which grassroots support for militant groups that is genuinely felt among the wider population, as opposed to being the product of fear and intimidation. This was certainly the case in Northern Ireland. Intimidation tactics were rampant in both nationalist and loyalist areas of Northern Ireland. Punishment attacks against petty criminals or as a result of criminal aspects of militant operations were frequent (often not warranting media attention). There was, despite this, the broad feeling among Catholic-Nationalists was that the Northern Ireland state, whether under

local Unionist rule or even direct rule from Westminster, was not functioning properly for the benefit of the minority population. Ironically, the Sinn Féin movement, as the political wing of the militant IRA, received scant political support at the ballot box while the campaign raged on. The election of a hunger striker notwithstanding, there was little appetite among wider Catholic Nationalists in having 'terrorists' represent them politically – at least not yet. They may have come to agree with the overall aim of a united Ireland, but bombs and bullets were only really supported by a minority of nationalists in Northern Ireland. In addition, support for Sinn Féin in the rest of Ireland in elections where they stood was negligible. However, as the Troubles lurched towards an endgame and the prospect of talks with Irish Republicans began to seem possible, support gradually increased at the ballot box. Ironically, the party that brought Sinn Féin in from the cold, John Hume's SDLP, has suffered dramatic declines in the aftermath of the Belfast Agreement. Similarly, on the Unionist side, it was the party of Ian Paisley, the uncompromising defender of the Protestant Union who triumphed over their more moderate rivals, the Ulster Unionists. In the end, it would be a power sharing executive led by both Ian Paisley and Martin McGuinness that would establish the first functioning executive since 1972.

The level of support for militant groups in Thailand is perhaps difficult to gauge. There are conflicting accounts with respect to the number of villages who are reliably sympathetic to militant aims in the southern Thai context (Funston, 2008). However, the data is inconclusive about just what sentiments among the wider populous are towards either the militants or the Thai government. More civilians have died at the hands of militants than Thai security forces.

Opportunities for cross factional grassroots (Track Three) engagement

Throughout the violent phase of the conflict a small number of initiatives emerged at different points from the grassroots level to challenge the polarization of Northern Irish society. Much of it was of necessity in the 'interface' areas within urban centers. These were places where Catholic-Nationalist and Protestant-Unionist residence leaved in close proximity. Until the eruption of violence in the late 1960s many areas would have been quite mixed, or at least would have contained a minority of residents from the 'other side'. But as violence intensified in the early stages of the conflict and polarization took root, urban areas become monochrome in their sectarian make up and

frequently the minority was forcibly removed from their original dwellings by angry mobs from within the sectarian opposite. The erection of the ironically named 'peace walls' only reified the division. These divisions remain today, and unfortunately show no signs of becoming less salient. What did emerge in parallel, however, was the valuable work of community interface activists, who sought to short circuit any immediate misperceptions that might arise between factions divided within an urban setting. The work is delicate, time consuming and usually unsupported. It was (and remains), however, extremely vital.

Around this work, and along with sparse but vibrant community organization across the province, one important strategic initiative did emerge as the peace process entered its more visible stages (Arthur 2010; Bush and Houston 2012). It was not even an initiative of any of the primary or state actors. It in fact emerged from the European Union. The EU Peace Programs commenced in the mid-1990s when it was clear to European policy makers that the IRA ceasefire was real, that it was a new phase in the ongoing peace-making effort and that other forms of support were needed to embed progress. Northern Ireland and the border region of Ireland (those administrative areas of the Irish Republic that were contiguous with the Northern Ireland province) had suffered significant economic difficulties during the Troubles. When the EU Commission President, Jacques Delors, met with European Parliamentarians from Northern Ireland it was quickly recognized that the EU could play a vital and constructive role beyond that of the primary actors. The peace programs offer an example of considerable interest to those seeking innovation in peacemaking, particularly as Track One remains in a delicate state and Track Two is difficult to evaluate, if it exists at all. At its heart the programs were a specific kind of structural funding designed to compel greater inter community interaction and dialogue between 'opposing' communities through funded initiatives and community projects. The extent, depth and complexity of these programs is beyond the scope of this study (Bush and Houston 2012; Arthur 2010).

Thailand is uniquely placed to be a focus for this kind of initiative. While ASEAN's main focus historically was ensuring peace between nations as member states (Severino 2008; Sidaway 2002; Acharya 2001). There is ample opportunity for innovation and engagement by the organization as a supporter of less state-centric policies. As a leading member of ASEAN, Thailand could easily make a case for the introduction of 'peace funding' within the

context of the southern provinces. However there are inhibitions to this as an effective measure at present. First and foremost there is the unwillingness of the Thai authorities to risk the internationalization of the conflict through any involvement of external actors. Technically, an ASEAN initiative would not necessarily run up hard against the non-interference principle as there are several mechanisms that could potentially permit a track three level initiative. The ASEAN Foundation is committed to goals compatible with wider state objectives.

- Promoting ASEAN Awareness and Identity
- Enhancing Interaction among Various ASEAN Stakeholders
- Developing Human Resources and Capacity Building
- Addressing Socio-Economic Disparities and Alleviating Poverty

(ASEAN Foundation website)

The funding of projects by the ASEAN Foundation could readily be adapted to the establishment of programs designed to engage at the track three level of interaction. However, while the conflict in the southern provinces continues to be viewed primarily and solely as a security issue this is unlikely to be realized. This is unfortunate.

The Second Domain: The Wider International Arena

In the second of the two domains, our focus is on the wider contextual factors that inevitably have a role in sustaining, regulating or even transforming a given conflict. Here we begin at the interstate level and work further outwards to include regional organizational involvement and alterations in global politics.

Opportunities for mutually supportive engagement by state actors

At the diplomatic level the British and Irish governments embodied separate mindsets throughout the period of the Troubles. On the British side there was a clear disengagement from the island in its totality after the settlement establishing the Irish Free State in 1921. With the departure of the British administration from most of Ireland in that year and the establishment of devolved power in Northern Ireland the British effectively withdrew from any real engagement with the Irish problem. As the conflict evolved from the late 1960s the British-Irish relationship oscillated throughout the Troubles from indifference to positive, to tense and back again.

In its first significant analytical foray into the Northern Ireland Conflict the EU Parliament (then the EEC parliament) in 1984 produced the Haagerup Report. In it, the political affairs committee of the European Parliament makes clear that:

[A]ny changes, any reforms and any improvements in the overall political situation in Northern Ireland should be planned and executed by the responsible UK authorities with the consent of the peoples of Northern Ireland and with the fullest possible co-operation with the [Irish] Republic (Haagerup 1984).

It was a prescient and wise conclusion to draw. Ultimate responsibility for the conflict – and its resolution – rested squarely with the two governments.

Up to and including a historic agreement between the UK and Ireland in 1985 there was no effort to involve the other state party to the conflict by the British, certainly not in the formal sense. But in 1985 it was recognized, particularly by the British, that the conflict was not merely a sovereign internal matter for one state. The Hillsborough Accord, signed by UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and Irish Prime Minister Garret Fitzgerald, was a clear recognition that the conflict could only be resolved through the contribution of the other affected state. Northern Ireland was not a self-contained geographical entity. It shared a land border several hundred miles long with the rest of Ireland and was only linked to Britain via sea and air routes. Militant attacks had frequently occurred along the border with perpetrators of attacks latterly disappearing into remote locations in the Irish Republic through the porous frontier. This is something very recognizable in the Thailand case. Clearly, even only from a security point of view, the collaboration of Britain and Ireland was required to bring the conflict to a resolution.

Political intransigence by the two state actors, at varying points, undoubtedly contributed to the emasculation of efforts towards a settlement. However, when John Major assumed the premiership in the UK and Albert Reynolds assumed the leadership of the Irish government in the early 1990s a different dynamic emerged. It made a substantial difference. The fragile cross community efforts in Northern Ireland between mainstream or moderate Nationalists and Unionists, along with increasing popular revulsion at terrorist atrocities, converged in the receptive ears of both political leaders. The two governments began to work very closely together at both the political and official level to chart out the basis for a settlement that would both advance the Nationalist case for equality and bring the Unionist side along with the

assurance that the status of Northern Ireland (as part of the UK) would not change without one key principle: consent.

Even with changes in political leadership (Reynolds was replaced in 1995 by Bertie Ahern, and John Major's Conservative Party lost the 1997 UK election to Tony Blair's New Labour) the momentum only strengthened. From the announcement and publication of the Downing Street Declaration in December of 1993 it was clear that British Irish relations had entered a new phase (Konnikova 2002).

In the Thai case we appear not to have the same level of interstate enmity in historical terms, there is certainly no enmity strong enough to undermine relatively normal and unproblematic interstate relations between Thailand and Malaysia (Croissant 2005; ICG 2016). Thailand's initial handling of the conflict, however, has strained its relations with its southern neighbor.

The evolution of regional politics and globalization

That was also a significant variable in the Northern Ireland example was the changing nature of interstate relations in the European context throughout the period of the Troubles (Mabry 2013). A sclerotic European integration process at the end of the 1960s and into the 1970s, ended following the EEC's expansion to nine states from six. Concurrently, the détente period of the Cold War ended with the election of Ronald Reagan, and Jacques Delors was appointed European Commission President. The emergence of neo-liberal orthodoxy and the dramatic changes in international economics from the mid-1980s further eroded a fundamental precept of international relations: the ultimate sovereignty of nation states (Nugent 2010).

From the period at the end of the Thirty Years War (1648) up to the inclusion of the principle in the UN Charter (1945) there had been no question or doubt on the issue of national sovereignty. However, as the post war reconstruction of Europe continued in the shadow of the Cold War and the looming presence of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, European states began to unpack that concept of sovereignty. Particularly from the mid-1980s onwards, and the proposal for a Single Market within Europe, the borders between EEC states began to become much less pronounced, not least with the emergence of free movement of people across the Union. In a very short period of time, the EEC (later the EU) began to increase its density of interstate cooperation, particularly along functional lines. In short, the practical functional

governance of nation states was increasingly interconnected, the rhetoric of national 'sovereignty' notwithstanding. As the treaty base of EU integration began to increase with the establishment of the single market in 1992, and the interconnected nature of the European system of governance continued to deepen through monetary union, the latticework of connectivity between the two states implied by the Northern Ireland conflict increased. The net impact of this was a reduction in the salience of national borders, coupled with the increasingly free movement of labour. As population mobility around Europe increased the emphasis on national identities declined (until recently) and the interdependence of EU member state economies facilitated greater ease of travel and interaction. The disappearance of 'hard borders' between the Irish Republic and Northern Ireland after the establishment of the Single Market sapped the practical importance of the partitioning of the island.

The Irish Diaspora also had a significant bearing in the internationalization of the conflict. From the middle of the nineteenth century thousands of Irish left their homeland to seek a new life elsewhere. Emigration is something of a national tradition in Ireland. Most went to the UK, North America or Australia/New Zealand. In more recent times the Irish have dispersed across Europe and elsewhere. By far the most significant numbers settled in the United States, becoming so entrenched in the social and political life of the eastern United States that some cities became synonymous with its Irish connection. The political capital that lay latent within Irish America culminated in the election of John F Kennedy, a descendent of Irish migrants of the nineteenth century, to the presidential office in 1960. As the Troubles emerged in the late 1960s Irish American interest grew in two distinct directions. First there was the establishment of NORAID in 1969, which sought (ostensibly) to fundraise for the families of IRA volunteers and prisoners (Dewind and Segura 2014). The organization, based in the US, was latterly forced by the US suspend operations in 1984 when a court ruled that it was raising money for the IRA that went beyond charitable support. Another dimension was the role of Irish American politicians within both Democratic and Republican parties, not least the role of the Kennedy family themselves through JFK's brother, Edward Kennedy. As progress towards a settlement gathered pace in the 1990s the Clinton Administration in the US became a key player in facilitating a resolution. The role of the Irish diaspora in pushing US involvement in the Northern Ireland conflict culminated in the establishment of a US Special Envoy for Northern Ireland, the first being Senator George Mitchell.

De-legitimization of violence as a policy option by actors

For most of the Troubles the British government never eschewed the option of the use of lethal force against Irish Nationalist extremists or, for that matter, loyalist extremists. Counter insurgency actions and the utility of aggressive intelligence gathering through paid or coerced informants very likely had a deleterious impact on specific operations undertaken by militants. But the overall impact was to entrench support for militant extremist movements without actually seriously impacting the effectiveness of their asymmetric military operations. In addition, while the rhetoric of UK political elites sought to de-legitimize 'terrorism' as merely 'crime', and thereby undermine their political justification, the actual practical response to 'terrorism' throughout most of the Troubles was a militarization of the conflict and – for all intents and purposes – the adoption of a war footing by the British state's security apparatus. By denouncing violence the state actor then appears hypocritical.

It took over two decades for both the militants and the state actors to realize that the violent route, however it may have appeared justified, was in fact a cul-de-sac. This was a manifestation of the 'Ripe' Moment in Zartman's phrase (Zartman 2000), which is the point where all parties to violent campaigns recognize that a solution does not lie with military actions and violence. A military victory will not solve the problem. The problem was a political one and could only be resolved politically. That point was reached in Northern Ireland in the early 1990s when IRA spectacles and atrocities were matched by effective counter-terrorism operations. But the conflict continued and more lives were lost. Neither the defeat of the IRA nor the re-unification of Ireland looked like remote possibilities. Among ordinary people the sentiment grew for a shift into a new phase.

The temptation by the state actor to utilize its monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, to draw on Max Weber's famous maxim, is usually hardest to resist when the circumstances are least conducive to its effectiveness. State impotence in the face of random atrocity is often countered by the visible assertion of state power through military action. This is more symbolic than substantive. In the late 1980s, British security forces undertook a number of operations that resulted in high profile incidents where Irish Nationalist militants were intercepted in the midst of undertaking operations, usually as a result of a 'tip off' of an impending operation through intelligence agents. Sometimes these security operations resulted in the deaths of paramilitary operatives. Psychologically, it probably had the impact of denting militant

confidence in their operational effectiveness, but it also undermined the state's own rhetorical stance on the inefficacy of violence and its moral invocation of the rule of law. The Thai example also exhibits these features. The use of paramilitary forces and the circumvention of due processes erode the legitimacy of the state actor in the eyes of observers.

Recognition of state failure in policy and practice

By far one of the most important steps forward in the Northern Ireland context, in spite of the fact that there was much resistance to it over time on the part of political leadership, was the acknowledgement (if not always openly) that the structural discrimination against a minority was ultimately the responsibility of the state actor. Whether in terms of wider social equality or indeed as a result of acknowledging flaws in state accountability for actions during the conflict the eventual recognition of state failure was a necessity in reestablishing state legitimacy in the eyes of significant section of the community in the province.

No incident was more pivotal to this dimension than the events of January 1972 in the City of Derry, when 14 unarmed protesters were shot dead by British paratroopers during a civil rights demonstration in the city. The report that followed, the Widgery Report, was largely viewed within the Nationalist community as a whitewash and its conclusions were at variance with the eyewitness testimony of the events, including by media and foreign observers. In 2010 the conclusions of a second report were published (the Saville Report) and its conclusions were radically different. The violence perpetrated by members of the British security forces was deemed unjustified and unjustifiable and this was formally acknowledged by the British state. The British Prime Minister's public apology on the conclusion of the inquiry in the UK parliament was a significant milestone in recognition of the failures of the state.

The credibility of the British legal system was sorely tested and even discredited in the eyes of many Irish nationalists after the convictions of individuals for terrorism offences that were later overturned on appeal, but not before those imprisoned had spend lengthy periods in jail having been wrongfully convicted. The cases of the so called Guildford Four, Birmingham Six and the Maguires, who were convicted of terrorism offences later overturned on appeal, did significant damage to Irish Nationalist confidence in the British legal system. The release of these prisoners and the acknowledgement of the state's role in their wrongful prosecution and conviction was a similarly

necessary, if difficult, component of reconstructing peace (Kee 1989).

Opportunities for political innovation

By far the most significant condition that needs to be in place is a willingness to experiment. In the Northern Ireland case there was ultimately a willingness to suspend political prudery and 'talk to terrorists'. There was a need on the 'terrorist' side to recognize the futility of armed violence and take the risk of pursuing ideological goals through democratic means. The roads travelled by all parties in reaching these conclusions were bloody ones. There were considerable risks involved for everyone and all sides, and for some these risks were not merely political. For governments there was the risk of legitimizing violent militants by meeting and talking to people who had guns and had demonstrated a willingness to use them on civilians. For Unionists there was the risk that this engagement would alienate their voter base, play into the hands of extremist loyalists and result in a slippery slope towards the reunification of the island of Ireland and the severing of the link with Britain. The Irish political elite risked much less overall, but it would as the process unfolded finally relinquish its territorial claim over the Northern Ireland province and effectively relegate the goal of 're-unification' to an aspiration only. The leaders of the Irish Nationalist militant movement risked the discrediting of their efforts in the eyes of their own activists, to say nothing of the diminishing horizon of eventual Irish unity.

The power-sharing executive established by the Belfast Agreement of 1998 was an innovation on the consociational model that actually reified the divisions in Northern Irish society (McEvoy 2008, 2015). But it nevertheless gave the minority a say in political decision-making that had not to that point been possible. The contrivances of cross community peacebuilding were painstaking and not always apparently successful (McEvoy 2006; Crowley 2015). In fact, the cross community effort is, despite the amount of social and financial capital invested, remains unconvincing in its achievements. Significant innovations emerged within local government and community relations as a result of match funding by both governments, the EU and the International Fund for Ireland (an initiative of the Irish diaspora, primarily in the United States). Innovation in Thailand may not bring success by itself, but it may help avoid failure in the long run.

Conclusion

We cannot, it goes without saying, slavishly apply the example of peacemaking garnered from one conflict to another. There are as many differences between Northern Ireland's 'Troubles' and Thailand's 'fire' as there are similarities. In the Northern Irish case, therefore, the practical wisdom of actual peacemaking is something that can be mined for possible options in the Thai case. The undertaking of multiple tracks of peacemaking, the slow and painstaking construction of cross-community engagement and the de-emphasis of national sovereignty in favour of wider inter-state cooperation were essential in the European example. Northern Ireland is certainly not the perfect example. There are still profound difficulties to be overcome within the province. However, the cessation of violence and the transformation of the political system into a more representative structure is an important step forward. Other aspects of 'peace' continue to evolve. Ultimately, time itself will do most of the healing as memories fade.

However, by far the most important conclusion from the above analysis is with regard to the conditions that necessarily needed to be in place in the Northern Irish context for the fragile peace process to move forward and – when challenges emerged – to continue despite these difficulties. Northern Ireland's case was assisted significantly by major changes in the 2nd Domain, outside the specific locus of the conflict. In addition, time itself was the key variable; time for attitudes to both harden and soften on all sides, for the 'ripe moment' to emerge, as the violent option was played out and found to be wanting in terms of achieving goals. The perpetration of atrocity by militants was what simultaneously captured the attention of publics and policy makers on the one hand, and which hampered and de-legitimized the realization of Nationalist objectives on the other. By the same token, state violence could hinder, disrupt and erode militant capacity for violence but also deepen antipathy towards the state and delegitimize its interventionist role as peace broker in the eyes of the international community as well as its claims to moral supremacy through the rule of law and due process. Both militant and state actors worked out over time that the concept of national sovereignty and the principle of non-interference were not sustainable in a globalizing economy and in the face of deepening regional integration within the EU. Diaspora and internationalization of the conflict is not happening in the Thai context. These were significant variables in the Northern Irish case, in particular the role of the Irish American diaspora in pushing the United States towards greater involvement.

The implications for the Thai case are clear. There is much work to do, and much of it will be very difficult. The conditions outlined above for the Northern Ireland peace process were painstakingly constructed or were even a byproduct of much larger forces and therefore beyond the scope of many of the actors involved. Even the state actors could not have fully understood the impact of closer European integration and its impact on the Northern Irish Troubles. It is unclear whether these conditions can be replicated in the Thai case. Within the Thai context the question of political participation is perhaps the single biggest difficulty confronting peacemakers. If participation is not an option, then violence becomes the *de facto* alternative. The opportunities for normal political engagement have not been easy at any point, but under current arrangements these are even more difficult. The largely exclusive Track One approach remains unsupported and seems to be without overt or significant augmentation by either Track Two and Track Three. The political journey of the state and non-state actor towards a 'ripe moment' of realization looks like it has only begun. Many issues remain relatively untouched: the role of interface work, the question of confessional cleavages and relations between militant and moderate factions within communal groupings; the possible role of neighbouring states and the utilization of regional initiatives.

The Thai conflict at the moment has arguably not at the point where either the militants or the Thai state have been convinced of the need to explore alternatives to the violence-security response nexus. Like the early negotiations between the British and the IRA in the mid 1970s there is an air of unrealism about the current dialogue (ICG 2016). Who is representing whom? Where is the capacity for civil society to participate in the wider process? How much political participation and activism is possible under military rule? The regional dimension remains underdeveloped, despite the clear potential and capacity for a meaningful intervention at the level of Track Three by ASEAN or an ancillary body within it. There is no 'hurting stalemate' or ripe moment. Internationalization of the conflict is not permissible in the current context. False dawns were a salient feature of the Northern Ireland example. They will undoubtedly be a part of the efforts to put out Thailand's Southern Fire. The overall evaluation is inevitably a pessimistic one.

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Peacebuilding Processes in Thailand and Myanmar/ Burma: The Dynamic Roles of Muslim Minorities in Conflicted Societies

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Abstract

This paper explores the concept and record of political transition in Thailand and Myanmar particularly as relates to the Malay and Rohingya, both Muslim minorities in their respective countries, who are struggling to achieve a greater measure of positive peace. In general, minorities are protected only where democratic institutions can run smoothly, but this situation does not prevail in most of the Global South. Moreover, ethnic and religious minorities in this region are often confronted and harassed due to their cultural and identity differences. This paper explores two cases from Southeast Asia where the military has directly or indirectly ruled for many years. In Thailand, due to various considerations, the government has tried to negotiate with its Malay Muslim ethnic religious minority. The case of the Rohingya in Myanmar, where the State has deliberately refused to incorporate them in the ongoing democratic process, is more problematic. In both cases, the approaches of the State have not properly worked because of its unwillingness to accommodate equal existence and political diversity. This comparative study, examining different levels of political transition, points to why Thailand and Myanmar's ruling elites are not likely to adequately accommodate their ethnic Muslim minorities to achieve a genuine peace process nor to integrate them into the State with full respect for justice and human rights.

Keywords: *Muslims, Minorities, Peace building, Thailand, Myanmar*

Introduction

In order to develop a democratic society, Thailand and Myanmar should ensure all minorities presence and place in mainstream political life. The Malay and Rohingya Muslim minorities in the respective countries had participated in government before the emergence of violent conflict. Many Malay-Muslim politicians have represented their constituents in the Thai parliament over decades of democratic development. Politically, the Malay Muslims could become well-adjusted and reassert their identity through democratic governance, despite the strong enforcement of Thai assimilationist policies and sporadic suppressive measures applied since the 1940s. However, armed resistance movements of Malay-Muslims have conducted violent campaigns against the Thai State to reassert themselves in this unresolved identity conflict of over fifty years, and such violence has escalated since 2004. However, a peace process was initiated in 2014 under an elected civilian government in an attempt to find political transition. The military regime that took power by coup in 2015 has reluctantly accepted that approach to maintain order in the Deep South. However, there are many challenges in the peace dialogue because of the lack of political will. As the peace dialogue has unfolded, the Thai elites have clearly shown that they are not ready to accept and recognize the equal status of the resistance movements. The basic underlying issue is that identity politics and its fallout have destabilized the discourse of Thai-ness and Thai state-building, which makes it difficult for a fair and just political transition to come about. In Myanmar, with respect to the Rohingya, the situation severely deteriorated for them and other Myanmarese Muslims after the 2012 communal riots in northern Rakhine State, in which scores of Rohingya were killed and more than 80,000 displaced, though there were also Buddhist victims. The fallout from the riots was that no political party nominated any Muslim candidate in the last parliamentary election. Aung Sun Suu Kyi and her NLD government have failed to accommodate Rohingya Muslims in the ongoing peace process. In this context, peace-building will not be fruitful in either country. Without the respectful involvement of Malay and Rohingya Muslims, both Thailand and Myanmar will continue to suffer the ill-effects of identity-related violence.

Muslim Roles in Myanmar/Burma regarding the Peace Process

Myanmar is one of the most ethnically diverse countries of the world. Nearly half a century of conflict has left Burma with a legacy of deep-rooted

problems and weakened its ability to cope with a growing host of new ones: economic and social collapse; hundreds of thousands of refugees and displaced people; environmental degradation; narcotics problems; and AIDS. These are problems that exist all over Burma, but the ethnic minorities groups have suffered the most (Smith 1991). Official nationalist history has witnessed that modern Burma was created by British colonial rule. Today's Burma integrated as a province of British India through the third Anglo-Burma war in 1824. After 1937, it was separated from India and called British Burma. From the early days of independence, Burma/Myanmar has been fragile in terms of the nation-building process. Burma failed to establish the federal concept of a multi-party democracy. Moreover, post-independent leaderships tried to establish a Burman-dominated, Rangoon based central authority. John Furnival (1956) suggested that in Burma, "a promise of national unity was foreshadowed from before the dawn of history because the major racial elements are akin, peoples fundamentally the same racial and cultural kind" (Silverstein 1980, 6). However, during the beginning of the decolonization, it was seen that some parts of the society were not ready to identify themselves as members of the Union of Burma. Rather the majority of people thought of themselves as members of their respective ethnic groups. In the modern history of Burma, with Panglong¹ decolonization conference as a milestone, Burman and non-Burman ethnic minorities agreed that the future state should be based on a concept of nations within a nation. The basic principle was that the State should be federal union, which recognizes political and economic equality and the self-determination of non-Burman and Burman ethnic nationalities. Regarding the Arakan context, in 1946, General Aung San assured full rights and privileges to the Rohingya/Arakanese Muslims as an indigenous people, saying: "I offer you a blank cheque. We will live together and die together. Demand what you want. I will do my best to fulfill them. If native people are divided, it will be difficult to achieve independence for Burma" (Seddiqui, 2016). Based on the Panglong Agreement, the Constituent Assembly developed the

1 The historic Panglong conference was held on February 1947 in Shan State, where Aung Sun, head of the interim Burmese government, and ethnic minorities of Shan, Kachin and Chin leaders met to decide their position in the future independent State of Burma. In the second-round meeting on February 1947, 23 signatories expressed their willingness to work together and developed the principles of the Union of Burma. It must be noted that other major ethnic groups such as Mon, Arakanese, Naga and Wa representatives were completely excluded from this process.

Constitution of the Union of Burma on the 24th of September, 1947. It stated, "Burma's formal solution to the double problem of national unity was outlined in the 1947 constitution and expressed in the political institutions it informed" (Silverstein 1980, 185). The Muslims and other ethnic minority leaders of the nationalist movement in Burma had deep faith in the national hero U Aung San, who publicly took a stand in favor of unity and diversity. The Panglong spirit was reflected in the 1947 Constitution and it assured the ethnic minorities' language and culture could coexist with Burma and not necessarily become "Burmanized." Everyone was guaranteed their freedom of religion. Ethnic and linguistic minorities were not barred from a state educational institution nor were they forced to accept religious institutions against their will. In the absence U Aung San, the post-independence leaderships of Burma faced serious difficulties from the ethnic minorities' and they could not materialize the achievements from the first constitution. From the early days of independence, Burman ethnic domination has been a major challenge of the post-independence nation-building process in Burma. As a result, the ethnically diverse nation-state Burma became the ethnic Burman dominated Union of Myanmar. The ideas of federalism and decentralization could not work in Burma until today. "Ethnic politics is the obverse of the politics of national unity," was the very starting point of one study on Burma's complex ethnic problems by Robert Taylor. Since independence, the perception of race has remained as an extremely sensitive issue (Taylor 2007, 7). In addition, Taylor also mentioned that non-Buddhists have always been regarded with great suspicions and it was reflected in their state policy. The Muslim Rohingyas are particularly subjected to institutionalized persecution based on their religion and ethnicity.

The Rohingya and Muslims in Burma/Myanmar

The present nation state Burma/Myanmar has always been dominated by Buddhists, with a sizable Muslim minority. Muslims are dispersed geographically and highly diverse ethnically. It is a common perception in Burmese society that all Muslims are settlers from Bangladesh² Mostly Muslims migrated to Burma

2 All non-Muslims interviewed in Yangon stated that most of the Muslims are settlers in Burma, especially the Rohingya Muslims, who migrated from neighboring Bangladesh during the British colonial era. It was possible due to a porous border and weak administration. After they settled in Rakhine State, they claimed themselves "Rohingya". Their appearance and ethnicity are totally different from other indigenous people of Burma.

during the British colonial period, when Burma was a province of British India. Muslims are the only residents in Burma who have their religious affiliation noted on their identity cards. According to J.A. Berlie (2008), there are four major Muslims groups in Burma. First and most numerous are Muslims with origins from British India, including Pakistan and Bangladesh, The second group comprises of Arakan Muslims or Rohingyas³. They are different from the first group but ethnically closer to South Asian Muslims. The third group is the Panthays who are ethnically Chinese. The fourth group comprises of Burmese Muslims or Zavieran, an ancient name of Persian origin. They are well known as Zerabadee in Burma. The Burmese ruling class and civic groups often try to establish that Rohingya are similar to the Indo-Aryan race and migrated from Bangladesh during the colonial times (Haque, 2014). In fact the Rohingya are ethnically closer to South Asians, especially Bengali Muslims, and their dialect is colloquial Bengali. Their appearance is not like other Burmese ethnic groups. It must be stressed that this does not mean that the Rohingya are outsiders or recent settlers in the present nation-state of Burma. Berlie (2008) also stated that the Rohingya or Muslims of Arakan have a separate identity in Burma that is quite different from Muslims of South Asian or Indian origin. It is noted that North Arakan, the ancestral land of the Rohingya, has the largest Muslim concentration. The Rohingyas population is estimated to be more than 3 million, including about 1.6 million taking refuge in alien lands. Other ethnic Muslims are based in urban areas and not as significant politically (Abu Tahay, 2016). Historical facts prove that during the parliamentary era, Rohingya Muslims who dominated the Mayu frontier zone enjoyed a sort of autonomy from the Burmese central government. In the struggle for independence, Rohingya community leaders such as Sultan Ahmed from Maungdaw and Abdu Gaffar MP from Buthidaung worked together with General Aung San for the Constitution of Burma before independence (interview, Chit Lwin-former MP in 1990's election, October 2016, Yangon). After the Ne Win coup, Rohingya Muslims were systematically excluded from mainstream political life. In Myanmar/Burma political history, the BSPP regime enacted a new citizenship law in 1982. But it was not enforced until the late 1980s. It is also clear that before the enactment of the 1982 Citizenship Law, Rohingya Muslims enjoyed the same status and rights as other Burmese citizens.

3 Rohingyas have Arakan ancestry and are ethnically closer with other South Asian Muslims.

Myth or Reality: Rohingya Threat to National Integrity in Burma/Myanmar

It is commonly alleged that the Rohingya are involved with separatist movements that threaten to destabilize Myanmar. Since the early days of independence, ethnic minorities have been struggling to establish their rights under the Union and in present times Kachin, Karen, Shan even Rakhine rebel groups often clash with the Burmese army. However, the Rakhine Commission Report only mentioned Bengali⁴ separatist trends and border areas where people are loyal to Bangladesh.

The Rakhine communities stated that in reality, the Bengalis in Rakhine would not be able to live peacefully with others in Myanmar because the Bengalis from Butheetaung and Maungdaw always took Bangladesh's side whenever Myanmar had disagreements or issues with that country, for example, on border demarcation (2013).

It is an easy strategy for the Buddhist Rakhine community to take advantage and seek support from within the country against the Rohingya⁵. There was a strong trend among the Rohingya Muslims to merge with neighboring Muslim-dominated Pakistan at the time of independence. That movement was not successful, but its legacy left a deep mistrust between the Rohingya Muslims and the majority Burmese- Rakhine Buddhists. The Mujahid Party, a Muslim group, was formed in 1947 and led by Jafar Kawal who was a popular singer at that time in Arakan⁶. The Mujahid tried to launch an

4 In Burma/Myanmar, the government and ultra Buddhist nationalist called the "Bengali" instead of Rohingya. Even mainstream media also treat them as illegal migrants from neighboring Bangladesh.

5 However, the government formed Inquiry Commission was surprisingly silent about Rakhine militant organizations working outside of Burma's national sovereignty.

6 There is much confusion and myth about the Mujahid movement or Mujahid party in Arakan. After independence in Burma, the Buddhist Rakhine started to massacre the Muslims. They killed many thousands, burnt their villages and looted their properties. Being put to a serious task of maintaining their existence, the Rohingya were compelled to rise in arms against the tyranny of the ruling regime. Mujahids claimed that they had taken arms only when all their protests and appeals had gone unheeded (AFK Jilani, 2002). A young Muslim Jafar Hussain, a singer by profession with a background of Japanese military training, started the movement. By virtue of his profession he was popularly known as Jafar Kawal. He was the first president of the movement and prominent Muslim leader Omra Meah Sahab chief advisor of that movement. Different Rohingya leaders and scholars argue that their aim was not to join with Pakistan but to form an autonomous Muslim state named North Arakan, comprising Buthidaung, Rathidaung and Maungdaw townships taking the region from the

offensive against Burman rule in 1954, but when the Burmese Army started Operation Monsoon in that year, they almost abandoned their fight against it and many of them fled to East Pakistan, which is now Bangladesh (Fistie 1985, 103; Berlie 2008 58). Even today, Rohingya are treated in Burma as people of the “Mujahid Movement”. It can be argued that the Jafar Kawal led Mujahid movement and later, in the 1970s, the Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front (ARIF), Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO), and Arakan Rohingya National Organization (ARNO) were ideologically close to each other.

From the early days of independence until the late 1990s, these political groups conducted militant activities against the Burmese regime. To some extent, their political and arms struggle was conducted against the Burmese occupation in Arakan/Rakhine State. These movements also had an Islamic flavor which is why it was easy for the Burmese central and Rakhine State government to identify them as Islamic militants as well as separatists. The Burmese government accused all these groups living in the Burma-Bangladesh border areas. It remains a strong perception throughout Burmese society that most the Rohingya are supported by Bangladesh and are trying to separate the northern part of Rakhine State. Even non-Rohingya Muslim leaders also accuse Rohingya of separatist aims (Haque 2014).

It is clear that two major trends have developed in the Rohingya movement since Burmese independence. Apart from ultranationalist movements, from the beginning, moderate Muslim groups tried to amicably resolve ethnic tension with the Burmese government, which is why they proposed that Muslim dominated Northern Arakan should be controlled from Rangoon. Muslim leaders opposed Rakhine control over their area. A “regional autonomy of Northern Arakan State” proposal was placed before the Burmese Constitutional Assembly by Muslim members (Abu Tahay 2016). However, it was not approved, possibly because of Rakhine Buddhist rigidity. After the military took over State power in Burma, the Rohingya community became more isolated from mainstream politics even though some Rohingya leaders were highly placed in the BSPP regime.

The Government of Myanmar (GoM) and the Rakhine community both allege that the Rohingya threaten national integrity and are conducting a separatist movement from the Bangladesh border. The allegation of the GoM

west bank of Kaladan river up to the east bank of the Naf river. The region would remain under the Union of Burma. The demand was made on 20 August 1947. Later, Prime Minister U Nu created the Mayu Frontier Area at the demand of Rohingya in 1961.

that the Rohingya are a security threat is just a pretext to continue its atrocities against them. In addition, Rohingya leaders and intellectuals accuse Rakhine Buddhists of mounting a strong insurgency against the Burma nation-state. The 88 Generation activist Osman alias Ye Naing argues that many Rakhine Buddhists have been conducting armed struggle against Myanmar and conducted it from the Bangladesh-India-Myanmar border areas (Osman 2016). During the military regime, Rakhine and Rohingya struggled against Burmese occupation of their land. Until today, some Rakhine groups battle against the Myanmar security forces. However, after the 2012 communal riots, religious identity triumphed over the nationalist movement. As a result, most of the Rakhines and other Burmese became closer through their protection of the Buddhist identity and Buddhist land from the Rohingya Muslims. Both Buddhist groups have been trying to establish that there are no Rohingya in Myanmar's history and all migrated since the colonial period from neighboring Bangladesh. Rakhine nationalist leaders tried to get support from other parts of the country and tried to establish that Islam is a religion which swallowed Hinduism and Buddhism in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the whole Indian peninsula, including Pakistan and Afghanistan. According to this logic, the Muslim population growth and conversion rate is a real threat to Burma's national integrity. After the communal riots in 2012, the Burmese government became more hostile to the Rohingya and their general predicament deteriorated further. Currently, thousands of Rohingya have been living in internally displaced persons camps for almost four years. Due to government restrictions, international humanitarian agencies frequently cannot access to the Rohingya IDPs.

The Rakhine Commission and its Failure

Earlier it was mentioned that the whole situation changed after the mid-2012 communal riots. Due to the international community's pressure, the Rakhine Inquiry Commission was established on August 17, 2012 under the authority of the President's executive order to discover the root causes of communal violence and provide recommendations for the prevention of the recurrence of violence in the future and the promotion of peaceful coexistence.

It was the first formal peace process in the Rakhine State. The Commission was comprised of historians, social scientists, legal experts, and leaders from economic, political, and social sectors. The Rohingya Diaspora and political leaders inside Burma accused the USDP government of not including any Rohingya representative of that commission. Haji U Nyunt Maung Shein and

U Tin Maung Than, two prominent Muslim leaders, were purged from the Commission seeing that they were most insistent on the truth (Joint Statement 2013). The United Nations Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in Myanmar, Tomás Ojea Quintana, welcomed some recommendations from the Rakhine Investigation Commission report. However, he expressed concerns over the lack of recommendations to address impunity and ensure investigations into credible allegations of widespread and systematic human rights violations targeting the Muslim community in Rakhine State (UN News Center 2013). The international community believed that the Rakhine Commission report might find a durable solution for peaceful co-existence of the two major communities in Rakhine State. However, their whole report was biased and again failed to accommodate the ethnic religious minority in their nation-building process. Major Rohingya organizations argued that, “it is a biased report favouring Rakhines, and their hostile views and arguments towards Rohingya people”. Indeed, the Rakhine Commission observations and recommendations were not helpful toward reaching a durable solution to this longstanding crisis. Moreover, the report instigated racial attitudes and Islamophobia against the Rohingya and other ethnic Muslim minorities in Burma.

Peace Process under the NLD Regime

The National League for Democracy (NLD) secured a landslide victory and formed a democratically elected government in Myanmar in April 2016 after nearly half a century of junta rule. The military-drafted 2008 constitution guaranteed that unelected military representatives take up twenty five percent of the seats in the parliament and that it have a veto over constitutional change. Due to constitutional barriers, Aung San Suu Kyi was not eligible to be President of Myanmar/Burma. So that is why the NLD-led government created a new post, State Counsellor of Myanmar. It is the de facto head of the government and was created on April 6, 2016 to allow for a greater role of Aung San Suu Kyi within the Government of Myanmar.

The NLD has a strong pledge to establish peaceful co-existence among the people of Myanmar. As part of that initiative, the government organized the 21st Century Panglong Peace Conference on the last day of August and it ran for five days in the capital city Naypyidaw (Radio Free Asia 2016). No Muslims or Rohingya representatives were invited to that conference. Two Rohingya political party leaders were present at the inaugural but were not

allowed in the working session (Abu Tahay 2016). Burma-related expert, Ashley South stated that “without Rohingya participation the conference will not be inclusive” (South 2016). Aung San Suu Kyi has been under international pressure, even from her fellow Nobel laureates, for not speaking out for the persecuted Rohingya. During her last visit to the US, she stressed that her government was committed to the resolution of the complex political, economic, and humanitarian challenges in Rakhine State and the development of the state’s economic potential (Joint Statement 2016).

As State Counselor of Myanmar, Aung San Suu Kyi, recently formed a nine-member Advisory Commission chaired by former U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan to find a lasting solution to the issues in the Arakan/Rakhine State. The overall objective of the Commission is to provide recommendations on the complex challenges facing the Rakhine State. The Commission will initiate a dialogue with political and community leaders in Rakhine with the aim of proposing measures to improve the well-being of all the people of the State. In its work, the Commission will consider humanitarian and developmental issues, access to basic services, the assurance of basic rights, and the security of the people of Rakhine. The Commission is expected to submit its final report and recommendations to the Myanmar government in the second half of 2017 (interview, Aye Lwin-Muslim representative in Commission, October 2016, Yangon). Indeed, the newly formed Annan Commission created enormous hope for Muslims. As a result, Rohingya and other Muslims expected that the Commission would make a comprehensive assessment of the decades of Rohingya victimization in Myanmar, including the organized deadly violence that has occurred and reoccurred against them in Arakan from 2012 and which has not yet been properly and truthfully investigated (Islam, Kader 2016).

The Arakan Rohingya National Organization (ARNO) cautiously welcomed the Kofi Annan-led commission but also criticized it for failing to incorporate their community representatives, whereas the two Buddhist Rakhines - U Win Mra and Daw Saw Khin - who were involved in the 2012 communal violence against Rohingya in Arakan, were taken in among the six national members of the Commission (ARNO 2016). Simultaneously, the Rohingya leaders are concerned about the internal political equation in Myanmar regarding this initiative. Veteran Rohingya leader Chit Lwin argues, it is imperative that the NLD-led government has the political will to act upon the recommendations of the Kofi Annan Commission amidst strong opposition by the still powerful military with the Rakhine community (Lwin 2016).

After the commission was formed, Rakhine nationalists rejected the news that Annan would head the commission to discuss ethnic conflict and clashes in Myanmar's Rakhine state (Win 2016). The Arakan National Party vice chairperson Aye Nu Sein stated that it was not necessary to form another commission, since the administration of former President Thein Sein had created a Rakhine affairs investigating commission. She also stated "I object because this makes the issue an international affair rather than domestic" (VOA 2016). Members of the former ruling party and a splinter group from democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi's party also released a statement against this commission.

Apart from Rohingyas, other Muslim leaders in Myanmar are highly optimistic about the Kofi Annan Commission. Hossain Kader, Chulia Muslim leader, argues that the military-backed main opposition USDP is trying to destabilize the democratic government and provoking ultra Buddhist group against the peace process in Rakhine State. Some federal and regional political parties met at the USDP headquarters in Yangon and signed a joint statement against the NLD's initiative on Rakhine State. After the meeting, USDP spokesperson Khin Ye said,

"The whole nation condemns it. So do the political parties. People demonstrated. However, the commission is still operating. We don't denounce the establishment of the commission but we are pointing to the public concerns. We receive letters from the public saying they are worried. The government has responsibility for their concerns. Our statement is urging the government not to neglect the public concerns"(Win 2016).

Current violence and foiling the peace process

It is sad that following attacks on three police posts on October 9 in Maungdaw district by unknown alleged Rohingya assailants, the whole Maungdaw district in northern Arakan has turned into hell for the Rohingya. Under the pretext of looking for the attackers, there has been a combined military and police crackdown on the civilian population with a view to annihilating the remaining Rohingya population. At least 100 villagers were killed, hundreds of houses burned down or destroyed and more than 20,000 people were internally displaced (BROUK 2016). The military has prevented media persons as well as any supplies of food, medicine and essentials from getting through even by the WFP creating a great humanitarian disaster that

demands urgent attention of the international community (Arnold 2016). In this context, some views have come from different interviews in Yangon in the aftermath of October 2016 violence.

Generally, it can be said that the military, holding three powerful ministries, is behind the creation of ongoing human tragedies in order (i) to frustrate the Kofi Annan Commission so that the human rights situation in Rakhine state remain unaddressed, (ii) to keep the Rohingya majority area of northern Arakan under military control by raising false alarms of security or so-called terrorism; (iii) to produce IDPs in Maungdaw district was done in Akyab/Sittwe district with the aim of destroying them ultimately; (iv) to permanently divide the two sister communities of Rohingya and Rakhine on ethnic and religious lines; (v) to divert the attention of the people away from the ongoing war in Kachin State.

During the field work in Yangon, various Rohingya and other ethnic Muslim politicians and civil society members agreed that the Rohingya issue should be resolved within the Burmese constitutional framework. They denied any involvement with separatist-militant groups rather preferring to live in peaceful political co-existence in Burma. They were even sometimes embarrassed by exile activists' role on Burma politics. Some exiled leaders have separatist aspirations but they are not a major force among the Rohingya community in Burma (Ullah, Tahay 2016).

The country representative of the Pyidaungsu Institute, Dr. Sai Oo, clearly stated that there is no effective opposition party in the parliament, but the military played a de facto role of opposition (Oo 2016). Three major ministries are now controlled by the military and they are only accountable to the Chief of Staff. A mature political leadership has not developed as yet because of the decades-long military rule in Myanmar. As a result, major state machineries are not under the control of a democratic government. Open-minded progressive forces exist in the society but ultra nationalist groups are much stronger in both groups, making it easy for them to hinder the peace process. It should be noted that that NLD government is earnestly trying to mitigate ongoing violence in the border town Maungdaw. However, the Union Home Minister, who is a representative from the military, speaks very aggressively and attempts to terrorize the Rohingyas to leave the country.

This research fieldwork suggested that that majority Rohingya and other ethnic Muslims are ready to help the NLD's Commission. However, misguided Rohingya youths trained in Afghanistan have tried to destabilize the Arakan/

Rakhine State in the name of religious war. At the same time, the military-backed USDP and Rakhine Buddhist ultranationalist also play an aggressive role and provoke fresh violence all over the country against the Muslims.

The History of Patani's Identity in the Context of the Building of the Thai Nation-State

Patani has a long history of being an old Sultanate before being annexed to the modern Siamese state in 1909 under the Anglo-Siamese Treaty. Thus, violence and conflict in Thailand's Deep South might have unfolded from different factors, but central to these factors is identity politics. For years after the formation of the modern nation-state, the Thai state had drastically rearranged and transformed Pattani's elite and political structures, particularly in terms of governance and Islamic educational and legal systems, into a more secularized, Thai-oriented system. The succeeding violence is essentially a renewed version of the older separatist struggles of the early twentieth century, followed by the underground movements of 1960s and 1970s. How far the current groups are linked to the previous generations of insurgents remains an open question, but the root cause of the problematic embodies the same dimension of conflict between the centralized state and the resistance movements representing the interests and grievances of an ethnic minority - a multifaceted state-minority conflict.

For many Malay-Muslims in Thailand's Deep South, the basic underlying factor that explains the conflict in terms of identity politics is that they are "very proud of an identity that they considered highly distinctive, as Malays, as Muslims and as people of Patani, an ancient kingdom and center of Islamic learning and culture" (McCargo 2008, 4). However, the creation of the Thai nation-state through geographic mapping of the country's borders, represents not only marking territory, but also spreading the idea of nationhood, arousing nationalism, patriotism or other messages about the nation, which have led to the feeling of otherness and alienation among the different ethnic minorities (Winichakul 2008, 137). The suppression and assimilation of other ethnic groups in other parts of Thailand has, as in the Deep South, resulted in conflict in the different regions of Thailand, but they have somehow to a greater or lesser extent, been resolved. For years, however, the most critical and sustainable segment of resistance movements in Thailand's recent history is embodied in the violent conflict in the region of the Deep South.

There are two strands of reaction to centralization in the Deep South, violent and non-violent movements. The past century of the region has been characterized by periodic bouts of insurgency. During the 1930s and 1940s, the movements were clearly put down to partly become a silent monument representing Dusun Nyor of Narathiwat (Satha-Anand, 2007). In the 1970s, the insurgent movements were linked to palpable separatist motivations. Many of their leaders surrendered under an amnesty policy announced in the 1980s and, as a consequence, the government of Prem Tinsulanond during this time was able to bring about a temporarily peaceful period. The security forces were not so abusive; the special central government agency, the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center (SBPAC) had been established to report problems directly to Bangkok leaders and violence was kept to manageable levels. However, most of the Malay-Muslims in the region still have limited access to educational and employment opportunities. But some who have endured through these difficulties have still been able to be parts of peaceful movements through democratic parliamentary processes when these have been available in Thailand.

The peaceful reactions in response to the centrally-ruled Siamese systems have evolved under the context of a democratic, open polity that could be considered the “representative rule” of the Thai State meant to reframe and address the issue of a “legitimacy-deficit,” where power suffers from a weakness and the ruled Malay-Muslims of old Patani withdraw their consent, often described as delegitimation (McCargo 2008, 15). The most significant peaceful movement emerged in 1975, when a large-scale demonstration in front of Pattani’s provincial hall to protest against the killing of 5 Malay Muslims by the Thai marines led to the incident of an explosion with 12 fatalities and scores of injuries. In 1988, a huge demonstration in Yala province to protest against the official prohibition of Muslim women to wear headscarves in accordance with an Islamic standard led to the general recognition of women’s Islamic dressing in public spaces. These have been some of the political memories that later generations of Malay Muslims are aware of (Panjor 2012, 18-34).

The open political space during the 1980s and 1990s was characterized by the transformation of identity politics to be a kind of mixed composition. On the one hand, the Malay Muslims had more opportunities to express their identity through a democratic political process. There were many local political figures who struggled within Thai political terms, such as Wan Nor Matha, Den Tomena, and the Wah Dah group. This characterizes the politics of minority

representation where Malay Muslims could entertain certain political space and privileges in return for accepting the political framework of the Thai state (McCargo 2008, 83).

On the other hand, armed separatist groups have also been active since the late 1960s, particularly in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The largest and most effective group of several operating then was PULO (Patani United Liberation Organization). The PULO has kept their demands for an independent Islamic state but the major characteristic of this movement is that it is more ethno-nationalist than Islamist. For years, as mentioned above, the Thai state managed to cope with the insurgencies by political and economic reforms that weakened support for the armed groups and, as a result, many fighters accepted laying down their arms to the authorities. All the while, insurgency movements had hidden underground and prepared their recruitments by the mid-1990s. Armed struggle over identity politics has never finished. There are many active and effective groups, such as BRN-C (Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate, National Revolutionary Front-Coordinate) who recruit within Islamic schools; Pemuda, a separatist youth movement (part of which is controlled by BRN-C), is responsible for a large proportion of day-to-day sabotage, shooting and bombing attacks; GMIP (Gerakan Mujahidin Islam Patani, Patani Islamic Mujahidin Group), established by Afghanistan veterans in 1995, is committed to an independent Islamic state; and New PULO, established in 1995 as an offshoot of PULO and the smallest of the active armed groups, is fighting for an independent state (International Crisis Group 2007).

New Turn of Violence from 2004 onward

After a certain period of relative calm and simmering conflicts during the 1980s and 1990s, the surge and escalation of violence in 2004 shocked many people. Amidst the confusion, however, there are clear patterns of violence in terms of locations, victims, and tactics of operations (Jitpiromsri 2007, 109). The violence differs from the other types of criminal actions because of its political aims and motives and their far-reaching psychological repercussions beyond the immediate victims or targets. It is obviously the expression of identity politics through other means.

The response of the Thai state to the expansive violent conflict has been an approach of counterinsurgency. Since the escalation of the Southern conflict in 2004, the security-oriented approach has developed its own dynamism, interacting with the armed struggle of the militant movement. Its most

remarkable feature is the overall number of personnel serving in the security agencies. Altogether, the level of “securitization” of the region is indicated by more than 150,000 “hard power” armed soldiers including more than 40,000 military and police personnel amidst an overall population of approximately 2 million, i.e. a “militarization” rate of 8.2 %. After the modification by the Thai government’s Southern policies in the second half of 2007, there was a gradual de-escalation of violence. The incidents of violence decreased down a significant level and have leveled off. After the failure of the policy to stem the violence through a heavy-handed approach during 2004 to 2007, the combination of political and military approach has proved to be an effective tool of the government to stem the insurgencies. The approach of politics leading the military appeared to be more fruitful.

Nevertheless, central to this policy seems to be a focus on gaining the upper hand in the war through winning the hearts and minds of the local people, while doing away with any serious attempt to cope with the root causes of conflict – namely the issues of identity and poverty. The economic development policy and civil affairs activities, as major components of the structural adjustment policy to enhance military operations, failed to achieve intended goals, specifically in terms of socio-economic development for equal redistribution (Jitpiromsri and McCargo 2010, 165-66). In 2016, the World Bank Report has shown that despite higher budgets provided to the conflict-affected areas to improve service delivery and gain the confidence of local communities, the Deep South has continued to lag behind in several development indicators, particularly in education. Poverty rates in the Deep South have remained stubbornly above national averages and remain at 33 percent in 2013 (World Bank 2016, 52).

Deep South Peace Processes: Moving Forward, but a Slow Course

After 12 years of violence, on February 28, 2013, the Royal Thai Government represented by the National Security Council (NSC) and the most powerful resistance movement group, the National Revolutionary Front (BRN), signed a general consensus document on a Peace Dialogue Process. The event came into existence with the active support of the Malaysian government, which took the function as a facilitator. During the peace talks, BRN had proposed five demands to the Thai government:

- 1) The "Siamese (Thai) government" must accept the role of the Malaysian government as “mediator” of the peace talks and not just as a "facilitator".

2) The peace talks will be attended by only the Malayus led by BRN, and the authorities of the Siamese (Thai) government. (“Melayu” is the self-description of the BRN, used only for Thais of Malay origin in the deep South. It is one key to negotiations.)

3) Representatives of ASEAN members, members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and other non-governmental organizations should be allowed to observe the discussions.

4) The Siamese authorities must release all detained suspects without conditions, and must suspend and stop issuing additional arrest warrants for other suspects.

5) The BRN’s status must be recognized as a Patani liberation movement, not an insurgency group.

The Thai government was reluctant to accept the demands from BRN. However, the significance was some form of a peace dialogue. The dynamic of this peace process has opened up space for the discussion of contested political issues relating to the southern conflict, which was organized by both government agencies and local civil society groups inside and outside the southernmost region. A favorable atmosphere for peaceful conflict resolution has been constructed and implemented, which has resulted in a substantial decrease in lethal violence on the ground during the 40 days of Ramadan in 2013. The number of dead from insurgency-related violence had not declined since the outbreak of violence in 2004 except during this ceasefire agreement. However, the Thai Government and BRN still failed in perfectly maintaining the ceasefire throughout the 40-day period initially agreed upon (Jitpiromsri and Engvall, 2014). In addition, the peace dialogue was stalled because of political crisis in Bangkok.

After the Thai coup in 2014, the military government of General Prayut Chan-o-cha continued the peace dialogue with the new terms defined by the NCPO’s Statement of 98/2014 on July 30, 2014 concerning the “Solutions to the Problems in the Southern Border Provinces and the Prime Minister’s Order of 230/2557, which have further developed the government’s structure of the Deep South’s policy and peace dialogue into a complex two-structures and three-tiers approach. On the policy concerning the solution of the problems in the Deep South, the structure is comprised of the policy level led by the Chief of the NCPO, the policy implementation level led by the committee to drive the implementation of policy, and the operational unit level led by the Internal Security Operation Command Region 4 (ISOC 4). On the structure to

drive a peace process in the region of the Deep South, there are the steering committee led by the prime minister, the peace dialogue panel led by the appointed person who is a head of the dialogue team, and the area-based inter-agency coordination working group led by the director of ISOC4 (Deep South Watch 2015).

In the new context after the coup, the Malay Muslim insurgents have formulated a new umbrella organization called MARA Patani (Majlissyura Patani), comprising of BRN, three factions of Patani Liberation Organization-PULO, Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Pembebasan-GMIP and Barisan Islam Pembebasan-BIPP. There were unofficial meetings between the Thai government's Dialogue Panel and MARA Patani in Kuala Lumpur, facilitated by Malaysia. The new set of demands was brought up in the peace dialogue. Their demands, which are rather lame in comparison with the BRN demands in 2013, are as follows:

- 1) Putting the southern peace talks on the national agenda
- 2) Providing immunity from criminal prosecution for the groups it represents
- 3) Recognizing Mara Patani as its counterpart in the talks

The recognition of Mara Patani as a dialogue party is the most controversial issue. The Thai state's hesitation to recognize the group reflects a long-held policy to keep the southern conflict as a domestic affair. The Thai state seeks to prevent international interference in Thailand's sovereign issues. Foreign intervention might open the way for insurgents to claim independence, the worst nightmare of Thai elites. The military establishment is following advice from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to avoid any actions that "...may allow the situation in the South to be defined as a Non-International Armed Conflict in accordance with the International Humanitarian Law's Common Article 3" (Chalermripinyorat 2016).

On April 27 2016 in Kuala Lumpur, the meeting of the Joint Working Group-Peace Dialogue Process (JWG-PDP), the official name of the unofficial peace talks between the Thai military government and MARA Patani, was held. The head of the Thai government's dialogue panel, Party A, General Aksara Kerdpol, informed the meeting that the Thai government was not ready to endorse the Terms of Reference (TOR) because the Thai Prime Minister had not yet approved it. Mara Patani, however, stated that it would give ample time for the Thai government to review the agreed TOR and inform the Malaysian facilitator of its decision in due course. The response by the Thai

leader was harsh. General Prayut Chan-O-Cha made a statement that “... Thailand cannot negotiate with law breakers. It must be based on a law and justice process... Why should we accept their demand of how they should be called? You know how many groups there are? You know why the talks were held abroad; because they could not be held in the country,” he added. The spokesperson of MARA Patani subsequently raised a pertinent question: “How could one be considered sincere and truthful when one can't even mention his dialogue partner's name ?”(Abu Hafez Al-Hakim 2016).

Currently, the status of stalemate in the peace dialogue is of concern considering the trend of the Deep South's violence that seems to vary and fluctuate in a certain way formulating distinct characteristics. The situation has been clearly volatile, confusing and complex, and thus there is a high chance of escalation. The trend of violent incidents over recent years has formulated a highly variant pattern. To be sure, the intrinsic equilibrium forces need to be maintained through the continuing process of building common spaces and supporting peaceful, political solutions. The future of Thailand's Deep South, at best, could be appropriately defined by the report of World Bank Group in 2016 that “While the attempt at dialogue is encouraging, the insurgency remains active, levels of violence are significant, and it is not clear how and when a definitive end to the conflict will be secured” (World Bank 2016, 31).

The Comparative Perspective

In the past, Rohingya Muslims tried to merge with neighboring Muslim dominated Pakistan at the time of independence, which was not successful. The legacy was a deep mistrust between the Rohingya Muslims and the majority Burmese-Rakhine Buddhists. After the military took over in Burma, the Rohingya community became more isolated from mainstream politics even though some Rohingya leaders were highly placed in the new regime. But Malay Muslims in Thailand's Deep South have no intention to merge with neighboring Muslims in Malaysia. The Patani Malay would be more likely to have an autonomous governance and some of them have put forward the demand for self-determination, an ambiguous term sometimes overlapping with independence.

In Myanmar, most of the Rakhines and Burmese became closer through their protection of the Buddhist identity and Buddhist land from the Rohingya Muslims. Both Buddhist groups claim that there are no Rohingya in

Myanmar's history and all migrated since the colonial period from neighboring Bangladesh. Moreover, Rakhine nationalist leaders have tried to get support from other parts of the country, creating a discourse that Islam is a dangerous religion for Hinduism and Buddhism. But the Thai government has tried to avoid the religious prejudice, at least on the surface. The public discourse about the harmonious society where Buddhists and Muslims have coexisted and lived together for a long time is propagated. The terms "Thai Muslims" is coined to reconfirm that sort of imagined peaceful society. However, violence from both sides has deeply undermined the inter-religious relationships.

For both cases, there are two paths characterizing the struggle for identity- violent and non-violent movements. But the non-violent movements of Malay Muslims appear to be more receptive in Thai society than those of their coreligionists in Myanmar. Malay Muslim politicians are accepted in the Thai National Parliament while the Rohingya Diaspora and political leaders inside Burma accuse the government of not including any Rohingya representatives in the Rakhine Inquiry Commission that was established in August 2012. With many difficulties, the Malay Muslims in the Deep South of Thailand could bring about some policy changes, which does not seem likely in the case of the Rohingya.

The NLD has a strong pledge to establish peaceful co-existence among the people of Myanmar and organized the 21st Century Union Peace Conference. However, no Muslim or Rohingya representatives were invited to that conference. Two Rohingya political party leaders were present at the inaugural, but were not allowed in the working session. For the Malay Muslims in Thailand, the peaceful movement to enhance their local identity has been partially successful. The Thai government accepted the implementation of Islamic law in private property with Islamic judges in Thai court, even though they have limited power. The politicians from Wada group could change the rule that prohibited Muslim women from wear the headscarf (hijab) and the Thai system of education has opened space for private Islamic schools. The educational subsidies for the Islamic schools have become a driving force for expanding Islamic education. The initiation of the peace dialogue in 2014 has somewhat changed the local situation, in spite of its slow-moving nature.

Conclusion

In general, one can say that both cases share a similar form of identity conflict. However, Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar have suffered more than the Malay Muslims in the Deep South of Thailand. The Rohingya Muslims have been suppressed, subdued, and prejudiced against by the Buddhist Rakhines and Burmans for decades and their hope for accommodation through a peace dialogue or political process is slim. However, the plight of Malay Muslims in Thailand's Deep South is still mixed and could possibly become better or worse. The elected politicians who are Malay Muslims are still waiting for next year's general elections promised by the military regime. The peace dialogue between the political wing of the separatist groups and the representatives of the Thai government in Malaysia is moving forward slowly, but the hope is dependent on the success of organizing effective safety zones to protect the soft targets in public spheres. There are still many challenges for the Malay Muslims to reach their demands for self-determination.

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Communication and Media for Peace and Conflict Transformation

A Stage for the Unknown? What Theatre Art Can Bring to Peacebuilding

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Abstract

This article explores possible connections of theatre art and peacebuilding, particularly in the field of reconciliation and healing. Presenting the context of reconciliation in Nepal ten years after the end of the armed conflict, it argues for complementary processes of top-down and community-based, bottom-up approaches to reconciliation. It introduces the concept of “theatre-facilitated dialogue” as a way to strategically integrate Playback Theatre in peacebuilding work. By staging a non-cognitive dialogue through storytelling, music and theatre, Playback Theatre has shown strong potential to support personal healing and relationship-building at the community level. However, to fully unfold its capacity for peacebuilding, conscious and critical planning for the project framework and its implementation are necessary.

Analyzing the case of the project “En Acting Dialogue”, the authors present the structure, outcomes, and learning of theatre-facilitated dialogue work in communities where former combatants of the Nepali People’s Liberation Army (PLA) have settled. The study is based on a theoretical overview of secondary resources, the writers’ participatory observations, informal interviews, and quantitative monitoring data of the project.

It shows how the creation of a safe space during each performance is an integral aspect for changing hostile relationships between ex-combatants and so-called conflict victims. Further, it argues that storytelling processes can contribute to understanding the root causes of the conflict on a deeper level and to creating linkages from the violent past to a desired future.

Keywords: *Peacebuilding, Reconciliation, Theatre Art, Dialogue, Playback Theatre, Nepal, Storytelling, Trauma Healing, Integration of combatants*

Introduction: Peacebuilding and Theatre

With the growth of Peace and Conflict Studies as an independent research sector, the role of arts in peacebuilding has been gaining more and more attention. Sociologist J. Paul Lederach found the words to describe the crucial role of creativity in peace processes: “People living in settings of deep-rooted conflict are faced with an extraordinary irony. Violence is known; peace is a mystery. By its very nature, therefore, peacebuilding requires a journey guided by the imagination of risk” (Lederach 2005, 39). He emphasizes the fact that peacebuilding also includes taking risk which requires the capability to imagine the unknown. This is highly important given the fact that a major share of what is taught under the label of “Peacebuilding skills” is focusing on cognitive and analytical skills. Accepting that we also need a non-cognitive process that includes the mysterious and the irrational, the question would be whether and how such a space can intentionally be integrated in a peacebuilding process. The Playwriter Erik Ehn describes the connection between theatre artists and peacebuilders as their capacity to open space without the intention to control results: “Theatre creates an emptiness, or an availability – you create imaginative space into which the audience may write themselves. Likewise, the peacebuilders do not want to create peace; they want to create a space in which ‘God’ can make peace come” (Cohen et al. 2011, 3).

Referring to the connections of art and peacebuilding, Cynthia Cohen states that artists can be the right persons to channel crucial processes of transitions from violence: “Artists can serve as mediators. In divided communities where violence has impaired people’s capacities to listen, artists can use the qualities of receptivity to facilitate expression, healing and reciprocal understanding” (Cohen 2003).

However, one might argue that art, like any kind of communication, cannot be created from a neutral position, nor can artists be seen as “outsiders” to a conflict scenario. Artists do have a special role in society with high potential for supporting creative change processes, but obviously their work does not automatically lead to peaceful transformation. So, where are the connecting points between arts and peacebuilding and what are the risks of both sectors losing their effectiveness when being wrongly brought together?

In the development sector, theatre has been widely accepted as a means of communication that can be especially beneficial in rural societies. Theatre can be experienced as a reality that is close to people’s own lives

and can influence people's thoughts and behavior. While some methods like street theatre and radio drama focus on the spreading of specific messages, interactive approaches like the Theatre of the Oppressed¹ and Playback Theatre give spaces to explore the lived reality as well as the "unknown" jointly with the audience².

In this text we explore, in greater depth, Playback Theatre as an approach that by its nature provides an empty space, where personal stories are mirrored with emotional resonance. People are invited on stage to tell their story and a group of actors and a musician enact it by carefully addressing different layers of what they have heard. They use movement, voice, music and a limited amount of simple props to create an artistic expression on the spot. Compared to the methods of Theatre of the Oppressed, Playback Theatre is less solution-oriented and more focused on deep listening, mutual understanding and recognition.

According to the co-founder of this approach, Jonathan Fox, the birth of Playback Theatre in the 70s came about as a result of frustration with the modern world – with its elitism and alienation - including frustration with the art sector (Fox 2009). While Playback Theatre initially spread in Western societies, it has however since reached more than 65 countries in the world, including conflict affected societies such as Colombia, Chile, Mexico, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, South Africa, Serbia, Lebanon, Israel/Palestine, Egypt, Turkey, Ukraine, Fiji and Nepal. Yet its application in peacebuilding is not to be seen without thorough analysis of its potentials and risk factors. In his article "Playback Theatre in Burundi – Can theatre transcend the gap?" Jonathan Fox for instance questions the framework in which peacebuilding organizations integrate Playback Theatre into their approaches and argues for a long-term perspective in the planning and implementation process (ibid.).

In this article, we discuss the question of how the Playback Theatre approach can be integrated in peacebuilding work, particularly in the field of reconciliation and healing. Analyzing the case of Nepal, we provide insights

1 The term "Theatre of the Oppressed" describes theatrical forms developed by the Brazilian theatre practitioner Augusto Boal since the 1960s. Augusto Boal was deeply influenced by the philosophy of dialogical learning of Paulo Freire and gives the audience an active role. Boal's theatre work strongly focuses on social and political change processes and is applied to transform different forms violence.

2 Both approaches work with non-scripted plays and value the power of improvisation. They invite the audience on stage to give them an active role in the theatre process.

into the perspective of project planning as well as learning from practical experiences in the implementation process³. After giving an overview of the Nepali context for reconciliation, we explore the concept of “theatre-facilitated dialogue” as an approach of making Playback Theatre a strategic element of peacebuilding work. Afterwards we present the case of the project “EnActing Dialogue”, implemented in Nepal since the beginning of 2015, and the learning it has provided in terms of contributions to peacebuilding. The case study is based on observations of training processes and performances, of informal interviews as well as quantitative data from 108 dialogue performances, which we use to analyze the outcomes of the newly introduced “empty space” of artistic creativity.

Reconciliation in the Nepali Context

In the decade-long armed conflict (1996 – 2006) between the Maoist People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Nepali state about 14000 people were killed and more than 1300 disappeared person’s whereabouts remain unknown. During the peace talks in 2006, the Nepali Government (represented by the Seven Party Alliance) and the then Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) formally committed to democratic transition and to addressing topics of discrimination, exclusion and human rights. In the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) the conflict parties also agreed to establish two truth-finding commissions and to establish transitional justice processes for healing and reconciliation. However, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and the Commission of Investigation on Enforced Disappeared Persons (CIEDP) were only founded in 2014 (8 years later) and the crimes from the conflict period have not yet been prosecuted. Some of the alleged perpetrators have even reached high positions in Nepali society⁴.

In 2012, the dissolution of the PLA cantonments and the resettlement of the former Maoist combatants were seen as milestones in the Nepali peace process. Because of the delay in the TRC process, this integration was initiated

3 Both authors are working in the reconciliation project ‘EnActing Dialogue’, which is being implemented by the German NGO CSSP- Berlin Centre for Integrative Mediation and its Nepali partner organization Pro Public.

4 Examples are Kuber Sing Rana’s promotion as Inspector General of the Police and Raju Basnet’s promotion as Brigadier General in 2013. See <http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/annual-report-nepal-2013>

during a phase where crimes from the conflict period could not be investigated. However, the settlement of the former combatants happened without directly refueling violence. It seems that the common desire for peace and prosperity was high enough to repress feelings of revenge or frustration over the limited change in social and political structures. Yet, a lot of work remains to be done.

Since their establishment the commissions have been criticized by many of the Nepali civil society actors for their slow pace and their negligence towards victims' concerns. In particular, the debate about whether perpetrators of crimes during the war can be granted amnesty has become one of the main controversies. The initial bill of the Nepali Government had breached international legal standards and was then rejected by the Supreme Court. Reconciliation was thus felt as a process that would try to protect the perpetrators rather than the victims. Thus, Nepali victims' groups advocate for being heard and for the right to forgive or reconcile on a voluntary basis. This describes a demand that often seems to be underestimated in peace processes: "the right not to reconcile is a key issue in understanding some resistance victim attitude to reconciliation, and one often forgotten by international actors as they blithely design post-conflict reconciliation processes in the abstract." (Bloomfield 2006, 24 in Fischer 2011)

One important issue when discussing reconciliation in Nepal is the local understanding of the concept. Reconciliation translates into Nepali as *melmilap*⁵, which can be understood as a mutual understanding in an atmosphere of harmony and unity. The principle of "social harmony" is of high importance in Nepali culture and it is linked to a balanced co-existing interdependence of different caste groups, ethnicities and religions. When dealing with conflicts there is a tendency of avoiding or negating (silencing) them by referring to the high value of "social harmony". In some narratives, even the fact that the country went through ten years of armed conflict seemed to be no more than an interruption in this overall harmony, rather than a symptom of a century old history of deep rooted structural violence. In that sense, the discourse around reconciliation in "social harmony" itself carries the potential to downplay concerns of disadvantaged and marginalized groups.

5 For non-Nepali peacebuilding actors it can be confusing, as the word *melmilap* has been recently introduced to translate "mediation" and distinguish it from what has former been understood as "arbitration" (*madhyasthata*). So the words used for reconciliation and mediation are currently the same which describes the fluidity of the process and reflects how local concepts differ from what is introduced by the international peacebuilding sector.

For the Israeli psychologist Dan Bar-On the term reconciliation is too strongly drawn from Christian beliefs and needs to translate into other cultures differently (Dudouet et al. 2008). He states that reconciliation requires a change in identity as well in addressing the root causes of a conflict: “The concept of reconciliation suggests that the enemies of yesterday will give up and let go of their hatred, animosity or wish for revenge, as well as their identity that had been constructed around the conflict. One expects that a new identity construction will develop together with new relationships between former enemies that will address the roots of the conflict, not only its unfortunate outcomes” (Fisher et al. 2011).

In the Nepali peace process the root causes of the conflict have remained widely unaddressed. There has yet been little change in structural areas like land reforms, citizenship law, policy on inclusion and mechanisms against corruption. Out of the 40 points that the PLA was demanding from the government when opting for their armed struggle, only a few have been fulfilled after Nepal was declared a democratic republic in 2008. The idea of a federal system to create a new and more inclusive balance in the country has mainly created new conflict lines⁶. In that sense one can claim that the idea of “social harmony” in Nepal is currently in a crisis.

Louis Kriesberg distinguishes the following four different dimensions of reconciliation as essential for conflict transformation in post-war societies: shared truth, justice, regard (referring to the recognition of the humanity of the others and their human rights) and security. Interestingly, he works out that the four dimensions cannot be fully realized simultaneously and might at times be contradictory (Fischer et al. 2011). Referring to the existing confusion of the term reconciliation, David Bloomfield argues that it should be understood as an “umbrella term” with justice as a key instrument in the process of relationship building (Bloomfield 2006). Like Dan Bar-On, he also advocates for complementary processes that are needed at the national and community level. While reconciliation as a top-down process implemented through

⁶ Federalism was integrated as an amendment to the CPA after the Madhesi uprising in 2007. When the federal system was then finally voted for in September 2015, lawmakers from Madhesi parties left in protest. The result of the government’s failure to integrate their concerns resulted in violent protests that killed at least 45 people in August and September 2015. Even one year later, the newly declared provinces only exist on paper and the administration is not yet in place.

truth commissions and legal reforms needs certain structures of governance, bottom-up processes at community level can already start without a national framework. However, both approaches are most effective when they complement each other: “Bottom-up, “cultural” reconciliation processes operate at the small scale interpersonal and/or grass-roots level, and have a complementary relationship to top-down, “structural” processes which take place within, and based on, the legitimacy of state-wide institutions” (Bloomfield 2006).

Theatre-facilitated Dialogue as a Peacebuilding Approach

Jenny Hutt and Bev Hosking have explored in detail how Playback Theatre can be a resource for reconciliation in the sense of supporting relationship building processes at the community level (2004). Interestingly, they state that most work done in conflict settings⁷ was not deliberately designed for peacebuilding, but rather for a broader social development purposes.

In this article, we use the term “theatre-facilitated dialogue” for interventions through Playback Theatre that are intentionally planned as part of a peacebuilding strategy. In order to understand the approach we first present what has been discovered as potential of the Playback Theatre and what is meant by the term “dialogue” in Playback Theatre. Further, we elaborate on how Playback Theatre dialogue can be placed in a peacebuilding intervention.

Contributions of Playback Theatre for Reconciliation

Playback Theatre creates a space that commits to certain values expressed in rituals that allow the audience to feel respected and safe. The framework for meaningful interaction for reconciliation is often referred to as safe space: “Psychological restoration and healing can only occur through providing the space for survivors of violence to feel heard and for the details of the traumatic event to be re-experienced in a safe environment” (Fisher et al. 2000: 130).

Trauma expert Kaethe Weingarten describes that “compassionate witnessing” is what allows people to express their “states of vulnerability” and also what helps them to connect with their own strength: “As difficult as it is to

⁷ Experiences were drawn from Jonathan Fox in Burundi, from the Middle East, India, Angola and the Fiji. Experiences were also shared from the US in dialogue work between people of color and white people as well between the Jewish and Muslim community.

put this story into words – and as painful as it is to feel the states of vulnerability – it is also the beginning of an antidote to the violence that inspired it” (Weingarten 2003: 232 in HuttHosking 2004). Jonathan Fox refers to Judith Herman’s theory of transforming traumatic experience into narrative memory as a prerequisite for restoring social order and for the healing of individual victims (Fox et al. 2008). Being able to access a person’s own traumatic memory and finding a safe space to share it with others is itself a way to healing. Playback activist and psychologist Ben Rivers writes that in Playback “trauma is revisited and re-examined”, as a result “tellers often report that during an enactment they are able to spontaneously recover memories that were long forgotten” (Rivers 2013). He summarizes the psychological benefits he observed in his Playback Theatre work in Palestine as: strengthening fortitude, empathic joining, emotional release, distance and perspective. Through Playback Theatre audiences get strengthened emotionally and are supported in joining as a community that can share difficult emotions and transform traumatic experiences (Rivers 2014). Recent trauma research has pointed out that the human memory is highly complex and works in several layers that our brain cannot access in the same way. The memory helps us to understand our own identity and to connect the present with the past. In this regard, our brain also has the capacity for resilience and for healing in the sense of transforming traumatic memories that are stored in the body into explicit memories (Levine 2015).

Even though Playback Theatre does not claim to be a therapeutic space, it does hold potential to stimulate processes where traumatic experiences are shared⁸. The transformation of the story into the space or artistic expression creates an “aesthetic distance” that can be the base for self-reflection (Scheff 2001 in HuttandHosking 2006). Tellers can observe their own story in a third space and witness their own feelings and reflections. Gaining this distance can support an inner healing process. As Playback Theatre is performed in a public, communal space, the effects also contribute to collective healing: “Collective

8 When introduced in peacebuilding projects, the risk for secondary traumatising of actors or audience needs to be thoroughly observed and mechanisms to support and strengthen the actors are mandatory. An example in Angola has shown that a Playback Theatre project had to be stopped because the implementing NGO did not feel capable to deal with the intensity of stories and lacked resources for of psychological and emotional support of the group (HuttandHosking 2004).

witnessing of a story by a community builds connections between the teller and members of the audience, as well as between the audience members themselves. It has the effect of strengthening the teller's relationship with the others present, and serves as a pathway to integrate or at times re-integrate an individual into their community" (HuttandHosking 2004: 11). The atmosphere of deep listening and equal acknowledging of all experiences creates a culture of inclusion and respect that can itself strengthen the awareness for social cohesion in the community.

The Concept of Dialogue in Playback

As Playback is a process of storytelling combined with artistic enactment it can hardly be compared with cognitive, interest-based dialogue held by different sides to a conflict. "Instead, it is a dialogue in the realm of story, image, emotion and physical action; an embodied, imaginative dialogue" (Salas 2005). Insofar as it focuses on real, personal stories and emotions, during a Playback Theatre ritual there is literally no space for discussing or arguing about different experiences and perspectives in a cognitive way. The concept of dialogue is thus understood in an indirect way, as personal stories are prompted by each other without expectation. "The dialogue proceeds through association and inspiration in relation to any aspect of what the teller has said and how the performers have brought it to life on stage" (ibid.).

Playback dialogue is in some ways a space for the "unknown", as neither depth of the dialogue or the content of the stories can be anticipated beforehand. The moderation of the process (called conducting) and the artists on stage will invite stories by creating a welcoming atmosphere, but whether or not people tell their stories depends on the level of trust that is being built up in the room. The way the stories create a common thread between each other which does then result in common themes has been analyzed as a process of collective healing (Hoesch 1999).

As actors are trained to show many layers of the story, Playback Theatre creates a space that avoids the oversimplifying and instrumentalizing of experiences (Fox 2008). As in mediation, when the mediator reframes statements of blaming, Playback actors are also trained to focus their artistic creation on the "heart of the story" and its emotional meaning. In that sense the conductor of the Playback Theatre has a special role in "co-creating" what the teller is telling by supporting and shaping the story, so that it can be enacted and at the same time open a space for more sharing in the audience: "Multiple

images, threads and themes are presented and those listening are free to find their own meaning and their own relationship with what is told. The relationship of the teller to their story is evident: we are not just relating to the story, but to the teller and the teller's relationship with their story" (Hutt and Hosking 2004).

Different from dialogue that is focusing on cognitive exchange of different conflict parties, the goal of a Playback Theatre dialogue is not to change opinions or the achievement of consensual thoughts or even certain agreements. As it can embrace different and even opposing narratives in the same acknowledging way one after another, Playback art can contribute to the integration of ambiguity and complexity of reconciliation processes in a way that goes beyond what can be expressed by words. As such it alters and expands each person's comprehension of the shared reality (Salas 2005). In that sense, the strength that Playback can offer in the field of the non-cognitive, emotional understanding can be part of the complexity that reconciliation processes demand: "it could well be part of a longer, more complex process in that direction [of reconciliation in the sense of agreements]. But it is likely to build a realm of openness in which people become less walled-off by their views and experiences, more receptive to each other as people" (ibid.).

Theory of change for theatre-facilitated dialogue

In Peacebuilding we need to be involved in a continuous reflection about our assumptions of how our interventions intend to influence the conflict setting. Theory of change is a flexible approach meant to encourage critical thinking in the design, implementation and evaluation of development activities (OSCD 2012). Interestingly, many storytelling projects have been poorly evaluated, assuming that the approach itself is positive. Questions of how the audience is selected and whether the shared stories could have also generated negative impacts such as cementing victimhood or social division have not been examined (Bush 2011). The assumption that public sharing of conflict-related memory can lead to a moment of catharsis that brings healing is implicitly guiding the justification of most storytelling work. In his anthropological research on theatre in war, James Thompson makes the analysis that stories themselves have both potentials, to deescalate as well as to escalate conflicts: "I believe that stories can unburden. They can become the triumphant mode for denouncing violence and having oppression heard, challenged and resisted.


However woven with them are tropes, forms, iterations and mystification that are also capable of re-marking violence or constructing new relationships of divisions, anger and bitterness” (Thompson 2005).

In the storytelling work of a theatre-facilitated dialogue the assumption for change is that the intervention can reduce grievances, fears and prejudices and enhance respectful coexistence, social cohesion and cooperation in conflict-affected communities. Playback Theatre actors can offer a space that does create trust, mutual understanding and healing within the audience and a wider community. The precondition is that the actors are well-trained in deep listening skills and are able to create an artistic representation of different layers and the core emotions in a story. Technically, the fact that the audience actually shares silenced stories that are related to the conflict stays out of control of the performers. They can merely give the opportunity by creating a safe space and their conductor can ask welcoming questions that help the audience access different layers of their memory. However, the assumption is that the actors’ open hearts and listening skills are conditions that make the telling for conflict-related stories likely. At the same time, the performers also deepen their skills in listening and enacting with every process of theatre-facilitated dialogue. So, the more they perform and reflect on their learning to refine their skills, the deeper the dialogue processes can become.

A further assumption is that a community divided by conflict will be especially challenged during the time of the top-down truth finding and reconciliation process of the national level commissions. The process of national truth finding can intensify existing fears and frustrations and support a climate of social and political polarization at community level. Theatre-facilitated dialogue work can be especially fruitful when being designed complementary to national-level processes, but they can also start before them and continue afterwards.

When thinking of Playback Theatre as part of a peacebuilding strategy it is then crucial to reflect on who are the actors that can represent the conflict setting in such a balanced way and how they can be accompanied in a way that they have sufficient space for self-reflection, so that they do not merrily reproduce or even escalate the conflict dynamic on stage. This includes criteria for selection as well as patterns for capacity building and long-term coaching mechanism. Further, there needs to be a reflection of how to invite an audience that represents diversity in relation to the conflict, so that it does not promote

a mutual confirmation and consolidation of one-sided perceptions without giving space for change in perception. It can be important to put a clear regional focus, so that theatre-facilitated dialogue is not a one-time event, but a space that is offered to the same community as part of a continuing process in community life. However, it is necessary to work beyond the performances, by involving key people of the community such as politicians, social workers, social activists and government representatives in the planning and implementation of the project. The inclusion of key people can increase feeling of local ownership for the dialogue events. This also can protect the project from potential spoilers that might be afraid of a certain narratives being told.



More People/Key People Framework for Theatre-facilitated Dialogue

Following the planning approach for Reflecting on Peace Practice Project (RPP)⁹, the question becomes how the process of theatre-facilitated dialogue integrates a “key people strategy” as well as a sociopolitical outreach.

⁹ For more details on the Reflecting on Peace Practice Project (RPP) approach, see: <http://cdacol-laborative.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Reflecting-on-Peace-Practice-1-Participant-Training-Manual.pdf>

Depending on the conflict setting, theatre artists can be chosen as the direct mediators to the conflict and can perform for a conflict affected or conflict related audience. However, if the artist's identity does not represent the conflict sides in a balanced way, it can be fruitful to work with dialogue facilitators, a group of people that are chosen as people with mediative capacities (concerning their personal background, their skills and also their network with political and social key actors). The dialogue facilitators can then be trained in the Playback Theatre approach with the support of theatre artists. Assuming that the actors of Playback performances are doing good work, the performances can achieve individual change for a larger part of society. However the question whether this can then have an impact at the socio-political level has to be well examined. One definite way to reach out to the socio-political level is with the clear involvement of "key people" as supporters to the dialogue work. The link between the local-level dialogue work and the national top-down processes can be especially beneficial to relate the achievements and the insights of integrating non-cognitive work to the public discourses on peace and conflict.

Case Study: the Project "EnActing Dialogue" in Nepal

"If you come with another short-term project, to open our wounds and then leave, then we are not interested!" (Ex-Combatant in Bardiya at the starting point of the project)

This statement was a clear warning from the side of a disappointed dialogue facilitator who was fed up with peace projects starting big and ending soon after. When working on reconciliation at community level, we assume a high level of responsibility and need to be at eye-level with those we are working with. If we fail to show integrity at a human level, reconciliation work at community level will not be fruitful.

The Framework of the Project

The project "EnActing Dialogue" was designed as a peacebuilding project for communities where high numbers of former Maoist combatants had settled after they had opted for reintegration in society in 2012. The first activities at the community level started in March 2015 as a continuation of another dialogue project that had phased out of funding in summer 2014¹⁰.

¹⁰ The initial work with ex-combatants after their reintegration was based on research that the Nepali NGO Pro Public conducted for the GIZ project 'Supporting Measures to

The idea to introduce theatre-facilitated dialogue to the same communities¹¹ was based on the belief that previous dialogue initiatives that had worked in small groups could increase their outreach in the community. Theatre was seen as a strong connector in Nepali communities which could reach people in a way that political dialogue initiatives would not. Nepali theatre artists were important mediators when it came to exploring the cultural adaptation of the Playback Theatre. They assisted in finding a Nepali name that grounds the approach in local practices of reconciliation at the community level¹².

With the support of the Nepali theatre artists, local dialogue facilitators were then trained as Playback Theatre groups. These local theatre groups were composed in an inclusive way with the intention to address the conflict dynamics in a balanced way. Half the groups were former Maoist combatants and the other half were members of the community from different backgrounds (different political affiliations, partly being victims of the conflict). The groups were selected according to a criteria of inclusion (50% women and balanced representation of different caste and ethnic groups) as well as based on their personal commitment and capacity to work for communal dialogue.

The capacity building of the dialogue facilitators was realized in a stepwise approach with training, experiencing performances and coaching. In 2015, ten trainings (basic and advanced) of four days each were organized for a total number of 60 people (12 artists and 48 dialogue facilitators)¹³.

Strengthen the Peace Process' (STPP). Here, local dialogue facilitation structures have been established in areas where major numbers of former combatants have resettled after leaving the cantonments. In 2012, social dialogue facilitators of different backgrounds (50% ex-combatants, 50% community members) were trained in four districts in order to generate trust and mutual understanding in selected communities. In 2013/14, Pro Public continued and expanded the work of dialogue facilitation to six additional districts with the support of the Nepal Peace Trust Fund (NPTF) of the Nepali government.

11 The project was introduced in six communities of the Nepali Terai districts: Bardiya, Banke, Dang, Rupandehi, Mohattari and Udayapur that had already been part of Pro Public's dialogue work since 2013.

12 In the first training in March 2015 the actors decided to translate Playback Theatre as Chautari Natak (Chautari Theatre) in Nepali. Chautari is a communal resting place under the Bal and Pipal tree and of great cultural and social importance. It exists in almost every Nepali village and its shadow serves as a place for social gatherings and for taking rest. In the past it was also the place for traditional justice mechanisms such as the village kachahari, a form of arbitration by the elders.

13 The trainings were designed for groups of 12 to 16 participants. The advanced level trainings were organized on district level for a group of 8 dialogue facilitators. For a detailed description

In 2016, five advanced level trainings of five to six days were organized for the same group. The trained dialogue facilitators organized 186 Playback Theatre events in the target communities from March 2015 to September 2016 (78 dialogues were organized in 2015 and 108 in 2016). As the work with traumatic stories includes strong personal development the ongoing support in self-reflection and learning from practice is mandatory. For this reason the Playback groups were visited regularly and after observing their performances one-day refresher trainings were designed as coaching support to the dialogue facilitators in 2016.

The target communities for the performances were chosen by them in close coordination with local key actors for peace and the project staff of Pro Public. They were villages with high numbers of ex-combatants and conflict victims (family members of disappeared, killed or tortured people) and the attempt was to invite them equally. Whenever possible, members of the police, military and representatives of political parties and local administration were also invited. Altogether more than 10,000 audience members were reached through these theatre-facilitated dialogue events¹⁴. The audience was composed in an inclusive way. However the percentage of female observers was above average (about 65% of female), mostly due to the fact that many men had left their villages as labor migrants.

Besides the community level engagement of the project, there is a component to reach out to the national-level by involving members of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and the Commission of Investigation on Enforced Disappeared Persons (CIEDP). Documentary film material of the theatre-facilitated dialogue events at grassroots level was shown to the national level reconciliation bodies and selected dialogue facilitators were invited to the capital for a direct interaction program with them. The goal was to sensitize the government to developments and needs at the community level and also to have a forum of discussion of how top-down and bottom-up approaches can complement each other.

on the start of the project in 2015, see: Dirnstorfer 2016.

14 Different to street theatre, which is performed in the open space and can attract several hundred people at a time, Playback performances are organized in inside spaces and in relatively intimate audiences of around 50 to 60 people.

Learning from Performance Patterns

From the close monitoring process of the project (qualitative and quantitative) it was learned that the theatre-facilitated dialogue events were well-attended and received positive feedback from the audiences. The support of local leaders and community workers is often crucial in the organization of the performances and for inviting the selected audience from conflict-affected communities. The dialogue facilitators state that it is mostly easy for them to gather an inclusive audience, owed to the fact that theatre works as a strong social connector in Nepal.

The stories that came up in the dialogue performances differ in each district and from village to village. Almost 90% of the performances related to the armed conflict in some way. However the majority of shared stories within a performance do relate to other topics¹⁵. Partly, it is the nature of the trust building process that needs other stories as well, so that the stories from the past can be shared. Partly the openness of the stage in Playback Theatre creates connection between past and present that are not cognitive but guided by emotions and associations. Conflict-era related topics that appeared in the performances were linked to combatting/fighting (58.3%), threatening (41.7%), torture (41.7%), killing (22.2%), disappearance (16.7%) and abduction (14.8%). Other topics that emerged in high numbers were often connected to the wider root causes of the conflict, such as poverty (31.5%), domestic violence (30.6%) and caste discrimination (13%). Some stories might have also just related to difficult personal situations such as accidents (29.6%) and sickness (21.3%) that are experienced in a context of a weak health system. Migration is one of the topics that was especially strong in the stories of the more urbanized communities (44% in Rupandehi and 33% in Mohattari) and can be seen as one of the consequences of the low economic capacities in the post-conflict society. The fact that audiences decide by themselves what they want to share implies a “risk” for the peacebuilding project’s assumption that sharing can lead to healing. However, the voluntary response of the tellers is one of the core principles guiding the work and is also a main reason that it is appreciated.

15 The figures relate to the monitoring data of 108 performances in 2016. Multiple issues could be marked as content of stories per performances; hence the percentage refers to the amount of performances in which the issue was relevant.

Breaking of Silence as a Moment of Risk

Observation and interviews have shown that audience members are relieved after being able to share as well as of seeing their story enacted. Many express their experience in a tone of surprise, noting that they wouldn't have thought they could really become tellers, nor did they expect such a positive feeling afterwards. To become a teller is something that is mostly decided spontaneously, triggered by the atmosphere and the sudden feeling that this might be a safe space where they can take the risk to talk. A storyteller from Bardiya district shared her story related to the disappearance of her husband in 2004 and the fact that she did not have any information about whether he was alive or dead. *"I came to observe Playback Theatre, and however, it was about telling a real life story. I thought, I should not miss the opportunity to share my story as I could not sleep well for years"*. Indirectly, she also expressed an expectation for finding inner peace by sharing what had happened to her.

Observing the actors on stage and listening to the music stimulates the audience to connect with their emotions and to access parts of their memories they are otherwise not showing. A female storyteller from Banke district says, *"It has been nine years, and I have never shared this story to anyone and hidden it within me. After sharing, I am feeling so relived and my heart is light now"*.

Often, the courage to tell a deep, personal story seems to itself bring a breakthrough for an individual's suffering. Once a story is shared in a performance, the story becomes a public story and the experience of being heard (referred to as *collective witnessing* by Hutt and Hosking 2004) can be empowering for a teller and giving him/her the confidence to be part of the community. Interestingly, the feeling of being alone and misunderstood seems to negatively affect both victims as well as combatants from the armed conflict. A female ex-combatant and dialogue facilitator from Mahottari district reflects: *"Community people could hardly understand our real feelings because they were entirely indifferent to us. People remained detached from us and simply could not understand or see connections between their lives and ours. The greatness of the Playback Theatre is to really focus on the emotions of a storyteller in an empathetic way, and this has brought community people closer and enabled them to restore their relations with us"*.

The creative space on stage triggers connections between stories and it can support finding shapes even for complex stories or contradicting emotions.

A performance in Bardiya district started with a woman sharing a love story that had started when she worked as a migrant worker in Malaysia. She and her lover had a relationship for several years but when returning to Nepal she found out that he was actually already married and had no interest in continuing with her. She felt deeply disappointed and cheated on as she had fully entrusted her life to him. After the actors had enacted this personal tragedy, an ex-combatant came to stage and told the story of his life's betrayal that was deeply linked to the armed conflict: *We were once in the combat with my comrades and we were attacking an army camp. However we were located a bit down the hill and the bombs that we were throwing uphill were ironically coming back towards us. I lost a close friend in this attack... Sometimes, I feel that this whole war was a story of betrayal. I entered the PLA as a child. I have giving my life to the Maoist vision. However, once the party came to power after the war, they had left us behind and forgot about us.*

Looking at the content level of these two stories one would not find them so obviously linked. However, when focusing on the emotion of deep disappointment and total loss of trust and meaning, they clearly follow the same pattern. Interestingly, the combatant came to the stage right away, knowing on a subconscious level, that his story would have to follow next. However, when starting to tell he suddenly seemed to struggle a bit about how to tell and what to focus on. There were too many interrelated stories, too many experiences from the war that he could have shared. He seemed confused, yet clear that he did want to share. The facilitator had to help him focus and shape his story. Eventually he found the way by taking the metaphor of the betrayal to "create" his story.

Often tellers feel that their story is unique and maybe far too complex to be told. The common thread between the stories and the different level of connections strengthens a sense of interdependence and of belonging to the same community. In that way, a teller that takes the risk to tell his/her story is often telling it in the name of many others. Regularly, people who do not share a story on stage express a feeling that they also have similar ones and listening to others makes them feel better as they realize that they are not alone.

Opening Eyes and Hearts for Each Other

Long-term observations have shown that after a year of project implementation negative images such as discriminating stereotypes, prejudices and rumors can transform through the support of theatre-facilitated dialogue

events. Images of who is a “victim” or who a “perpetrator” get blurry as the contradictions in these categories become more obvious. By telling their story, individuals can liberate themselves from images they feel burdened by. One of the dialogue facilitators from Bardiya district shares: *“We, the ex-combatants, came to be perceived differently in this community. Now, Playback Theatre has given us a space for connecting with other community people and a chance to change their perception toward us”*. In other districts, ex-combatants tell of similar results. Negative feelings towards them seemed to decrease due to the theatre program. In Dang, ex-combatants expressed how they had often been negatively addressed as “camp people”, a term that has now been used less frequently due to the growing awareness of each other’s experiences.

In some cases, participation in a theatre-facilitated dialogue has brought direct change in life situations. In Rupandehi district, a young widow had told her story of being discriminated against through rumors and superstition. Her husband was killed during the armed conflict and afterwards she was blamed as a “husband eater” and seen as a “bad omen” in the eyes of her in-laws. When the actors showed her story in a respectful way, it created an environment for positive responses towards her. The family and community members who were present in the same performances could develop empathy and gradually changed their attitude towards her. Later on, the family decided that they should treat her like their own daughter rather than a daughter-in-law. She got their permission to re-marry another person and start a new life. This dramatic change in perception towards her was unbelievable to her beforehand. It can be argued that the safe space provided to share her story in a way that it touched the hearts in her community supported a change in thinking that could transform her life.

In this sense the theatre-facilitated dialogue events also support an increase in the sensitivity of communities, allowing them to extend their awareness and acceptance of diversity. Partly, this can be seen as an engagement to work on the root causes of the conflict -not in the sense of directly challenging them, but rather in creating an atmosphere in which people open their hearts more to perceiving each other without blame and without denial.

A Path of Personal and Collective Development

An important aspect learned from the project is that one should be prepared for the domino effect that the empathic sharing through Playback Theatre can have. For the actors the regular performing of other people’s

stories will trigger more and more of their own stories. The storytelling work increases their self-awareness and self-reflection and also brings up memories they might otherwise not access. The initial assumption that theatre artists were not directly affected by the war and could thus support the project as “outsiders” to the community was only partly true. When listening to the stories from the communities, we had to realize that literally everyone in our group had his or her stories that were in one way or another linked to the war, to direct atrocities or to the root causes such as extreme poverty and gender-based violence. Hence, it was necessary to support the self-reflection spaces for the artists serving as Playback Theatre trainers just as well as for the ex-combatants and community people in the target communities.

In the context of the project, it was crucial to plan for free time and adequate breaks where these reflection processes could happen. Further, in the advanced skill development the enactment for traumatic stories had to be given a special focus. When stories of strong violence are shared, actors are frequently challenged and tend to choose modes of enactment that are less literate (such as through poems). To find the right level of showing violence while at the same time strengthening the resilience of the teller is a challenging process in creating the space for healing. The more actors and dialogue facilitators have had spaces to reflect on their own stories, the easier it is for them to deal with other people’s heavy weight.

Conclusion: Knowledge around the Unknown

As a conclusion, it can be stated that theatre art, when integrated well into a peacebuilding strategy, can contribute significantly to the success of peace work. In conflict-affected societies, cognitive dialogue on social or political issues alone cannot address the complex needs to strengthen coexistence and social cohesion.

The experiences from the project “EnActing Dialogue” have shown that theatre-facilitated dialogues can refer to the unknown in a double sense: on the one hand, the Playback Theatre approach has the capacity to bring up memories and stories from the past that might not be completely accessible by cognitive thinking. These stories might have been unknown as they had been silenced out of fear from the tellers who avoid dwelling on them or out of social taboos that make certain topics difficult to express to others. Sharing them brings relief, inner distance and often also the realization of not being alone.

The theatre approach offers a normative space that is safe and where imagining an unknown future in peace can grow. The rituals of sharing in Playback Theatre follow a pattern of deep respect for every individual perspective. The actors are trained in refining their capacities to perform every single story in a unique, creative and acknowledging way. A communal space for deep listening where connections on an emotional level can be experienced and expressed increases the trust in the possibility of newly defined relationships. In that sense, theatre-facilitated dialogue can foster imagination of peace on personal as well as on an inter-personal level. Furthermore, it can link the past to the future and support communities in finding meaning and trust in a joint process forward.

In the Nepali context, the harmful root causes of the conflict are still hard to address in a meaningful way. There has been too much political propaganda, rigidity and defensive reactions on the part of those in privileged positions. During the theatre-facilitated dialogues, people share their stories of suffering and most of them do in one way or another relate to the conflict-era and its root causes. Being in a space of art, people feel the emotional connections of their stories and get a sense of them all belonging together. They develop empathy for each other and might even develop a deeper awareness of what root causes have affected their lives.

For peace workers thinking of integrating arts in their work, they should see the benefits and the risks and take it as a challenge as well as a responsibility to the process. Arts will certainly never be the only answer to supporting peace. However, there might be spaces where only non-cognitive work can achieve what needs to be done. Theater-facilitated dialogue can contribute when political processes are stuck or too slow; it can bring individual and collective healing and support by weaving together the broken social patterns of a community. The need to find acceptance and acknowledgement in one's own community seems to be universal and arts provide a space that can create depth and meaning where words might fail. Every cultural context demands its own application of the Playback Theatre approach and it is crucial to give time for adapting and experimenting. Further, projects for theatre-facilitated dialogue should be thoughtfully designed in relation to each conflict setting. They should integrate a long-term trust-building and learning process that supports the personal development of everyone involved. Continuous monitoring and evaluation of the impact on actors, audiences and communities

should be an integral part of the peacebuilding interventions. Hopefully, theatre-facilitated dialogue projects will spread to many areas of need as knowledge on their positive and peace-conductive effects are widely shared.

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Biography

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Peacebuilding in South Asia

***Azadi* – a Call for Political Transition in Kashmir**

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Abstract

According to a standard definition, the meaning of the word *azadi* is “freedom” or “independence”. In India-administered Kashmir, this word is widely used in the fight for self-determination and political transition. However, its meaning has been evolving over the years. It has traditionally been understood to mean freedom from oppression and injustice. Later, it came to be understood in the context of having the right to be involved in the political life of Kashmir. With the partition of India, *azadi* began to be used in the sense of fighting for a choice of representation and, with time, understood as the right to self-determination and having an independent state. It is also associated with Muslim concepts due to the fact that a majority of the inhabitants of Kashmir are Muslims. The evolution of the idea is related to the question of identity that is based on territory, language, and perhaps most of all, religion. Thus, it is strongly linked to the rise of political consciousness in the Kashmir Valley. Currently, the fight for *azadi* continues and represents a call for political transition. The meaning of this word in Kashmir is essential to properly analyzing the conflict and understanding the political culture of Kashmir.

Keywords: *azadi, Kashmir, freedom, independence, conflict*

Azadi – the Call for Self-determination and Political Transition in Kashmir

The topic of this paper is “*Azadi* – call for political transition in Kashmir.” *Azadi* is a term of Persian origin meaning “liberty; freedom from worldly cares” (Steingass 1992:42). Hindi and Urdu dictionaries define it as “freedom, independence, release, deliverance” (McGregor 2013:82, Prasād 2014: 121) as well as “liberation, discharge; freedom of action, liberty” (Platts 2007: 45). The same meaning of the term is found in the Kashmiri language (Grierson 1932: 1245). In the political and social context of the 20th century, the term

azadi as used in India has been understood in different ways. The idea as used in nationalist and social movements was not clearly defined within a political context. For Mahatma Gandhi, *azadi* meant that Indians become not just independent, but also self-reliant. Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar, a social reformer, defined *azadi* as a call for freedom from economic and social persecution for the lowest castes in Indian society. Currently, this term that had positive connotations in India is predominately linked to the situation in Kashmir, where it is regularly used as a slogan demanding freedom and independence from India. *Azadi* is shouted by the Kashmiri people in front of the Indian army on the streets of Srinagar, the capital of the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir.

I intend to analyze this complex idea of *azadi* with both a historical and cultural approach, including the political perspective of recent protests that started in June of 2016 after Indian security forces killed the young Kashmiri commander of Hizbul Mujahideen, Burhan Wani. This widely used term used in the context of Kashmir's fight for freedom has multiple meanings. It is crucial to understand all of them in order to analyze this political conflict. The questions yet to answer are: how has the meaning of the term *azadi* changed over the years? Is the present-day call for *azadi* is the same as it was during the partition of British India in 1947? Does the call for *azadi* express Kashmir's demands for political transition?

This paper is a component of my PhD research at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Warsaw, Poland. The topic of my doctoral thesis is "Social Bonds in the Political Culture in Kashmir". I have already focused on Kashmir in previous research papers. For my BA thesis, I concentrated on the image of Kashmir as paradise on earth in Indian literature. My MA thesis focuses on the case of Kashmiri Pandits, a Hindu minority in Kashmir who were forced to flee the valley in the 1990s. Recently, I have been granted the University of Warsaw Research Grant for Doctoral Candidates for my PhD research in India concerning the political culture of Kashmir. In August 2016, I was supposed to start working with University of Kashmir professors and students, but due to an unsafe situation in the region, a curfew was imposed and the universities in Srinagar were closed. I decided to cancel my plans and conduct my research in Delhi. Some of my interviews are with researchers from different institutions in Delhi and my analytical results are included in this paper.

I find the question of the meaning of *azadi* necessary for understanding the political culture and the context of the political conflict including recent protests in Kashmir. The idea came to me when I was conducting interviews

with Kashmiris in Delhi and researchers from different scientific institutions working on the Kashmiri conflict. During the interviews, the answers to my question “What do Kashmiris want?” were identical: “*Azadi*”. The follow-up, the more precise question “What kind of *azadi* do you want?” usually confused my respondents. The answers were different: “We want to finally be free,” “We want to have a choice,” “We want to be given the right to decide for ourselves,” “We want the referendum that was promised to us in 1947,” “We want independence.”

I have encountered a similar confusion about the use of the term *azadi* in Indian newspapers and magazines. Journalists use the word very often, especially in headlines e.g. “BJP doesn't get it: Kashmiri youth want *azadi*, even if it means moving to Pak” (Chatterjee 2016); “Is Kashmir's yearning for *azadi* a political aspiration or a statement of religious identity?” (Sibal 2016). The same use of the term can be found also in international newspapers when focusing on the issue, for example in Bangkok Post (2016). However, the explanation of this idea can rarely be found in such articles. Shahnaz Bashir asserts that “the multitudinous call for *Azadi* is trivializing the essence of the specific importance of freedom for the states striving for territorial sovereignty from India” (Bashir: 2016). In order to understand the meaning of *azadi*, this paper will trace its origins, evolution, and political significance.

Kashmir – Brief Introduction

At present, the largest part of Kashmir, the Valley of Kashmir with its capital in Srinagar, is part of the Indian state Jammu and Kashmir. The other parts include: a small autonomous territory of Azad Jammu and Kashmir, [i.e., ‘Free Jammu and Kashmir’] which belongs to Pakistan, and a mountainous, less-populated region of Aksai Chin - a conflict area between India and China (currently under Chinese control). The Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir is divided into three parts: besides Kashmir, where there are mostly Muslim people speaking Kashmiri language called *Köshur*; there is Jammu: greatly populated by Hindus speaking the *Dogra* language; and also Ladakh, with a *Ladakhi*-speaking Buddhist population. The Kashmir Valley has been predominantly Muslim since the 14th century (1339 to 1819 A.D) and Jammu and Kashmir is the only Indian state with a predominately Muslim population.

The Evolution of the Meaning of the Term *Azadi* in Kashmir

As Chitrlekha Zutshi said, “The cry for *azadi* is an old one in Kashmir, and it has held multiple meanings for those deploying it through the decades” (Zutshi 2016). *Azadi* as a political idea of independence was introduced in Kashmir in the 20th Century. Before the Partition of British India, the princely state of Kashmir was under the rule of British-installed Hindu Maharaja, Hari Singh of the Dogra dynasty. In the 1930s, during the rule of the Hindu Dogra dynasty, the movement led by the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference called for *azadi*, i.e. freedom from injustice, exploitation, and oppression towards Kashmiri Muslims. As the rhetoric evolved from the conception of Kashmir simply as a land or homeland to more of a territorial conception of a nation, a parallel change could be observed in the meaning of the word *azadi*. It began to mean “freedom to choose one’s own political representatives” (Zutshi 2003:250). Gradually, the movement demanded *azadi* – liberation - for Kashmiris from the Dogra rule.

With the partition of British India, Kashmiris started to regard *azadi* as the right to self-determination. According to the partition theory, Hindu-majority regions would merge with India, while Muslim-majority regions would be included in Pakistan. However, the Princely states had the option to either join the newly formed countries or to stay independent. The Hindu Dogra ruler of Kashmir, Maharaja Hari Singh, ruling over the Muslim majority, remained undecided about who to join so stayed independent in order to avoid the dilemma of Hindu-Muslim interests in region. Jawaharlal Nehru, whose family ancestors were Kashmiri, promised a referendum in which Kashmiris would have a chance to vote (Dębnicki 2000, 144). However, when Pashtun tribesmen from Pakistan attacked Kashmir in 1947, Hari Singh sought help from India to quell the attack. The pressure from India and the British officials forced him to sign the Instrument of Accession on October 27, 1947 in return for military help against the tribesmen. The Instrument of Accession signed by him contended that the entire state belonged to India. It gave India authority to control the state’s defense, foreign policy and communications. It also called for a referendum in the region once the situation calmed down. After the Indian forces arrived in Srinagar, the first Indo-Pakistan war over Kashmir’s territory was fought (the second war was in 1948, and the third one in 1999). As a result, the territory was divided between two countries and *azadi* started to be used by Kashmiris in the context of their desire for independence.

In the 1980s, the religious conflict in Kashmir between the Muslim majority and Hindu minority escalated due to various political and social reasons in India and abroad. Among them was the conclusion of the war in Afghanistan (Dębnicki 2000,144). The term *azadi* began to be associated with the Islamization of Kashmir. For Hindu Kashmiris (called Kashmiri Pandits) the call for *azadi* carried out by Muslim inhabitants was equated with there being no more place for them. Madhu Purnima Kishwar from the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies in Delhi paid attention to how the word, which had positive connotations before, started to be regarded as an expression of hate and anger against Hindu India and evoked fear of the Islamization of Kashmir. She observed that after the 1990s, it was the first time that people interpreted *azadi* from a religious aspect. The situation in Kashmir started to be regarded in the context of religious identity expression. The demands of Kashmiri Muslims grew to be based on the ideal of an Islamic society. The slogan on the streets became "*Azadi ka matlab kya? La ilaha illallah*" (What does *azadi* mean? There is no God but Allah).

The call for azadi has grown even louder since a young Kashmiri Hizbul Mujahideen-commander, Burhan Wani, was killed by Indian security forces on July 8, 2016. Crowds of young people went out on the streets of Srinagar and other cities chanting anti-Indian slogans such as: "*India se azadi*" (Freedom from India) and "*Hum kya chahte? Azadi!*" (What do we want? Freedom). Since that time, over 85 civilians, including women and children, have been killed. Around 13,000 more have been injured and blinded due to pellet guns fired by Indian security forces. All of my interviewees from Kashmir said that, this time, in contrast to the 2008 and 2010 protests, they will fight until they finally achieve *azadi*.

As mentioned before, the meaning of the term has been evolving over the decades. At the beginning, it was understood as freedom from oppression, from injustice. Then, it was used as the right to be involved in the political life of Kashmir. With the partition of India, *azadi* became to be used as fighting for a choice of representation. Gradually, it started to be understood as a right for self-determination and a right to have an independent state. It also began to be associated with the Islamic religion. The evolution of the idea was related to questions of identity based on territory, language and, most of all, religion. It is strongly linked to the rise of political consciousness in the Kashmir Valley (Zutshi 2003, 211). Currently, the fight for *azadi* continues and is a call for political transition.

Azadi as a Fight for Political Transformation

The meaning of *azadi* in Kashmir can be analyzed from the perspective of the fight for political transition. According to the Chatham House survey concerning the political future of Kashmir made in 2010, there is an overwhelming demand for political transformation among Kashmiri people (Bradnock 2010, 20). Zutshi states that the definition of *azadi* invoked not freedom from India necessarily, but Kashmiris “freedom to decide and to choose whether they would ally with India or Pakistan” (Zutshi 2016).

As in 1947, the people of Kashmir are as divided as their leaders. Although they are all connected with the idea of *azadi*, they have a different understanding of its meaning. Shahid Siddiqui underlines that “Kashmir is not a monolith...In a crowd, when youngsters raise the slogan of *azadi*, they don’t mean the same thing” (Siddiqui 2016).

First of all, to Kashmiris, *azadi* means having the right to self-determination. They want to be entitled a choice that was never given to them by India. The Instrument of Accession signed by Hindu ruler Hari Singh did not consider the will of the Muslim majority living in Kashmir. Therefore, Kashmiris are asking on what grounds is the accession still valid? Moreover, the right to decide about their future was promised to them several times by Jawaharlal Nehru. In 1947, he said that “the question of accession in any disputed territory or state must be decided in accordance with wishes of people”, that “the people of Kashmir would decide the question of accession,” and “We have declared that the fate of Kashmir is ultimately to be decided by the people.” He also said, “I have repeatedly stated that as soon as peace and order have been established, Kashmir should decide on the question of accession by plebiscite or referendum under international auspices such as that of the United Nations.” The people of Kashmir are still referring to his words and asking where is that *azadi* that was promised to them during the partition times.

Among the Kashmiri people, there is a call for *azadi* in terms of a significant self-rule within the state of Jammu and Kashmir. It was well said by Kanhaiya Kumar, a 28-year-old PhD student from Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) in Delhi: “We don’t want freedom from India, my brothers, we want freedom in India.” All Kashmiris with whom I had a chance to talk agreed that they want to be part of India but with respect to their autonomy and self-determination. They want the 370th article of the Indian Constitution, which, in theory, gives Jammu and Kashmir special status among other Indian

states, to be respected. In addition, they are pleading that the army serving in the region will be made up of Kashmiris. The question remains, how much autonomy can the Indian state yield?

Conclusion

The struggle for azadi still continues today, nearly seven decades after the partition of India. While submitting the paper for the conference, the situation in the Kashmir Valley remains fragile and the cry for azadi is loud. Kashmiris are fighting for azadi, which, as Chitralkha Zutshi states, means “the pursuit of good governance, social justice, economic equality, as well as human dignity” (Zutshi 2016). At the same time azadi in Kashmir represents the possibility of having an own identity and freedom to express the identity based on religion. For this idea, people will continue fighting and dying in Kashmir, what was well assessed by Arundhati Roy: “The people of Kashmir have made it clear once again...that what they want is azadi...For this, they are prepared to face down bullets with stones. For this, they are prepared to die in numbers. For this, they are prepared to exhibit acts of open defiance that may lead to their death or incarceration in the most densely militarized zone in the world. For this, they are prepared to take to arms, to fight to the death, knowing full well that they will die young” (Roy 2016).

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Biography

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Infrastructures for Peace and the Role of Peace Services in Nepal

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Abstract

The concept of Infrastructures for Peace (I4P) has been given considerable attention by peacebuilding researchers and practitioners over the last years. While it has not yet been conclusively defined, it is generally accepted that infrastructures for peace, encompassing different levels of society, can support peace both in acute conflict situations and in the long run. In Nepal, following the armed conflict fought between the Maoist People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the state from 1996 to 2006, the framework of I4P has found its way into government policies. We would like to briefly report on this and other developments relating to I4P in Nepal, including a selection of the existing I4Ps for greater illumination.

As Suurmond and Sharma (2013) have argued earlier, approaching I4P from a 'user perspective', that is, asking participants on a micro-level about aspects of peace, is a promising and insightful angle to look at the topic. So while we will paint a picture of infrastructures for peace on different levels in Nepal, we will also present results from a study on peace needs and peace services conducted in 2015. Defining peace as the absence of internal and external violent conflict (negative peace) and a state of wellbeing (positive peace), people in Nepal were asked where and who they go to restore their sense of peace on different levels; in other words, which peace services they access. The results of the study, that incorporated data of 1177 participants, show that people preferred different kinds of peace services depending on the level at which the conflict occurred (intrapersonal, interpersonal, or inter-community). In addition, participants had specific ideas about which peace services would be beneficial for addressing certain kinds of conflicts. Building on these results, we will discuss ways forward for I4P in Nepal.

Keywords: *I4P, Infrastructures for Peace, Peace Services, Nepal*

Introduction

Recent peacebuilding literature emphasizes the importance of taking into account local perspectives, traditions, and practices when designing strategies to contribute to peace, as opposed to importing international, 'external' peacebuilding interventions (e.g. Paffenholz, 2013). One concept that is often cited to promote this view is Infrastructures for Peace (I4P, see for example Van Tongeren, 2012). First conceptualized by John Paul Lederach in the 1980s, it has received considerable attention, especially from academics and policymakers. The description regularly cited for I4P is the following, based on the definition developed at the first African seminar on I4P, organized by the UNDP in Kenya in 2010:

“Infrastructures for peace are a network of interdependent systems, resources, values and skills held by government, civil society and community institutions that promote dialogue and consultation; prevent conflict and enable peaceful mediation when violence occurs in a society” (UNDP 2013)

The I4P concept can be applied both to acute conflict situations and post-conflict-situations, but is not limited to them. Instead, we understand it as a concept applicable to societies and countries across the globe. We believe that it makes sense to ask more openly: what are the structures, mechanisms, resources, values and skills that contribute to peace in this given context?¹ In post-conflict transition, the concept might be of great support for finding access points to building sustainable peace (Giessmann, 2016). Also in Nepal, I4P gained momentum after the armed conflict. Several official infrastructures for peace, such as the Ministry for Peace and Reconstruction (MoPR), Local Peace Committees (LPCs) or the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and the Commission for the Investigation of Enforced Disappeared Persons (CIEDP) were created in response to dealing with the aftermath of the armed conflict. When looking at infrastructures for peace in Nepal, we do this with the recent armed conflict in mind. However, we direct our attention to peace in the perceptions of the general population in their daily life. In the framework of I4P, the focus is on internal capacities and local approaches to supporting peace. This, together with our interest in how peace is and can be supported in the long-term, led to the research questions presented here.

1 In line with this idea, the Global Alliance for Ministries and Infrastructures for Peace (GAMIP; gamip.org) is supporting the global establishment of ministries and departments of peace.

Even though Infrastructures for Peace are generally described as systemic and operating on multiple levels, conceptualizations differ. On the one hand, there are descriptions of I4P that focus more on institutions and structures that provide top-down peace services, such as ministries for peace and formal infrastructures (e.g. Hopp-Nishanka, 2012). On the other hand, grassroots peacebuilding and informal infrastructures are frequently mentioned as examples as well (e.g. Suurmond & Sharma, 2013).

Suurmond and Sharma have proposed understanding infrastructures for peace as offering peace services, hence, structures that can meet peace needs (Figure 1).




Figure 1: Different levels of the peace sector (Suurmond & Sharma 2013, 3)

If we are looking at infrastructures for peace through this lens, the step to considering the recipients of peace services, the users of infrastructures for peace, is a small one. This is the angle that we are coming from in this paper.

We will describe infrastructures for peace in the Nepali context briefly and then present results from a study recently completed by Pro Public and SeeD (2016). In this, we will focus on peace services, because we sought to investigate which peace services, and hence which infrastructures for peace, people in Nepal are actually using. In addition, we believe that identifying local

definitions of peace, peace needs, and peace services opens access points for practitioners and researchers².

1. The Nepali Context

Nepal, enclosed between China and India, is a country with roughly 26 million inhabitants. It is a country with a rich diversity of cultures and languages. The majority of people in Nepal are Hindu, with smaller proportions of the population identifying as Buddhist, Muslim and Christian (see e.g. Nepal Census, 2011). Even though known for its high mountain peaks, Nepal's 75 districts in its newly demarcated seven provinces stretch across great geographical diversity from north to south and east to west. Most people in Nepal work in agriculture, and many people have to go abroad for work, sending remittances back to Nepal (UN Data 2014).

Until Nepal became a democratic federal republic in 2008, the country faced a decade-long armed conflict and political unrest. The Communist Party of Nepal – Maoist (CPN-M), later with its armed wing, the People's Liberation Army (PLA), launched a so-called people's war in 1996 to fight the established political system. The Nepal Royal Army, police and armed police force were on one side of the conflict, the combatants of the PLA on the other; and many people of Nepal were between the lines. More than 13,000 people lost their lives. An estimated 1,300 people disappeared due to government or Maoist forces. Many people were displaced and some have, until today, not returned to their old homes. Private and public infrastructures, such as schools, government offices and bridges, were destroyed (for more information see Nepal Institute for Policy Studies, 2013; UN OHCR, 2012). A Peace Accord ended the armed conflict formally in late 2006, marking the start of a peace process that continues till this day.

In September 2015, driven by political developments after the earthquakes, the new constitution was promulgated. With the introduction of this new constitution, especially in regard to the new province-borders that were delineated in it, protests emerged. They reached a violent stage between protesters and police, and the trade with India, essential in regard to many goods of daily consumption in Nepal, was significantly held up. The resulting

2 Although focusing on Nepal here, we hope to contribute to comparing and learning across contexts, as is the idea of networks like the Global Alliance for Ministries and Infrastructures for Peace (GAMIP) and its regional affiliates, such as the Asia-Pacific Alliance for Ministries and Infrastructures for Peace (APAMIP).

shortage of goods, especially fuel which is used both for transport and cooking, was a painful burden for most people of Nepal.

At the personal level, conflicts in Nepal tend to happen most often between family members, in-laws, neighbors, and other community members. Topics of dispute are for example land boundaries, transactions, assault, defamation, domestic quarrels, property and alimony, community forests, irrigation, and agriculture (Governance Facility, 2016; Stein, 2013). For many women, violence is part of their lives. According to a study conducted in six districts by the Nepalese government (2012), almost half of the women interviewed (48%) reported that they had experienced violence at some time in their lives, and 28% had experienced violence in the past 12 months. In terms of mental health, depression and anxiety are highly prevalent in Nepal, especially among disadvantaged groups and those living in difficult conditions in the high hills (Luitel et al. 2013; Risal et al. 2016). Although accurate information about suicide rates is not available, the World Health Organization projected the suicide rate for Nepal in 2015 to be among the highest (7th) in the world³.

1.1 Government-initiated Infrastructures for Peace in Nepal

In 2006, amidst the arrangements for a new form of government, the parties to the peace talks in Nepal decided to establish structures to support the imminent peace process. The Ministry for Peace and Reconstruction (MoPR) was established in 2007 (for an overview, see for example Thapa, 2007). Because of the MoPR, Nepal is often cited as an example for I4P, as it is one of the few countries in the world with a Peace Ministry.

Since 2008, the MoPR has been providing interim financial assistance and services in a so-called Interim Relief and Rehabilitation Program. Other agencies, like the Nepal Peace Trust Fund (NPTF) and the local peace committees (LPCs) were also established in 2007, as supporting agencies of the Nepal peace process by the government of Nepal.

The Nepal Peace Trust Fund (NPTF) received funding from the Nepalese government and international donors. It financed projects in different areas relevant to the peace process – for example the integration of ex-combatants, security and transitional justice or peacebuilding initiatives (this included for example projects on voter education, dialogue and mediation projects and

3 http://gamapserver.who.int/gho/interactive_charts/mental_health/suicide_rates/atlas.html (Accessed on March 29, 2017).

peace initiatives via media). In 2014, with an envisioned end of the NPTF in 2017, the focus was slightly changed and currently only two projects, both related to addressing the effects of the armed conflict.

The Local Peace Committees (LPCs) were set up to be local structures for promoting peace. In an LPC, so was the idea, local actors from political parties, non-governmental organizations and citizens could come together to exchange, receive support to transform conflicts, and keep peace. Their first task was to provide compensation to conflict victims in the 75 districts. However, there were accounts of insufficient support and power struggles, leading to more diminished effects than originally envisioned (e.g. Carter Center, 2011). In addition, existing local peace initiatives had not been integrated into the LPCs, leading to frustration, and they were sometimes seen as politicized (Odendaal, 2010). The future of the LPCs is unclear, as according to their mandate, they are supposed to dissolve once there is a functioning local government structure in place. Local elections have been announced for May 2017, 20 years after the last local elections (Himalayan Times 2017).

Envisioned in the CPA in 2006, the two commissions of the transitional justice process, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and the Commission for the Investigation of Enforced Disappeared Persons (CIEDP) were established in 2015 with an initial two-year mandate. They became active last year and their mandate has recently, in February 2017, been extended by one additional year. There are continuous discussions around their work, including requests for amendments by victims groups and international criticism, for example by the international center for transitional justice (ICTJ). The regulations have been criticized by the commissions themselves as well, so the process of their implementation can be seen as ongoing.

The National Planning Commission of Nepal included a program to strengthen infrastructures for peace in the government plan for the period 2013-2016 after being introduced to the concept. This was positive and showed the government's dedication to a strong and sustainable peace process. At the same time it has been noticed that in Nepal that infrastructures for peace on different levels, be it the MoPR, the LPCs or the commissions related to the transitional justice process, do not receive sufficient attention or funding. Only recently, the staff of the CIEDP for example, was cut down to a number of 20 from 25 officers for collection and investigation of cases. (At this point, according to the Himalayan Times, the CIEDP had received a number of 2,793

of 'complaints'; the TRC more than 55,000 as reported on August 6, 2016.) The MoPR, unlike other ministries, never had offices in the districts and is thus depending on other ministries and structures, like the LPCs.

1.2 Other Infrastructures for Peace in Nepal

Other infrastructures for peace in Nepal, which are not funded by the government, include informal justice mechanisms, like traditional methods of conflict resolution, and information sharing initiatives like NepalMonitor, an online mapping platform of human rights and security incidents, that informs subscribers by text message and via social media and can be fed into by individuals reporting incidents (nepalmonitor.org).

Mediation has been practiced in judicial institutions and local governance institutions, and in rural communities in Nepal for several years (for a recent introduction, see Khanal & Thapa, 2014). An estimated 10,000 community mediators have been trained by NGO's and INGO's across the country⁴. Various civil society organizations have been involved in implementing community mediation services and have cooperated with local bodies like village development committees and municipalities to establish centers for resolving disputes at the community level. Due to the variety of actors in the field, and in the absence of a comprehensive assessment of mediation services across actors, the numbers of mediators and mediated cases can only be estimated. In 2012, mediation services were available in a majority of districts, but far from being accessible to everybody (Suurmond & Sharma, 2012). Legally, mediation has been endorsed with the Mediation Act of 2011, together with official rules and regulations. Mediation is differentiated into three forms of mediation in Nepal: court-referred, court-annexed and community mediation. Community mediation is now seen as beneficial also at the ministerial level. The government, especially the Ministry of Federal Affairs and Local government (MoFALD), is working on defining the processes and procedures in agreement with the provisions of the Mediation Act and Rules. MoFALD stated that community mediation was one of the core functions of the local bodies and aims for there to be the availability of community mediation everywhere in Nepal (Mukti 2017). The mediators themselves often work voluntarily.

Theatre has since long been used in Nepal to address political issues on

⁴ Number estimated on the basis of personal communication with Community Mediators Society Nepal and Center for Legal Research and Resource Development Nepal.

community level, both by local theatre groups and by local and international NGOs. Dirnstorfer (2016) described street drama in its connection to the democracy movement, theatre of the oppressed as a way of opening dialogues about community conflicts such as domestic violence, and, more recently, playback theatre as a form of addressing issues of the transitional justice process and the effects of the armed conflict in Nepal.

Another dialogue structure is provided by community dialogue programs, such as dialogue projects inviting ex-combatants and community members to come together (examples are the Support of measures to strengthen the peace process (STPP) project supported by GIZ or the currently ongoing program "From combatants to peacemakers" by Pro Public, funded by USAID. Community members and ex-combatants who resettled in the communities are participating in trainings to become dialogue facilitators and subsequently organize dialogues, large-scale peace events, mediation and basic psychosocial referral. Community dialogues on various topics relating to peace and reconciliation have been, and still are being organized by different local organizations and initiatives in many communities across Nepal. These are often funded by international organizations such as Search for Common Ground or the United States Institute of Peace. A couple of examples are dialogues between youth and government officials or dialogues between security personnel and civil society (Search for Common Ground 2017; United States Institute of Peace 2017).

2 Peace Needs and Peace Services in Nepal – Some Results from an Empirical Study

In April and March 2015, the Forum for Protection of Public Interest - Pro Public, a Nepali NGO, in collaboration with the Cyprus-based think tank SeeD (Center for Sustainable Peace and Democratic Development) collected data for a study on peace and violence in Nepal with support from the Civil Peace Service Program of the German Development Cooperation (ZFD/GIZ). The study was inspired by the I4P-concept and aimed to explore peace needs and peace services as experienced by the people. Data from 1177 respondents in 40 villages and towns across Nepal was used for analysis (Figure 2)⁵. Based on the data by the Nepal Central Bureau of Statistics, the Risk Management Office of DFID - GIZ and the UN coordinators office, districts for sampling were

⁵ Due to the earthquake in April 2015, 23 questionnaires were lost.

identified based on two parameters: Areas that formed potential 'hotspots' in terms of potential for violence and location in terms of covering diverse geographical location (hills-plains/east-west/urban-rural).

Purposive sampling was used to select identity groups. Factors included here were caste, ethnicity, gender, religion, geography and political party affiliation. Within identity groups, random sampling was used to choose respondents (for a more detailed process description, see Pro Public & SeeD, 2016).

Data collection was done by researcher teams of three, consisting of one researcher from the capital and two researchers from the respective district. The questionnaires were administered face-to-face in the mother tongue of the participants by a native speaker researcher. The gender of interviewer and interviewee was matched to increase comfort.




Figure 2: Sampling districts across Nepal

A total of 1177 household surveys were included in the analysis. Roughly equal numbers of men and women participated (51.8% men, 47.8% women, 0.3% other). The majority of participants were between 18 and 35 years old (44.4%), followed by participants between 36 and 55 years of age (40.6%) and 56 years or above (15.0%). Respondents households consisted of one to 15 people ($M=6.4$; $Sd=2.9$) and they stated to have between no up to 12

dependents ($M=3.4$; $Sd=2.7$). The table below presents demographic data on education level, main source of income and religious affiliation below (Table 1).

Level of education, n (%)	
No education / beginners only	225 (19.1)
Primary school / incomplete	46 (3.9)
Primary school / completed (1-5)	104 (8.8)
Lower secondary school (6-8)	122 (10.4)
Secondary (9-10)	129 (11.0)
SLC & equivalent	162 (13.8)
Intermediate & equivalent	154 (13.1)
Graduate & equivalent	100 (8.5)
Post-graduate & equivalent	25 (2.1)
Main income source, n (%)	
Farming & animal husbandry	379 (32.2)
Regular job	232 (19.7)
Business	194 (16.5)
Inheritance & pension	191 (16.2)
Wage labor	181 (15.4)
Religion, n (%)	
Hindu	843 (71.6)
Buddhist	148 (12.6)
Kirat	88 (7.5)
Christian	16 (1.4)
Other	8 (0.7)

Table 1: Demographic data of participants

For this contribution, as stated earlier, we will focus on the peace services people use in order to further explore infrastructures for peace in Nepal and as a concept. More specifically, our question will be: which peace services do people use to restore their sense of peace? To start this exploration, we will report on when respondents of this survey felt at peace, so that we may

come closer to defining peace from the user perspective. We will then report on whether they believed there were enough people qualified to support them in (re-) gaining peace on different levels and which new peace services they saw as most important to have in their communities.

2.1 Concepts of Peace

Participants were asked to indicate whether they felt at peace in various situations. They were read 24 options, including one open answer option, and were asked to choose five to indicate when they felt at peace. The three situations most often chosen were the following:

- 1) 'When your family is happy' (89.0%)
- 2) 'When you don't have any worries' (82.7%)
- 3) 'When you have done a good job' (68.6%)

The same went for situations when they did not feel at peace. The three situations chosen by a majority of participants for not feeling at peace were:

- 1) 'When you are feeling confused, sad, angry, or stressed' (81.6%)
- 2) 'When there are disputes in your family' (76.6%)
- 3) 'When there are disputes in your community' (60.4%)

2.2 Peace Services

If we understand peace services to be part of infrastructures for peace and directly experienced by people, it makes sense to try and assess the kind of peace services people know and are actually using. Because peace services will most likely be used by someone when he or she is experiencing a conflict, this was how we approached the research question. Respondents were asked how they had usually resolved conflicts in the last few years. Because we were assuming that conflicts on different levels would call for different peace services, we asked about:

- 1) Situations in which respondent felt unhappy (Intrapersonal peace)
- 2) Situations of conflict with own family (Interpersonal peace)
- 3) Situations of conflict with community (Intercommunity peace)

Hence, the interviewers provided options on who the respondent had usually gone to for support and advice regarding a conflict and why. In addition, they asked if the respondent had ever gone to a specific peace service provider on a list, such as community mediation center, LPC etc. to more specifically assess use of 'formal' service providers.

Intrapersonal Peace Service Providers

When asked how they were usually dealing with feeling 'unhappy inside' over the last few years, almost half of the participants told the interviewer that they had kept quiet and dealt with it by themselves (46.5%). Regardless of their answer to this question, participants could still indicate who they usually went to for support and advice. Among the respondents, a majority named their spouse, family members, and friends in relation to intrapersonal peace. The top three of people most often mentioned, can be regarded as primary, secondary and tertiary peace service providers; indicating their importance for getting support to (re-)gain intrapersonal peace (Figure 3).

Even though spouse, family members, and friends were the three most often mentioned, there were differences in regard to how often they were usually consulted. While 66.7% of all respondents stated that they 'always' went to their spouse when experiencing feelings of unhappiness, this applied to 46.9% in regard to family members and 22.4% in regard to friends. Friends, in comparison, were consulted 'sometimes' by a majority of respondents (56.3%), whereas 42.3% sometimes consulted their family members and 13.8% sometimes went to their spouse in case of intrapersonal conflict.




Figure 3: Peace service providers for intrapersonal peace (as in Pro Public & SeeD, 2016, p. 39)

The most important reasons participants gave when asked why they were going to the person they had indicated for support were that this person understood them, the person kept what they said confidential, the person was easy to contact, and the person gave good advice.

To assess the use of peace services that we considered as potentially relevant, respondents were asked if they had ever participated in a specific service or event to bring inner peace to themselves. Because not all peace services may have been available to respondents, we are only reporting on those who stated that they knew this specific peace service was available in their community (see Figure 4 for a summary of availability and use of services).

Of 133 participants who knew that psychosocial counseling/psychotherapy was available in their community, the majority (68.7%) stated that they had never used this kind of service for gaining intrapersonal peace (21.6% 'sometimes'; 6.7% 'often').

Of 779 participants who knew that music/dance/cultural programs and festivals were available in their community, the majority (63.9%) stated that they had sometimes used this kind of service for gaining intrapersonal peace (19.8% 'often'; 15.5% 'never').

Of 335 participants who knew that learning how to meditate was available in their community the largest group (43.5%) stated that they had never used this kind of service for gaining intrapersonal peace (37.5% 'sometimes'; 16.4% 'often').

Of 299 participants who knew that yoga classes were available in their community the majority (53.2%) stated that they had never used this kind of service for gaining intrapersonal peace (29.4% 'sometimes'; 14.4% 'often').

Of 301 participants who knew that peace lectures by non-religious persons like academics or social workers were available in their community, the majority (59.1%) stated that they had sometimes used this kind of service for gaining intrapersonal peace (5.6% 'often'; 33.2% 'never').

Of 197 participants who knew that rehabilitation services (e.g. for substance users or victims of domestic violence) were available in their community the majority (76.1%) stated that they had never used this kind of service for gaining intrapersonal peace (16.2% 'sometimes'; 5.1% 'often').

Of 342 participants who knew that learning how to resolve conflicts without using violence was available in their community the most (47.7%) stated that they had sometimes used this kind of service for gaining intrapersonal peace (17.0% 'often'; 32.2% 'never').

Of 263 participants who knew that learning how to effectively communicate was available in their community the biggest group (46.0%) stated that they had sometimes used this kind of service for gaining intrapersonal peace (8.7% 'often'; 43.3% 'never').

Of 1036 participants who knew that social dialogue groups (like women groups, youth clubs) were available in their community the largest group (44.6%) stated that they had sometimes used this kind of service for gaining intrapersonal peace (15.5% 'often'; 38.5% 'never').




Figure 4: Services available in the communities with indication of use for intra-personal conflict (in percentage)

For the total group of participants, assuming that these services or actions were possible for all, using walking/exercising for intrapersonal peace was used sometimes by most people (41.5%, 34.4% 'often'; 21.8% 'never'); spending time in nature was used sometimes by a majority (50.6%, 25.3% 'often'; 22.1% 'never'); and going to a religious place was also used sometimes by a majority (55.9%, 24.9% 'often'; 16.7% 'never').

Interpersonal Peace Service Providers

Given three options on how they had usually resolved conflicts with their family over the last few years, most participants stated that they had used peaceful discussion among family members (93.5%). However, 35.3% had also usually used help from outsiders and 9.5% said that they had argued until one person had won to resolve family conflicts.

As with intrapersonal peace, participants were invited to state whether they went to particular persons or institutions when they were in conflict with a family member. As is visible in Figure 5, participants most often went to other family members, friends or relatives for advice and support when in conflict with a family member. Here, the person most often 'always' consulted was another family member (53.6%), while relatives, friends or neighbors were announced to be 'always' consulted by around 15% of participants. In these cases 'sometimes' consulted were most often relatives (50.7%), friends (47.9%), and neighbors (46.6%).




Figure 5: Peace service providers for interpersonal peace (as in Pro Public & SeeD, 2016, p. 40)

The most important reasons for choosing the persons they had indicated as first source of support were that this person understood them, was easy to contact, and gave good advice.

To assess the use of peace services that we considered as potentially relevant, respondents were asked if they had ever participated in a specific service or event to settle disputes with their family. Because not all peace services may have been available to respondents, we are only reporting on the cases that stated that they knew this specific peace service was available in their community (for a summary of services available and used see Figure 6).

Of 500 participants who knew that community mediation centers were available in their community the majority (69.3%) stated that they had never used this kind of service for gaining interpersonal peace (26.9% 'sometimes'; 2.8% 'often').

Of 353 participants who knew that paralegal committees were available in their community the majority (86.4%) stated that they had never used this kind of service for gaining interpersonal peace (10.8% 'sometimes'; 2.0% 'often').

Of 877 participants who knew that police was available in their community the majority (73.4%) stated that they had never used this kind of service for gaining interpersonal peace (24.7% 'sometimes'; 0.9% 'often').

Of 343 participants who knew that a court was available in their community the majority (84.3%) stated that they had never used this kind of service for gaining interpersonal peace (13.1% 'sometimes'; 1.5% 'often').

Of 570 participants who knew that a Local Peace Committee (LPC) was available in their community the majority (78.1%) stated that they had never used this kind of service for gaining interpersonal peace (20.4% 'sometimes'; 1.1% 'often').

Of 472 participants who knew that a dialogue group/social dialogue group was available in their community the majority (71.2%) stated that they had never used this kind of service for gaining interpersonal peace (23.9% 'sometimes'; 2.3% 'often').

Of 125 participants who knew that a psychosocial counseling center was available in their community the majority (79.2%) stated that they had never used the service of a psychosocial worker for gaining interpersonal peace (17.6% 'sometimes'; 2.4% 'often').

Of 165 participants who knew that a forum theatre group was available in their community the majority (81.1%) stated that they had never used this

kind of service for gaining interpersonal peace (15.2% 'sometimes'; 1.2% 'often').

For the total group of participants, assuming either that these services were available in all communities or not able to get information on the availability, we are reporting on the following other services:

The VDC secretary or executive officer was never approached for interpersonal conflicts by the majority (70.4% 'never'; 25.6% 'sometimes'; 2.6% 'often').

Teachers were never approached for interpersonal conflicts by the majority (84.2% 'never'; 12.8% 'sometimes'; 0.7% 'often').

Traditional dispute mechanisms were never approached for interpersonal conflicts by the majority (73.4% 'never'; 19.5% 'sometimes'; 6.2% 'often').

Religious leaders were never approached for interpersonal conflicts by the majority (78.7% 'never'; 17.7% 'sometimes'; 1.8% 'often').

High-status people in the community were never approached for interpersonal conflicts by approximately half of the participants (50.7% 'never'; 34.8% 'sometimes'; 13.3% 'often').

Community organizations were never approached for interpersonal conflicts by the majority (74.2% 'never'; 22.3% 'sometimes'; 1.7% 'often').




Figure 6: Services available in the communities with indication of use for inter-personal conflict (in percentage)

Intercommunity Peace Service Providers

To find out about which peace service providers participants had experienced using in their community they were asked not about their personal involvement in community disputes but rather for their impression on how community conflicts were usually resolved. Similar to interpersonal conflict, respondents were invited to indicate whether community conflicts were usually resolved peacefully, by arguing, or with the support of trusted people. The majority of respondents stated that conflicts in their community were usually resolved by peaceful discussion (86.2%). As multiple answers were possible and the categories were not seen as exclusive, a majority stated that conflicts were resolved with the involvement of a third party (79.6%). However, 19.6% stated that they were usually solved by arguing ('shouting, threatening or blaming') until one side was winning.

Participants were then asked where people from their community would usually go to for resolving conflicts. Again, they could indicate whether people would go to these people or institutions for resolving an intercommunity conflict 'always', 'sometimes', or 'never'.

Participants stated in 63.9% of the cases that people would sometimes go to the police when they were in a community conflict, and in 18.4% that people would always go to the police in that case. A large number of participants mentioned social workers as people that community members would sometimes go to in case of a conflict (61.4%; 14.8% 'always'). Regarding the VDC secretary, more than half said that people would sometimes go (58.0%) and 15.5% would always go to receive support in a community conflict (Figure 7).




Figure 7: Peace service providers for interpersonal peace (as in Pro Public & Seed, 2016, p. 42)

Asking the participants why they thought their community members would use the peace service provider they had mentioned, they assumed that it was because they gave good advice, were trustworthy, were knowledgeable and that they were skilled in 'solving problems like these'.

Because we were interested in finding out who the respondents thought was the most important person or institution in their community for community conflicts, we invited them to indicate the three persons that people would most often go to. The responses somewhat correspond with those mentioned above. More than half of all respondents named the police as those community members would most often go to for help, followed by the VDC secretary (43.3%) and political actors (37.6%).

Person most often sought for help	Yes (n; % of N=1177)
Police officer	631; 53.6
VDC secretary	508; 43.3
Political actor	442; 37.6
Social worker	410; 34.8
Community mediator	403; 34.2
Traditional justice leader	298; 25.3
Dialogue facilitator	171; 14.5
Representative of community organization	121; 10.3
Lawyer	101; 8.6
Paralegal committee member	99; 8.4
Local Peace Committee member	57; 4.8
Religious leader	49; 4.2

Table 2: Indication of persons community members most often go to for help with disputes

2.3 Availability of Qualified Support

Respondents were asked to indicate whether they believed that there were enough people available in their community one could go to in case of lack of intrapersonal peace / feeling unhappy, lack of interpersonal peace / disputes with family or friends, and lack of intercommunity peace. Around a third of participants stated that there were not enough qualified people. For intrapersonal peace, 30.2% stated that there were not enough qualified people, for interpersonal peace 32.7% stated that there were not enough qualified people and for intercommunity peace, it was 37.6%. Explorative Chi-Square tests of cross tabulation revealed that there was a significant connection between estimations. People who stated that there were not enough people to resolve conflicts on an intrapersonal level were also more likely to say that there were not enough people to resolve conflicts between family members or friends ($\chi^2 (1)=374.67$; $p<0.001$). They were also less likely to say that there were enough qualified people to support in resolving community disputes ($\chi^2 (1)=321.10$; $p<0.001$). A significant association was also found for the latter, community disputes, with estimating enough qualified people to resolve interpersonal disputes ($\chi^2 (1)=343.75$; $p<0.001$).

2.4 New Peace Services

For all three assessed areas of peace, intrapersonal, interpersonal, and intercommunity peace, the researchers asked respondents to choose one service from a list that they saw as most important to act towards strengthening peace in their community.

For intrapersonal conflicts, the almost half of all respondents said that support in dealing with substance abuse would be the most important new service to introduce in their community for people feeling unhappy (48.2%). The other services, in order of importance for the whole group of participants were: learning how to resolve conflicts (16.6%); support dealing with domestic violence (16.3%); psychosocial counseling / psychotherapy (7.1%); meditation (4.8%); learning how to communicate (3.2%); dealing with anxiety / fear (1.6%); healing from depression / trauma (1.5%); other (0.6%).

Asked whether they themselves would use this most important new service mentioned, the majority said that they would (84.1%). Asked whether they would be willing to pay for this service in case it were the only way to make it available, the majority said yes (79.1%), a small proportion was not sure (5.4%), and 14.0% were not willing to pay even in that case.

For interpersonal conflicts, the most important new service chosen was learning how to solve conflicts without using violence, which was picked by around a quarter of all participants (24.6%). Other new services wanted were, in order of percentage of respondents choosing them: support to help family members or friends to find a solution (15.8%); more information about how to handle conflicts and bring peace (11.3%); advice from someone knowledgeable (11.0%); help in preventing violence (10.8%); a place where different groups in our community could meet (9.3%); learning how to have an effective conversation (6.4%); support to heal broken relationships (6.0%); learning how to meditate / do yoga (2.5%); psychosocial counseling (2.2%).

Also here, the majority indicated they would use the new service (90.0%). Paying for this new service in case it was the only way to make it available was approved by 79.9%; whereas 4.2% said "maybe", and 14.3% would not pay for the new service.

For intercommunity conflict, a little less than a third of all respondents said that the most important new service to introduce would be teaching children how to resolve conflicts without using violence (29.1%). The other wanted services were, in order of percentage of participants: Helping people with trauma, substance abuse, depression, anxiety and stress (24.7%);

reconciling different community groups (15.0%); teaching adults to better understand each other and handle conflicts non-violently (8.8%); supporting more constructive community dialogues (7.1%); protecting people from violence (4.7%); lobbying and advocaing against exclusion and discrimination (2.5%); monitoring violence (1.6%); helping leaders / politicians to improve their communication (1.0%).

As in the two other areas, most of the participants were imagining that they would use the new service (94.5%). The majority was willing to pay for the new service they were wanting (84.6%), a small proportion was unsure (4.2%), and 10.3% were not willing to pay.

3 Discussion

When people are not feeling at peace, how do they respond and where do they go? Results from a big survey in Nepal confirm that there are indeed 'systems, resources, values and skills' that contribute to peace in everyday lives of people. Coming from a 'user perspective' we can say that the respondents of this survey find ways to address their experience of conflict on different levels.

espondents mainly defined feeling at peace as what scholars call 'positive peace' – a state of well-being, not the mere absence of violence. The respondents' choice of situations when they felt at peace, tells us that they did not primarily associate it with the absence of violence and physical insecurity. They did, however, connect it to the absence of negative feelings. Jones and colleagues (2013) reported, based on a qualitative analysis of responses from South and South-East Asia, that a little more than half of their participants defined peace in terms of positive peace, most often as 'harmony'. Slightly fewer of their participants preferred to define peace as negative peace. These authors, too, reported mention of emotions, both the absence of negative feelings and the presence of positive feelings as a personal indicator for peace for their respondents. The mention of family and community points to the importance of social ties for feeling at peace. Yang, Bekemeier and Choi (2016) only recently reported from a qualitative study on concepts of sociocultural health, which somewhat relates to our operationalization of intrapersonal peace, that their participants defined good health also as "peace in the family". Still, in the context of our study, which took place against the backdrop of an ongoing transitional justice process and an armed conflict that lies only ten years back, as well as the high number of women who experience violence in

Nepal, we could have imagined more mention of negative peace indicators.

Even though peacebuilders have mainly focused on conflict between people, we found it important to assess how people are dealing with conflicts within themselves too. This can be described as absence of intrapersonal peace, or feeling unhappy. One reason for including this level was that armed conflict, or basically violence at any level, can lead to reduced wellbeing and impaired mental health. This linkage has been shown many times, also in Nepal (see for example Luitel et al., 2012). Conversely, reduced psychological wellbeing may be connected to an increase in violence. For example, loss of psychological resources, such as self-perception and self-value, has been linked to support for political violence and ethnocentrism (Hobfoll, Canetti-Nisim & Johnson, 2006).

The reliance on the closest social relationships, spouse, family members, and friends, for support in situations of internal conflict corresponds to a repeatedly found connection between mental well-being and social support (e.g. Milner et al., 2016). Looking at professional support for intrapersonal peace, an obvious service coming to mind would be psychosocial counseling or psychotherapy. Our results show that only a minority of our participants was aware of this kind of service in their community, and it is very likely that this is because mental health care is scarce in Nepal (Luitel et al., 2012). Even of those respondents that seemed to have access, only a small proportion stated to have used these services. However, other services we consider to be infrastructures for peace, such as social dialogue groups, were more widely known and used by more than half of the concerned participants. Traditional ways of coming together, with a joint purpose or simply enjoying time together, as in festivals, cultural events, music and dance, also contribute to intrapersonal peace in the perception of respondents. Interestingly, from participants' point of view, services that relate to the interpersonal level, such as learning how to communicate more effectively and learning how to resolve conflicts without the use of violence, seemed to contribute to intrapersonal, not interpersonal peace. This is interesting, because offering learning opportunities touches both on peace education in schools and private initiatives that could be of economic interest for providers (also see below regarding "new services"). Taken together, we see a mixture of traditional and community-based opportunities for gaining intrapersonal peace, happiness, and stability, together with more targeted services, like non-violent conflict resolution or dialogue groups. Clearly, close relationships play the most important role for this level of peace.

Interpersonal peace and community peace have been more in the focus of peacebuilders. Looking at interpersonal peace, respondents in this study indicated that their close social contacts were the most important peace service providers, similar to the area of intrapersonal peace. Here, however, we see a professional service as a secondary peace service provider appear: The social worker as a supporter in times of interpersonal conflict. Traditional justice providers were also mentioned. Their existence and importance for the resolution of conflict in Nepal has often been, sometimes critically, discussed (see for example Upreti, 2014). It is interesting that participants mentioned traditional justice providers as secondary service providers, but when asked more directly, a majority stated to never have used them. For intercommunity conflict, traditional justice mechanisms were mentioned by approximately a quarter of the respondents. Even though other peace services seem to be more appealing to many, it can be assumed that they have their place in the scope of providers in Nepal. A question for further research could be whether there are developments in regard to their use and involvement in the communities in Nepal and what the implications of their use are for their clients and the communities.

Community mediation services were used both for interpersonal conflicts/family disputes and community conflicts, however, not as often as might be expected. Especially in regard to community conflicts, mediators seem less present than government service providers, like police officials and VDC staff. However, they were mentioned by the respondents, and around 30% had used them in the past for support in interpersonal conflicts. They seem to be established as peace service providers to a certain degree in Nepal (for earlier discussions see also Stein, 2013; Suurmond & Sharma, 2012). In addition, they have for some time been in the process of being more and more institutionalized, with a Mediation Act introduced in 2014 and a number of institutions like the Ministry of Federal Affairs and Local Development, and the Community Mediators' Society working on promoting community mediation.

The finding that political actors are often approached for community conflicts demonstrates how large an influence political parties have on the local level – despite the absence of local level elections to this date. We assume that there is some overlap with the group of high-status people in the communities that were mentioned by almost half of the participants to be consulted in cases of interpersonal conflict. When attempting to strengthen community infrastructures for peace in Nepal, considering this group of peace service

providers will be an important aspect. While we are aware of projects, including our own, where this is already being done, the quantitative data from this study underpins its relevance.

Looking at the differences in use of peace services between interpersonal and community conflict, it seems that for the latter, respondents leave the realm of personal support. This might at least in part be due to the change in operationalization by the researchers – the interviewers asked not for personal peace service use in this section, but rather which ones community members were using in case of a conflict. In addition, family members and other closer social connections were not mentioned in the list. Looking back, it would have been interesting to know whether they would also have been mentioned as primary service providers. However, respondents stated the involvement of a third party much more frequently for community conflict (79.6% versus 35.3%) and also mentioned involving formal structures like the police more often for conflicts in the community. We think it reasonable to assume that for conflicts that move away from our intimate circle and involve people that we are less close to, we are approaching peace service providers that are further away from this kind of relationship. Rather, as community life might be based more on rules and official structures; and community conflicts are more likely perceived as breaking those rules, people will be more likely to approach institutions and people who hold places in this community space.

More information on the use of peace services can be derived from respondents' ideas about new peace services. Taken together, learning how to solve conflicts nonviolently seems to be a peace service that, in the eyes of the participants, applies to conflicts within oneself as well as conflicts with close social networks and wider social networks. This is also a service that many people indicated they were willing to pay for, if it were the only way to make it available. Interestingly, 'learning' something is not a direct peace service, as it will not target a conflict directly (in comparison to mediation, for example), but respondents were making a clear link to keeping or re-establishing peace. By asking for learning opportunities, we imagine they are envisioning being able to deal with conflicts by themselves, transforming their approach to conflicts – a beautiful piece of information for peacebuilders who like to speak of, for example, local agency and sustainability. In fact, if there is a considerable number of people in Nepal who would like to learn peaceful conflict transformation; and are ready to pay for it, it could be promising to further investigate the possibility of offering this kind of a service locally and in economically self-

sustaining ways (Pro Public & SeeD, 2016). Another topic that clearly emerges from the ideas about new services is dealing with substance abuse, which participants seem to make a link to not only intrapersonal conflicts, but also to intercommunity conflicts.

In conclusion, infrastructures for peace that are usually highlighted in the literature seem to have less importance in the everyday peacemaking activities of people in Nepal than existing social networks and intimate relationships. In addition, structures and providers that are not primarily the focus of peacebuilders in Nepal, such as social workers or VDC's, play an important role. It seems important to take this information into account when wanting to strengthen mechanisms for conflict resolution or transformation on the local level. Similarly, as people seem to frequently resort to the formal structures of VDC secretaries and police officers, supporting them with capacity-building or other forms of support to further enable them to take on this role might be an effective strategy to support peace on the local level. The LPCs, often cited as an example of infrastructures for peace in Nepal and other countries, seem to be less important for dealing with conflicts than expected. A little less than half of the respondents had access to or knew of LPCs in their vicinity, and of those, only around a fifth had approached them for support to interpersonal conflict. For intercommunity conflict, one area that LPCs were intended to cater to, the rate was even lower. If the explanation for the low use of this infrastructure on the local level is to be found in reasons that have been discussed previously (Odendaal, 2010; Suurmond & Sharma, 2013) it must be investigated if LPCs are to remain instated to support peace on a local level.

What could be the reasons for participants of the study, and, most probably, many more people in Nepal, to only rarely make use of infrastructures for peace that were initiated by the Government of Nepal? Apart from the obvious practicability and utility of going to your family and friends for immediate support, we can consider the information that participants gave when they were asked why they would go to a specific peace service provider. Across all three levels of conflict, respondents said that they went to someone because he or she gave 'good advice'. That means, people like getting useful support, however we would need to investigate further as to what 'good advice' constitutes. Also, it would be interesting to know how people choose their preferred peace service provider – would they actually be trying out different peace service providers, comparing them, and making a decision?

This, too, could be interesting to look at if one were to expand our knowledge on the use of peace services. Factors like trust, confidentiality and easy access were also mentioned and should be taken into account when planning peace services.

As a last point, we would like to briefly discuss the perceived availability of qualified peace services. It is positive that the majority of respondents felt that there was sufficient capacity in their communities to support people in times of conflict, be it intrapersonal, interpersonal, or between community members. However, the results also show that a proportion of the participants felt that there were no such services available, or that they were not sufficient. That this perception went across categories with significant connection could be a hint to a group of people that have no access to appropriate peace services. In this light, 30% of participants is quite a high proportion and a further reason to think about how to make peace services accessible for as many people as possible. We believe that coming closer to local definitions of peace and finding out more about what constitutes useful and supportive peace services is a promising direction to take in supporting infrastructures for peace.

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Non-violence and Peace Education

The Role of Education in Building Peaceful Communities Hizmet Movement's Educational Approach in Conflict Areas

Yusuf Bektas

It is widely accepted that education is important for society and state and one of the most important tools to establish a peaceful society. Indeed education of future generations is directly related to the sustainability of a bright society. Although there is a common understanding on the importance of education for society, there is no such common point on details, aim, approach, implication, and expectations. Not only multicultural societies within countries, but also regionalism and globalism have effects on education. The main aim of this paper is to analyze the Hizmet Movement's educational approach to establishing peaceful and harmonious societies and also to frame the Peace Islands metaphor originated by Fethullah Gulen, founder of the movement.

Hizmet Movement (HM), which is an international civil society movement with its Islamic and Turkish origin, has active volunteers in more than 170 countries and several thousand educational institutions around the globe including higher education institutions. HM is a unique movement in terms of its origin, expansion, and activities. Education is the key factor for HM for establishing a peaceful and harmonious society and education for future generations or ideal generations is one of the most important duties for volunteers. Although there are some movements that have similar understanding with HM in Muslim world, in the Christian world, in other religious organizations or even non-religious societies, HM is different from all the others and this creates difficulties for researchers to analyze.

Examining Hizmet movement's applications is quite important for South East Asia region in which volunteers have been running educational institutions for 20 years. Thousands of students from different backgrounds, ethnicities, religions, races or colors have been learning in these institutions without any discrimination. This paper is too limited to analyze the whole educational philosophy of the movement, however, I aim to attract scholarly attention to educational activities of Hizmet movement in some areas from different regions such as the southeastern part of Turkey, Balkan countries,

Northern Iraq, and also some Southeast Asian countries such as Thailand, Cambodia and the Philippines. Therefore, there will be more questions than answers in this paper. In recent years, the number of academicians working on HM has been increasing, however, there is no multi-disciplinary, global scale research on HM and its educational activities.

Education is a wide term and relatively costly investment. Its continuity and success in conflict areas is quite difficult. Achieving the trust and approval of state administrations, local people and even conflicting parties to establish an educational institute and its continuity are quite difficult tasks. In addition, motivation of educational professionals, students and parents are other difficult aspects of establishing educational institutes in conflict areas. These are also discussed and examined in the study. Hizmet Movement gives special importance to an educational institution called "Peace Islands" aiming to create peaceful and harmonious generations and societies.

Basically, the study aims to look for answers the questions: What is the role of education in establishing peaceful societies according to Gulen and Hizmet Movement? What is Hizmet Movement's educational philosophy and how does it apply to different parts of the world? Why have educational institutions in Hizmet Movement been called Peace Islands and how is this idea applicable to other non-Hizmet Movement educational institutions?

There are three main arguments used as theoretical framework for this paper. The first one is a model of cross-national diffusion of movements developed by Doug McAdam and Dieter Rucht and adapted version to Hizmet Movement applied by Mehmet Kalyoncu in his research. This is an important argument to analyze how the movement interacts and diffuses with other societies rather than its own origin.

The second theory is established by Marc Gopin who suggests that "Religious norms can be used to bridge gap between cultures and even resolve long standing conflicts. What is needed, according to this line of thought, is to find shared values that can be built upon as well as to emphasize those aspects of religions that promote peace, understanding and cooperation" (Gopin 2000, 3-12). The importance of this argument is understanding role of religion in relations of societies whether sharing the same state or not. Also another important aspect is argument in parallel with Gulen's understanding about religion. Therefore, it is useful to analyze what is the movement's inspirational source, what is their base for dialogue between inter and intra religious societies, and finally how this argument can be applied to education.

The third argument of Clifford Geertz's approach to "Ethos and World View" is:

A people's ethos is the tone, character, and quality of their life, its moral and aesthetic style and mood; it is the underlying attitude toward themselves and their world that life reflects. Their world view is their picture of the way things in sheer actuality are, their concept of nature, of self, of society. It contains their most comprehensive ideas of order. Religious belief and ritual confront and mutually confirm one another; the ethos is made intellectually reasonable by being shown to represent a way of life implied by actual state of affairs which the world view describes, and the world view is made emotionally acceptable by being presented as an image of an actual state of affairs of which such a way of life is an authentic expression (Geertz 2000, 126-127).

Geertz's definition of Ethos and world view is also a useful argument to analyze the Peace Island concept, and how Hizmet Movement's ethos could help to build a new society.

In this study there are mainly five parts as; the first part: beginning with short information about H.M., analyzing educational philosophy of H.M. including the character education in the institutions, the second part focusing on the "Peace Island" metaphor and building peaceful and harmonious societies, the third part: collecting information and stories from selected countries related to the main theme of the article. This chapter mainly depends on other researchers' findings and works and also there are some original data gathered from directly from educational institutions of mentioned countries via email interaction. The fourth part is discussion of the possibility of exporting ideas of HM to non-Hizmet affiliated educational institutions and also the possibility of sharing the "Peace Island" metaphor with all of humanity. Finally, the last part is the conclusion part of the article. However, as mentioned above, this article mainly aims to attract attention of the academics to the topic, therefore there will not be an exact conclusion on the topic.

Section 1

Hizmet Movement in Brief

Hizmet, a Turkish word, literally means "service" therefore the Hizmet Movement can be translated as "service movement" as well. Hizmet Movement is a non-political, non-violent faith based civil society movement that is not state-sponsored, so it is a non-governmental organization (Kalyoncu 2008, Ebaugh

2010). It started in Turkey dedicating education of people and communities as well as motivating and encouraging people to offer educational activities for others. Fethullah Gulen, as a scholar, author and preacher, is the founder of the movement; therefore the movement was formerly called as Gulen Movement which Gulen did not approve. He always mentioned that Hizmet is a “dedicated people’s movement”.

The movement started in the West of Turkey in mid 1960s with local people to dedicate themselves for education and religious awareness. Today, it has grown relatively quick and spread into more than 170 countries and evolved to be a unique global civil society movement. The movement volunteers mainly focus on education, dialogue activities, business networking, aid organizations, and institutes regarding social development and media fields. The movement has no formal membership and special identification and requirements for its volunteers, and there is no centralized organization. Gulen has been accepted as moral leader and called as “Hocaefendi” which literally means as “Senior Teacher” and his ideas are highly respected among Hizmet volunteers. His books has been translated into several languages. He is one of the most influential contemporary Muslim thinkers and peace advocates. He lives in self-exile in Pennsylvania, USA and still continues his teachings.

Basically, the main idea of Hizmet Movement is “Service to God through Service to humanity” as it started in Turkey; its origin is based on Sunni Islam and ideas of Anatolian Sufism. Gulen accepts Nursi’s ideas on three main enemies, which are ignorance, poverty and disunity of whole humankind in general and Muslims in particular. Gulen explains how to struggle against these three enemies of humanity through knowledge, work-capital, and unification (Gulen 2006, 198). According to Gulen ignorance is the most serious problem of humanity and it should be solved by high-quality education which is the best way to serve the whole humankind in the global village and also a right way to establish dialogue among civilizations (Ibid.).

The movement strongly promotes serving humanity and giving importance to education reconciling science and religion, volunteerism for society accepting all humankind without any differentiation and rejecting any kind of violence towards humanity and environment (Fontenot 2012, 30). Since it embraces all humanity and movement volunteers are active in almost all over the world, the movement has been attracting an increasing number of non-Muslim volunteers as well (Ibid. 19).

Love, Humanism and Suffering (Chila)

According to Gulen, “Humans are the greatest mirror of names, attributes, and deeds of God” and “marvelous fruits of creation” (Gulen 2006, 112). “Therefore, love is foremost among the human reflections of Divine Existence, and humanity is His most polished mirror and object of His own role” (Kim 2012, 57). Heon Kim describes Gulen’s definition of true humanism as a doctrine of love and humanity. This understanding of love and humanism shapes Hizmet Movement’s activities and projects and provides bases for education and dialogue activities.

Gulen accepts that loss of humanism is the essential problem of today. Hatred, enmity, lack of tolerance, increasing extreme materialism become common all over people as a result of this loss. After the diagnosis of the disease, Gulen suggested to bringing back the humanism of love and tolerance and establishment of dialogue as a cure for humanity(Ibid.). The core value of Hizmet Movement is to ultimately serve to humanity without expecting any worldly return. Gulen describes “People of Service” as

First of all, they understand that they are responsible and answerable for work left undone, must be considerate and fair-minded to everyone who seeks their help, and must work to support the truth. They are extraordinarily resolved and hopeful even when their institutions are destroyed, their plans upset, and their forces routed. People of service are moderate and tolerant... zealous, persevering and confident... so faithful to the cause to which they have devoted themselves that, deeply in love with it, they willingly sacrifice their lives and whatever they love for its sake. So sincere and humble are such people that they never remind others of their accomplishments.

Therefore, volunteers of the Hizmet movement need to be

people of integrity, to act independently and freely from any worldly power, to think, investigate, believe, and overflow with spiritual pleasure. They must be completely truth loving, trustworthy and, in support of truth everywhere, ready to leave any worldly things, comforts and luxuries for the sake of society, dedicated to their lives for humanist and truth. They need to use mass media, try to establish a new power of balance of justice, love, respect, and equality among people. They also stay in touch and communicate with people’s minds, hearts and feelings, never discriminate, equipped with good morals and virtues. They will unite spirituality, knowledge, thinking, scientific approach and wise activism, always increase in knowledge. They never be reactionary as well. (Gulen 2006)

Gulen describes volunteers as “devotees of love” and believes that “only those who overflow with love will be able to build the happy and enlightened world of future” (Ibid.). He accepts a quota from Nursi. “We are devotees of love; we don’t have time for antagonism” as a principle for the movement (Ibid.) and also from Yunus Emre, an Anatolian Sufi poet, “We love creature for the sake of Creator” and he also says that “Open your heart as wide as the oceans, Become inspired with faith and love for others. Offer a hand to those in trouble and be concerned about everyone.”

All of the descriptions and expectations given above are not easy tasks for volunteers. Gulen also accepts the weight of responsibility and the burden of carrying out such a difficult task. Heon Kim brings an attention to Gulen’s article on *Chila* (*Suffering*) and quotas how Gulen describes Chila as:

Suffering in this sense becomes, beyond our own spiritual progress, the dedication of our lives to the happiness of others in both worlds and living for others. In other words, we should seek our spiritual progress in the happiness of others. This is the most advisable and the best approved kind of suffering: that is, we die and are revived a few times a day for the guidance and happiness of others, we feel any fire raging in another heart also in our own heart, and we feel the suffering of all people in our spirits” (Kim, 60)

Humanism of love and tolerance, establishing dialogue and suffering (Chila) while doing service to others, volunteers seek a way to educate themselves and others, and cope with the main problems of the world.

Sincerity (*ikhlas*) in Hizmet Movement

Ikhlas, which is translated into English as “purity of intention” or “sincerity”, is another important characteristic for Hizmet volunteers (Michel 2014, 91). Michel discusses the meaning of *ikhlas* and how Hizmet volunteers understand the concept in his book *Peace and Dialogue in a Plural Society* as *ikhlas* is generally accepted as a religious concept having two aspects as “sincerity” or “honesty of mind” and “purity of intentions” or “dedicating, devoting or concentrating oneself”. Although *ikhlas* is one of the key virtues in Islamic practice, it is generally accepted as a Sufi concept. Although Nursi’s approach to *ikhlas* is different from other Sufi Masters and Islamic scholars, he brings *ikhlas* into practical life as “purity of intention” or “pure religion” than simply by “sincerity”. According to Nursi, *ikhlas* is when one practices all acts

of religion just for seeking God's pleasure rather than any personal benefit whether materialistic or even emotional. Therefore, one should worship God with sincerity and needs to purify his/her intentions and actions" (Ibid.).

Gulen accepts Nursi's approach to *ikhlas* and puts it into real life and generalize to all kinds of works and deeds, not only religious purposes; and makes it a target to achieve for Hizmet volunteers. According to Gulen, a volunteer needs to keep his/her sincerity and purity while serving others and society and always seeks to reach real *ikhlas* (purity of intention and sincerity) without expecting any worldly benefit (Ibid., 95). Gulen considers deeds as a body and sincerity as its soul; and the body is not valuable without a soul. Similarly, Gulen considers deeds and sincerity as two wings of a bird; birds need both wings to fly, nothing can fly with one wing. (Gulen 2011). Michel explains how Gulen's understanding of *ikhlas* put into practical life as

...when Fethullah Gulen focuses on *ikhlas*, there are these two ideas that are always there. The first one, *ikhlas* is an element of the mystery of the person's individual relationship to God. *Ikhlas* is whenever we do; whether picking up people at the airport or whether it's providing drinks at the coffee break. If you do this for God, this has a value which only God knows and rewards.

The second aspect of *ikhlas*, which is important to Gulen, is in the unity of the community; how is unity maintained in the community. Well, nothing breaks a community apart more than some people going after privileges, are ambition, are rivalry, are competition. But focus on *ikhlas* helps people to maintain that unity by saying that everything that is done, is done for the pleasure of God. These are the two foci that we find in Gulen's treatment of *ikhlas* (Michel 2013).

The *ikhlas* concept can be considered very important for those who work for the society, especially in education, dialogue activities and all other social works. Gulen's understanding of *ikhlas* in real life could be applied by everyone and there is no need to limit it by Hizmet volunteers or Muslim community.

Importance of Education

Education is in the center of all the movement's activities. Hizmet movement volunteers run more than two thousand schools and other educational institutions including universities in more than 170 countries. Since there is no place as we can define as center or headquarters or any kind of organic connection rather than sharing common ideals, and experiences,

telling the exact number of institutions is not easy. Therefore, Hizmet movement might be called a global education movement.

As mentioned before, education is the most important way to serve humanity. Gulen argues that a human has three dimensions - spiritual, intellectual and physical - therefore true education should cover all three areas and is vital for individuals and societies. Education is a lifelong process for individuals to reach essential human identity. Future of societies depends on education of youth. Nursi stated more than hundred years ago as “there is an understanding of education that sees the illumination of the mind in science and knowledge, and the light of the heart faith and virtue”. Gulen puts Nursi’s ideas on practical life and encourages people to serve the country in particular and humanity in general through education.

According to Gulen there must be consensus and cooperation among the family, school, environment and mass-media to guarantee desired results. Nations should consider education as their first priority and young generations should be educated with high ideals, good morals, and necessary level of scientific and technological knowledge (Gulen 2006).

Gulen gives a special attention on school and teacher. He describes schools as a “laboratory offering an elixir that can prevent or heal the ills of life”, and educational goal of the schools are “the integration of the study science with character development, social awareness, and active spirituality”, schools are places where students prepare for today’s life and the next life under the guidance of true teachers who know importance of their duty, real educator who is different than ordinary teacher, patient and consider and care each and every student as different world (Gulen 2006, Michel 2014).

Education System of Schools

Schools run by movement volunteers are secular schools, (Acar, 2014), following either national curricula of host countries or international systems. Almost all of these schools are highly prestigious and won several awards in national and international competitions. There are several papers analyzing schools’ system and success therefore there will not be much discussion on this topic. There is no organic link with educational institutions and Gulen himself except inspiring and encouraging people to open schools in Turkey and around the world. There is another important issue regarding three dimensions in Gulen’s educational approach. Michel analyzes Gulen’s understanding on

spirituality and spiritual values. According to Michel; “some might read this as a code word for “religion” and employed to counter-act prejudices towards religiosity in modern secular societies” (2014). I totally agree with his concerns therefore I would like quote his opinions as

...it is clear that Gulen is using the term in a broader sense. For him, spirituality includes not only specifically religious teachings, but also ethics, logic, psychological health, and affective openness. Key terms in his writings are compassion and tolerance. It is the task of education to instill such “non-quantifiable” qualities in students, in addition to training in the “exact” disciplines (Ibid.)

Ethos of Schools

“Ethos of schools is universal and encourages hard work, tolerance, compassion and honesty” (Colak, 2015). There is nothing contradictory about that as “religion is the inspirational source in emergence of the movement.” “The movement volunteers believe that they need to create a shared understanding, a shared experience, and a shared code of ethics since world becomes global village” (Cetin, 2010; Acar, 2014) and this should be done without conflicting with people’s cultural heritage and values (Aslandogan; et al. 2007).

Character Education – Values Education in Schools and the Movement

Character building is quite important part of education. Gulen calls a new generation of youth as “Golden Generation” who has been educated with true humanistic values, contemporary science and knowledge, ready to deal with local and global struggles for the whole humanity, knows his/her own culture, values, language and identity as well as connected with other nations and countries. He describes his ideal generation and ideal human beings in his books, lectures, interviews and sermons and encourages people to prepare ideal conditions for upcoming long awaited generations.

Schools follow secular education and local or international curricula; therefore, there is no common syllabi about character education or values education. Moreover, there is no such lesson taught in these schools in case local or international curricula requests. As an example, three schools in Thailand follow national curricula of Ministry of Education of Thailand therefore in middle school and high school (Grades 7 -12), they have 1 period of mandatory religion subject. Similarly, at the fourth school following American Core curriculum and

IB system in high school, there is no such subject in high school. However, schools are famous for their character education system depending on teachers and role modelling. In the schools, international common core values have been being taught through role modelling and by practicing instead of lecturing. Questions may arise about whether these are international or common values or the values coming from the origin of movement. or in other words, from Islam. Schools are very sensitive about religious teaching and they don't make reference to any particular religion in case there is no regulation from local authorities in that direction. This issue has been discussed by several academicians who worked on Hizmet Movement and several journalists have been asking these questions. Especially two questions come to people's minds as "Is there any Islamization process in these schools?" and "Is the Hizmet movement carrying a missionary agenda similar to the Christian Missions?" The movement has been opening schools around the world and they have been checked for more than 20 years, evaluated by related stated organizations of host countries. However, there was no such evidence found to support ideas of Islamization or being a kind of Islamic missionary movement.

Movement's character education based on concentric circle system of values which inspired from Nursi's writings on "capital of life and how to spent it"

I was once asked the following question by some brothers who were helping me:

For fifty days now you have asked nothing at all, nor have you shown any curiosity, about this terrible World War (Nursi had never shown any interest about news regarding World War II from its beginning until its end) ... Is there some other event more momentous than this war? Or is it in some way harmful to be preoccupied with it?

My reply as follows:

The capital of life is very little and the work to be done very great. Like concentric circles, everyone has certain spheres of concern which exist one within the other: they have the spheres of the heart and the stomach; the spheres of body and home; the spheres of the quarter in which they reside and the town or city in which they live; the sphere of their country; the sphere of the earth and humankind, and the sphere of all living beings and the world as whole. Each person may have certain duties in each of those spheres, but the most important and permanent duties are those which pertain to the nearest, smallest sphere, while the least important and temporary duties pertain to the furthest, largest one. According to this standard, they may be duties, the importance and sphere of which are inversely proportional to each other. But because of the

appeal of the largest sphere tend to be neglected, as people preoccupied with unnecessary, trivial, and peripheral matters. It destroys the capital of their life for nothing and causes them to waste their precious time on worthless things. ... (Nursi 2011, 21-13).

Gulen and educators in the movement brings idea of concentric circles of life into education as follows: Values of the first circle are the most important and they are about the individual; the second circle is about family and neighborhood; the third set is related to the nation and state; and the fourth group is about the whole humanity and the world.

Love, compassion, anger, lust, courage, patience, curiosity, tolerance, hard work, lying, greed, honesty, sincerity- purity, altruism, holding one's thought, prudence, progress, openness, youth, scientific knowledge, trustworthy, hardworking, laziness, inner wisdom, love of mother, rights of parents, respect to elders, neighborhood, sharing, caring, rights of children, true friendship, good will, looking from positive side, giving, respect for thought, family values, consultation, keeping secrets, addiction to comfort, respecting others, love of nation, true patriotism, knowing identity, social responsibilities, rights of people, sacrificing comfort, social responsibilities, environmental Issues, animal rights, importance of peace, humanitarian activities are some values that are taught in the schools and around movement volunteers.

Values are taught trough role modelling and try to be explained in a positive way. Karina Korostelina analyzes Gulen's approach on "ill opinion" such that "negative views and opinions comes from negative behavior and character as a result of jealousy, suspicion and rancor. Gulen shows the importance of positive acceptance of the other, avoidance of competition and judgment. Therefore, education of the movement and especially character education are based on good will, good view and good intention" (Korostelina 2010).

Another important point is that values taught in these schools are not conflicting with local values and customs. This is also one of the reasons why schools accepted and supported by local people worldwide as their own.

Section 2

Peace Islands, Peaceful and Harmonious Society

Gulen considers educational institutions as Peace Islands, and strongly motivates people to establish educational institutions for new generations,

societies, nations and for all humanity. Peace Islands represents hope and aim of establishing peaceful society since modern society has been challenged by several problems, difficulties and erosion of values and losing essence of true humanity. Educational institutions are not only educational places but they are also used for social motivation and encouragement for collective action of local volunteers. Thousands of institutions has been established in different parts of the world, carrying similar ideals, supporting by local people of host countries, most of whom have no relation with Turkey and origin of the movement and even some are not Muslims, but they share similar humanistic values with volunteers and would like to participate in educational and dialogue activities for their society in particular and for whole humanity in general. I would like to share the summary of Mehmet Kalyoncu's research on activities of Hizmet Movement in Southeastern region of Turkey, in his book "A Civilian Response to Ethno- Religious Conflict".

In his research, Kalyoncu uses a model of cross-national diffusion of movements developed by Doug McAdam and Dieter Rucht to analyze Hizmet Movement's activities in Mardin which is a multi-ethnic, multi-religious city suffering from socio-economic and political problems as well as terrorism in the Southeastern region of Turkey. The model emphasized both relational and non-relational channels of transmission of ideas of movements, relational ideas are direct interpersonal contacts and non-relational channels are transferring information when initial identification is established (McAdam 1993, 63). Kalyoncu applied McAdam and Rucht's model to analyze the spread of Hizmet Movement in Mardin. According to the model, diffusion and interaction happen between equivalent actors, both the transmitter and the adopter. Each party is active in their own setting and diffusion begins with interpersonal relations and adapting similar activities between movements. Later on, diffusion continues through non-relational channels. However in Hizmet movement concept, movement spreads through its volunteers from its native environment to other geographies and societies; and instead of contacting and interacting with local social movements, volunteers made contact with individuals and social groups. Therefore, Kalyoncu added a new dimension to McAdams and Rucht's method (Kalyoncu 2008, 14-17). Once interpersonal interaction established with Hizmet volunteer and local people or community, relational and non-relational models initiate the diffusion process. This also explains the system of localization of Hizmet Movement and loose connections

between other Hizmet Organizations established by volunteers. In each society, Hizmet Movement interact with local people and groups and a new form of Hizmet movement established which carries out colors of host culture.

This is one of the first papers analyzing interaction with Hizmet Movement volunteers and local people and also diffusion of the movement in different societies; therefore, it is important to explain “Peace Islands” concept and importance of education to establish a new society without carrying any political agenda.

When a volunteer moves a new society, he/she searches for a person who has similar ideas as himself/herself about serving society and education. The movement volunteers generally do not engage with political figures or other social movements in host community but they introduce themselves to local authorities and explain their intentions. Transparency towards local authorities is one of the important characteristics of the movement. The volunteer seeks a person who believes in the importance of education, aim to improve society and carry non-political agenda. In addition, this person does not necessarily be a Muslim. This is another important characteristic of the movement, although it is originated in Turkey in a religious (Sunni Islamic environment) atmosphere, it has communicated and interacted with everyone without considering their religion, ethnicity, race, color or social status. Humanistic discourse of the Hizmet Movement embraces all human beings. In Southeast Asia Region, the movement volunteers has been active in more than 20 years in totally different societies.

Kalyoncu’s research on Mardin is a good example to generalize the movement’s activities in different cultures and societies. When a volunteer meets local people, they gather for one purpose: how to improve society through education, how to deal with three main enemies of humanity; in addition, how to improve humanism and human dignity. Their collective action and motivation focus on one target, establishing a new educational institute to be a place for ideal generation. This target shapes the new group’s understanding and serving to whole humanity in general and their society in particular. While the number of volunteers has been increasing, these people begin to interact with other Hizmet movement organizations in other parts of the world. They share their experiences, ideas and understanding with other Hizmet organizations.

Establishing a new educational institute is not only building an educational complex or a simple school; but these ideas nurture new volunteers to serve society and improve their inner wisdom. Institution building becomes an educational place for new volunteers as well. When the educational institution is established, it educates not only students but parents and volunteers as well. Several projects and activities have been organized in schools for parents, volunteers and society according to their needs such as language classes, cooking clubs, and sports activities for parents, reading courses, aid activities, charity activities, seminars, conferences and several gatherings. They have all been organized for the society; therefore, school works as a lighthouse for volunteers to reach out the others.

Schools became not only an aim but also a source of motivation for further activities. Once the first step has been completed, volunteers set further targets for them to achieve. Generally they have been establishing foundations and organizations with the support of locals. While establishing educational institutions and other organizations, number of local volunteers has been increasing; and in many places the number of new ones outnumbered pioneer volunteers who had moved from other places at the beginning.

As Kalyoncu mentioned, Hizmet Movement diffuse into a new society and blends in the local culture and turns into a local movement with increasing number of local volunteers. Since Hizmet movement does not carry any political agenda and tries to establish global understanding through education, local people turns as local volunteers and owners of their own version of the movement. This also fits movement's format.

Movement encourages people to be volunteer for their own society and for all humanity; therefore, Gulen describes them as "dedicated people". Some important ideas and characteristics of volunteers has been analyzed in the first chapter. Hizmet Movement does not have any kind of membership or time-based of volunteerism, therefore it is also difficult to say the exact number of people who are related with the movement. Hizmet movement might be called a group of dedicated people who would like to serve humanity and share similar thoughts with Gulen and pioneers of the movement. There are some papers analyzing relation between movement and its volunteers and their intention to be part of this kind of movement and also reasons of their commitment. Here I would like to discuss on some important motivational and operational principles and concepts for volunteers. Kalyoncu divides these principals into two groups; the first group of principals is related with

characteristics of volunteers as: “the purpose of one’s life”, “altruism”, “living for others”, “sense of personal responsibility”, “spirit of devotion” and “person of heart”. Kalyoncu called these six principals as “idea of living to serve”. The second group has six operational concepts: “conversation and service”, “collective decision making and board of trustees”, “personal commitment and passion of giving” (Ibid., 19-20).

Six Core Values of Idea of Living to Serve

During his teachings, Gulen encourages people to serve for their nation and whole humanity through true education which combines harmony of body, mind and spirit. Love, tolerance, ikhlas (sincerity and purity) and chila (suffering) are major characteristics of the movement and emerald hills for volunteers who decide to climb. Gulen combines wisdom of Anatolian Sufi masters and contemporary knowledge and puts them into practice in real life. He encourages people to commit as much as they can and motivates each and every one to take some responsibility to serve others. These six core values are set for volunteers to be an ideal human being. Although these characteristics come from Islamic sources and tradition, Gulen enlarges their meanings to cover all humanity. These values are used for character education in the schools without mentioning their religious backgrounds.

Six Operational Concepts of Hizmet Movement

These six core operational concepts give us ideas about how movement works and volunteers act.

Service

It is the main idea of the movement. Hizmet, Turkish word, literally means “service”. Therefore Hizmet movement sometimes called as “Service Movement”. It covers all kind of values and practices that a person serve to his/her community and whole humanity.

Conversation (Gatherings)

Volunteers gather together to socialize, or to learn about some topics. This is one of the important educational activities for movement; volunteers share their experiences or carry out some ideas. Volunteers believe there is no limit for education, therefore they prefer periodical gatherings which they could discuss variety of topics ranging from history, literature, humanistic issues

to their professions. However, politics and other worldly issues are usually not a part of these gatherings. Talking of politics or similar issues are not accepted in the movement as well as any topics that might result in alienation of some people or taking their attention away from service to their communities.

Collective Decision Making

This is different than “conversations or gatherings regarding training and sharing information. Volunteers of the movement believe importance of collective decision therefore they would like to discuss all of their projects, activities with a group of dedicated people. These people are taking part in movement activities as volunteer and dedicated their lives for service to their communities and whole humanity as well as having experience about the issues they discuss. For example, to build a new school, volunteers from education, business world and even architects and civil engineers gather to discuss about it. Gulen gives great importance to collective decision rather than individual decision. He says that “Consultation is the first condition for obtaining good results. Paying attention to the opinions of friends and well-wishers is a very important means of avoiding mistakes”(Gulen 2012, 77).

Board of Trustees

There is no membership in the movement and everything based on volunteerism; therefore, people’s dedication and aim shape their position in the movement. However, there are some people who really believe and commit themselves to serve others. The movement rely on several small groups of dedicated people willing to take more responsibility than others. Therefore the people in front of the movement are expected to work harder or giving more than others. These people promise to take some responsibilities regarding their local communities or bigger projects such as small dedicated group of people who have some small businesses might promise to give scholarship to hundreds of students and they work whole year to fulfil their promises. On the other hand, some other group of bigger business people might promise to build some schools or universities for their society and in other countries. Being a part of such board of trustees is related with a person’s dedication as well. There is no obligation besides a person’s own feelings and understanding of service.

Personal Commitment (Himmet) and Passion of Giving

Kalyoncu defines understanding of 'Personal Commitment (Himmet)' as "one's personal commitment to carrying out the duty at hand, be it sponsoring a school project or reaching out to as many people as possible to share movement's educational vision. The act of giving or committing itself seems to be more important than the amount given or the sort of commitment. This commitment may be money, time, or effort" (Kalyoncu 2008, 37).

Personal commitment is directly related with altruism, living for others and serving humanity to serve God. Volunteering in Hizmet movement means that a person is ready to give to society without asking any return. This is a kind of passion for volunteers.

Helen Rose Ebough describes that financial giving is a common characteristic of participants of the movement (2010) Personal Commitment (Himmet) is different from raising funds in a way that fund-raising is emphasized to collect the sum of donations. However, 'act of giving' is more important than the amount given in personal commitment (Kalyoncu 2008, 55). According to Ebough, encouragement of movement for the people to do personal commitment as a revival of Turkish –Islamic philanthropy and Gulen encourages people to give for whole humanity for God's sake.

Trust and Transparency

Trust and transparency are very important in the movement. During her interviews, Ebough had learnt that "members expressed their trust in how their donations were being used. Repeatedly, interviews said that they never worried how their money was being used because they know it is being well spent. Another frequent comment was, "We see results." By this they meant that they see students who are performing well academically in the schools and prep courses" (Ebough 2010). Kalyoncu discussed accountability and he concludes that board of trustees and people who join collective decision-making activities are mostly local people and sponsors, therefore all collected amount and spending are well examined (Kalyoncu 2008, 57-59).

Movement volunteers believe that there is no way to serve legal course through illegal means (Ibid., 50). The movement has been more than 170 countries and never accused by any illegal financial issues or any other accusations. This is strong evidence for trust and transparency of movement's projects.

Role Modeling

Gulen believes that “temsil (role modeling) is more important than tabligh (preaching)” (Alam, 2015) and the modeling should be supported by actions as well (Akdag 2015). Gulen suggests that pioneers of the movement should work harder and live in simple exemplary life to be a good model for coming generations. Action supported role modeling is the key factor to show intentions and also the most effective way to improve society.

Movement’s Theory of Peacebuilding

Zeki Saritoprak, one of leading academicians on the movement, argues that “Gulen’s theology of peace is based on the integrity of the individual regardless of ethnic or religious background and approach to peacebuilding, therefore is one of ‘bottom-up’ social change (Saritoprak, 2010). Scholars of peacebuilding consider forgiveness essential for peacebuilding, and in Gulen’s theory of peacebuilding there is no place for revenge (Ibid.).

A Hizmet Approach to Rooting out Violent Extremism

A research made by Ozcan Keles and Ismail Mesut Sezgin published by Centre for Hizmet Studies. In their research, they argue that Hizmet Movement rejects any kind of terrorism whatever the situation or circumstance (Keles and Sezgin 2015, 39).

Gulen states that

... any terrorist activity, no matter who does it and for what purpose, is the greatest blow to peace, democracy, humanity, and all religious values. For this reason, no one—and certainly no Muslims – can approve of any terrorist activity. Terror has no place in one’s quest to achieve independence or salvation. It costs the lives of innocent people....

The world should be assured that, although there may always be some who exploit any religion for their interests, Islam does not approve of terrorism in any form. Terrorism cannot be used to achieve any Islamic goal. No terrorist can be a Muslim, and no true Muslim can be a terrorist. Islam orders peace, and the Qur’an demands from each true Muslim that he or she be a symbol of peace and support the maintenance of basic human rights. If a ship is carrying nine criminals and one innocent person, Islam does not allow the ship to be sunk to punish the nine criminals, for doing so would violate the innocent person’s rights.... (Appeared in Washington Post on September 21, 2001)

Keles and Sezgin argues that the movement proposes counter-narrative arguments for extremism such as love and compassion, diversity of belief, free will, middle way (sirat al-mustaqim), good view and good will, positive and proactive action. Then they claim that the movement's activities for society refuting reasons and arguments of extremists while recruiting new people or defining their actions (Keles and Sezgin 2015, 41-44).

Dialogue Activities

Hizmet Movement accepts that dialogue is necessary and important in a globalized world. Gulen defines 'dialogue' in his article 'the two roses of the emerald hills: Tolerance and Dialogue' as "Dialogue means the coming together of two or more people to discuss certain issues, and thus the forming of a bond between these people. In that respect, we can call dialogue an activity that has human beings at its axis" (Gulen 2006, 50).

According to Gulen "the goal of the tolerance and dialogue that we want to reach will be very expensive. Just as not easy to obtain precious and exclusive things, it is also difficult to protect them once they have been achieved. Attaining social harmony through dialogue and tolerance is a matter of achieving two valuable things in order to realize a third" (Ibid., 51)

Thomas Michel argues that "Hizmet Movement has been active in sponsoring and organizing "Abrahamic" dialogues with high-ranking representatives of Judaism, Christianity and Islam. The movement also organizes associations for the promotion of interreligious activities at the local and regional level, and has established dialogue associations in Africa, Europe, North and South America, and Asia, all of which take independent initiatives toward promoting interreligious understanding and cooperation"(Ibid.). Jill Carroll argues that "Gulen has championed dialogue as a necessary commitment and activity in the contemporary world" (Carroll 2007).

According to Ihsan Yilmaz and Mohamed Abu-Nimer, "Gulen does not pursue an identity politics and does not define himself by the other." Moreover, "he rejects the idea that a clash between the "east" and "West" is necessary, desirable, or unavoidable. In Gulen's view an abstract West is not enemy of Muslims; but ignorance, poverty, and disunity are" (Esposito et al. 2010, 30).

Section 3

Fox and Sandler argue that religion effects human behaviors and also domestic and international politics in several ways. In their book “Bringing religion into International Relations” (Palgrave- Macmillan, 2004) they introduce a new theory and discuss how to integrate religion into international relations discipline. , Fox and Sandler discussed four main roles of religion as one of the sources’ of people’s worldviews; as a source to intervene, conflict or being allies; as source of legitimacy; its relation with formal institutions. Transnational religious phenomena tends to fit more than one of these categories and religious fundamentalism is related with religious identity. Religion is related with several national and international issues such as human rights, rights of women, sustainable development, and environmental issues and so on.

Hizmet Movement, as discussed in previous chapters, has been started with religious motivation to serve humanity. They believe that education is one of the main ways to tackle main enemies of humanity as ignorance, poverty, disunity; and in a global world, they need to work with people from different backgrounds and cultures and sharing similar ideas with them. As described in the second chapter, schools have been used as a center of collective action and social capital.

In this chapter, the main theme is how Hizmet movement volunteers use education to establish peaceful societies and what prescriptions they use to solve problems. Case studies have been selected to get some frames and ideas, however this is not enough to see the complete picture.

Southeastern Turkey

Kurdish issue in Turkey and region is almost a century old. Since establishment of the modern Turkish Republic, and other neighbor countries where Kurdish people lives such as Iraq, Syria and Iran. Since early 1980s, there has been terror problem in Turkey especially in Southeastern regions of Turkey where Kurdish people are majority of the population. Ethnic terrorism (PKK) since early 1980s and religious based terrorism (Turkish Hezbollah) since 1990s negatively affected Turkey and region in particular. In addition to security and terror problems, the region has been suffering with poverty, lack of education and less development compared to other regions of Turkey. Analyzing Hizmet Movement’s activities in the region is quite important to understand how the movement works in real life. In this paper, Sophia Pandya’s and Mehmet

Kalyoncu's researches has been summarized to get brief information.

Pandya analyzed Hizmet Movement in Northern Iraq and Southeastern Turkey in her essay "Hizmet and the Kurdish Question in Southeastern Turkey and Iraq" (Turkish Journal of Politics, 2014). "Southeastern part of Turkey where majority of Kurdish people live has quite low education and literacy rates, around 40%, compared to literacy ratings of other regions around 90%. This causes young people to join PKK, Kurdistan Workers' Party-Kurdish terrorist group. State repression, inadequate localized choices, fear and insecurity about the future are also other important factors to motivate the youth to join this terrorist group. Hizmet movement's activities are quite valuable for the region in many ways as the first educational institution of Hizmet Movement opened in 1988 by volunteers, since then more than 289 educational institutions has been established. (Private schools opened by Hizmet movement were the first private schools in the region- author's addition). Another activity of Hizmet movement is about social projects with Kimse Yok Mu foundation, international aid organization established by Hizmet volunteers. Dunya TV is the first private Kurdish television channel established in Turkey and approved by the state. Educational scholarships for low-income students to study in other cities has also been another factor that reduced number of participations to terror groups. TUSKON, confederation of industrialists and business people, has been started to invest in eastern and southeastern regions. Hizmet provides opportunities not only to Kurdish people in the region but also other ethnicities and religious groups, too" (Pandya 2014, 73-93).

Mehmet Kalyoncu analyzed Hizmet movement's activities in Mardin, a multiethnic. Multi-religious, relatively poor, under-developed city in southeast region of Turkey suffering from poverty and terror. In 1988, a volunteer of the movement met with a local shop owner. This is how movement has been started, in 1988 – 1991, periodic meetings with local people were started and local volunteers motivated to involve educational activities to develop their society and to serve their people. Their first aim was to open preparatory center for university entrance examination. The first preparatory school was opened in 1991 by local volunteers, then the first private school of Mardin was opened in 1995 by donations from wealthy Mardinian businessman who lives in Istanbul. When local people saw fruits of education, they started to establish foundations to improve villages "MARKOYDER", to assist needy students in their studying

“MOSDER” (opening free reading halls to support students from low-income families), and also through School, volunteers offer free reading courses for women and encourages and supports girls to attend schools. They also establish business networks to improve local economy, finding scholarships and accommodation for students to study in other cities. During religious festivals, they invite wealthy businessman from other cities, mostly from Western regions and bigger cities of Turkey, to visit the villages here to celebrate their days together and distribute aids.

Terror leaders’ complained about movement’s activities, but they could not fight against them because of local support for the movement. They complained about reducing number of young people to join them. “Piotr Zalaweski from Time Magazine on June 4, 2012, stated that Kurdish PKK militant activists have identified Hizmet as their number one enemy”(Ibid.).

In general, Hizmet Movement opened the first private schools and tutoring centers in southeastern region of Turkey and free reading halls where more than 300,000 students learn annually. They also established dormitories, hostels, houses for students in local cities, encourage girls to continue their studies, established several foundations and associations to improve living conditions of villagers and town people, established business associations, links with other cities and arrange accommodations and scholarships for students. The first private Kurdish TV channel, Dunya TV, was opened by volunteers as well.

Northern Iraq

Pandya analyzes Hizmet Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan as follows “Iraqi Kurdistan is a semi-autonomous region founded in 2005, disturbing neighboring countries like Turkey, Syria and Iran because of Kurdish population in each country. The first schools in Iraq were opened in Iraqi Kurdistan in 1994, later the Hizmet has built more than 30 schools all over the country, including three in Baghdad with approximately 12,500 students. There is also one university in Iraqi Kurdistan called Ishik University. According to Iraqi Kurds opinions, they consider Hizmet schools and universities funded by these Turkish businessmen as the best educational options currently available. Pandya quoted a Turkish educational director of Hizmet institutions in Iraq stated: “Hizmet schools try to advance the country they are in. If Iraq becomes more modern, the [Hizmet] teachers will be happier. If Iraqi people get richer, Iraq will import more goods from Turkey” (interview, Erbil, April 1st 2013). In Iraqi

Kurdistan, Hizmet's projects have also been accompanied by large number of development ventures. More females than males attend the Hizmet-run Ishik University, pointing to women's development in the region. A smaller number of Kurdish students are sent by Hizmet to Turkey to get graduate degrees. Erbil also hosts a cultural dialogue center, where community outreach takes place. Hizmet activists reached out to the local Mullahs so they would be informed about the religious inspiration behind Hizmet activities, and brought them to the center for dialogue, eventually also taking them on a trip to Turkey. Pandya concludes her analysis as "The main reasons given by those Kurds who appreciated the educational institutions include the following: 1. Superior schools and teachers, 2. the schools ease tensions between communities, and finally, 3. they help build a strong Kurdistan and stronger Iraq" (Ibid., 73-39).

Besides educational projects, dialogue activities and business investments, volunteers also invest in media in Northern Iraq

Balkan Countries

Balkan region is one of the first areas that Hizmet Movement volunteers moved and opened schools. Zeki Saritoprak shared his experience about schools in Macedonia as "During his visit to the school in Skopje in 2004, he learnt that during civil war time, members of different ethnic groups send their children to school. While parents were fighting with each other, their children studied together peacefully under the same roof" (Esposito et al. 2010).

Kosovo is the newest and the poorest country in Balkan region that had several crisis and civil war which ended with the declaration of independence by Kosovo people. Jeton Mehmeti explains in his article "The role of education in Kosovo and the contribution of Gulen Movement" as "Volunteers established the first school in 1999 right after the war. Mehmet Akif College is the one of the most prestigious schools in the region and there are three schools run by volunteers. The movement contributes not only in education but also in interfaith dialogue. Moreover, several students have been sponsored to study abroad and several dormitories have been opened for students in Kosovo. Movement activities have been recognized and supported by local people and the government. Schools have been example for other schools in the state and foundations set by volunteers offer scholarship and accommodation for hundreds of students" (Mehmeti 2012, 213-221).

Hizmet movement volunteers went to Bosnia- Herzegovina during the civil war to open school in Sarajevo. The first school was opened in 1996 at a building in Sarajevo's Vraca neighborhood, which was under the control of Serbs during the war and used by Chetniks (Hizmet 2014). Salih Yucel and Ismail Alptekin mentioned about schools opened in Bosnia- Herzegovina as "...in Bosnia, Croatian and Serbian students, though few in number, study peacefully among Bosnian students in spite of the brutal war. This is a powerful indication that Gulen Movement's schools have succeed in establishing a non-sectarian atmosphere in their educational system while respecting cultural and religious differences" (Yucel and Albayrak, 2013). In my own experience, I met with two students from these schools joining International Environmental Project Olympiad in Baku, Azerbaijan at 2011. Although they were Serbian ethnicity, they were representing Bosnia-Herzegovina. Moreover, one of the students were going to join International Turkish Olympiad in Turkey. They were talking about their schools positively. Besides, Journalists and Writers Association, a Turkey based NGO, organized a football match at Istanbul between Turkey's national team and players from other international teams including Maradona in 1995 and more than 100,000 people watched it. Aim of the match was raising awareness of national and international community on ongoing civil war in Yugoslavia (JWF 1995).

South East Asia

Thomas Michel shares his memory in his book "Peace and Dialogue in a Plural Society, 2014" as "his first contact with the schools was in 1995, in Zamboanga, on the southern Philippine island of Mindanao. When he heard about the existence of a Turkish school, he decided to visit. The name of the school, The Philippine-Turkish School of Tolerance, took his attention. The school was located in Zamboanga, a city almost equally having Christian and Muslim population and for more than 20 years various Moro separatist movements have been struggling with government forces. During the visit, he was informed that there were over 1000 students study and live in dormitories, teaching staff were Turkish and Filipinos, Christian and Muslim. The School was offering Muslim and Christian Filipino children an educational standard of very high quality, a more positive way of living and relating to each other" (Michel 2014, 57). Besides, Michel said, when I contact with one of school administrators who has been living in Philippines for more than 15 years, he answered my questions as follows.

“Q: What are the contributions of your institute to local society and country?

A: Especially our school in Zamboanga has contributed a lot. Reaching out to communities in need with no discrimination. Scholarship programs for the poor and deserving students and their success stories. Friendship dinners where people from different walks of life come together. And all the other socio-cultural activities the schools undertake have already an impact on the community.

Q: What are your main differences of your educational understanding from other educational institutions established by Missionaries, religious organizations or social movements?

A: Self-devotion is the quality we seek in our faculty members. Accessing information is just a click away in our age. But as we become more technology addicted, reaching out to the lives of our children became more challenging. The Social Media and Internet is continuously enslaving our younger generations. We need real role models like teachers who can show them the right path and work hard for it. If not, the uncontrolled world of internet and our new age have terrible consequences on the upbringing of our youth.

Q: Is it possible to share diversity in your institution (gender, religion, ethnicity, language etc.)?

A: In Zamboanga, we have a good combination of Christian and Muslim students studying together. In our Manila schools, this is even a lot better. Having students from more than 15 different nationalities and almost all the beliefs is a proof that we have a diverse environment in our schools.

.Q: Is there any concrete effect of your institution to peace in society? Could you share?

We have several programs. First, annual friendship dinners, here we invite people from different backgrounds, beliefs and positions. These people are usually people of influence where they share their experiences to others around or under them. Second, beef sharing, this activity also reaches out to people who are in need with no discrimination. This is usually done in coordination with government offices and religious leaders to provide an opportunity for unity and togetherness.

Q: Do you think that your institution can be accepted as “Island of Peace”? Why?

A: Our school in Zamboanga has already an award with that name. This award was given by secretary of Department of Education to our Foundation which makes it even more significant.

Q: Would you share a memory or experience related with togetherness, peaceful society?

A: In fact, there are many examples. The statement of former mayor of Zamboanga is very memorable for me. During one of our meetings she said; “I want to confess, Until I met you, my perception about Muslims was, the best Muslim is a dead one. After meeting you, this has changed” and she was 75 years old. “

Mohamed Nawab Osman's paper "Towards a Middle Way: Islam in Southeast Asia and the Contributions of the Gulen Movement" analyze movement's contributions in Southeast Asia, especially in Singapore and Indonesia (Osman 2010, 269 – 287) "Individuals from the movement first arrived to Southeast Asia in 1980s. However, the first school was established in 1993. Today movement has schools almost all counties in the region (except Brunei). The movement opened school in Cambodia in the late 1990s (in 1997, founded by a Turkish journalist) right after political turmoil and genocide. Movement follows similar pathway as other regions of the world in South East Asia. Turkish business people and volunteers accepted responsibility to support newly opened educational institutions and educators were invited to work in these schools. The Gulen-inspired schools played an important role in peacebuilding efforts in the region."

Philip Bruckmayr argues that "The case of the Gulen movement is unique as it is an Islamically inspired international actor providing not religious but secular education." Moreover Bruckmayr suggests that Gulen's ideas on living in non-Muslim lands should be considerable for all Muslim minorities and immigrants around the globe (Bruckmayr 2010, 203-205).

In Thailand, the movement's educational activities were started with three high school graduates who were trying to enroll in university and to find an opportunity to open a school in 1993. The first school was opened in 1996 in Chiang Mai with the support of local people. It is one of the first bilingual schools in Thailand and the first one in Northern Thailand. There are currently four schools in Thailand with more than 2000 students studying from Kindergarten to Grade 12. The schools have been accepted by local community, students from different ethnicities and beliefs have been learning together. Wichai Wittaya Bilingual School has received Royal Award twice (for Secondary and Primary Sections) and twice in students level. Moreover, one student from Siriwat Wittaya Bilingual School has received Royal Award as well. Schools follow Math-Science curriculum and received several awards at National and International Competitions. Schools have been actively participating in several social responsibility projects and students take part in several activities. Besides education, volunteers have been organizing Ramadan Iftar Dinners which gathered people from different beliefs, Noah Pudding activity was organized as remembrance for all humankind are destined in the same ship, Qurban Meat Distribution Project organized with local people and state

agencies. Business networking and organizing international conferences with local universities are other activities. (I shared my personal experience since I was part of this education team for 12 years)

Section 4

Possibility of Transferring

Hizmet Movement's ideas on education and 'Peace Islands' concept are based on humanistic values, idea of serving whole humanity, 'transforming society through transformation of individuals without carrying any political agenda and dialogue with everyone. Therefore these ideals could be transferred and implemented in any society (Esposito et al. 2010, 10-11).

Since the movement has been founded on Islamic values and Sufi understanding and originated in Turkey, Muslim societies might find much more similarity than other societies.

When we observe evolution of the movement throughout the years, we might even say that Hizmet movement will be truly transnational or global movement in near future by blending with multiculturalism. Localization process of the movement is still in progress in some areas and in different levels based on interaction and activities of volunteers.

There has been increasing attention on the movement in academic level; however, the movement is still unknown for public in many countries.

Critics of the Movement

There are several critics on the movement on several issues, local volunteers of the movement and some researchers studying on the movement have been responding such issues. I would like to bring some critics on the movement and answers.

1. There is no exact educational model provided by the movement

Movement schools have been established by individuals in different countries and there is no exactly organic connection between these schools; therefore, they could not establish a center to set an educational model for everyone. Unfortunately, this might be the biggest weak point of the movement. There is another reason for not establishing a common education model, the movement does not have many academicians in education field yet. They have several experienced and excellent teachers and school administrators; however, there is no establishment to carry their experiences and prepare a model for the whole humankind.

2. The movement is an Islamic religious order and there is a hidden agenda. The movement carries secularism ideas towards Muslim society and get supports from Western countries. There is some secrecy among volunteers.

The Hizmet movement never hide its origin and they consider this is their strong point; however, they always express they do not have a religious mission, and they don't carry any Islamization policy. Similarly, they are not a tool of Western world in Islamic countries. Both are irrelevant and baseless accusations. The movement is not cult or secret organization. Since schools and other activities of the movement have been controlled and inspected by related authorities of host countries, there is no such accusation happened.

3. The movement has been being operated by Turkish people and carrying Pan-Turkish agenda.

Ethnicity of the movement volunteers has been changing from dominance of Turkish people to multi ethnic format. However, majority of the movement volunteers are still Muslim. Since the movement is open for everyone sharing similar ideas and thoughts, in the near future, diversity in the movement will most probably be increased.

4. The movement supports collectivism rather than individualism.

The movement supports individualism and free will. However, they support collective action and unity. There is no contradiction, this is similar to human body, each and every organ have uniqueness but also they are working collectively. Although they are different, they feel the same pain and love.

5. The movement erases national identities and creating a new identity for its students.

It is true that the movement aims to transform the society; however, this does not mean that erasing national, religious, ethnic identities of its members and students. On the contrary, the movement wants to build a humanistic discourse with awareness of differences.

6. How to evaluate teaching of values in these schools.

There is no such criteria to measure values thought in these schools. However, there are some researchers working on alumni and there is no complaint about alumni of schools around the world.

Section 5

Conclusion

Ignorance, poverty, disunity and erosion of humanistic values are common problems of humankind. Besides, globalization has introduced new difficulties and benefits to societies. Hizmet Movement's educational activities and 'Peace Islands' concept are alternative ways to deal with these problems and others.

Bringing education into the center of collective action encourages local people to be involved in social activities for their society and for the whole of humankind.

The movement does not pursue an identity politics and does not define itself through 'us' and 'others'. The movement accepts all humankind as one group with differences. Moreover, it is not reactionary and non-political. Therefore, each and every one might find a place in the movement to serve society. It is a bottom up movement encouraging role modelling and being in action more than lecturing and preaching.

There is no complete study on the Hizmet Movement's educational activities through alumni from these schools from all over the world, from USA to Japan, from Mongolia to Central Africa, from Brazil to Laos. This might give us ideas about the effect of the movement on individuals and societies.

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Politics of Multicultural Society

20 Years of Frozen Conflict: A Comparative Study of Education in Brčko District and Bosnia-Herzegovina

Jusuf Sarancic

Abstract

The 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement both ended the Bosnian War and created the consociational democracy that exists in Bosnia and Herzegovina to this day. The ethnic autonomy created by the Dayton Agreement has resulted in a frozen conflict between ethnic groups that has manifested itself in the country's monoethnic education system. This study explores the short-term stability under consociationalism and the long-term stability under a multiethnic education system. Additionally, this study explains the importance of the country's only multiethnic education system in Brčko District and how it came into existence. Perhaps more importantly, this study suggests a heavier handed approach to international intervention post-conflict is necessary in igniting stronger peacebuilding efforts.

Keywords: *Consociationalism, Peacebuilding, Statebuilding, Education, Development, Post-Conflict, Ethnonationalism, Reconciliation, Conflict Resolution, Bosnia*

*To my parents, brother, family,
and friends for their unconditional support.*



Map 1: Cantonal Map of FBiH. (Cantonal 2014)



Map 2: City Map of BiH. (Bosnia 2016)

Introduction: Fikreta's Story

It's another hot day. It's well over a hundred degrees and the air is absolutely stagnant. A small, rickety Volkswagen bus labors its way up the steep foothills surrounding Mostar. The doors on the bus have been pulled open to allow air into the cabin because there's no air conditioning. The whirl of the diesel engine is particularly deafening. It's not long before I arrive at my destination of Potkosa. It's a tiny village where my mom's paternal aunt and uncle live. Fikreta, my mom's aunt, is a sixth grade history and geography teacher in Stolac, which is another town about fifteen minutes away. Eno, my mom's uncle, is a retired electrician. The purpose of the visit is two-fold. For starters, I haven't had a chance to visit them during my field research in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), so it was long overdue to visit some extended family. It is also a chance for me to interview a grade school teacher in an ethnically divided school.

So, over Turkish coffee, for the next two hours she explains to me what it means to teach and attend a Two-in-One school (an ethnically divided school), and more generally about the poor state of the education system. Fikreta begins slowly and explains that in her school and that school I drove by, the Bosnian Croat¹ and Bosniak² students will enter the school building through opposite sides. The teachers and school administrations enter through a joint entrance (Zaklan 2015). The interaction between Bosniak and Croat students is limited to before and after school (Zaklan 2015). Each ethnicity has its own curriculum, textbooks, classrooms, teachers, administrations, lunch periods, recesses, and even custodians (Zaklan 2015). "There are two distinctly different schools under one roof," said Fikreta. She reiterates that her school and the one I drove by are not the only ones that have this particular program, but also that each of the three constituent peoples (Bosniaks, Croats, and Bosnian Serbs³) has their own education system with curriculums, textbooks, and teachers (Zaklan 2015).

1 Bosnian Croats are Croatian by descent, but were born in Bosnia. They typically adhere to Catholicism. Going forward I will only refer to them as Croats to identify Bosnian Croats for the purpose of simplicity.

2 Bosniaks are Bosnian Muslims. This group maintains an ethnic plurality in BiH. Going forward I will only refer to them as Bosniaks to identify Bosnian Muslims for the purpose of simplicity.

3 Bosnian Serbs are Serbian by descent, but were born in Bosnia. They typically adhere to Orthodox Christianity. Going forward I will only refer to them as Serbs to identify Bosnian Serbs for the purpose of simplicity.

As we continued talking about the education system in BiH, she became increasingly frustrated with how the political elites have been treating the matter. She explains that “education has become a political issue and it is the children who are suffering.” When I ask her to explain why education is a political issue, she simply responded with “that’s just the way it is.” Now, I am the kind of person who doesn’t really question people, but I couldn’t leave it at that. For the remainder of our conversation I would try to get her to dig a little deeper, but she felt very content with her answer. She just kept saying, “That’s just the way it is.” Her response left me feeling very uneasy and dissatisfied about the whole interview.

After we finished, I gave my great aunt and uncle big hugs, a kisses on the cheeks, and thanked them for their time. They both wished me well and made me promise I would call when I got back to Mostar safely. I headed out the door and into the scorching late afternoon heat to catch the next rickety bus back into town. Many days passed by until Fikreta’s uneasy answer finally settled itself. It all came down to thinking critically about how the education systems came to be and why each ethnic group maintains autonomy over their education system. It is the result of a consociational government, or an ethnic power-sharing democracy, created by the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA).

Consociationalism is a form of proportional power-sharing government that emphasizes ethnic autonomy within the greater decentralized federal state (Lijphart 2002). For example, in BiH the state is responsible for matters related to international politics and trade, taxation, and the military (General 1995). All other responsibilities are reserved for each of the three constituent peoples, so responsibilities like education, police, agriculture, and tourism (General 1995)⁴. So when I asked Fikreta why education is a political issue and she responded with “that’s just the way it is,” she was being very sincere with me. Ethnicity and politics are so closely linked together within a consociational democracy because ethnic groups are the source of sovereignty (Ghai 2002, 149). In Stolac, and almost all of BiH, there is no unified education system where all students of all groups learn together from a single unbiased textbook and curriculum because there is ethnic autonomy within the state. Naturally, coordination between ethnic groups is encouraged, but is not mandated. If they want to work together they can and if they don’t want to then they don’t have to. This is why in the short-term a consociational government has a better

⁴ Annex 4, Article 3, Section 3, Point A of the General Framework for Peace Agreement.

likelihood at stopping ethnic conflict because it is more likely for the various ethnic groups to agree on a system where they are able to self-govern. However, consociational governments in the long-term do not promote political moderation, as there are little institutionalized incentives to do so (Hulsey 2015). There are no real incentives for political parties to gain votes outside of their ethnic group (Hulsey 2015). The end result is typically institutionalized extremism and what academics like Valery Perry call, a “frozen conflict” (Perry 2015, 15-16).

In the case of BiH, this institutionalized extremism has manifested itself in the country’s education system. The political elites have no incentives to unify their education systems, so they try to make their own education system unique from the others (Anonymous Government Employee 2015). As a result, the educational content severely diverges when it comes to the national group of subjects (NGS), which includes history, geography, language, and the arts. Every child has a right to an education; they have a right to learn in their own ethnicity’s language, and to learn their own ethnicity’s courses in the NGS (Anonymous Government Employee 2015). As a result of the institutionalized autonomy and lack of incentives to gain electoral support across ethnic lines, it makes sense that each group would have their own education system. However, it is interesting that one district in northeastern BiH, Brčko, has a multiethnic education system with a unified curriculum in which all three languages are utilized in the classroom along with the three different ethnically biased textbooks, and students belonging to all ethnicities utilize the classroom together (Education Specialist 2015).

The guiding question for this project is: despite the shared context of a consociational government, why does Brčko District have multiethnic schools while other parts of the country do not? The answer lies in a different approach to international intervention that took place in Brčko District and not in the rest of BiH. The international intervention provided a clear and direct mandate of responsibilities that needed to be fulfilled by the international community in Brčko that did not occur anywhere else in BiH. International intervention moderated the political system in Brčko District, which allowed for the creation of multiethnic schools that pride themselves on the principle of multiperspectivity⁵. The rest of BiH did not experience this type of clear

⁵ Multi perspectivity is defined in this paper as the process of utilizing a plurality of discrepant viewpoints to achieve a well-informed understanding of any topic.

and directed international intervention, so political extremism became deeply rooted in the voting booth and in the education system. This extremism can be seen in the monoethnic schools, the Two-in-One School program, and the continued election of the four major ethnonational political parties, which will be discussed in greater depth later on.

The following discussion will focus on initially developing a better theoretical understanding of consociationalism, and the importance of a moderate education system. This paper provides an interesting dialogue by bridging the divide between two very relevant fields of academic literature. There has been little work done on how education systems are created in consociational democracies, which is what this project hopes to bring to the "table". The theoretical discussion will be used to build a strong foundation for understanding how the theories have manifested themselves within BiH. By understanding the theoretical framework in a complicated political system like Bosnia it will be much easier to understand the importance of this project. The analysis itself will show why a clear and direct mandate issued by the international community was successful in moderating the consociational government in Brčko District. Furthermore, it is also incredibly important to acknowledge other existing claims on the discussion and other possible solutions to the question, which have come about through personal exploration and other academic research.

The discussions on consociationalism and the importance of education for moderation are nothing new to the academic field of post-conflict statebuilding. However, few attempts have been made to bring the two bodies of literature together to see whether and when a consociational democracy can produce a multiethnic education system. This is because inherently it is illogical for multiethnic education systems to exist in consociational democracies. By drawing from two large academic fields the scope of the project is further narrowed into a much smaller and far less discussed field that relates the importance of international intervention in moderating the political and social extremism that develops within the consociational model. To begin, I want to set the stage and talk about the historical background of former Yugoslavia and how the death of a leader led to the creation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

A Brief History: The Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia

On November 29, 1943, Josip Broz or Tito founded the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Silber 1996, 28). Under his rule Yugoslavism⁶ was readily present and all ethnonationalism⁷ was suppressed. He dictated the country until his death in 1980. (Silber 1996, 35). Following his death the economy went into a free-fall, which comes with widespread public dissatisfaction for the political system.

Additionally, many people demanded individual identity and shied away from Yugoslavism, which paved the way for extreme nationalism in the respective countries that made up the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). As a result, this destabilized the political system with complete collapse in 1991 with the secession of Slovenia and Croatia (Silber 1996, 114-130). Bosnia and Herzegovina quickly followed in 1992 (Silber 1996, 205). Yugoslavia still remained with only Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo.

Turmoil in Bosnia and Herzegovina

In January 1992, Serb politicians in BiH declared a portion of Bosnia as the “Republika Srpska” and voted a referendum against Bosnia’s independence from Yugoslavia (Silber 1996, 220). On April, 6, 1992 peace protests in Sarajevo against the conflict were stopped by gunfire from the Army of Republika Srpska (VRS), and the Siege of Sarajevo began (Silber 1996, 222-224). For the next three-and-a-half years a brutal conflict unfolded, which was largely fought between the Bosniaks (Muslims), Croats (Catholics), and the Serbs (Orthodox). After numerous failed attempts at diplomatic negotiations, NATO became involved via concentrated airstrikes in late 1995 and a Bosniak-Croat land offensive finally forced the Bosnian Serb forces to concede (Silber 1996, 370-380). This was all not without the loss of over 100,000 people and the displacement of over 2,000,000 people (Silber 1996, 380).

The High Representative and Dayton

Thankfully in November 1995, the U.S.-sponsored peace talks in Dayton, Ohio led to the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement by representatives from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)

⁶ Yugoslavism is national pride in Yugoslavia or brotherhood in socialist states.

⁷ Ethnonationalism is pride in one’s own ethnic identity, which divisive in a state that wants equality and uniformity for all.

(Silber 1996, 364-378). The purpose of the DPA is to promote peace and stability within BiH. In order to achieve implementation of the DPA, the position of High Representative was created. Their office, the Office of the High Representative (OHR), is responsible for supervising and assisting in the peacebuilding process in BiH. It is “an ad hoc institution overseen by a Peace Implementation Council (PIC) consisting of more than fifty member states ” (Moore 2013, 53). Initially, it had a very limited scope of powers until 1997⁸ when the PIC granted the OHR the “Bonn Powers,” which are “binding powers,” such as the dismissal of politicians⁹ and the implementation of legislation¹⁰ (Office 2015). The OHR is the primary international political presence in BiH, so for the purposes of this paper whenever international community or international intervention is utilized this office is what is being referred to.

In order to get all parties to agree to the terms of the DPA there had to be some level independence since that was really what the conflict was about, independent identity and self-identification. An agreement was made within the DPA called the Inter- Entity Boundary Line (IEBL) (General 1995: Annex2), which essentially solidified the military front to create two autonomous entities within the borders of BiH. Map 1 illustrates the decentralized Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH, the “Bosniak- Croat Federation”), which comprises about 51% of the territory and it is further broken down into ten cantons that maintain almost all governmental and financial responsibilities autonomously (5 Bosniak majority cantons¹¹ , 3 Croat majority cantons¹² , and two are mixed¹³). The centralized Republic of Serbia (RS, the Serb entity) comprises the other 49% of the territory where the entity government is responsible for most tasks. BiH has one capital city, which is Sarajevo; however, Sarajevo is also the de facto capital of the FBiH as the entity government is

8 The powers of the OHR were expanded because the international community wanted to speed up the implementation of the Dayton Agreement. Local politicians were blocking attempts by the OHR to implement the Dayton Agreement, so the international community wanted to bypass this issue.

9 Politicians can be dismissed from their role without due process based on the design of the Bonn Powers, which has been a serious issue of contention within BiH. However, the OHR can also lift the ban on politicians, which has been occurring in recent years.

10 The Assemblies can be bypassed by the OHR to implement legislation that is consistent with their mission of implementing the Dayton Agreement.

11 Una-Sana (Bihac), Tuzla, Zenica-Doboj, Bosnia-Podrinje (Gorazde) and Sarajevo

12 Posavina, West Herzegovina, and Canton 10 (known locally as Hercegbosanska Canton)

13 Central Bosnia (Travnik) and Herzegovina-Neretva (Mostar)

there, while Banja Luka is the de facto capital of the RS for the same reason. In the end, one final piece of land remained after the entities were created.

Brčko District, in northeastern Bosnia, was seriously argued over due to its prime location in the country, as it would conjoin the two halves of RS and the two halves of FBiH. It was agreed in the DPA (General 1995:Annex 2, Article 5, Section 1) that Brčko would be placed under the authority of an International Arbitration Tribunal. Their responsibility would be to reach a final decision on the status of the District of Brčko. During that year the international community was tasked with bringing security to the region and when the Tribunal finally did convene, neither side could agree on a final status.

The 1997, Rome Award, established an international supervisory body, which would be led by the Principal Deputy High Representative¹⁴ (Brčko Supervisor, the Supervisor) for one year (OSCE 2007, 6). The Supervisor was given “binding regulations and orders,” which would “prevail as against any conflicting law.” Furthermore, the 1998 Supplemental Award explained the justification for the continued international intervention and confirmed the continued supervision by the Supervisor (OSCE 2007, 6). It also solidified the strength of the Supervisor and gave them power equal to the Bonn Powers, which was awarded the year before¹⁵ to the High Representative. The Final Award in 1999 established the District of Brčko as a special political unit within BiH. Neither entity would exercise political authority within the District. (Arbitral March 1999: Article 2, Section 6) Brčko District is a jointly administered region by the entities, but remains autonomous much like the cantons of the FBiH. The District’s roles, responsibilities, and autonomy have been described as similar to that of Washington D.C. in the United States. (OHR 2016). The OHR’s regime would continue until the District Supervisor notified the Brčko Tribunal that the District’s institutions are “permanent”. In the analysis, more detailed information will be discussed on how Brčko District’s education system came into existence. In addition, the role and powers of the OHR will be extensively discussed because it will be important to further the point that different kinds of international intervention led to the different education systems. Specifically, a clear and direct international mandate to the OHR Brčko led to moderation of the education system, while no clear direction or mandates were issued for the High Representative to extend to the rest of BiH.

14 The Principal Deputy High Representative is the second-in-command at the OHR.

15 The Bonn Powers were issued in 1997 and the Supplemental Award was issued in 1998.

Now that a strong historical base of events has been developed, a theoretical framework can be built upon that base. This will serve as a model for how consociationalism and moderate education theories fit together in the context of BiH.

Theoretical Underpinnings

The Long and the Short of it

After violent ethnic conflict the short-term goal is peacekeeping. This is achieved through the design of political institutions and electoral systems. Getting the various ethnic groups to agree on something is beneficial to promoting peace in the region. This is why consociational models are typically used and are easier to negotiate, as each group typically wants autonomy after conflict. The long-term goals of statebuilding include stability and reconciliation amongst all people. This can be achieved through the design of local institutions like the education system.

Design of Consociational Governments and the Electoral System

As coined by Arend Lijphart, a consociational democracy is a power-sharing democratic system or a fragmented system that is broken up along lines, such as, ethnic, religious, or linguistic (Lijphart 1971). The system is designed around proportional power-sharing and ethnic autonomy (Lijphart 2002). In order to achieve the proportional sharing of power, Lijphart recommends institutional changes like a proportional representation electoral system, governing coalitions comprised of all major ethnic factions, mutual group vetoes on major political issues and allocation of financial resources, and civil service positions in proportion to ethnic membership in the country (Lijphart 1969). Additionally, ethnic autonomy can be created through local institutions like separate educational systems (schools, textbooks, curriculums), independent cultural affairs councils, ethnically-based courts with jurisdiction over family or religious laws and language rights policies such as separate broadcast networks for different linguistic communities, or territorially, through the use of ethnofederalism as in the case of Bosnia (Lijphart 1969).

The consociational approach encourages cooperation and coordination between elites representing ethnic parties to achieve any legislation in the assembly because no group has a majority (Hulse 2015). However, they do not need to do this, as groups are autonomous within the greater state, so they

may or may not choose to work together. The whole system rests on the belief that the political elites will work together, which will moderate the political system through their compromises and creation of grand coalitions across ethnic lines. Countries like Switzerland, Belgium, and Austria are all success stories of consociationalism (Lijphart 1969:208)

However, this system severely struggles if inter-group political parties refuse to work together. It creates debilitating gridlock to the point of governmental shutdown because if groups refuse to work together and no coalitions can be created to achieve a majority rule then no legislation will be passed. Countries like Cyprus and Nigeria have had to abandon the consociational model because cooperation and moderation could not be achieved (Lijphart 1969, 209).

Now, each of these ethnonational parties believes that they are “best” representing their ethnic group. As Yash Pal Gai explains, “the system creates incentives for parties and their leaders to intensify appeals to narrow ethnic interests, linked to their kinfolk in other states, which does little for the unity of the country” (Ghai 2002, 149). Simply, the political parties only have incentives to become the most extreme as the proportional representative system guarantees a one-third share of seats in government. If there are fifteen seats available in an assembly and five are reserved for Serbs then the ethnonational parties will only appeal to their ethnicity because they are guaranteed those five seats. From the voter’s point of view, there is no incentive to electing moderate, multiethnic parties because citizens believe that moderate parties will not fight for their ethnicity and individuality like an extremist, ethnonational party might.

According to Hulse, consociational democracies are constantly evolving because newer, stronger parties replace old, weak ethnonational parties (Hulse 2015). Since voters are more likely to vote based on how hard that particular party will fight for their constituency it makes sense then that they will want fresh, new political parties replacing their old ones. Political institutions are important in achieving immediate compromise and post-conflict peacekeeping in the short-term. That’s why power-sharing democracies are typically implemented post-conflict, which is why consociational governments have been created in countries like BiH, Nigeria, and Cyprus. However, the traditional consociational model does not provide any institutionalized incentives for ethnonational parties to gain support across inter-group parties

nor to gain voters outside of their own ethnic groups. The question now is: how can consociational governments achieve long-term stability?

Designing a Moderate Education System

Long-term stability and reconciliation between previously warring parties can be achieved through a multiethnic, and multiperspective education system. Educational systems are designed to help socialize children into society; a moderate education system is expected to instill political moderation. This is because if children are learning to celebrate differences rather than to highlight and discriminate against them then the political elites may see more opportunities for compromise and coordination between inter-group parties. In a study by Padilla and Ruiz, they explain that ethnic attitudes are formed early on in a child's development, so whether it is positive or negative prejudices then they will only increase with time (Padilla 1973). With children being so impressionable it becomes extremely important to nurture civic values early on in a child's development.

Education can be used in a constructive fashion and old methods of marginalization of the "other" need to be abandoned. Bush and Saltarelli offer plenty of ways that education can be used positively. They discuss topics like conflict-dampening, desegregation of the mind, linguistic tolerance, cultivating inclusive citizenship, and the disarming of history (Bush 2000). These are all tools that can be used to help the education system once again rebuild past relationship, be the source of proper socialization for children, and be the moderating force in a consociational government. These processes can be used to create a positive image of the "other" and create a sense of trust between groups.

Multiperspectivity is another incredibly important idea within the classroom (Perry 2015, 15-16). This technique utilizes a plurality of views and opinions in addressing any topic, so that all sides from the conflict are represented to help foster the open dialogue and reconciliation process (Pingel 2009, 285). Multiperspectivity is also the process of thinking deeply and critically about all possible viewpoints. K. Peter Fritzsche has explained it as a "development of tolerance...able and willing to regard a situation from different perspectives...[and] a strategy for understanding" (Fritzsche 2000, 4). This particular approach in education can help to achieve a plural society that is accepting and tolerant of all views, which is important for all societies as communities are

becoming more globalized. By incorporating this technique in the classroom it will offer more ways for students to view their politicians and community leaders, outside of what is being expressed at home, which is crucial in developing critical thinking skills.

Education is invaluable in post-conflict communities because it can be used to help reframe psychological trauma, help rebuild relationships by having all ethnic groups together, help to create a common history and truth, and it can even be used to help socialize children and adults back into the communities “new” value system. These are all incredibly valuable assets that if not promoted through a strong education can lead to what some call a “frozen conflict,” where the violence may have come to a halt and animosity towards one another is still strong. (Perry 2015, 15-16). When the system is not fostering a positive outlook on other groups then there can be no further advancement towards sustainable peace.

Tying Consociational and Educational Theory Together

Education is an extremely sensitive topic post-conflict. Especially when education is so closely tied to national identity like history, language, and the arts. As a result, it is very difficult to implement moderate education practices into post-conflict communities. It becomes even more difficult in consociational governments because each ethnic group is guaranteed a high-level of autonomy within the political system. Each ethnic group has a right to have their own autonomous education system under the consociational model. However, if for some reason there is a desire to unify all the different education systems in a country then this is possible through the creation of a grand coalition that must maintain a majority control over the legislature to pass legislation. So the historical base has been constructed along with theoretical framework that has been developed on top of that base. Now, the two will be merged in the discussion on how the consociational and educational theories have come to fruition in BiH.

A Look into Bosnia and Herzegovina *Consociational Design*




Figure 1. Levels of Government (BiH 2016)

The DPA identifies the people of BiH as “Bosniacs, Croats, and Serbs, as constituent peoples (along with Others)” (General 1995). It is built around the idea of autonomous ethnic communities (Ghai 2002, 149). When arrangements are made for representation within the government, the ethnic communities are used as the piece that represents groups (Ghai 2002, 149). These communities are the municipal level of government, which can be seen in Figure 1. In BiH, the ethnic communities are the Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs. Figure 1 shows the breakdown of the entire political system in both the FBiH and RS. Each ethnic group is equally represented by a one-third proportional representation at the cantonal, entity, and national levels. Each ethnic group is guaranteed a minimum proportional representation at the local or municipal level, which is based on a complicated mathematical formula that combines percentage vote share and the 1991 census results. Each of the three Presidencies between the national, FBiH, and RS have three Presidents that rotate through terms. For a country of four million people, at any given time there are three Presidents and six Vice-Presidents. Since there is autonomy and no cooperation between each ethnic group, there are a lot of redundancies across all levels of government. For example, there are twelve different Ministries of

Education (MoE) and another Education Department in Brčko District. By design, these redundancies are institutionalized to promote ethnic autonomy; however, “it is not sustainable” (Anonymous 2015).

Political Parties

Each of the three ethnic groups in BiH has a dominant ethnonational party that has been consistently winning elections since before the war. The Bosniaks have the SDA. The Croats have the HDZ. The Serbs actually have two, the SDS and SNSD. The SNSD has risen in power over the last ten years, which follows the consociational design of poorly performing parties being replaced by newer, stronger ones. The SDS is the old and poorly performing, but SNSD is the new strong party that will go to more extremes to fight for their constituents. For example, SNSD leader, Milorad Dodik, has been trying to have the RS secede from the FBiH to join greater Serbia (Zuvela 2015).

Design of Educational System

In the case of Bosnia, when it comes to education there is no national level MoE, so each entity has an entirely different education policy and in the case of the FBiH each canton has its own policy. In the two ethnically mixed cantons¹⁶, the education policies are further devolved to individual schools and municipalities (Anonymous 2015). Bosniak and Croat majority cantons will press a one-sided monoperspective curriculum much like how the Serb majority, RS, will as well. The FBiH has an entity-level MoE that has no real power, as education is an issue that is left up to the cantons, so it serves only a coordination role between all the cantons (World Bank 2015). As a result, the country has a total of 12 different MoEs along with a separate Education Department in Brčko and with 13 distinctly separate curriculum (each canton, FBiH, RS, Brčko) for a total of about 167,000 primary school students (World Bank 2015).

Furthermore, the cantons are allowed to have “special relationships” with other countries, so Croat cantons can have a relationship with Croatia and the same goes for the RS and Serbia (Anonymous 2015). This has been used for the importation of textbooks from those countries for their respective constituency. Of the three major ethnic groups, every citizen has a right to learn in their “mother tongue” and to learn “their” constituent people’s NGS education (Anonymous 2015). Well, if each school has an “ethnic flavor” then

16 Central Bosnia (Travnik) and Herzegovina-Neretva (Mostar)

what happens to the student who is not a part of that constituent group? Well, they can choose to go to a different school where they fit the flavor better or they can choose to be assimilated to that particular flavor. This has become an increasingly important issue with the introduction of religion classes into the public school curriculum. For example, there is an entirely Bosniak school near Stolac and a Serbian boy attends that school because he is in that school district and his family cannot afford to drive him to another school. He is assimilated into the entire school system, except for the theology course. As this is a Bosniak school, Islam is the theology class where students will learn various prayers, how to pray, and how to practice their religion. The boy being an Orthodox Christian sits outside for 45 minutes until the class is over, on a daily basis (Stolac 2015). Some may say that this is simply an act of respect for the religion, which it could very well be. Although, could the time be better spent? Could the class be more about world religions and learning about all different cultures, as opposed to learning scripture?

Over time there have been some reform efforts that have taken place to consolidate responsibilities, increase coordination, create a standardized curriculum and textbook for the NGS, and to help integrate schools (World Bank 2015). For example, the BiH Ministry of Civil Affairs (MoCA) has a small education agenda that serves as a coordination role between all ten cantons, Brčko District, and the RS (World Bank 2015). The MoCA has the power to implement legislation across all municipalities, cantons, and entities; however, there is no political support or resources to allow for this to happen (World Bank 2015).

The Conference of Ministers of Education was designed to help the coordination between all the ministers and so there could be more standardization of textbooks, curriculum, and teacher training across cantons (Perry 2014). Then there was the state-level Education Agency that “was established to set basic curricular standards based on learning outcomes” (Perry 2014). The GEI created the “Common Core Curriculum,” (CCC) which is a checklist of topics that teachers have to cover for each grade for NGS topics (Retired 2015). This is something that has managed to continue existing, as it serves as a syllabus and not a manual on how to teach the material. There are the numerous civil society organizations who have independently sought to create teacher-training programs, textbook reform initiatives, programs that “bridge the divide” between ethnic groups, before-and-after school programs, and peace education studies. Valery Perry best summed up the state of all

these programs when she said, “in the absence of the political will to make such bodies work, not one of these bodies are truly independent, all suffer a lack of resources and, most importantly, enforcement power” (Perry 2014, 2). The terrible truth is that “they only work, while they are actively being implemented” (Retired 2015). This is important because it shows the reliance on the international intervention in training teachers, changing textbooks, and curriculum, but the problem is that because there has been little support to unify the education systems. Once the international involvement stops then ethnic groups go back to being autonomous, which is entirely permissible under the DPA. However, there is one program that has stood the test of time and has been vigorously enforced by all levels of government.

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Mission to BiH (OSCE) was responsible for BiH’s most well-documented program, which was the Two Schools Under One Roof Program (2-1 Schools) (World Bank 2015). The purpose of the program was to help facilitate refugee return in divided communities, such as, Stolac and most of the Herzegovina-Neretva Canton as it is a “mixed canton” (World Bank 2015). The mentality was that even if the students are not in the same classroom or learning the same material then they will at least be in the same building and it is a start to the reconciliation process (World Bank 2015). It was supposed to be the first step in a much longer overhaul of the education system, but the system has continued to linger around with no end in sight. Civil society groups like the Nansen Dialogue Centre (NDC) have created “extra classes” to add between the passing periods of the two ethnic groups, so both groups are together learning about a particular topic like peacebuilding or citizenship. These programs can only do so much until there needs to be a major overhaul of the education system to the extent that classrooms become multiethnic.

Textbooks have also been a well-documented problem in BiH. They have received significant help and many positive reforms have taken place. In 2004, the Minister of Education and Culture of the RS, all the cantonal MoEs, and Education Department of Brčko District adopted the “Guidelines for Writing and Evaluation of History Textbooks for Primary and Secondary Schools in BiH” (Retired 2015). Its goal was to provide everything necessary that a textbook should do for children. It included points like using BiH as a main reference point, having all peoples represented in an impartial manner, having the objective of reconciliation and peace in BiH, and even including a multiperspective approach (Retired 2015).

A study published in 2008 by Dr. Heike Karge of the GEI looked at seven different textbooks to see if they were meeting The Guidelines and they were met with varying results. For instance, two textbooks utilized “hate speech” when talking about events related to WW2 and these same two books utilized a “predominantly Serbian history”, while another used Croatia as the main reference point, and another was using “hidden messages” throughout the text to incite an inflammatory response from readers with opposing viewpoints about historical events (Karge 2008). All hope was not lost though as two of the books came close to the standard, while another was also close, but “lacked consistency”. The problem of importing textbooks from Croatia or Serbia has been a noted issue because those texts will naturally use their host country as the focal point, even though it is permissible under Dayton.

The Unique Case of Brčko

Following the arbitration process, Brčko District started the multiethnic unification of its schools in 2001 (Moore 2013). The integration process was completed in 2004 when all schools in Brčko District became multiethnic. This meant that going forward all schools would be multiethnic and would have a diverse group of students and teachers from all the constituent peoples teaching and learning together. What are the implications? Simply put, Brčko has the only multiperspective curriculum, multiethnic classrooms, and moderate educational system in all of BiH.

The teachers will lecture in all three national languages, and they use at least three different textbooks to present a multiplicity of perspectives to their students (Education 2015). This is all regardless of the demographics of the classroom, so if there are no Serb students in the class then the teacher will still lecture in Serbian along with Bosnian and Croatian. Additionally, there is still a theology course much like the rest of the country, but at the end of each academic year the parents have the option to select what class their child will take (Education 2015). For instance, a Catholic family could select an Orthodox course for their child. The OSCE has also created a peacebuilding and citizenship course that can be taken in place of the theology courses, which a lot of students have been taking (Education 2015).

Now the entire foundation has been constructed from the discussions on the theoretical underpinnings of consociationalism and education theory along with how those theories have manifest themselves within BiH. Additionally, the historical timeline is important to understand the sequencing

of how everything occurred in BiH. The following will solidify the question of: why does Brčko District have multiethnic schools while other parts of the country do not, despite the shared context of a consociational government?

Answers to the Guiding Question

How did Brčko's education system come to be?

The role of the international community in the first years after Dayton was reconstruction and peacekeeping. The education reform efforts were largely left to civil society groups. An annex to the 1999 Final Award quickly changed that role. It mandated that:

“...the Supervisor will integrate the District's educational system, harmonise curricula within the District, and ensure the removal of teaching material which the Supervisor considers to be inconsistent with the objective of creating a democratic, multi-ethnic society within the District” (Arbitral August 1999).

This clear and direct mandate issued by the international community is what has set Brčko District's long-term stability on a more effective path than the unclear and lack of mandates for the rest of BiH. This is because education is only mentioned in the Dayton Agreement in the context of education being a right of every citizen. Outside of that there has been no direction given to the OHR except for making sure that Dayton is successfully implemented. If by those standards then Dayton has been successfully implemented.

Furthermore, the Final Award went on to sanction the formation of the Brčko Law Review Commission, which sought to revise existing legislation to unify the existing educational systems together (OSCE 2007). Between 1999-2001, the commission drafted 40 laws, by-laws, and regulations (OSCE 2007). One of which was the Law on Education, which effectively lays down a platform for integrating the schools (OSCE 2007)

The Law on Education was not well received by the students, their families, and the community. Serb students and adults reacted violently against the Bosniaks because of this (Arnaut 2000) Thousands of Serb students took to the streets to demand that the schools be separated, while the Bosniaks demanded increased security (Arnaut 2000). It even saw 13 Bosnian Serb delegates walk out of the Assembly during the voting (OSCE 2007) which can be expected because each ethnic group is entitled to a vast amount of autonomy within the consociational system. However, the Supervisor exercised his power to impose the law because it was consistent with the mandate by the international community to integrate the school system. Both the Law on education and the newly developed curriculum were signed into effect on July 5, 2001 (OSCE 2007).

What happened in the rest of BiH?

It is important to understand that there has been international intervention in the rest of BiH, but not as aggressive as it has been in Brčko District. Earlier the international intervention in the education system in BiH was explained with the role of the OSCE, the creation of the Guidelines for textbooks and curriculum, and the creation of various councils to help increase the coordination between all the different Ministers of Education.

Additionally, the OHR in Sarajevo extensively utilized their powers in the beginning, but recently they have been utilizing their powers less and less. Between 1998-2004 there were 139 different politicians who were dismissed from public office. (Shakhtakhtinskaya 2004). There were 21 dismissed in 2002 and 7 in 2003, which is a sizeable decrease in the dismissal of politicians (Shakhtakhtinskaya 2004). Additionally, between 1997-2004 there were 67 laws imposed, but in 2002 only 28 laws were imposed and half as many in 2003 (Shakhtakhtinskaya 2004). This pattern is consistent with the OHR's philosophy of creating more "ownership" from the local population (Shakhtakhtinskaya 2004). The international community believes that the locals have no sense of ownership over their government if laws and politicians are being imposed or dismissed. As a result, a more "hands-off" approach has been taken over the recent years by the OHR for the rest of BiH.

Why are the Education Systems Different?

The difference between Brčko District and the rest of BiH is that the international community provided a clear mandate (the Final Award and its Annexes) for the Supervisor to follow and execute. To achieve this mandate, things like the unification of the law occurred in order to achieve a unified education system. The OHR in Sarajevo did not have any clear mandate outside of making sure the Dayton Agreement was being effectively implemented, which did not give any clear direction of responsibilities, or mandates. As a result, fruitless attempts have been made with the existing institutions to unify the curriculum, textbooks, and subsequent education system, which have no incentives to unify their education systems. In Brčko, the Supervisor bypassed the Assembly to impose the unification of the education system because the mandate that was given required this to happen and was legally binding.

Competing Solutions

What are other Possible Explanations for the Different Education Systems?

Going forward the purpose of the following section is to show other possible arguments for the reason that Brčko District has a different education system compared to the rest of BiH.

Different Institutional Designs

Moore argues that the design of local institutions in Mostar (severely ethnically divided community in the HNK canton) and Brčko District have resulted in different peacebuilding outcomes (Moore 2013). He argues that the institutional framework in Mostar solidified ethnic divisions, while the integrative model designed in Brčko District has been more effective in mitigating conflict and attaining a multiethnic government (Moore 2013, 57). Moore explains that the international community intervened in Mostar to try and mediate negotiations by creating six different municipalities within Mostar, but it ended up creating an even more divisive consociational government than the rest of BiH (Moore 2013, 57-64). The difference between the institutional design of Brčko District and Mostar is that Mostar is divided into six smaller municipalities, while Brčko is one large municipality. They both maintain a consociational government that prides itself in proportional representation and power-sharing.

The OHR was heavily involved in the creation of institutions within Mostar much like in Brčko District; however, there were no clear or direct mandates that were created to direct the peacebuilding processes of the OHR in Mostar like there was in Brčko. There was heavy involvement by the OHR and the international community in Mostar, Brčko District, and all of BiH. The reason why Brčko District was able to achieve multiethnic schools is because the OHR had a clear and direct mandate that they were legally obliged to follow unlike the rest of BiH.

Different Financial Influences

Moore posits the argument that different financial resources affected the peacebuilding efforts between Brčko District and the rest of BiH. However, Moore does a great job of explaining that this is not the case. Moore explains that the High Representative, Paddy Ashdown, in 2006 estimated that "Bosnia had received \$16 billion in aid since the end of the war. He calculated Brčko's share to be only \$70 million while Mostar had received an estimated

\$300–\$400 million” (Moore 2013, 5). It was not the amount that Brčko District received, but how they received those funds and how they were utilized. The funds were used in many ways one of which was to implement a moderate and multiethnic education system.

The Ethnic Breakdown of Brčko

Another possible answer as to why Brčko District has a moderate education system and the rest of BiH does not is because certain ethnic groups have better reconciled their differences. Perhaps the larger population of Bosniaks in Brčko District could be the reason why they have been able to succeed in creating a moderate education system, while Croats and Serbs have not been able to. It's an interesting idea that is based on the principle that particular ethnic groups are more extreme than others, which is why the rest of the country is being held back. Perhaps for the fear of losing power if the consociational, power-sharing model were to be abandoned. However, this idea also proves to be a mistake.

According to the census conducted in 1991¹⁷, the ethnic breakdown of Brčko District was Bosniaks (44.07%), Serbs (20.69%), Croats (25.39%), and rest is comprised of smaller ethnic groups ranging from Montenegrins to Italians. Compare that ethnic breakdown to another municipality in BiH like Tuzla and it will quickly become apparent that this idea is not the answer. Tuzla was composed of Bosniaks (47.61%), Serbs (15.40%), Croats (15.50%), and the rest like Brčko is also composed of many smaller ethnic groups. Clearly, the ethnic breakdown in Tuzla is very similar to that of Brčko District, but Tuzla still has monoethnic schools. This is important to understand because it again shows that it is probably not likely due to certain groups being more moderate than others.

Conclusion

To echo the words of Fikreta, “that’s just the way it is,” as they guided us into the discussion by showing that the monoethnic education system is simply commonplace in the consociational model they also guide us out; however, it is important to understand that it doesn’t have to be. We have just seen that if the international community really takes a strong hold of the peacebuilding

17 Since there was a large amount of displacement during the war, this could be particularly difficult to test. However, once the newest census is released then the results will be updated to reflect that new ethnic breakdown.

and statebuilding processes then very positive outcomes can develop. It would be an incredibly disservice to the complex nature of statebuilding to say that different institutional design, finances, and even different ethnic breakdown have no effect on the resulting education systems. It is certainly possible that each process of these processes has a small net impact on the overall outcome of the system; however, the data has shown us that it is not as great as the impact of aggressive international involvement.

A heavy-handed international development role can have lasting positive benefits for the local population in creating strong infrastructure post-conflict. It is also important to understand that too much international involvement can smother any sort of local ownership over statebuilding and peacekeeping. Striking a healthy balance between too much and too little is imperative to providing concrete resources for locals to take a firm grasp over their community.

Epilogue

In 2012, the OHR suspended their supervisory powers in Brčko District and now serve in an advisory capacity. All the institutions that were created through their involvement still exist and a mass exodus has not occurred. More importantly, multiethnic schools still exist in Brčko. This is important because it shows that the consociational government that exists in Brčko has been moderated by the international intervention. Their intervention allowed for the creation of all these wonderful institutions, which still exist after they left. A purely consociational government, like the rest of BiH, cannot exist in moderation because there are no incentives to do so; however, with the help of the international community it can.




Figure 2. Attitudes to Dayton, by ethnicity, 2005-2015 (Maraniss 2016)

Looking forward, the citizens of BiH are not happy with their current government and are not happy with Dayton, which can be seen in Figure 2. The citizens feel as though “Dayton was necessary to end the war but now BiH needs a new constitution to prepare for the EU” (Maraniss 2016). Something has got to give in BiH because there is rampant unemployment, the youth are leaving the country, and the economy is stagnant. Even if it is for selfish reasons to save one’s own group, but the country and people will continue to suffer if something does not change.

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Multiethnic Society in Malaysia: Learning Lessons of Peaceful Coexistence

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Abstract

The objective of this study is to explore and examine peaceful coexistence in the multiethnic society of Malaysia especially as relates to the NEP (New Economic Policy). During the colonial era, the British brought Chinese and Indians into the country for economic development and decided to rule them through a “policy of neglect”. This paper employs the qualitative method and collected data through documentary methods. Malaysian society became less assimilated and also the different ethnic groups had less understanding of each other. One result of this was the May 1969 ethnically related riots. This study finds that the NEP became an important tool to make peace in Malaysian society because it emphasize the quality and economics and political terms among the different ethnic groups. Therefore, the NEP was successful in decreasing tension in Malaysian society. In addition, an important approach of peaceful coexistence in Malaysia should be to widen political bases and spaces. This would give more political chances to the Chinese in Malaysia. Because in general, ethnic Malays have had more influence in the political sphere. Malaysian identity also has to be inclusive, with plurality within unity. This will lead Malaysian society to be more unified. Therefore, the peace building approach of the NEP was used to examine the multiethnic society in Malaysia as an example for other pluralistic societies with similar issues.

Keywords: *multiethnic society, peaceful coexistence, New Economic Policy, Malaysia*

Malaysia has been a multiethnic society since the British colonial era. As a result, the government has needed to adopt the best approach to promote peaceful coexistence in Malaysia. After the May 1969 riots that made conflict

among different ethnic groups obvious. Some scholars consider this caused challenges to assimilation and understanding of each other. Because the British ruled Malaya through a “policy of neglect” it resulted in each ethnic group having few opportunities for real interaction. Therefore, after the May 1969 riots, the government decided to use the New Economic Policy or NEP an important tool to make peace in Malaysian society especially in terms of political and economic matters.

Considering Malaysian history, many Chinese migrated to the Malay peninsula in the 1850s. This is because of the demand from European countries and also the United States who needed tin in huge amounts. As a result, the British colonial rulers of Malaya were interested in importing Chinese laborers to work in tin mines. Furthermore, during the late 19th century, the automobile industry he was being developed rapidly by Henry Ford. Therefore, the British also encouraged Indian labors under their rule to work in rubber plantations. This resulted in the increase of rubber plantations in Malaya. Therefore the migration of Chinese and also Indian laborers to Malaya are somewhat similar, because most of them migrated under the auspices of British colonial rulers who needed to increase their economic interests in Malaya.

Most of the Indian labors were of the untouchable caste in India. They started to migrate to Malaya during the 1880s. The reason behind this is the British preferred Indian labors from the untouchable caste because they worked hard and did not require much compared to other classes in India. In addition, the British continued to rule Malaya through the “policy of neglect” especially in the education system. The British enfranchised each ethnic group to build up their own schools. As a result, each ethnic group in Malaya separated themselves in terms of education. Sometimes the British encouraged funding to Malay schools. All of these factors became one significant in making me ethnic groups of Malaysia becoming less understandable to each other since the British colonial times.

The post-British colonial era witnessed the conflict among ethnic groups in Malaysia still continuing and increasing in violence especially between the Malay and Chinese. In 1969, the general elections in Malaysia expressed that,

When the results of the 1969 general elections became known, it was obvious that the ruling Alliance Party had received a major setback in the general election although it had managed to retain a simple parliamentary majority.

They had lost Penang to the Gerakan Party; Kelantan to the PMIP (Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party), and Perak and Selangor were at the brink of falling into Opposition hands.” (Soong 2007, 42)

As seen above, in the 1969 general election in Malaysia, the Alliance Party had suffered a setback. This was due to Alliance leaders who did not keep abreast on antagonism among non-Malays over issues such as Malay special rights, the privileged position and preponderance of Malays in the senior ranks of the civil service, and also the attempt by the Malays to counter Chinese hegemony especially in commerce and industry (Comber 1983, 63). Finally, a riot broke out on May 13, 1969. Some analysts have examined and concentrated on the root of this riot, which stemmed from inequality in society, different political perspectives among each ethnic community, and lack of opportunity among the Malay ethnic community. In addition, the results of the 1969 riot were to dissolve the parliament and also establish a National Operation Council or NOC. The National Operation Council worked as a temporary government which consisted of all parties except the main opposition party.

The main significance of the National Operation Council policy after the riot in May 1969 was that they drafted a new policy aiming to solve issues based on an action-based policy. This was termed the “New Economic Policy” or NEP, where the government attempted to create a new society with equal status both economically and politically among different ethnic societies in Malaysia. Malaysia’s New Economic Policy (NEP) was announced in 1971. The plan of NEP was to run for 20 years starting from 1971 until 1990. In addition, two main goals of NEP were poverty eradication irrespective of race and also the restructuring of society to eliminate the identification of race with economic functions (Aziz 2012, 30).

As seen below;

“With these two prongs, the NEP was expected to reduce socio-economic disparities that existed between the various ethnic groups and thereby, reduce interethnic resentments and tensions, and subsequently create conditions for national unity, which was the overriding goal of the Plan.” (Aziz 2012, 30-31).

Since the implementation of NEP in 1971, poverty in Malaysia has been reduced. According to the official government statistics, the poverty rate in Peninsular Malaysia decreased from 49.3% in 1970 to 29.2% in 1980 and also reduced to 16.5% in 1990. Furthermore, the rural areas also continued to show

a decrease in poverty from 58.6% in 1970 to 37.7% in 1980 (See Table 1). The success of NEP also resulted in the increased opportunity for Bumiputera to work in professions such as doctors, lawyers, engineers, etc. from about 5% in 1970 to about 25% in 1988 (Aziz 2012, 31). (See Table 2)

Table 1: Malaysia: incidence of poverty, 1970-2004 (%) (Aziz, 2012, p. 32)

Year	1970*	1980*	1990*	1997	2002	2004
Malaysia total	49.3	29.2	16.5	6.8	5.1	5.7
Rural	58.6	37.7	21.1	10.9	11.4	11.9
Urban	24.6	12.6	7.1	2.1	2.0	2.5
Hard-core poor	-	-	3.9	1.4	1.0	1.2

*For Peninsular Malaysia only.

Source: Malaysia 1973, 1981, 1991, 2001 & 2006.

Table 2: Malaysia: employment by occupation and ethnic groups, 1970 and 2000 (Aziz, 2012, p. 32)

Occupation	Bumiputera		Chinese		Indians		Others	
	1970	2000	1970	2000	1970	2000	1970	2000
Professional and technical	47.0	63.9	39.5	25.8	10.8	7.6	2.7	2.7
Teachers and nurses	-	73.2	-	18.4	-	6.9	-	1.5
Administrative and managerial	24.1	37.0	62.9	52.3	7.8	5.5	5.2	5.2
Clerical and related	35.4	56.8	45.9	32.9	17.2	8.6	1.5	1.7
Sales and related	26.7	37.3	61.7	49.8	11.1	6.8	0.4	6.1
Services	44.3	57.7	39.6	21.8	14.6	8.5	1.5	12.0
Agriculture	72.0	61.2	17.3	10.3	9.7	6.9	1.0	21.6
Production, transport and others	34.2	44.7	55.9	33.8	9.6	10.0	0.3	11.5
Ethnic share of total employment	51.8	51.5	36.6	29.7	10.6	8.3	1.0	10.5
Ethnic share of total labor force	52.7	-	35.8	-	10.7	-	0.8	-

Source: Malaysia 1981 & 2001.

Also, by the end of the NEP period in 1990, employment in agriculture in Malaysia declined and fell to only 19.0% in 1998. The change from the field of agricultural to industrial base meant the migration of rural folk to the urban area. Therefore, this is a reflection of the transformation of society to a predominantly modern one. Also, this change created a class in society known as “a new middle class” in Malaysia especially the Malay middle class. This was a result of the decline in agricultural occupation and also under the NEP, they were provided abundance of opportunity to work in professional jobs (See table 3) (Aziz 2012, 33).

Table 3: Malaysia: employment by major occupational group 1990-2000 (000 persons) (Aziz, 2012, p. 34)

Sector	1990		1995		2000	
	000	%	000	%	000	%
Agriculture	1,890.7	28.3	1,662.2	21.0	1605.6	18.1
Non-agriculture						
Professional, technical and related workers	586.4	8.8	815.3	10.3	975.8	11.0
Administrative and managerial	163.8	2.4	213.7	2.7	372.6	4.2
services	777.6	11.6	981.5	12.4	1,046.7	11.8

Source: Malaysia 1996:113; 1999:103.

Moreover, some scholars considered NEP that was announced by Tun Abdul Razak during the opening of Parliament being not an absolutely new policy. As seen below,

“It will be recollected that General Templer, soon after his arrival as High Commissioner of the Federation of Malaya in February 1952, had made reference to the necessity for the Malays ‘to play a full part in the economic life of the country’ (Comber 2009, 83).

With the First Malaysia Plan 1966-70, they adjusted the economic balance between the Malay and Chinese communities with the aim of developing the rural areas in Malaysia. Most of the Malays were found in rural areas in the country while the urban areas were influenced by the Chinese community (Comber, 2009, p. 83). The New Economic Policy continued with several

challenges. For example, the Malays cooperated with the Chinese through a Malay partner who assumed the role as a sleeping partner with his participation to obtain licenses, quotas or tenders from the government. Later, they allowed the Chinese partner to take over from them and run their business. They called this business approach as an “Ali-Baba” by “Ali” referring to the Malay and “Baba” referring to the Chinese (Comber, 2009, p. 85).

Some Chinese felt that the emphasis on restructuring the economy was to help the Malays rather than the eradication of poverty regardless of race. Also, most of the NEP features were displeasing to Chinese businessmen. This is because the government officials controlled the Chinese businessmen and as a result, the criteria on which decisions were made became obscured (Milne 1976, 251). The Indians reaction to the NEP paralleled that of the Chinese. The Malaysian Indian Congress or MIC, which is the Indian component in the government, produced a “blueprint” within the framework of the NEP. Moreover, they concentrated on the relatively high rate of unemployment, and also the principle of proportionate allocations for admission of Indians to the university. The MIC also organized a unit trust with a purpose to support more Indians to hold shares in businesses (Milne 1976, 253).

The Malays also reacted to the NEP, especially to its political implications. Most of the Malays feared that advantages from the growth would benefit the non-Malays more. As seen below:

“As Esman wrote, “...the faster the rate of over-all growth, the less the prospect of economic equity at least for several decades. And this prospect is unacceptable to Malays, particularly the younger ones.” Such an outlook could lead to Malays deciding to leave resources unused, if their use would give disproportionate advantage to non-Malays. Just as in the years preceding the NEP, there was still a feeling that even projects intended to benefit the Malays would in fact bring short-run benefits mainly to non-Malays.” (Milne 1976, 253-254)

Therefore, it seems that the NEP was planned to encourage the Malays to be more advantageous for ethnic Malays as compared to the non-Malays in some aspects. However, the Malays were still concerned about how their benefit might end up benefitting non-Malays more. Furthermore, several Malay organizations wanted larger allocations of various kinds for Malays. For instance, contracts for government bodies, licenses to exploit natural resources, tax exemptions for small businessmen, and reservation of license. Some of the non-Malay critics to the situation that were initially set up to help the Malays

such as PERNAS and MARA could imply non-acceptance to the policy itself. The Malays also responded to Chinese criticisms that they did not believe the Ministry of Trade and Industry would act in good faith (Milne 1976, 254-255).

Also, the education policy was an important factor that could restructure society. According to the Constitution (amendment) universities and also other institutions of higher learning were directed to admit more bumiputras. It was a privilege for bumiputras to study in higher education even though their educational qualifications might be lower than the non-Malay candidates. The interesting part was that the government encouraged bumiputras with the opportunity to study in the fields of medicine, engineering, and science as well. However, the reconvening of the parliament on February 23, 1971 resulted in the above to be tacitly accepted by both the Malays and Chinese (Comber 2009, 86-87).

In addition, the ethnic percentages in professional and technical occupations have continued to increase. The proportion of bumiputras has increased in number significantly. As a result, it has been shown that the NEP has been a success education matters. Because bumiputras have had more chance to study in higher education, this has resulted in them being able to get more professional occupations (K.S. 2004) as seen as below (Table 4).

Table 4: Registered professionals* by ethnic group, 1970-2002 (number/percent) (K.S., 2004)

Year	Bumiputera	Chinese	Indian	Other	Total
1970*	225/04.9	2,793/61.0	1,066/23.3	492/10.8	4,576/100
1975**	537/06.7	5,131/64.1	1,764/22.1	572/07.1	8,004/100
1979	1,237/11.0	7,154/63.5	2,375/21.1	496/04.4	11,262/100
1980	2,534/14.9	10,812/63.5	2,963/17.4	708/04.2	11,262/100
1983	4,496/18.9	14,933/62.9	3,638/15.3	699/02.9	23,766/100
1984	5,473/21.0	16,154/61.9	3,779/14.5	675/02.6	26,081/100
1985	6,318/22.2	17,407/61.2	3,946/13.9	773/02.7	28,444/100
1988	8,571/25.1	19,985/58.4	4,878/14.3	762/02.2	34,196/100
1990	11,753/29.0	22,641/55.9	5,363/13.2	750/01.9	40,507/100
1995	19,344/33.1	30,636/52.4	7,542/12.9	939/01.6	58,461/100
1997***	22,866/32.0	37,278/52.1	9,389/13.1	1,950/02.7	71,843/100
1997****	10,659/27.3	21,298/54.4	6,653/17.0	515/01.3	39,125/100
1999	15,321/28.9	28,565/53.9	8,183/15.5	884/01.7	52,953/100
2002	35,046/37.2	47,270/50.1	10,593/11.2	1,411/01.5	94,320/100

1

This situation was later on, repeatedly emphasized by the government in the implementation of the NEP:

It would ensure that 'no-particular group will experience any loss or feel any sense of deprivation'. This had to be accepted at its face value and a chance given to see whether the new strategies to promote national unity would work (Comber 2009, 87)

As seen above, this shows that the government attempted to balance the relationship between each ethnic group in Malaysia while also continuing to give opportunity to the Malays as well. However, developing a country with multi-ethnic situation like in Malaysia was not easy. In fact, in 1957, prior to independence, both the Malays and Chinese attempted to create balance

1 *Architects, accountants, engineers, dentists, doctors, veterinary surgeons, surveyors, lawyers.
Excludes surveyors and lawyers. *Excludes surveyors. ****There was a significant change in the counting of professionals from 1997, including 1999 (Government of Malaysia 1999) and 2002 (Government of Malaysia 2003), with the total number of professionals and the bumiputera share dropping drastically. Source: Government of Malaysia 1976, 1979, 1981, 1984, 1986, 1989, 1991b, 1994, 1996, 2001b, 2003.

through unity. But, it was shattered during the 1969 riots. Some specialists examined the barriers to their unity which stemmed from the fact that the Malays and Chinese do not share a common history, heritage or culture, language, religious, daily life, etc. (Comber 2009, 87). As a result, they lacked a deeper understanding of each other. Later on, they found that the best solution was “integration” and according to the Rukunegara by which reference has been made to “Malaysia’s ‘rich and diverse cultural traditions” (Comber 2009, 88)

The NEP also was important policy to Malaysia because this policy was fulfill disadvantage in Malaysia’s society through various approach of NEP to encourage Malaysian to have more opportunity especially the bumiputera group who were left behind compared to other ethnic groups in the country. Therefore, NEP became affirmative action plan that was successful in many ways. For example, the NEP decreased poverty according to official data, percentage of households living below poverty line across all ethnic groups has been reduced from 49.3 percent in 1970 to 17.1 percent in 1990 and latest in 2009 resulted that overall had been reduced to 3.8 percent (Zubedy 2012). As a result, Malaysian have more quality of life as compared to before the NEP era through decreasing of inequality in Malaysian society. Later, Malaysians became more united and share the dream to develop Malaysia in the future.

Thus, the conceptual framework that explains the changing political state from conflict to peaceful coexistence in multi-cultural society is the concept of peace from Vincent Martinez Guzman’s perspective:

In all attempts on peace movement and social development, the absolute intention to make sustainable development in the society would bring about the relatively peaceful culture and the peaceful society, in which the members of the society can live their lives in harmony with other people and their surroundings. (Pindabanija, online)

In addition, Guzman examined inequality, especially in social and economic factors would lead to a critical point in society as follows:

Under the assumption that inequality in social and economic development would lead the society to the critical point where the people living in the society are overwhelmed with oppression, it is possible that such scenario would create the social conflict and, in worst case scenario, the violence among people in the society could emerge. Thus, the author believes that it would be beneficial to summarize some important philosophical points of view regarding the concepts of peace and peace studies in order to emphasize

the final objective of creating the peaceful culture, peaceful environment, and the relatively peaceful society. (Pindabanija 2012)

This concept considers that every society attempts to create a peaceful society through various approaches. In multi-cultural societies like Malaysia, the challenge is to form a plural and inclusive society for example in education policy and other matters. Further, Malaysia's society was faced with the May 1969 riots that made conflict among plural ethnic become obvious. This resulted in Malaysia government deciding to use NEP or New Economic Policy.

Jomo examined the factors of the May 1969 riots as follows:

(1) growing disillusion among the Malaysian public with the Alliance government's policies, especially in the economic and cultural spheres; (2) rejection among the growing Malay middle class of the Tunkus's (the first Prime Minister of Malaysia) accommodative policy to Chinese and foreign capital; and (3) the electoral rejection of the Alliance, especially in Peninsular Malaysia, in favor of an ethnically divided opposition (Aziz, 2012).

All of these became main factors that effect to Malaysia's society in various aspects especially in political and economic. As a result, Malaysia's government continued new policy was NEP in that time to solve these problems. At last, NEP was successful and became a good model to others countries which has similar issue like as Malaysia that can adapt or apply this policy to their countries.

Conclusion

Malaysia is faced with many challenges to having a peaceful plural society ever since the British colonial rulers decided to bring Chinese and Indians from their respective countries to Malaysia. When the British ruled Malaya, they did not merge the local people with migrant people. Also, they attempted a "policy of neglect" towards each group based on their racial classification. As a result, there was a lack of deeper understanding among each other. After the post-colonial era, Malaysia was still faced with old issues like the struggle of multi-ethnicity in the country. The government needed to solve conflict among different ethnics in Malaysia as soon as possible. Later, the government announced the New Economic Policy in response to the 1969 tragedy during the post-general election race riots.

The NEP plan had the main goals of poverty eradication irrespective of race and also the restructuring of society to eliminate the identification of race with economic functions. Furthermore, the NEP attempted to rebuild the

country through redistribution of wealth among Malaysians from diverse ethnic groups and also expanded the middle class, especially the Malay middle class. The NEP did not only concentrate on economic issues but also included the educational matters. This is because education would provide an opportunity to create a quality society for the next generation. In addition, the NEP continued despite several difficulties from some critics that this policy was not a justifiable policy, especially to the Chinese.

However, in general the NEP was successful because this policy decreased the poverty level of the Malaysian people, especially the Malays in rural areas. Also, NEP brought the country to new development and transformed the Malaysian society with its ethnic politics. Malaysia's society has a new multi-ethnic middle class that emerged from the implementation of the NEP. Therefore, the NEP was not only significant to Malaysia in political and economic aspects. Because of this, the NEP changed the country to a new era with more equality and decreased tension among the people in the country.

Further, the NEP became one important tool to make peaceful coexistence in Malaysia. In the post-NEP era, Malaysian society has more unity among different ethnic groups. Also, Malaysian people are more united and enjoy more peace. As a result, Malaysian identity also has shown an inclusive pluralistic identity within unity. The results of the NEP also became an important factor that brought Malaysians together. The peace building approaches of the NEP that can decrease tension in this multiethnic society may serve as an example to other pluralistic societies with similar issues. They can adapt the approach of the NEP to be more suitable to their societal issues.

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Biography

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Language Policy, Linguistic Discrimination, and Thailand's Southern Impasse

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Abstract

No credible claims can be made that the role of Malay has been entirely overlooked by those studying conflict dynamics in South Thailand. Nevertheless, those concerned with religious factors dwarf the number of studies interrogating issues related to language. Without suggesting that language represents some sort of silver bullet solution to this complex conflict, I argue that anyone pursuing peaceful, political resolutions to Thailand's southern impasse must be more informed about language policy, linguistic justice, and how linguistic repertoires are linked to inequality. My interests in this paper are theoretical (rather than empirical). The first of this paper's two substantive sections describes the nature of Thailand's (diverse) linguistic landscape and how the language policies pursued by Bangkok resemble those of other states between South and Southeast Asia. In light of Bangkok's policies towards southern Malays resemble those that impacted Lao and Khmer-speaking Buddhists in the northeast provinces, I suggest that some dynamics in South Thailand need to be de-exceptionalized. In the section that follows, I interact with theoretical treatments of language and religion in ethno-nationalism, and linguistic injustice. My argument is that anyone seeking peaceful political resolutions in South Thailand—where a nation linguistic minority is connected to the Malay cosmopolis—must address the politically sensitive issue of Thailand's discriminatory language policy that has led to widespread language loss.

Introduction

Particularly in comparison with other ASEAN member states possessing significant Muslim minorities, Muslims in Thailand has been extensively studied. Ecologically aware, bright-eyed newcomers familiarizing themselves with what has been published will (presumably) celebrate the presence of non-print options that will save a small forest of trees. The subject of most of this scholarship is the Malay dominated far-southern provinces of Pattani, Yala,

and Narathiwat. An exhaustive inventory of the factors that initiated, and sustained the insurgency since 2004 will not be possible here, but there is broad agreement on a number of issues. The general context is a state described by Marc Askew as chaotic (2007, 2008). Southern dynamics are the severest symptom of wider political crisis in Thailand (McCargo, 2010b). In the far-south, Bangkok lacks political legitimacy (Askew, 2010; McCargo, 2008), yet refuses to explore any form of regional autonomy (Jitpiromsri and McCargo, 2008; McCargo, 2010a). In addition to political dysfunction, uncivil constituencies exist among both Thai Buddhists (Jerryson 2009, 2011; Joll, 2010; McCargo, 2009) and Malays (André 2012, 2014; Askew and Helbardt, 2012; K. Helbardt, 2011; Liow, 2009). Some studying post-2004 are specifically concerned to place South Thailand in its post-9/11 milieu (Abuza, 2009; Gunaratna, Acharya and Chua, 2005).

My objective in this short paper is to breathe fresh air into the analysis of Thailand's southern impasse by exploring how language policies and linguistic discrimination exacerbate sub-national conflicts. No credible claims will be made that the role of Malay language has been entirely overlooked by those studying conflict dynamics in South Thailand. Indeed, my contribution builds upon work sharing my concern that after 13 years of interest in ethnoreligious issues, more attention must be given to ethnolinguistic dynamics¹. To be clear, I make no claims that Malay language in South Thailand represents some sort of miraculous silver bullet cure. Whatever their form, mono-causal myths must be replaced by an acknowledgement of multi-causality and complexity (Joll, 2015).

I have long-standing interests in language dynamics in Malay dominated South Thailand, where I lived and worked for a decade from 2000 (Joll, 2011). These include language change over the last millennium that began with an Arabic cosmopolis (Ali, 2011; Ricci, 2011) replacing the Sanskrit cosmopolis (Pollock 1998, 2006). More recently, bilingualism is now widespread, particularly among urban Malays. I have also interrogated the relationship between language and belonging, and religious rhetoric connected to the economy of merit (Th. bun, PM pahalo). Ironically, my interests in linguistic policy and discrimination only began after leaving Pattani (in 2010). In North Thailand I was exposed to some issues faced by southern Malays resembling those encountered by ethnic minorities elsewhere. At the end of 2012, I began

1 See (Kosonen, Person, Sercombe, and Tupas, 2014; Premsrirat, 2014, 2015; Premsrirat and Person, forthcoming; Premsrirat and Uniansasmita 2012).

a multi-sited fieldwork among (a) Thai-speaking Muslim communities in Ayutthaya, Bangkok, (b) Southern Thailand-speaking Muslim in Pang-nga Bay, and Songkhla, and (c) rural Malay communities in Narathiwat. I documented discrimination against Malays in Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat by Thai-speaking Muslims further north, and encountered a dramatically different linguistic landscape in Narathiwat to what I had become familiar with in Pattani². In Narathiwat, bilingualism (and code-switching) was less widespread, and Jawi literacy much higher than in Pattani.

Few having conducted fieldwork in South Thailand's hinterland (hulu) will quibble with the assertion that more than one "Malay South" exists. Hulu communities are far from photocopies of their coastal cousins, yet these are yet to receive the attention they deserve³. Bannang Sata (Benang Setar), Raman (Reman), Ruesot (Jaba), Rangae (Legeh), and Sungai Padi are among the most violent districts in Malay-dominated South Thailand, yet they are the least understood (see Figure 1). These are also communities where the use of, loyalty towards the Malay language is greatest (see Figure 2). In addition to analysis about this diverse region being based on data collected in its least recalcitrant parts presenting the lowest risk to researchers.

2 On language in Pattani (Joll 2011, 75-78)

3 Notable exceptions include the following (Cornish 1997; Patya 1974; Tsuneda, 2009; Unno 2011).




Figure 1: South Thailand's Geography of Violence (Engvall 2015, 28)




Figure 2: Malay Language Use (Engvall 2015, 23)

This paper is part of a wider research project seeking to place this sub-national conflict in its wider national and regional context. Comparative historical analysis helps isolate dynamics which are – and are not – unique to the to the Malay-dominated portions of the Thai/Malay Peninsula (Joll, 2016). In this respect, I have benefitted from the approach to “ethnic” conflicts in North Thailand pursued by Chayan Vaddhanaphuti (Salemink, 2015)⁴. Charles Keyes has commented that while ethnic minorities geographically concentrated near international borders are “more likely to develop secessionist movements”, there must be (real or perceived) economic and political advantages to “separatism” (2003, 203). This explains the absence of separatist movements among Thailand’s Northern Khmer, Shan, Mon, and Karen minorities. By contrast, rural southern Malays who have benefited least from Thai modernity, maintain close contacts with Malaysia where Malay is the national language, Malays benefit from preferential treatment under the New Economic Policy (NEP), and an ideology of Malay supremacy (Ketuanan Melayu) is firmly entrenched. Finally, this paper develops arguments that ethnolinguistic dynamics – specifically Malay angst about language loss and linguistic discrimination – require more attention than they have over the last decade (Joll, 2013).

Few credible claims have been made about restriction on religious freedom in contemporary Thailand. Shane Strate’s treatment of the systematic persecution of Catholics during Phibun’s wartime administration (2011, 2015) includes this being a specific aspect of a wider atmosphere of “religious nationalism designed to pressure all religious minorities to conform to the majority faith.” Muslims were also subject to “state interference”. For example, in February 1941, the Ministry of the Interior held a meeting at Wat Mahathat that all non-Buddhist civil servants in the Bangkok area were required to attend. In addition to Catholics and Protestants, Muslims were also required to sign a document indicating their willingness to adopt Buddhism. Those not willing to do so could no longer work for the government (Strate 2011, 75). This is context for an incident that Anthony Stockwell mentions having occurred in South Thailand at the same time. He recounts a Malay politician lodging an official complaint with Phibun that the Buddhist governor of Patani

4 These point out that, a range of factors are involved, such as upland ethnic minorities being profiled as threats to national security due to their vulnerability to recruitment by communist groups, and that Thai citizenship was withheld from groups residing in northern forests that local state elites were making plans to monetize (Vaddhanaphuti, 2005).

that “compelled all Malay leaders and “ulama to pay homage to the image of Buddha” (1979, 143)⁵.

As is well known, Haji Sulong’s seven demands (presented following the fall of Phibun’s military government) called for Islamic judges being present in civil courts, that Muslim affairs come under the direct authority of local (Malay) heads of these provinces, and that changes should be made to fiscal arrangements, and political and bureaucratic appointments. His third and fourth demands related to language: That both Malay and Thai function as official languages, and that the former become the medium of instruction in local primary schools. Over fifty years later, Thailand’s National Reconciliation Commission (NRC) made similar recommendations. It noted that many Thai Muslims of Malay descent “understand spoken Thai to varying extents, but lack confidence in speaking it”. While supportive of policies promoting the Thai language, Bangkok must accept that Malays possessing “little knowledge of Thai will have trouble communicating with state authorities, sometimes so much so that they are discriminated against.” Therefore, Malay should be “declared an additional working language in the three southern border provinces” Official documents should be in both languages; and signs for “government offices, street names and village names” should be in the Jawi script; the proportion of Malay-speaking government officials should be increased; and interpreters should be present at all government facilities (National Reconciliation Commission 2006, 100). Although linguistic discrimination is not new, it deserves a more thorough treatment.

While my perspectives on language in South Thailand are based in long-term fieldwork between Central Thailand, the Southern Thai-speaking upper-south, and the Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat, my interests are more theoretical than empirical. This paper begins with a description of Thailand’s (diverse) linguistic landscape and how the language policies pursued by Bangkok resemble those of other states between South and Southeast Asia. As Bangkok’s policies towards southern Malays resemble those impacting Lao and Khmer-speaking Buddhists in the northeast provinces, some dynamics in South Thailand need to be de-exceptionalized. In the section the follows, I interact with recent treatments of how language and religion are involved in constructions of ethno-nationalisms, and linguistic injustice that leads to inequality among linguist minorities. My argument is that seeking peaceful

5 Cited in Pitsuwan 1985, 98.

political resolutions in South Thailand – where a national linguistic minority possesses close connections to the Malay cosmopolis – need to prioritise addressing the politically sensitive issue of Thailand’s discriminatory language policy that has led to widespread language loss.

Thailand’s Linguistic Landscape and Language Policy

Thailand does not deserve its reputation as an ethnically and linguistically homogeneous geo-body. North Thailand is Kingdom’s most ethnically diverse region, and Thai citizens of Chinese descent represent the largest, most prosperous and successfully assimilated ethnic minority. Approximately 85% of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat are ethnic Malays. The Thailand Provinces of Satun and Songkhla border the Malaysian states of Perlis and Kedah. 50% of Satun, and 30% of Songkhla are Muslims (Parks, 2009). Thailand’s third largest ethnic minority are one million Khmer who live in southern Isaan along the Cambodian border. As Buddhists, Peter Vail (2007) has referred to these to be “invisible”. Chayan Vaddhanaphuti notes that although census conducted between 1985 and 1988 estimated the total population of ethnic minorities in Northern Thailand at half a million, this figure can be contest for the following reasons. Shan, Yunnanese Chinese, and Burmese were classified by Bangkok as ethno-regional groups that settled in North Thailand at the beginning of the 20th century. The reality, however, was that the Karen, Lua, T’in and Khmu had occupied upland areas before this, while Mons had long lived in Central Thailand (2005, 152-156).

More than 70 languages are spoken in Thailand. These belong to the Tai-Kadai, Austroasiatic, Austronesian, Sino-Tibetan, and Hmong-Mien language families, and are hierarchically organized (Smalley, 1994). At the top is Central Thai, which is Thailand’s sole official language. Next are the Northern North-eastern and Southern dialects of Thai, whose grammar, pronunciation, and lexicon can be likened to differences between Romance or Germanic languages. The next layer in Thailand’s language pyramid, are languages that Premsrirat classifies into the following four groups: Displaced languages associated with people who have settled in Thailand fleeing wars or famines, or seeking employment. Although including Mon and Khmu, most are Tai languages⁶; Town languages, the most important of which is Chinese; Marginal languages

⁶ Tai language examples include Phuan, Song, Phuthai, Lao, Wiang, Lao Khrang, Nyoh, Yooy.

located in close proximity to borders⁷; Enclave languages spoken by “small isolated ethnolinguistic groups who live in the area surrounded by totally unrelated languages and are wholly contained in the country (2005, 643-644).”⁸

The first three rulers of Bangkok’s Chakri dynasty were primarily concerned with regaining control of territories that Ayutthaya had historically influenced. Polities furthest from Bangkok (such as Terengganu, Kelantan, and Kedah) remained un-integrated vassals (prathetsarat) and subordinate feudalities (huamuang). An unintended consequence of Bangkok achieving their objective was that approximately half of the population it claimed to rule spoke Lao or Kammuang. As already noted, these Tai dialects were closer to Central Thai than Mon, Khmer, or the other Austroasiatic, Austronesian, Sino-Tibetan, and Hmong-Mien languages further afield. Nonetheless Bangkok was suspicious about the loyalty of its Lao-speaking subjects in the Northeast (Th. Isaan) (2007, 391-393, 401). Siam avoided being directly colonized by any European power, but it pursued a policy of internal colonization⁹. These had the largest impact on Siam’s largest ethnolinguistic minorities (see figure 3), which I describe below.




Figure 3: Size and spread of Siam’s largest ethnic minorities in the 1903 census
(Source: Grabowsky 1996, 71-74)

7 The most important border languages are Shan and Khmu, Khmer, Mon, and Malay.

8 Examples are the Nyah Kur (Central Thailand), the Chong, Kasong, and Samre (Near the Cambodian border), So (Thavueang) on the upper Korat plateau, Gong (Central plains), Lavue, Mlabri, Bisu, and Mpi (North Thailand), and the Urak Lawoi and Moken in the Andaman south.

9 Harrison & Jackson, 2011; Loos, 2004-2005, 2011; Streckfuss, 1993.

Most Malay residents of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat might now be bilingual, yet Malays continue to be referred to as a religious and linguistic minority. From the late 19th century, Siamese assimilationist policies impacted educational institutions and the organization of religion also targeted Lao and Khmer-speaking Buddhism minorities. Peter Vail relates that as early as 1898, Bangkok began its “slow process of instituting mass education” in parts of Northeast Thailand where most spoke Northern Khmer. Before this, state and temple schools had coexisted, but dismay exam results by Northern Khmer students confirmed that (in comparison with Lao-speakers further north), Khmer faced many obstacles to learning Thai (2007,125). In addition to language use, Bangkok sought control Buddhist leadership and practice. The Sangha Act of 1902 forbade Khmer monks from teaching Lao and Khmer scripts in temple schools. The Minister of the Interior at time was Prince Damrong, who permitted local languages to be taught, although only education in Central Thai would be funded. The pace with which Siamese schools spread in the Northeast increased dramatically after (often violent) resistance to the 1902 Act. As is well known, these were motivated by the form of Buddhism mandated by the newly established Sangha, differed from the ritual and doctrinal idiosyncrasies of Buddhism in Isaan (Grabowsky 1995; McCargo 2004).

Decades later, concerns about the size and prosperity of Siam’s Chinese population motivated King Vajiravudh (1910-27) to articulate a Thai form of nationalism based on Chat (the Thai people), Satsana (Buddhism), and Pramahasat (the Monarchy) (Vaddhanaphuti 2005, 155)¹⁰. Following the 1932 coup which deposed King Prajadhipok and brought an end to the absolute monarchy, Siam’s military rulers promoted ideas of a “unifying national culture”, and a “single Siamese/Thai nation”, rather than the recently marginalized monarchy (Simpson and Thammasathien 2007, 396)¹¹. The role that language played in the construction of Thainess was most pronounced during the governments led by Phibul Songkhram, who (ironically) was the son of a Cantonese-speaking Chinese immigrant. The fourth state decree (Th. Ratthaniyom) promulgated during this period discouraged the use of “any regional or ethnic/religious modifier of the word ‘Thai’, so that terms such as ‘southern Thais’, ‘northeastern Thais’, and ‘Islamic Thais’ should not be used.” All inhabitants were simply ‘Thais’ (1940, 1281). The ninth Ratthaniyom

¹⁰ On Vajiravudh, see (Vella, 1978)

¹¹ For a recent treatment of these developments, see Strate, 2015 #22616}.

which specifically addressed Thai language, called upon Thai people to “extol, honour and respect” their language. In addition to studying the national language, others should be assisted to do so. Regional accents should be rejected as a mark of difference, as all born as Thai possess the “same Thai blood and speak the same Thai language” (1940, 155).

At the beginning of the 21st Century, Thailand’s ethnolinguistic minorities speak mother tongues with family members, and neighbours from the same community. Central Thai is spoken in schools, the market, and in dealings with Thai officials. This has led to widespread reductions in bilingualism, or diglossia. Furthermore, contact between languages produce “contact languages”¹². As is well known, these are characterized by shrunken lexical repertoires, and syntax influenced by the grammar of the dominant language. Premsrirat claims that many minority languages in Thailand have now been replaced by Thai, to the extent that many no longer function as the language of “the speech community or even the home” (2005, 644). For enclave languages without scripts such as Chong, Nyah Kur, Thavueng, and Gong, Thai orthographies have been developed in the hope that these will both “reduce the pace of a wholesale shift to Thai”, and “facilitate teaching these languages to younger generations” have been developed (Premsrirat 2005, 644). Controversially, these have also been prepared for Khmer, Mon, and Malay – all of which possess their own literary traditions. Orthography wars waged elsewhere, have spread to Thailand.

Keyes views Thailand’s southern Malay population as the sole “truly successful case of the perpetuation of a nonstandard Thai writing system for use among a significant population” (2003, 195). Malay literacy has fared better than either the Northern Khmer (Vail 2006, 2007; Vail and Pantakod 2013) or Mon (McDaniel 2008). Although Premsrirat and Unianasasmita point out that apart from religious contexts where “Standard Melayu written in the Jawi script” predominates, the local dialect of Malay that resembles Kelantanese and is commonly referred to as “Pattani Malay” is used in all other spheres of life throughout Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat. Bilingual residents in South Thailand’s urban centres speak an increasingly creolized version of Malay. As such, Pattani Malay is now “not as close (in practical terms) to the Standard Malay spoken in Malaysia as some people think” (Premsrirat and Uniansasmita

12 {Siemund, 2008 #12282; Garrett, 2004 #12314.

2012, 85)¹³. Although engagement with Thai modernity, and consumption of Thai mass media has impacted Malay language viability in South Thailand, similar dynamics are discernable among Malays in Singapore¹⁴. The single biggest threat to the local viability of Malay is its shrinking lexicon. Jawi is primarily read in Islamic schools, and Romanised Malay (Rumi) is rarely read in South Thailand. It is important to note that leaflets (Th. *bai pliauw*) penned and distributed by insurgents since 2004 are a mixture of Jawi and Thai (McCargo 2012; Unno 2011, 69-72).

To summarise, Thailand's linguistic landscape is far from homogeneous, and southern Malays are not the only ethnolinguistic minorities to have been impacted by language policies promulgated in Bangkok. An argument can therefore be made for de-exceptionalizing some dynamics in South Thailand. Below, I place Thailand's language policy in its wider regional context.

Brown and Ganguly's *Fighting Words* (2003) is one of a number of recent studies which have comparing the language policies pursued by governments in South, East, and Southeast Asia (Rappa and Wee, 2006). These draw attention to the perils inherent in specific ethnolinguistic settings, challenges that policymakers must confront, and – most importantly – lessons learned from the history of language policy. Brown and Ganguly distinguish between countries possessing unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar ethnolinguistic constituencies (2003, 419)¹⁵. In unipolar countries, where one group dominates the country demographically, politically, economically, and socially, “the formation of national identities is comparatively easy, and nationwide ethnic wars are less likely to develop”. Nevertheless, where one ethnolinguistic constituency dominates, it is more likely that minorities are mistreated through either sins of “commission” (oppression and forced assimilation) or “omission” (indifference and neglect). Countries described as bipolar, must

13 “Thai-ised Malay” (See, Joll 2011, p 76) is increasingly tonalised and influenced by Thai phonology such as the replacement of /j/ sounds for /y/ sounds (Jawi, becoming Yawi).

14 On Malay identity in Singapore, see {Chew, 2013 #24372; Hussin, 2012 #23252; Syed Mhd. Khairudin Aljunied, 2011 #14581}

15 These are defined as: (a) Unipolar: one group comprises roughly 90% or more of the total population, such as Bangladesh, China, the Philippines (and perhaps Thailand and Vietnam); (b) Bipolar: Two groups comprise approximately 90% or more of the total population, such as Malaysia, Singapore, Sri Lanka (and perhaps Laos); (c) Multipolar: No two ethnic groups taken together comprise 90% or more of the total population, such as Burma, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, and Taiwan.

“contend with only one major ethnolinguistic cleavage”. Rather than most conflicts being caused by the marginalization of a large number of politically significant ethnolinguistic groups, it is between two dominant groups. In multipolar countries, “nationwide ethnic wars” are unlikely due to no single ethnolinguistic constituency being large enough to dominate the entire country.

Like Thailand, Malaysia, Laos, and Vietnam have had mixed track records in managing minorities. Malaysia successfully established Bahasa Malaysia as the country’s national language, but this has been achieved at “a high cost to its Chinese and Indian communities” (Ganguly, 2003; Mukherjee and David, 2011; Rappa and Wee 2006, 29-58). Following the cession of their respective conflicts in the mid 1970s, the governments of Laos and Vietnam gave language issues “only intermittent attention.” Limited resources have prevented Laotian governments to “institute Lao as a national language”. Although Hanoi pursued a policy of accommodating ethnolinguistic minorities during the war, they have been “less sympathetic since.” Further north, Beijing’s policies since 1949 alternated between “accommodation and annihilation.” Brutal assimilationist campaigns were launched in the late 1950s and during the Cultural Revolution of the mid-to late 1960s. In Tibet and Xinjiang, military occupation was followed by “ethnically flooding” such potentially rebellious regions. Brown and Ganguly view Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Burma to have the poorest record in managing ethnolinguistic problems. Islamabad’s imposition of Urdu as the national language in 1971 led the East Pakistan’s Bengali-speaking population seceding. Ironically, Bangladesh adopted highly discriminatory language policies that have led to non-Bengalis being “marginalized linguistically, politically, and economically” (Uddin, 2006).

Governments pursue either unilingual (where one language dominates), or multilingual vision (in which two or more languages are widely used). Thailand has chosen the former. Although justified by “external and internal threats to national security”, these decisions “serve parochial political interests”. Other governments are either willing to tolerate ethnolinguistic diversity, or have become “resigned to diversity as a fact of life.” States most furthermore decided whether promulgate and implement policies that coerce or induce ethnolinguistic minorities. The former include “legal prohibitions, political repression, economic pressure, the imposition of martial law, and the use of military force.” Inducement, by contrast, seeks to persuade, co-opt, and

extend political, economic, and educational opportunities. Brown and Ganguly formulates the following five assertions about language policy:

- (1) Governments embracing “tolerant, inclusive, multilingual visions” have fared better than those that have imposed “hegemonic, exclusive, unilingual visions” (2003, 428);
- (2) Governments pursuing “hybrid linguistic visions” have “worked reasonably well”. Although post-independent Indonesian governments have established Bahasa Indonesia as the country’s sole national language, they have not sought to “eliminate other languages or vernaculars” (2003, 429);
- (3) Governments committed to “strict unilingual visions,” have either neglected, or actively suppressed minority languages. Those that have (including Thailand) have experienced ethnolinguistic tensions;
- (4) Inducement is more effective than coercion. Compared to governments that have attempted to impose their linguistic visions on unreceptive populations, those that have “relied on persuasive policy instruments have generally fared better.” Although Indonesia and Thailand have been reasonably successful in establishing “national languages under difficult circumstances”, and their “reliance on inducement has been one of the keys to these policy successes”;
- (5) The combination of “unilingual visions” with “coercive policy instruments” is particularly problematic, demonstrated by namely Bangladesh, Burma, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.

Brown and Ganguly argue that adverse reactions can be expected in ethnolinguistically diverse countries ruled by governments favouring “unilingual visions and coercive instruments. These are less effective than strategies that simultaneously “adopt inclusive, tolerant, multilingual goals and the pursuit of these through inducement and persuasive policy instruments”. Policymakers embracing this second option must, however, formulate “long-term perspective(s) on ethnolinguistic problems” and a tolerant “slow, incremental policy progress” (2003, 432). Concerns over the preservation of “political unity and territorial integrity,” frequently lead to national language policies functioning as mechanisms through which state control was centralized (2003, 433), which is the case in South Thailand. Why are informed decisions required about the specific roles and functions played by national languages – especially where minorities do not use the national language?

This complicates engagement with local government, and national justice and education systems, and minorities are more likely to identify with larger national entities where they “perceive themselves to be respected, integral members.” The opposite is also true: Feelings of alienation are inevitable whenever minorities are perceived as second-class citizens”.

Somewhat counter-intuitively, designating a single language as a country’s national language is not necessarily the best way to forge a strong national identity. National language policies based on inducement – rather than coercion – are noticeably more effective. Coercively implementing national language policies in Burma and China “provoked strong backlashes from minority groups.” (2003, 435). Even in countries where more than one national language has been established, minority languages are often promoted and protected. Where one national language exists, it is often the case and other languages are either “strongly discouraged” or denied “constitutional or statutory” protection. Wherever this occurs, minorities are more likely to mobilize (Brown and Ganguly 2003: 4, 442). The most extreme form of this policy is the creation of “linguistically defined provinces, regions, or states”, where a large ethnolinguistic group is concentrated in one part of a country that makes the creation of a separate administrative province or state viable. India’s has successfully employed this approach in Tamil Nadu and the Punjab where, far from leading to “secession and political disintegration”, regional autonomy has reduced secessionist impulses (2003, 437).

Unilingual Goals	Persuasive Instruments	Coercive Instruments
	Thailand	Bangladesh, Burma, China (until late 1970s), Laos, Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka (until late 1970s)
Mixed Goals	Indonesia, Philippines	China (since late 1970s), Vietnam
Multilingual Goals	India, Papua New Guinea	Singapore, Sri Lanka (since late 1970s)

Table 1 : Ethnolinguistic Strategies
(Source: Brown 2003, 432)

This section began with a summary of the Thailand's diverse linguistic landscape. I pointed out that the Malay speaking Muslims of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat are far from the only ethnolinguistic minority (adversely) impacted by its language policy. Finally, I placed these policies in their wider regional context. Below, I interrogate the role of language and religion in ethno-nationalism, and describe the concept of linguistic discrimination and its role in inequality.

Religion, Language, and Ethno-nationalism

Notwithstanding by stated interest in linguistic discrimination, omitted religious issues would be misguided. Most references to religion below will reinforce the similarities and dissimilarities to the neglected agency of language. I am aware that my extensive interactions with recent (compelling) contributions by William Safran, and Rogers Brubaker could conceivably be dismissed as academic infatuation. Peaceful political resolutions to complex conflicts requires sufficient quantities of the right sort of data being collected in Malay communities convinced that violence represents the only viable option for resolving their long-held grievances. Rectifying this empirical problem is the task of researches committed to putting scholarship to work, but while work begins on this important task. More need to instrumentalize insights provided by social theorists who have studied weak states working out how to accommodate large geographically concentrated linguistic minorities. While Malay-speakers are not the only linguistic minority in Thailand that are discriminated against, the relatively new field of linguistic justice deserves to more widely read. This is the task of this second section¹⁶.

Language and religion have seldom been studied together in a sustained and systematic manner. For specialists of both, these are too different, while ethnic studies specialist often view language and religion as too similar. Rogers Brubaker argues that when construed in certain ways, language and religion are similar enough to make comparison possible yet they are different enough to make them interesting. Scholars of ethnicity treat language and religion as functional equivalents. They are examples of 'cultural stuff' providing "grist for the mill of ethnic classification and boundary formation". Brubaker's contention is that such a position has a flattening effect that overlooks differences in the social organisation and political expression of language and religion

¹⁶ See (Mowbray, 2012; Piller, 2016)

(Brubaker 2013, 16). Religion has provided the bedrock for nation building, and some national identities are difficult to separate from religious matrices.

Any nuanced analysis of language, religion, and ethno-nationalism must acknowledge temporal and spatial variations. Secular societies have marginalised religion, but allegiance to some forms of ethno-nationalism resembles religious affiliations. Both possess a “shared ideology, celebrate common festivals, hold shared symbols, acknowledge common saints, and are associated with a community.” Furthermore, some ethno-nationalisms resemble secularised religions. Both can be changed through religious conversion, or (successfully) applying for citizenship. Not all countries permit dual citizenship, and membership to more than one religion is more common among Hindus and Buddhists than Abrahamic religions such as Christianity, Islam, and Judaism. In other societies, language and religion feed on one another. Language has sometimes become a substitute of religion, while in others religion has trumped language. Religions and languages spread over more than one ethnic group. It is common among some ethnies for its members to “adhere to more than one religion”, and where bilingual among younger generations has eroded loyalty to the language of its older members.

A range of case studies have recently been presented and analysed by William Safran. He notes that for centuries Roman Catholicism in Europe left no room for ethno-nationalism. Humankind was divided between Christians and Infidels, and Catholics and (Protestant and Orthodox) heretics (not French, English, Germans, Slavs, and Italians). Furthermore, the generation and dissemination of knowledge were in the hands of the clergy, who wrote in Latin. Since the Renaissance, language has trumped religion, and both now intersect. In Poland it was religion – specifically Catholicism – (not language) that was central to nationhood. To be Polish is to be Catholic, and in Poland national mythologies invoke notions of Poland having defended Catholic Christendom against Turks (Orthodox) Russians, (Swedish) Protestants, and (Atheist) Bolshevism. In the image of an “arch-Catholic Poland, language did not seem to play a major role because the clerical language was Latin” (Safran 2008; 72,178).

Historically, the popular appeal of Christianity required a particular – ethno-linguistic presentation. Joan of Arc was a religious ‘liberator’, and a nation-building heroine who spoke French. She is one of a number of religious personalities central to the formation of ethno-national identities. This is one

example of the wider phenomenon of religious identities based on narratives that were expressed in specific languages. Safran points out that The Danubian St. Stephen, the Bohemian Hus, and the Serbian King Lazar all spoke vernaculars. Slavic Orthodoxy differs from Greek Orthodoxy in its language, style of praying, and the saints that it appeals to, and no one confuses Persian Shi'ism with the Sunni Islam of the Ottomans (Safran 2008, 177). The complexity of connections between language and religion is demonstrated in the role of Urdu in North India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Urdu developed in northern India. Despite being closely related to Hindi, this was written in a modified Arabic orthography, not those based on Sanskrit. Most Urdu speakers were Muslims, and became the national language of Pakistan following its creation in 1947, yet the civil war that led to the creation of independent Bangladesh was not over religion (specifically Islam), but language (Safran 2008,177; Uddin 2006).

Safran argues that while religion had the “upper hand until the Renaissance, and language from then until the present”, both now continue to intersect with nationalism. From the nineteenth century, religion was “eclipsed by cultural populism and linguistic exclusivism”. Today, traditional religion has been replaced by civic religion that worships the “sovereign people, if not the state”. Language remains important in all states, but not necessarily in the same way. The relationship to religion is strongest in languages closely tied to ethnic communities, and weakest in trans-ethnic languages (such as English, French, Spanish). The “religious element may sometimes be so dominant in a given language that it cannot easily ‘desacralise’ itself”(Safran 2008,179).

Many more details about the range of dynamics between language, religion, and ethno-nationalism deserve to be included, but I will limit myself to links between language use and inequality. Dynamics of power and inequality are involved in linguistic difference in the form of linguistic repertoires, levels of fluency, literacy, and accents. That said, connections between inequality “within-language and within-religion inequalities”, and “between-language and between-religion inequalities” are neither sharp, nor are they the same (Brubaker 2015, 4). Let us now turn to considering the domains of linguistic and religious discrimination provided by Rogers Brubaker.

The Domains of Linguistic (and Religious) Discrimination

Brubaker interrogates the dynamics of linguistic and religious discrimination in the following four domains: (a) The political and institutional

domains (Brubaker, 2015, pp. 7-12), namely the laws, policies, and formal regulations that “govern language use”, and establish “parameters for religious practice” through which languages and religions are recognized (Brubaker 2015, 4); (b) The economic domain that confers “differential economic value” on different languages and religions which influence what languages are learned, and what religions are adopted. The right form of linguistic and religious competence translates into capital (Brubaker 2015, 12-11); (c) The cultural and symbolic domains that confer “prestige, honour, stigma, and (symbolic) value (Brubaker 2015, 15-17); (d) The informal social relations that (depending on the context) affected by linguistic choices and religious affiliation (Brubaker 2015, 17-20).

The Political and Institutional Domains of Discrimination

Due to all these being interrelated, it is as impossible as it is misguided to draw “hard and fast lines between them”¹⁷. Nevertheless, Brubaker argues that we these are analytically distinct, they should be considered separately. Inequality is, after all, a “complex phenomenon” associated with “linguistic and religious pluralism” that cannot be “reducible to a single kind of inequality”. In addition to this, there are distinct dynamics associated with “political disprivileging, economic marginalisation, cultural stigmatisation and informal discrimination.”(Brubaker 2015, 5)

To reiterate the important observation made by Safran above, the role of language and religion in inequality varies widely over time, and differs with context. In Western liberal polities, religion is “implicated in the production and reproduction of inequality in very different ways in different world regions, while language is implicated in the production and reproduction of inequality in rather similar ways across a wide range of contexts in the modern world.” Language is a “crucial form of cultural capital, a central focus of personal and collective identity, and a key terrain of political struggle”. Especially in the West, religion has become an “autonomous, differentiated, and to a considerable extent privatised sphere of its own” (Brubaker 2015, 6).

What roles do these four domains play in the generation and perpetuation of inequality, beginning with the political and institutional dynamics? As noted above, modern nation states operate “in and through

17 For example, policies confer economic, and informal social discrimination is shaped by particular languages or religions being devalued.

language.” It is therefore unavoidable that these advantage people possessing specific linguistic repertoires. In addition to these becoming powerful determinant of life chances, the “rules and practices that govern the language of public life” become “chronically and pervasively politicized”. States that privilege particular languages and religions lead to unequal (a) opportunities for linguistic/religious expressions, (b) access to goods and opportunities for people on the basis of their linguistic repertoires or religious affiliations), and (c) opportunities for the intergenerational transmission of linguistic or religious identities (Brubaker 2013, 10).

The first form of inequality arises from “restrictions on specific forms of linguistic and religious behaviour”. The right to speak a minority language in public places is not the same as the right to “communicate with public officials, receive schooling or other public services or even display commercial signage in that language”. Citizens speaking minority languages must either learn the official language or rely on translators. Although in cases when individual believers possess “serious religious commitments”, religion is more “sectorial and compartmentalized.” By comparison, language is intrinsically social and public. In modern liberal democracies, religion enjoys much stronger legal protection than language. Along with discrimination on the basis of “sex, race and ethnicity”, formal exclusion on religious grounds have been “massively de-legitimised in the West.” Nonetheless, discrimination on the basis of language choice or competence remains widespread. No one chooses one’s mother tongue, but language competence can be developed. Religious affiliations and practices may not only be “voluntarily changed”, but “easily, quickly and radically” than linguistic repertoires. Few question the legitimacy of official languages being learned by citizens, but this is not the case with religious affiliation (Brubaker 2015, 8-9)

On the issue of intergenerational transmission of linguistic or religious identities, Brubaker argues that states seek not only to “promote or restrict certain forms of linguistic and religious behaviour”, but also to “shape linguistic and religious repertoires and identities.” Doing so for adults might be problematic, but it is possible for those of a population to change if new generations are “socialised into a linguistic or religious repertoire(s)” that differ from their previous generations. For this reason, control of the “instruments of linguistic and religious socialization” is common in linguistic and religious struggles. (Brubaker 2015, 10)

This represents another substantive difference between language and religion: Linguistic pluralism was less self-reproducing, and political authorities rarely imposed linguistic homogeneity. However, in modern liberal democracies religious pluralism is self-reproducing, and most states permit religious diversity. Linguistic reproduction requires “prolonged and expensive schooling” on a scale that only states can provide. Children acquire basic linguistic competence in minority languages from parents and extended families that may be reinforced by media in minority languages. Nevertheless, without “comprehensive minority-language schooling” these are rarely “fully and durably reproduced”(Brubaker 2015, 10). Religious pluralism generated through immigration is more easily reproduced in states committed to religious freedom, but this requires neither a bureaucracy, nor state funding. By contrast, the future viability of minority languages requires a “major effort and carries a substantial opportunity cost”. Many states possess mechanisms for linguistic socialisation, but few are directly involved in religious socialisation.

Brubaker provides two qualifications to his argument. The first relates to his assumptions about the strength of state sanctioned languages or religions. When this is not the case, policies and practices privileging particular languages or religions are particularly important. Three types of policies support weak or threatened languages or religions: (a) Efforts to revive, sustain or promote a weak or declining language; (b) State protection or support of still-dominant (but declining or threatened) languages or religions; (c) Ethnically defined post-colonial states employing state power in a remedial or compensatory way to promote a language weakened by imperial predecessors. Furthermore, Canada, Switzerland and Belgium might have promulgated policies guaranteeing the equitable treatment of languages and religions, but these are (regrettably rare) and “never extended to include immigrant languages”(Brubaker 2015, 11) Measures minimizing linguistic discrimination include the provision of “signage, information, voting materials, or bureaucratic forms in minority languages; translators in medical, legal or administrative settings; or various transitional forms of bilingual education.” Yet accommodations of this nature are distinct from the construction of a comprehensive parallel school or “regimes of territorial autonomy” needed to ensure a “long-term reproduction and preservation of multiple languages within a single state.”

The Economic Domain of Discrimination

In addition to these political and institutional dynamics, Brubaker delineates a range of economic consequences of language loyalties. Notwithstanding these being dynamically interconnected, Brubaker differentiates between unequal economic opportunities “for people with different linguistic or religious repertoires or affiliations”, and unequal opportunities for “growth or survival for different languages and religions within a particular linguistic or religious ecology”. Linguistic competencies and religious affiliations operate as forms of cultural ‘capital’ that provide economic benefits. Religion functions as an “economically redeemable form of cultural or social capital” that leads some religious communities to perpetuate “formal social closure or informal discrimination.” These exclude religious outsiders from certain economic opportunities” Yet in all individual immigrants and immigrant communities, social mobility is intimately linked to the mastery of global, regional, and local languages. Linguistic repertoires and religious affiliations are dynamic. Changes to both are, furthermore, motivated by the (perceived) advantages that these will bring about. While most individuals make decisions for themselves, parental concern about the economic opportunities of their children compel decisions to be made for their children that transform linguistic and religious landscapes (Brubaker 2015, 12).

What Brubaker refers to as “ecological perspectives” on links between inequality, and linguistic preferences and religious affiliation explain both the “on-going spirals of language death.” Languages and religions compete with one another for adherents locally, nationally, and globally, yet competition between languages differs from rivalries between religions. The latter involves competition between organisations, and competition for itself (rather than in itself). Nationalist organisations might campaign for language rights, but languages are not organisations. Citizens may be persuaded to “identify themselves in particular ways in censuses”, adopt “particular forms of linguistic behaviour”, or to “send their children to particular schools”, but it is organizations – not languages – that compete. Languages compete for speakers. Despite the costs of changing linguistic repertoires, no one is locked into maintaining these, and (compared to the parents) the costs are minimal for children. Linguistic landscapes are significantly impacted when enough parents decide to alter the linguistic preferences of their progeny (Brubaker 2015, 15).

This relates to one of Brubaker’s most innovative conceptual contributions: Language is an example of a “hyper-collective” good whose value

increases with the number of people speaking it. As a hyper-collective good, the process of linguistic change is accelerated, leading to “self-reinforcing ‘stampedes’ into a particular language”. Powerful forces may seek to promote relatively stable distribution of languages by pointing out the costliness of language acquisition, the “symbolic and emotional meanings” of language, and the ‘political roofs’ that shield weaker languages from direct competition in specific domains (Brubaker 2015; 15, 22). It is important to note that, by contrast, religion is a collective enterprise. Religious communities are “less sensitive to such dynamics of economic demography”. Small confessional communities continue to reproduce themselves even without state support. As demonstrated by Christianity in Western democracies, those with state support may even decline. Therefore, the “demographic dynamics of religion are less acutely sensitive than the demographic dynamics of language to economic costs and benefits.”(Brubaker 2015, 15)

The Cultural and Symbolic Domains of Discrimination

The cultural and symbolic domain is the third aspect of linguist inequality dealt with by Brubaker. These relate to “discursive and symbolic processes” which “confer prestige, honour, recognition, respect and [...] symbolic value” on particular languages and religions. State institutions possess the power to “officialise, recognise, legitimise and naturalise, [...] identify, define, classify and categorise”. Symbolic inequality is therefore inexorably interconnected with the political and institutional domains of law and policy described above. Nevertheless, these are analytically distinct, and work through the medium of “discourse and representations within and outside the state”, as well as through “law, policy and procedures” (Brubaker 2015, 15). Amongst other things, state building is a cultural project that includes the development of a national language (or languages), sometimes in contexts of considerable linguistic heterogeneity. This requires legal commitments to compulsory education, policies that stipulate the language(s) of instruction, and linguistic standards. The symbolic dimensions of these processes are many, and include dialects and minority languages being stigmatized, and a form of “symbolic violence” being waged by authorities determined to devalue certain linguistic repertoires (Brubaker 2015, 16).

A language may be stigmatised due to its association with “devalued social categories.” Yet over and above “devaluation by association”, it is more common for religion to be “criticised, devalued or stigmatized” on its own

terms on account of its “ideational, normative and political content”. Religion represents a target of criticism and stigmatization, as well as an active agent. In other words, when compared to language, religion possesses a “deeper and different” structure of authority. Languages might be “routinely represented as primitive, undeveloped, crude, uncultivated, uncouth, impoverished and unsuitable for use in particular domains”, but religions have been (misre) presented as “evil, violence-prone or threatening to a whole civilisation or way of life”. (Brubaker 2015, 16).

Informal Social Relations and Discrimination

The fourth and final domain of linguistic inequality, are informal social relations. Brubaker suggests that the following are the most important ways that unequal access to goods and opportunities on the basis of either language or religion are mediated: (a) Differential treatment by others (as in labour or housing markets, bureaucratic encounters, or private relationships); (b) self-organised processes of “social separation” which perpetuate “linguistically or religiously differentiated social networks, friendship circles and marriage opportunities” (Brubaker 2015, 17). The most common forms of differential treatment involve discrimination, or “differential treatment” on the basis of a “functionally irrelevant yet subjectively meaningful categorical attribute”. Nevertheless, informal discrimination works in tandem with formal social closure. In most modern liberal democracies, religious discrimination is illegal—especially in the workplace, while, informal discrimination is analytically independent of the “cultural and symbolic devaluation of forms of difference.” Rather than prejudice against the language per se, linguistic discrimination reflects “associations between speakers of a language in a particular context and extra-linguistic categories (class, gender, race or ethnic, national or regional origin). Religious discrimination often reflects “associations between adherents of a religion in a particular context and other social categories.” Nourished as it is by the “discursive construction of religions in the public sphere,” religious prejudice is often more elaborate, and highly charged than beliefs about particular languages (Brubaker 2015, 18)¹⁸.

Other forms of differential treatment are inadequately described by this discrimination paradigm. This is true even in some relatively public

¹⁸ Piller has collated a wide range of compelling case studies of linguistic discrimination in Australian (2016)

contexts, such as examples of differential treatment based on language in the workplace. Differential treatment is most relevant in more private contexts. Amongst other things, religion and language affect access to friendship circles, and marriage opportunities. Dynamics of “exclusion and stigmatization” are distinct from “self-organised separation in social space(s)”. Brubaker comments that it is common that a “broad spectrum of activities”, are only open to individuals possessing “proficiency in the minority language in which they are conducted.” The constriction of opportunities through self-exclusion is an important social reality. Ironically, many involved have had no experience of discrimination, or active exclusion, which Brubaker describes as a form of “agentless exclusion [...] without excluders”(Brubaker 2015, 19).

Discussion and Conclusion

No credible claims can be made that the role of Malay language has been entirely overlooked in studies of conflict dynamics in South Thailand. Nevertheless, interrogations of the role in social cohesion and sub-national conflicts are dwarfed by studies of religious factors, and few have examined both. The reasons for this many, but include discussions of language in Thailand today being politically sensitive. This might explain the reason for the lack of analysis of language dynamics in Thailand being included in a synthesis report that concluded a four-year project funded UNICEF examining the role of language in social cohesion in Myanmar, Malaysia, and Thailand (UNICEF, 2016). I have demonstrated that Thailand deserves its reputation for having provided religious freedom for its religiously diverse citizens. Nevertheless, its (deeply entrenched) monolingual mind-set and discriminatory language policy – which I have placed in its regional context – has led to widespread language loss. Due in no small part to its geographic proximity to Malaysia and the wider Malay-speaking world, Malay is the most viable minority language in Thailand. But anyone familiar with the linguistic landscape in the Thai/Malay Peninsula where Southern Thai is widely spoken will be aware that Malay was once widely spoken (Joll, 2016).

Although I have described widespread language loss among urban Malays elsewhere (Joll 2011; 61-64,74-78), this is less widespread among rural Malays. Furthermore, language loss is gendered: Malay women are more comfortably bilingual than rural Malay men – who are the primary focus of BRN recruiters (Helbardt, 2015). No one should question local concerns about the future viability of Malay in Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat. Anyone brave enough

to do so will be reminded about the language loss north of southern Songkhla and Satun, and that relatives residing in South Thailand's local provincial capitals who have send their children to Thai government schools are no longer able or willing to communicate with relatives living in communities where Malay language loyalty and angst about its disappearance is high. Since the chaos unleashed in the Middle East since the Arab Spring, there has been a significant increase in the number of Malay parents sending their children to schools and universities in Indonesia, where the BNR enjoys more operational freedom.

Safran's sophisticated interrogation of the complex relationship between language and religion in the construction of ethno-nationalism, compliments Brubaker's juxtaposition of the role of language and religion in inequality. Both these possess the potential to breathe some much need fresh air into the examination conflict dynamics in the following ways. Collecting, analysing and disseminating the results of research conducted in the parts of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat that we know least well take years. Time in the field needs to be complimented with increased enthusiasm to mine the theoretical contributions. No one familiar with South Thailand's linguistic landscape will quibble with Brubaker's claims that religion are self-sustaining, but language is not. Wherever it exists, linguistic discrimination leads to inequality among linguistic minorities resolute in their loyalty to their mother tongue. South Thailand is not exception.

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Peace Dialogue and Negotiation in South Sudan, Nepal and Papua

Pedestals for Marginalized Voices: Peaceful Negotiation through Civil Society

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Introduction

Peaceful political transformation requires the voices from all affected stakeholders; the mainstream and marginalized, the majority and minority. In many stable democracies this voice is amplified through non-governmental organizations which act as pedestals on which the voiceless can stand. Employing the theoretical framework of Kurt Lewin's field theory in geographically different contexts, this paper explores the various factors that create conflict while considering strategies to influence social change and peaceful political transformation through civil society. While context is critical to sustainable strategies for peace, this paper focuses on the countries of South Sudan, Bolivia, and Thailand. The research sought to understand and illustrate the different ways in which civil society organizations strategically facilitate an agenda of social inclusion for minority populations?

Theoretical Framework: Kurt Lewin's Field Theory

The relationship between governmental leaders, multinational corporations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), citizens, and other international bodies is very complex and nonlinear. The dynamics can be expressed within the realm of systems theory. One definition of a system approach used by scholars was that posited by Walter Buckley, which states that

a synthetic approach wherein piecemeal analysis is not possible due to the intricate interrelationship of parts that cannot be treated out of context of the whole¹.

In the context of peace building, the system includes all of the parties

1 Daneke, G. A. 2005. The reluctant resurrection: New complexity methods and old systems theory. *Journal of Public Administration*, 28, p. 95

or stakeholders involved in the peace process. Building on systems theories, Kurt Lewin (1997) introduced field theory, which he defined as “²...a method of analyzing causal relations and building scientific constructs.” He stated that , Observing conflict through the lens of field theory involves four elements. The first is the ‘quasi-stationary equilibrium’. An example of this concept is demonstrated in the adaptive behavior of NGOs as they navigate spaces of conflict, specifically those that concern power relationships that are influenced by multiple external factors. The second element, Group Dynamics, places attention on changing the behavior of the group. The third element, Action Research, is directly connected to steps one and two. By understanding the forces within the field that affect the dynamics and equilibrium of group behavior, the group then adapts plans of action accordingly. The fourth, the 3-Step Model, involves analysis and planning to bring about broader social change. These three steps include (a) unfreezing, (b) moving, and (c) refreezing. Unfreezing is the process of creating the environment for social change to occur, however, this is not the desired goal. For example, unfreezing can be acts of terrorism, or other forms of social unrest or environmental disruption for the purpose of bringing about change for an oppressed group. The next step in the model, moving, is the change. This is movement towards more acceptable behaviors. Focusing on accountability and transparency, civil society acting on behalf of the people to create, facilitate, and implement activities that foster peace and social inclusion, could be seen as the movement. The final step, refreezing, is the process of stabilizing the entity through the acceptance and maintenance of its new environment. The sustained environmental change is the desired goal, which includes establishing and implementing new policies that are informed by and benefit the marginalized population.

The Role of Civil Society in Policy Development

The development of a strong civil society representative of multiple voices with the ability to stand on pedestals advocating and participating in policy development is critical for a stable country. Halperin, Siegle, and Weinstein (2004) drew a comparison between poor democracies and poor autocracies. They contended that poor democracies “are almost always stronger, calmer, and more caring than poor autocracies, because they allow power to

2 Zouhir, A. 2015. Language Policy and Identity Conflict in Sudan, *Digest of Middle East Studies*—Volume 24, Number 2—Pages 283–302, Policy Studies Organization.

be shared and encourage openness and accountability.”³ The research found that over time autocracies continued to maintain economic instability, created larger refugee and displaced person populations due to conflict and ethnic bias; and human development occurred either at the same, or at a lesser rate than poor democracies. In fact, the poor democracies on the other hand had higher rates of literacy, lower rates of infant mortality, and more stable governments, with less of a refugee crisis. In addition, these countries were able to respond to natural disasters because of the systemic flexibility of their governments. The involvement in NGOs in a society promotes transparency and development⁴. In addition, NGOs often foster social inclusion and participation which are key components to sustainable peace. That being said, not all NGOs are alike. There are trusteeship NGOs and representative NGOs.⁵ The representative NGOs are similar to the grassroots organizations (GROs) in that they provide direct services to the masses of needy people are indigenous, whereas the trusteeship NGO lacks community connection. Not all NGOs have the capacity to support the empowerment of marginalized groups.

Although, NGOs have been empowered in many ways, in general many NGOs contend they are excluded in critical policy development. According to Seckinelgin(2005) NGOs that were involved in policymaking ended up supporting policies that were directly linked to donor funding. The donors had set the policies, and the NGOs agreed based on their need to maintain financial resources. He also stated that only the international NGOs were invited to policy discussions, not the indigenous GROs. Usually the indigenous NGOs were subcontractors to the international NGOs, only implementing a piece of a program that was ultimately funded by and linked to policy created by the international donors.⁶ In addition, NGOs invited to and involved in policy decisions were usually operating within the realm of the established international policy framework.

3 Halperin, M.H., Siegle, J.T., and Weinstein, M.M. 2004. Why Democracies Excel. *Foreign Affairs*, 83(5).

4 Whaites, A. 2002. Let's get civil society straight: NGOs, the state, and political theory. In *Development, NGOs, and Civil Society*, edited by Eade, D. 124-141. U.K: Oxfam Press.

5 Carothers, T. and Ottoway, M. 2000. (eds.) *Funding Virtue: Civil Society Aid and Democracy Promotion*. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

6 Seckinelgin, H. 2005. A Global Disease and its Governance: HIV/AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Agency of NGOs. *Global Governance*, 11(3), 351-368.

The following three diagrams illustrate the current relationship that exists within field, as well as what could be. Figure 1 illustration the influence on policy by foreign donors and international NGOs. In this scenario, indigenous NGOs are stifled in their ability to influence policy through the limitations of the existing capacity building programs and the power dynamics with the international NGOs. In Figure 2, the influence on policy by foreign donors and indigenous NGOs is shown. In this scenario indigenous NGOs have greater influence on policy, however, are still limited by their relationship with international NGOs. Finally, in Figure 3 the influence on policy by foreign donors and indigenous NGOs is illustrated. In this scenario, indigenous NGOs have greater influence on policy in local and regional contexts, and somewhat in national contexts, illustrated with the dotted arrow. The indigenous NGOs are funded directly from foreign donors and national governments.




Diagram 1. Indigenous NGO Field—1. Influence on policy by foreign donors and international NGOs.




Diagram 2. Indigenous NGO Field—2. Influence on policy by foreign donors and indigenous NGOs.




Diagram 3. Indigenous NGO Field—3. Influence on policy by foreign donors and indigenous NGOs.

The international world regarded the nation of Sudan as one country under one rule prior to 2011. A country with an extensive history of enslavement and cultural hegemony, it would be several decades of struggle by the people in the southern part of Sudan before independence was achieved. For many years, the Sudanese Government prided and promoted itself at being at the “crossroads of the Arab and African world,”⁷ as it was a country bordered by Egypt, Libya, Chad, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Eritrea. Prior to 2011, the country of Sudan contained “within its borders representatives of all major African language families, excluding the Khoisan languages of South Africa.” It is estimated that the number of languages spoken in Sudan is 136, of which 114 are indigenous, while the rest are foreign, including English.⁸

Although there was pride in that national identity for some, there were still oppressive language and cultural policies that made it difficult for people who did not identify as Arab or Muslim to live freely. Political power was concentrated with the Arabs and the country implemented a system process of arabization, a process in which the people of southern Sudan struggled against for decades. At that time, it seemed as the most effective response to the oppressive system was armed resistance.

Over many decades there have been peace negotiations between the government and the people from the southern part of Sudan. Between 1972 and 1975, negotiations with Government of Sudan (GOS), specifically the National Congress Party comprised of the dominant Islamic Arab elites, resulted in signing of the first Peace Agreement between the SPLA/M and the government. In addition, prior and during the struggle for independence there was intra-region, inter-tribe struggle for natural resources, such as land. ‘The north-south war was just one part of a broader web of conflicts involving competing claims by various, shifting groups to land, water, natural resources, political power or cultural identity.’ As with many liberation movements around the world, the national government exploited these tribal divisions. Specifically, the National Islamic Front who seized power in 1989, “escalated policy of instigating massive south on-south killing used tactics such as offering dissident Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) commanders weapons,

7 Zouhir, A. 2015. Language Policy and Identity Conflict in Sudan, *Digest of Middle East Studies*—Volume 24, Number 2—Pages 283–302, Policy Studies Organization.

8 Yokwe, E. M. 1984. Arabicization and Language Policy in the Sudan. *Studies in the Linguistic Sciences*, 14(2), 157–170.

payments, and imprimatur through promises of direct negotiations.”⁹ These actions would fester post-independence. And not unlike many places in Africa, this intra-tribal conflict that continued to be stoked by the government was strategic, because while those in the southern region were focused on fighting each other, this paved the way for the national government to grant oil concessions in rebel territories to foreign companies to build a pipeline. In 1978, oil was discovered in the southern and border regions of the countries, and by 1999 the country was exporting oil from the region.¹⁰

The violence in the south became more deadly as “modern weapons turned cattle raiding into deadly assaults, targeting even women, children, and the sick and elderly. The southern Sudan NGO, New Council of Churches (NSCC) decided to organize a peace conference, and they coordinated their efforts with another Sudanese entity, the Sudan Ecumenical Forum. This forum was connected to the international organization, World Council of Churches, which subsequently was able garner support for the peace process from several influential governments including many in Europe, along with Canada, and the United States.

However, in concert with these negotiations, there were countries interested in derailing the peace process. They included Iran, Iraq, at times Libya and Egypt, along with China who was primarily focused on economic interests of the oil located in the southern region of the land. Together they played the adversarial role of keeping the focus of the issues for peace distracted by the many attacks and other efforts to derail the peace process.

After many years of struggle and battles, loss of lives, and livelihood, negotiations were resumed. However they only involved representatives from the SPLA/M and the National Congress Party. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) which consists of member states from Eastern Africa supported the peace and reconciliation process in the early to mid-90s. They provided a forum and a Declaration of Principles¹¹ that both the GOS and the SPLA/M could accept, which addressed “critical issues of the state and

9 Kelleher, A. and Johnson, M. June 2008. Religious Communities as Peacemakers: A Comparison of Grassroots Peace Processes in Sudan and Northern Ireland, Civil Wars, Vol.10, No.2 (June 2008), p.153

10 Young, J. 2005. Sudan: A Flawed Peace Process Leading to a Flawed Peace, Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 32, No. 103, Imperialism & African Social Formations.

11 Declaration of Principles http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SD_940520_The%20IGAD%20Declaration%20of%20principles.pdf

religion and self-determination.” However, by the 1998 attention shifted as Ethiopia and Eritrea broke out into their own war. As result, a Troika made up of the United States, Britain, and Norway, and later Italy, stepped into the peace process and continued through the declaration of the new state of South Sudan. The troika continued to include the African states from the IGAD and their process, however, the process also continued to lack transparency and neglected to address the issues of social inequality and human rights.

Although the intra-southern violence ended the feelings of distrust did not surpass, and many groups of people continued to feel slighted as the SPLA/M moved forward in the peace process with the Government of Sudan. For example, in 1997, the Khartoum Peace Agreement, which established the Wealth Sharing Protocol granted the southern opponents of the SPLA/M regional states that produce 40% of the oil revenue, however in the IGAD negotiations that led to independence they were granted only 2%¹². In the end, the wealth was primarily shared between the Government of Sudan and the SPLA/M, who would become the Government of South Sudan.

The ultimate goal is peace, and if peace means the absence of war, then peace was achieved. The international community rendered significant influence with the enforcement of sanctions against the Government of Sudan, which ultimately led to South Sudan’s independence. However, if peace means justice, for war crimes and other aspects of the long war and the peace process, then peace was not achieved, and possibly may be the reason, in part, for the return and escalation of the South Sudanese civil war, post-independence.

The diagrams below represent two scenarios. Diagram 4 illustrates a field in which international interests and foreign stakeholders influence the decisions of the Government of Sudan and the SPLA/M, while the voices and representation from other tribes and civil society remain marginalized. Diagram 5 represents a more ideal field needed to move the current conflict in South Sudan towards political transformation and sustainable peace.

12 Republic of the Sudan, “The Sudan Peace Agreement”, Khartoum (21 April 1997).




Diagram 5: Pre- South Sudanese Independence




Diagram 4: Post- South Sudanese Independence

Bolivia

Bolivia is a country located in central South America. A country was colonized by the Spaniards with the Spanish as its official language, it is bordered by Peru, Chile, Argentina, Paraguay, and Brazil. Most people have some indigenous ancestry and nearly 62 percent of the Bolivian population are native speakers of an indigenous language.¹³ Since the early part of the 20th Century, Bolivia has had strong civil society beginning with the unions in the 1930s. Many of these unions represented miners and factory workers. It was these unions that secured the revolution of 1952 and governed the country the first few years after independence.¹⁴ Because of this history, the union form of organization was preferred to that of the political party. The union form of government was perceived to be more equitable, benefitting peasant farmers, known as campesinos who were primarily indigenous, with land redistribution.¹⁵ However, Bolivia has a long history of oppressing the voices of the indigenous population and implementing neo-liberal policies that were counter to many cultural values. By the 1970s the indigenous movement grew, and student began to demand rights. Specifically, they demanded bilingual education and multiculturalism, and emphasized that they were oppressed by class and race, since they were not represented by unions.¹⁶ As the indigenous movement grew through the farmer union, its voice became amplified with that of the other labor unions that to support an anti-imperialist agenda in solidarity with the coca farmer.

Since the policies addressing racism in the country neglected to solve the problem of poverty that was prevalent among the indigenous population, this created an opportunity for cocalero leader, Evo Morales and his organization MAS to take the lead in addressing this concern. Initially formed as the MAS-IPSP, as part of the Political Instrument for the Sovereignty of the Peoples, and was not be considered a traditional party, but a political instrument of the social movements that form its eclectic base which includes: "campesinos, the landless movement, leftist lawyers, women's groups, some low-

13 INE (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas de Bolivia/UMPA) 2003. Bolivia: Características sociodemográficas de la población. La Paz.

14 García Linera, Álvaro, Marxa Chávez León, and Patricia Costas Monje (eds.) 2004 Sociología de los movimientos sociales de Bolivia. La Paz: Diakónia/Oxfam.

15 Stefanoni, Pablo. 2003. MAS-IPSP: La emergencia del nacionalismo plebeyo." *Observatorio Social de América Latina* 4 (12): 57–68.

16 2008 "Indianismo y Marxismo: el desencuentro de dos razones revolucionarios." Cuadernos CLACSO. <http://www.rebelion.org/noticias/2008/7/70232.pdf>.

land indigenous leaders...MAS does not have a defined ideological base, but a tactical flexibility,... extra-political sources of legitimacy, successful cross-sector alliances, emphasis on 'works' over 'ideas,' and the use of Andean cultural frames."¹⁷ According to Garcia and Linera (2004) this movement maintains its power through a moral authority and participant commitment to the cause.¹⁸ Evo Morales, through MAS and its ongoing coalition of trade unions, farmers, and indigenous populations, became the first indigenous President of Bolivia.


In 2005, Morales ran on a campaign slogan of "Somos pueblo, somos MAS" (We are the people, we are MAS [or more]). His platform addressed three primary components: 1) social inclusion by promising that the Bolivian state would be represented of the indigenous population 2) national sovereignty/dignity through the rejection of neoliberal capitalism; and 3) economic restructuring by reversing any neoliberal policies that had hurt the Bolivian economy. President Morales' platform has been referred to as indigenous nationalism.¹⁹ In 2009, every indigenous language from the country—current and extinct—became an official language.

The diagram below reflects the field of the MAS administration that is responsive to civil society at its core. However, although the once marginalized indigenous population is influential in the field, the Aymara are the most influential and represented. In addition, as a result of power shifting to benefitting the indigenous, there has been a growth in anger among the white-mestizo business class that now view themselves as marginalized with demands of regional autonomy, and youth from this group have perpetrated sporadic attacks on Andean migrants.

17 Albrow, R. 2006. Bolivia's "Evo phenomenon": from identity to what? *Journal of Latin American Anthropology* 11: 408–428.

18 García Linera, A. 2004. "The Multitude," 65–86 In, *Cochabamba! Water War in Bolivia*, edited by Oscar Olivera and Tom Lewis, 65–86. Boston: South End Press.

19 Stefanoni, Pablo 2003. "MAS-IPSP: La Emergencia del Nacionalismo Plebeyo ." *Observatorio Social de América Latina* 4 (12): 57-68



Thailand

Similar to the Government of Sudan, the Government of Thailand sought a united country, under one language, and for some, one religion as well. Like many countries, the region of Thailand's Deep South was annexed in the early twentieth century. In an effort to create a unified country, the government of Thailand instituted national policies of forced assimilation, especially regarding areas of cultural identity such as language and religion.²⁰

For several decades after the forced annexation, there were political uprisings and struggles for liberation against the Siamese rule. During much of this period there were government-led forced assimilation policies "that adversely affected all facets of Muslim identity and ethnicity, including matters of attire, bureaucratic administration, education, judicial settlements and revenue collection"²¹. During that period the region saw an emergence of Muslim separatist organizations with differing political agendas. Since then

20 Postero, N. 2010. "Morales' MAS Government, Latin American Perspectives", Issue 172, Vol. 37 No. 3, p. 29.

21 Ibid. pg. 207

the region continued to experience some level of armed struggle. The Thai government did make some attempts at integrating the religion of Islam into the Thai administrative structures through provincial Islamic councils. However, the Malay-Pattani did not see themselves adequately represented through this institution²². In 2004, the violence took on a new dimension in how it was deployed through a decentralized process in 2004 in response to the regime at that time which included the burning of schools and bomb attacks resulting in a martial law being imposed in the region.²³

In recent years the government attempted peace talks with individual groups. In 2015, five liberation groups formed MARA Patani as a vehicle for negotiations with the Thai government.²⁴ Many conflicts can be averted or solved by promoting an inclusive society; one that lifts up the voices of the marginalized and empowers them with the tools to flourish. Oftentimes conflicts foment and erupt as a result of specific populations experiencing social marginalization and political exclusion. Although most people who are socially marginalized do not perpetrate violent acts against humanity; for those who do, being excluded from the political process and/or relegated to the margins of society are cited as factors that influence the decisions of those who take that route.

To be socially marginalized means that a particular group does not have equal access to the same rights and privileges afforded to others in a society. It often means having fewer opportunities for economic advancement, and being socially stratified across other determinants that affect the quality of life, such as educational attainment, housing, police harassment, and lack of employment. In addition, groups of people who tend to be socially marginalized are often also under-represented in the political arena, and in the process of developing policies to improve their socio-economic conditions. Researchers have claimed that in the case of Thailand the Malay-Muslim and Malay-Pattani populations' conflict is one of "ethno-political legitimacy" and at times political will and lack of inclusivity have hampered the transformation to sustainable peace in Thailand's Deep South.²⁵

22 Che Man, W. K. 1990. *Muslim Separatism. The Moros of Southern Philippines and the Malays of Southern Thailand*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

23 Haberkorn, T. 2013. "Southern Thailand. Marginalization, Injustice and the Failure to Govern". In, *Diminishing Conflicts in Asia and the Pacific*, edited by E. Aspi-nall, R. Jeffrey, and A. J. Regan, 189–199. London, UK: Routledge.

24 Ibid. pg. 4

25 McCargo, D. 2012. *Mapping National Anxieties. Thailand's Southern Conflict*. Copenhagen,

In every conflict there are opportunities that can pave the way towards a resolution. As in many countries with internal conflicts, they are often the result of the unequal distribution of national wealth and resources. The consequence of development and economic investment occurring only in certain regions or benefitting specific populations perpetuate conflict” (Che Man 1990, 113; Diaz 2003, 44–45; Gutierrez 2000, 331)²⁶ Critical to sustainable solutions is the inclusion of marginalized voices, and strategies and examples are unique to the location as each country or region experiences different challenges, while support systems vary. Many governments struggle with engaging marginalized communities in meaningful ways. For example, in some countries where Muslims are a religious minority, they are under constant surveillance as a community because of violent activities perpetrated by a criminal minority groups within the country or in other parts of the world. The importance of not placing an entire demographic under scrutiny or surveillance cannot be overstated. When this happens, an intense effort in mutual engagement and trust-building between the government and target population needs to occur. And when this occurs, minority groups still may ask, “Can I trust the government or its representatives of having mutual respect and understanding, as we seek the common goal of reducing conflict and increase peace-building in our country?”

It is imperative that increasing opportunities for social and political inclusion of marginalized populations should be included in any plan for sustainable political transformation. However, decision makers will need to be mindful that this process will take some time as trust will need to be built between the excluded group(s) and the existing power structure. There needs to be a concerted effort to build trust with the national and local security entities and enhance partnership with the government, civil society, and private sector. It is also necessary to avoid often counter-productive approaches such as collective blame, and punishment, and ongoing profiling. The following are other examples from civil society organizations that reduce social marginalization and increase political inclusion. According to Rupprecht (2014)

Denmark: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies Press; Joll, C (2010). Religion and Conflict in Southern Thailand: Beyond Rounding Up the Usual Suspects Contemporary Southeast Asia Vol. 32, No. 2 (2010), pp. 258–79

26 Rupprecht, K. 2014. Separatist Conflicts in the ASEAN Region: Comparing Southern Thailand and Mindanao. ASEAS – Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies, 7(1), 21-40.

In Patani, for example, the centralized apparatus of Thai bureaucracy has brought about major political grievances for the local Muslims as they feel misunderstood and discriminated against by non-local Thai government officials who do not speak their language and originate from a different religious and cultural background.²⁷

Therefore, opportunities for shared understanding must be facilitated. Interfaith dialogue and action are beneficial promoting sustainable peace when religion may be a factor in the conflict. Celebrating a shared humanity will create allies who will support more inclusive programs and policies.

Reducing Social Marginalization: Inner-City Muslim Action Network

The Inner-City Muslim Action Network²⁸ located in the United States facilitates interfaith interaction in a “non-interfaith” environment through the organization’s CommUNITY Cafés and Takin It to the Streets: Urban International Festivals. IMAN’s CommUNITY Cafés are one of the few Muslim-led efforts in the United States that provide a space for people to collectively celebrate and engage in diverse and creative artistic expression.

Rupprecht (2014) further stated,

Efforts to install a more representative bureaucracy have failed because Patani-Malays that entered government service adapted to the bureaucratic culture and were often seen as “traitors” by their own communities.”²⁹

Increasing Political Inclusion: Muslim Public Affairs Council


An organization that promotes political inclusion of American Muslims in the United States is the Muslim Public Affairs Council whose mission is to “improve public understanding and policies that impact American Muslims by engaging our government, media and communities” established the Congressional Leadership Development Program, a fellowship program that places interns on Capitol Hill in the office of a member of Congress, where they learn to “...have access to mentors, a hands-on learning environment, and

27 Rupprecht, K. 2014. Separatist Conflicts in the ASEAN Region: Comparing Southern Thailand and Min-danao. ASEAS – Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies, 7(1), 21-40.

28 Inner-City Muslim Action Network, www.imancentral.org

29 Rupprecht, K. 2014. Separatist Conflicts in the ASEAN Region: Comparing Southern Thailand and Min-danao. ASEAS – Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies, 7(1), 21-40.

tap into a network of industry leaders who shape policy in our nation's capitol. Finally, it is important to stress that policy makers and law enforcement must ensure that efforts in peace-building and political transformation do not perpetuate a system of demonization or negative attitudes towards an entire group of people because a few members have committed acts of violence. The most sustainable methods in peaceful, political transformation are indirect, community-based, and community-driven. Grassroots partnerships between law enforcement and local communities are necessary in any initiative to support peace-building from a period of violent conflict. For example, recent changes to increase military authority in the southern region of Thailand could be an opportunity for civil society organizations to increase communication with the government, so that initiatives that seek to halt violence do not increase oppression.



Sustainable Peaceful Transformation Field

All of the factors in the orbit have a direct impact on the goal of sustainable peaceful transformation.

Areas for Further Research

Areas for ongoing research in the region include:

1. Ongoing assessment of the new security initiative.
2. Research and technical assistance to support further social inclusion of the Malay Pattani in all areas of society.
3. Continue to explore and expand examples of indigenous religious pluralism, such as those documented in the Songkhla Lake region in Thailand.³⁰

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30 Horstmann, A. 2011. Living together: The Transformation of Multi-religious Coexistence in Southern Thailand. *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, 42(3), pp 487–510

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Biography

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The Campaign of the Papua Peace Network (PPN) for Peace in Papua

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Abstract

This article describes how the Papua Peace Network (PPN) campaign for peace in Papua at the local and national level. This network was inspired by a series of studies conducted by the Indonesian Institute of Science (LIPI) that came up with the Papua Road Map in 2008. A Catholic priest of Jayapura and an LIPI researcher involved in the study initiated the PPN. This organization consists of trained facilitators from civil society elements to connect conflicted groups in West Papua, and to help both Papuan people and the Indonesian government preparing a Jakarta-Papua dialogue. At the local level, the PPN carried out several public consultations in seven cultural communities' regions in 2011. The results of these discussions, Papua Peace Indicators and dialogue as a method to end the conflict in West Papua, were brought to the Papua Peace Conference in the same year. However, the Indonesian government rejected the results of the proceedings due to participants of this conference being from a diaspora background representing the Papuan people. In 2013, the PPN approached the Indonesian government by conducting several explorative meetings that mediated between national government officers and West Papuan leaders. The meetings were held in Denpasar, Manado, Lombok, Yogyakarta, Semarang, Jakarta, and Bogor and discussed new peace indicators related to Papua. In the seventh meeting in Bogor, both parties agreed to declare Papua as a "peace land" and to end the military approach in resolving the West Papua conflict. The paper tries to argue that continuous communication between conflicted parties is necessary to create trust and mutual understanding. However, it is not a sufficient condition to make peace without a dialogue for reconciliation that is inclusive and representative.

Keywords: *Papua Peace Network, Papua peace land, reconciliation, and dialogue*

Introduction

Some ASEAN countries, in particularly Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines, have a problem of ethnic-based minority separatism. Indonesia resolved the case of East Timor in 1999 and Aceh in 2005 while the case of Papua is still ongoing. Thailand and the Philippines are still in the midst of peace processes with Muslim groups in the Southern parts of their countries. In the Philippines, the national government still engages in peace negotiations with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) which is mediated by Malaysia. In Thailand, the national government still works hard to implement peace policies to end the rebellion. To enhance political and economic stability in Southeast Asia, it is needed to learn how nation states could transform separatist conflict into peaceful relations between the national government and minority groups. Therefore, this article tries to offer some peaceful efforts conducted by a community to turn violent separatist conflict into peaceful relations through public consultations.

The relationship between Papuans and the Indonesian government has been consistently troubled since the integration of this region into the Indonesian state in 1963, based on the 1962 New York Agreement between Indonesia and the Netherlands. The conflict between Papua and Indonesia became more violent in the 1970s when the Free Papua Organization proclaimed the revolutionary government of West Papua. Since then, a series of political violence conducted by Indonesian military is ongoing until the present day although the level of intensity has lowered after the 1998 political reform. Political violence in West Papua is the longest separatist conflict in Indonesia's history compared to the Aceh conflict (1976-2005) and East Timor (1975-1999) (Heidbuchel 2007; Bhakti, Yanuarti & Nurhasim 2009; Sherlock, 2003; Wassel, 2014). Other problems in these regions are depopulation of Papua natives since the 1970s and the marginalization of Papua natives in socio-economic development. Although West Papua is incredibly rich in natural resources, this region is the poorest province in Indonesia. These unsolved problems result in an increase of distrust between the Indonesian government and the Papuans.

Some studies have been conducted to analyze the conflict in West Papua. One of the most quoted studies is the research by Widjojo et al. (2008) on the Papua Road Map. They identify four root problems of the Papuan conflict, namely: (1) the different standpoint of the Papuans and the Indonesian government in regard to the history of Papua integration, and the

political status of Papua, (2) the occurrence of political violence and human rights violations in Papua, (3) the unsuccessful regional development in Papua, and (4) the fact that marginalization and discrimination towards Papuans still exists until now. These findings are discussed widely in other studies conducted by Western Scholars, such as ICG (2010; 2012); King, Elmslie and Webb-Gannon (2011); Barber and Moiwend (2011), Macleod (2011), King (2011); Singh (2011); Drooglever (2010); and Anderson (2015). However, both the Papua Road Map and those studies have no focus on peaceful efforts and transformation. These studies emphasize analyzing the root of the Papuan conflict and how to resolve it using a structural and power relations approach. Unlike these studies, this paper highlights the peaceful efforts conducted by the Papua Peace Network (PPN) that mediate dialogue between the national government and Papuan leaders. Therefore, this article aims to describe PPN's efforts to promote a peaceful dialogue between the Papuan people and the national government of Indonesia in Papua.

The argument of this article is to bridge the gap of understanding between the national government and the Papuan people; an inclusive dialogue is needed as an approach to transforming the Papuan conflict from violence into peaceful negotiation. The differences in perspectives between Papua and Jakarta in understanding the root of the Papuan conflicts creates a significant distrust between both parties, thus making empathy difficult to grow. The lack of empathy complicates the implementations of permanent rule and regulations to implement peace in Papua. Dialogue is a mechanism involving all conflicting parties to identify the problem and find a peaceable solution together. The real dimension of efforts in resolving West Papua related issues exists in the community, including traditional conflict resolution mechanisms that represent the characteristics of Papuan culture (Elisabeth et al. 2005).

Conceptual Framework

This article uses three main concepts, namely conflict transformation, dialogue, and reconciliation that each relates to others. Conflict transformation is the grand idea that needs dialogue as pre-condition and approach to achieve it. The notion is that dialogue can only function as an instrument of conflict transformation if it is placed within the framework of reconciliation. Therefore, dialogue and reconciliation are close and related concepts. Finally, the goal of dialogue, reconciliation and conflict transformation is realizing a

positive peace, i.e. the absence of both physical and structural violence.

The notion of conflict transformation is different from conflict resolution and conflict management. Conflict resolution assumes that conflict should be resolved due to having destructive consequences to societies, while conflict management emphasizes that conflict can be managed because it cannot be resolved in a short time. According to Lederach, conflict transformation recognizes conflict as a phenomenon in everyday life or natural reality. Conflict results from social actors that are involved in a set of social relationships. If the players and their relationships can be transformed, the conflict also can be changed into a more peaceful condition. This is possible if we can transform conflict by using communication and institutional pattern that finally recreate the image of self and the other. The dangerous consequences of conflict can be transformed so that self-images, relationships, and social structures can be changed. Conflict transformation can only occur with mutual understanding and cooperation between disputing parties. Conflict transformation transforms the articulation of conflict from violent to the non-violent, from aggressiveness into cooperation, or from mutually destructive modes into dialogue and interdependence. These efforts can be realized through dialogue with people who support this method of transformation (Yevsyukova 1989).

According to Lederach (Barbanti 2005), issues that caused destructive conflict can be transformed into something constructive by changing the perspective of the conflict as something useful in social relations. The transformation of the conflict is the social processes of change of perspective towards constructive conflict like this. The amendment includes four dimensions, namely personal, relational, structural, and cultural aspects. First, the personal aspect is the change in cognitive, emotional, perceptual, and spiritual conflict as a result of experience. Transformation aims to liberate individuals from the destructive effects of social conflict. Second, the relational dimension targeting restoring interactions within a conflictual relationship. This is done by improving the sense of mutual understanding. Third, the structural aspect associated with the rules governing the relationship between individuals in society. This dimension also relates to a method of managing social relations, both economic and institutional, to meet basic human needs and provide access to the community, as well as mechanisms to promote non-violence in the face of conflict. Fourth, cultural dimensions to identify and understand the cultural patterns that can trigger violence as an expression of the conflict (Barbanti 2005). The four dimensions of conflict transformation require dialogue as the

first approach in building peaceful relations.

The term "dialogue" will be understood from a reconciliation point of view. Dialogue is the primary condition for all the reconciliation process between the two conflicted parties. Chaiwat Satha Anand argues that reconciliation consists of nine principles, namely: (1) opening the truth, (2) justice, (3) forgiving, (4) accountability, (5) dialogue, (6) peaceful way (Satha-Anand 2006).

Without an official statement to reveal the truth of troublesome past events, the establishment of reconciliation is nonsense. Events such as political violence and human rights violations were the results of the failure of policies or past acts made by the conflicting parties. By acknowledging this, the parties accept that their fallaciousness has inflicted pain on victims. Secondly, the statement of the truth has to be followed by a proper law process to achieve justice for all parties involved, including the victims. Without justice which is pursued by law, reconciliation is absurd. Furthermore, law enforcement for the reconciliation process has to be followed by the fulfillment of responsibilities. It means that the conflict actors have to pay the cost of their actions in accordance with the law. Fourth, after the punishment is established, victims of the violations have to forgive the perpetrators. The act of granting forgiveness is the most fundamental aspect of creating reconciliation when the whole process of law and justice has been established. Without forgiveness, hate will continue to breed and increase future possibilities of conflict. Fifth, reconciliation will be born when a proper dialogue between the actors and victims are held. A discussion will help decrease or better, even erase, all hate and distrust during the periods of conflict, and will also contribute to the emergence of trust. Sixth, a dialogue must be able to establish a peaceable conflict resolution mechanism, and a mutual commitment to resolve future conflicts in a peaceable way between the conflicting parties. Next, reconciliation involves giving space to record local history in a national frame. It means acknowledging past political autonomies and political identities of conflicted societies, especially minorities. Eighth, reconciliation will only be established if the government understands that conflict is not a result of an individual motive only, but of a structural failure. A structural failure indicates an unstable power relation between the central and local government. Finally, reconciliation involves a particular risk the violators should bear, such as an acknowledgment of past faults by the national government and military forces. Also, civilian victims have to acknowledge the punishment given and forgive the actors afterwards.

Kriesberg's (2001, 60) statement, therefore, corresponds with Satha-Anand's opinion, by arguing that reconciliation contains the following dimensions: (1) truth, in the sense of shared understanding, (2) the establishment of justice, (3) acknowledgments of past faults and the willingness to apologize, and (4) the safety of each group. The most important element of reconciliation as argued by Kriesberg is the effort each party offers regarding creating an acceptable new relationship between the conflicting parties. Therefore, reconciliation and resolution are two intimate terms, although they are individually distinguishable. Conflict resolutions will aim towards the birth of reconciliation if built on a mutual understanding of the transactional pain both parties suffer, and also forgiveness based on the settlement standpoint (Montville 1993). This concept can be established through a series of steps such as acknowledgment of the truth, paying compensation for the loss and acceptance of payment, asking for forgiveness and holding an emotional healing leading to peace (Kriesberg 1997; Miall et al. 2002, 334).

Aside from reconciliation, another important aspect of peacebuilding is trust. Ryan (1995, 242) defines confidence building as a set of ways which may give birth to an increase of a groups' self-confidence. This aspect is vital because conflict always leads to a mutual increase of distrust between disputing parties. Ryan (1995, 241) sets an example on the reformation of justice in North Ireland, as such reform would help to increase trust in the Catholic community. Similar to that, the government of Ireland's act of pulling back their claim towards North Ireland would contribute to raising trust in the Protestant community there. Hewstone explains that the groups' behavior in doing the things coordinated by their group is understood from the internal attribute perspective, while similar acts done by other groups is understood from the obvious attribute point of view (Ryan 1995, 242). The same goes for negative behavior done by opposing groups that generalize the group as a whole, while negative behavior done by their group is seen as a situational and an exception to the rule.

The next problem is locating reconciliation in the whole process of creating peace. Long-term reconciliation is the final destination of conflict management, which will result in real peace. Johan Galtung as "the nonexistence of structural violence" further defines the term "positive peace". This process can only come to life through a series of justice enforcement efforts (Muall, et al. 2002, 208). In this context, long-term reconciliation is the result of conflict transformation, which requires a justice enforcement processes. Without the fulfillments

of justice, reconciliation will just be a dream concept. It is important to note also that the process towards reconciliation is a reciprocal process between all conflicting parties (Jeong 2003: 193) and cannot be sought by a single party only.

Johan Galtung (2001: 3) and Louis Kriesberg (2001: 48) define reconciliation as a process to end the conflict and engage in trauma healing for both the victim and the actor. Kriesberg describes reconciliation as a process where the conflicted parties work together to establish a minimum friendship bond. Galtung argues that the process of reconciliation will unify the conflicted parties in a relationship based on peace and justice. Kriesberg defines reconciliation as a process where the conflicted parties work together to establish a minimum friendship bond. Other than reconciliation, justice, and peace, coexistence is also vital to establish. Coexistence, according to Kriesberg, is the accommodation done by different community members to live together without one community trampling on the other. Thus, coexistence is an agreement between the conflicted groups to pursue the process of peace in a parallel path. Passive coexistence, therefore, relates to negative peace and vice versa, active coexistence leads to real peace, or in other words, reconciliation. Failure in the process of reconciliation could very well end in destructive violence and distrust between groups.

Discussion

1. Political Problems in West Papua

The analysis made by the Papua research team of LIPI in 2004 emphasizes the large gap of understanding in the concept of nationalism between Indonesians and Papuans, which is defined as a political conception. For the Indonesian nationalists, Papua is a part of Indonesia, apart from the racial and cultural differences. Meanwhile, for the Papuan nationalists, the essence of Papua (ke-Papua-an) is based on the racial and cultural differences between Papuans and Indonesians, as Papuans mostly consist of the Melanesian race. To strengthen this racial argumentation, Papuan nationalists bring the political identity difference which is derived from international law and also Papua's history. To them, the determination procedure of Papua's political status in the Penentuan Pendapat Rakyat (Papua Referendum – PEPERA) in 1969 has been manipulated through an unfair representation of 1,025 Papuan representatives. As a result, the election does not represent the public opinion in Papua. Furthermore, in a Papuan nationalist perspective, the West Papua country

exists and has been declared since 1961.

From a different point of view, Chauvel (2005) argues that ke-Papua-an is built on colonial history, and is constructed as an anti-thesis of ke-Indonesia-an. According to Chauvel, Papua's nationalism is formed on four fundamental factors, which are: (1) the fact that a part of Papua shared the same historical disappointment when their land was integrated with Indonesia, (2) the Papuan elites sense a "competition" with the Indonesian government which has dominated the country since the Dutch invasion, (3) the economic and political growth of Papua which shows a sense of difference and lastly (4) the enormous number of non-Papuan natives, which increases the feeling of Papuans being marginalized. Correlating to Kelly and Kapal (2001), Chauvel also explains that Papuans feel intense hatred because they are seen as mere objects in decolonization without a chance to be participants, or in other words, having a decolonization but remaining colonized. According to Chauvel, the principle of self-determination that was underhandedly done in PEPERA became the centerpiece of the Papuan nationalism. There is consistency in the discourse that Papuans have continuously tried to establish a liberated country, which started by political manifestations in 1961 and continued at the international level by Nicholas Jouewe in the 1970s until the plea for independence in 1999 by Tom Beanal.

McGibbon (2006) argues that the growth of Papuan nationalism is influenced by the Dutch governments' promise to give independence to Papua. However, due to the Dutch's weak power, they refused to continue any further talks regarding Papua's independence. According to McGibbon, although Papuan elites have failed in declaring Papua's independence, the promise was a fundamental point that pushes contemporary Papuan nationalists to strive for freedom. The acceptance of the PEPERA results by the United Nations shows how the conflict resolution models regarding Papua's political situation was done through a Cold War model, meaning that the results were made without the consent of the Papuan elites. McGibbon furthermore explains that both Indonesian and Papuan nationalists have the same point of view in defining Indonesia's culture, which is done by excluding Papua. He insists that the real separatists, in this case, are Indonesian government officials who enforce policies that exclude Papuans.

Apart from Chauvel and McGibbons, Thorning and Kivimaki (2002) also analyze the basic Papuan conflict. According to them, the conflict is based on the construction of "Papua" created by Indonesian nationalists as a colonial

discourse to legitimate the presence of Indonesians in Papua. The stereotype planted by Indonesian nationalists shows a tendency to underestimate Papuans. As the research conducted LIPI on 2004 reports, the core problem of Papuan conflict lies in the perceptual difference in the construction of nationalism in Indonesia and Papua. Thorning and Kivimaki argue that regarding the political rights of Papuans as citizens of Indonesia, their cultural, economic and educational difference differs them from other Indonesians.

Thus, based on the narratives above, it is concluded that the interactive experience Papuans share during the Dutch colonization has led to a collective identity of Papuans, and also a linear understanding of their history. The term "Papua" at first was a political terminology constructed during colonization. The discourse about Papua's integration and political status by the Indonesian government is a political, colonial discourse. The history and political status of Papuans must be understood as a result of a long and painful political war between Indonesia and the Netherlands, in which the Papuans were not included. Moreover, tracing back the fact that the United States, in the attempt to limit the Soviet Union's power, showed their support in the integration between Papua and Indonesia in the past, the general narrative, which could be called the "history of Papua's integration" is dominated by the Indonesian nationalists, and leaves little or no more room for Papuans to express their thoughts. This leads to the conclusion of viewing Papua-nationalism as an anti-thesis of Indonesian nationalism.

Based on the research conducted by LIPI's Papuan research team, as an implication of the Indonesia's construction of nationalism, the efforts to maintain the unification of Indonesia has a parallel to the war against potential enemies. For the military-dominated Indonesian nationalists, the unified form of Indonesia is a must. Thus, the idea of separating oneself from Indonesia is viewed as a violation of the law. The concept of Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia (Unified Country of Indonesia, "NKRI" for short) is a hegemonic official text on verified nationalism, legitimized by military forces. The living example of this text occurred during Orde Baru (New Order), where military forces completely ruled Indonesia. As a result, during the New Order, what the military wanted is what the country wanted, and vice versa.

When the country's political policies failed to accommodate the needs of the people, the act of criticizing the state institution became just the same as criticizing military institutions. As a result, in the Papuan conflict, the wave of protests done by the Papuans against the state policies which exclude the

participation of Papuans was seen as an act of defiance. Apart from that, the separatist movements which were promoted by the Organisasi Papua Merdeka (Free Papua Organization, "OPM" for short) were regarded as a deviation against the Indonesian government. Although Indonesia has seen the last of the New Order, the military characteristics of Indonesia towards Papua, which is understood through centralism and violence, still remain.

The presence of the Indonesian government during the year 1962 in Papua marks a beginning of political violence. During 1962 and 1984 precisely, a "secret war" between the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Military, "TNI" for short) with the OPM occurred. Political violence was not a mere concept, but a real-life experience felt by all Papuans as a result of the strategy displayed by the Indonesian government to battle OPM. Indonesian representatives in Papua were mostly military and police officers. Indonesia, as an institution, exists in Papua as a military force.

Foucault (1977) believes that "governmentality," as an art to creating social welfare, does not exist in Papua. Indonesia, as a country, does not show any goodwill towards Papua, but rather shows itself as an oppressing power by using conventional means of violence. On a certain level, the acts done towards Papuans by the military and police officers can be seen as a dominating-dominated relationship between the invader and the invaded.

In the context of the Indonesian political state during the New Order, political violence was justified as a "holy job" done by the TNI to maintain NKRI's unification. Although the New Order regime ended in 1998, political violence still continues, even until now. After the fall of the New Order, there has been some political violence has experienced a change of form. Some of the changes include: (1) the military operations deployed to end separatism faced questions by NGOs and the church, directly creating a negative image of the TNI, (2) political struggles for Papua's independence took over by Papuan intellectuals and representatives of the church. However, (3) the experience of having endured political violence does not make the Indonesian government, let alone the TNI, change their strategy in dealing with separatism. Troops are repeatedly deployed to prevent separatism from happening. As a result, political violence has not decreased one bit, even after the reforms (an era emerging after the New Order). The experience felt by Papuans in reaction to the series of political violence against them created a collective memory of persecution. The term "memorial passionist" may be appropriate to explain the feelings of Papuans.

When analyzed in a deeper realm, the violence against Papuans has a sophisticated and comprehensive dimension. Not only involving physical violence, the violence includes psychological and also structural violence. In regard to the Papuan conflict, Theo van den Broek (2001), as cited by a report released by LIPI in 2005, identifies violence and human rights violation more specifically as forms of: (1) individual violence, (2) regional force, violence done towards people in a particular region, (3) psychological violence, (4) business activities, potentially violating human rights, and (5) structural violence involving the state's policies, potentially violating human rights.

During the Indonesian Reformation era, military forces were not the only representatives of Indonesia, both in Jakarta and Papua. Special autonomy became a new instrument for the government to accommodate the aspiration of Papuans. However, the character of political violence still existed and transformed into a structural violence, where Papuans remain the victims. The only difference is that during the New Order, Indonesia's military forces were seen as the actors of colonization, while at the moment Papuan elites are perceived to be the actors of colonization. Violent acts done by security officers, both during the New Order and Reformation, have not been adequately resolved. This is caused by the state's logic regarding NKRI and the national and military construction. Although human rights are listed and arranged in the national constitution and given a worthy place in the national political discourse, it is more of a meaningless symbol than a living reality. This leads to a discussion of human rights which are not seriously addressed by the NKRI. As such, the Papuan's aspirations to sue Indonesia for all past violations does not have a strong stance.

To end the Papuan conflict, the Indonesian government established UU 21/ 2001 regarding Otonomi Khusus Papua (Special Autonomy of Papua), which was expanded to UU 25/2008. Linear to the special autonomy, the national government deployed a series of steps, which includes: (1) developing regions/cities, which directly creates an increase of physical infrastructure projects and a surge of funds transfer from Jakarta to Papua (it is estimated that the number exceeds 45 trillion rupiahs since 2002), (2) the forming of UP4B (Unit Percepatan Pembangunan Provinsi Papua dan Papua Barat, the Presidential Office for Development in Papua) in 2011 to strengthen the coordination of the Papua development acceleration. However, the UP4B only focuses on quick win programs in the educational, health, local economy, and infrastructure development sectors. According to the majority of Papuans,

UP4B has yet to involve Papuans, especially in security and law enforcement issues. They also state that UP4B has not provided any protection towards the social, economy, and cultural rights of the native Papuans. In their perception, security policies and freedom of expression displayed by the government still uses repressive approaches. On top of that, violence still exists and is done not only by pro-independent movements but also by armed civilian groups and criminals.

Although the Indonesian government has allocated IDR 203.5 trillion to Papua between 2011 and 2015, the Papua issue is yet to be resolved (Swastono 2016). ELSAM (2015, 29) noted some political violence committed by Indonesian security forces in Papua and West Papua in 2012 and 2013. During 2012, there have been 139 acts of violence perpetrated by security forces against indigenous Papuans. As a result of such action, 40 civilians died, and 155 people were injured; 3 TNI members were killed, and ten were injured; three armed civilians were killed and two people were injured. Acts of violence in 2013 increased to 151 events and accompanied by an increase in the number of victims. In that year, as the result of political violence, 106 civilians died, and 220 people were injured; one policeman was killed, and ten policemen were injured, 13 members of the military were killed and five people injured; five armed civilians killed.

2. Establishment of Peace Papua Network (PPN)

Since the final quarter of 2008, LIPI's Papua research team has introduced the concept of the Papua Road Map, which involves dialogue between Jakarta and Papua. After the publication, the urge of dialogue was presented through a series of announcements in the national government, parliament, NGOs, religious institutions, and a list of international communities abroad. Among various ministries and institutions, the Indonesian Institute of Science (LIPI) assists the government in creating policies and programs that would be appropriate for Papua. In 2009, LIPI's Center for Political Research and the Vice President Official Secretariate initiated dialogues between the people of Papua and the central government by establishing the embryo of the Jaringan Damai Papua (Papua Peace Network, "PPN" for short) which is initially a joint venture with the Secretariate of Diocese of Jayapura (SKP). SKP held a peace conference in 2010, which concluded some indicators in creating peace in Papua. After that, LIPI had training dialogues for the native people of Papua in seven adat areas. Former participants then established the Peace Papua

Network (PPN) that works voluntarily to promote dialogue as well as facilitating the preliminary consolidation towards dialogue between the government and the customary inhabitants of Papua.

PPN is established to facilitate dialogue between the Indonesian government and the Papuans and stimulate communication between Papuans to conclude the Papuan conflict. This network was established by the head officer of the Papua research team of LIPI, who is also an editor and contributor to the book *Papua Road Map* (Jakarta, YOI, 2009), Dr. Muridan S. Widjojo, with a Catholic priest, the Director of Sekolah Tinggi Filsafat dan Teologi (High Education Institute of Philosophy and Theology, "STFT" for short) Fajar Timur Jayapura, Dr. Neles Tebay. PPN was established in February 2010 although the campaign for dialogue has been going on separately for years before the establishment.

On par to Dr. Muridan, Dr. Neles Tebay is also an author of the book *Dialog Jakarta-Papua* (SKP 2009) which received a warm welcome in the Papuan community. A series of discussions emerged, discussing the possibility of future Jakarta-Papua dialogues. Neles was present in debates and discussions about dialogue with not only intellectuals but also activists from various groups. The idea of initiating a dialogue spread quickly and received a positive response.

Trained facilitators from various civil societies, from lecturers to researchers, from higher education students to social institutions, from religious organizations to ethnic organizations and different strategic groups were gathered to be willing members of the PPN. Their primary task is to connect different elements and help Papuans and Indonesians in general to establish a Jakarta-Papua dialogue. Right now, there are around 30 listed facilitator leaders representing various institutions, both from Papua and non-Papua, from which around 30% of the members are women. Beyond that, PPN also has regional coordinators in different cities from which they have held several public consultations (JDP 2016). The members of JDP are some people who have idealism and individual goals, they work towards the "Papua Tanah Damai" (Peace in Papua) through dialogue. PPN enforces "Papua Tanah Damai" (Peace in Papua) as their primary work theme. This organization is not a social group, let alone an NGO. PPN is a network, created by the work of chosen individuals acting as a peace facilitator in Papua. Coming from diverse cultural, religious, and educational backgrounds, their participations in the JDP do not represent the opinion of any home institutions. If they wish to, members are welcomed to withdraw anytime. The only thing bonding them to PPN is their personal

commitment to voluntarily work for peace in Papua (Widjojo & Tebay 2010).

The primary task tackled by PPN is to facilitate the process of synchronization about Papua Tanah Damai for settlers in the land of Papua. After the establishment of PPN in 2010, it has actively promoted the concept through a series of public consultations, both inside and outside Papua. It is noted that PPN has succeeded in holding public meetings in 19 cities in Papua. The meeting also involved representatives of foreign settlers in 6 cities in Papua, held by Aliansi Demokrasi untuk Papua (Democratic Alliance for Papua) under the coordination of Latifah Anum Siregar, S.H., a member of PPN. In every public consultation, the public representatives were given an understanding of the concept of dialogue and were asked to give their opinions and hopes for future dialogues.

PPN also held seminars for higher education students, academicians, and women to engage with Papuans thoroughly. The Catholic Church in Papua took the initiative to break down the indicators of Papua Tanah Damai through a workshop. The triple signs of Papua Tanah Damai were discussed and enriched through the Papua Tanah Damai workshop held on June 12 – 14, 2011 in Jayapura. The workshops brought all PPN members, researchers and experts in related fields and also representatives from various religious organizations in Jayapura. Following the series of public consultations and workshops, the Papua Peace Conference was successfully held on July 2011. All participants agreed with the declaration that “dialogue is the best way to conclude the Papua conflict.”

The Papua Peace Conference (KPP) was hosted by JDP July 2011 at Cendrawasih University in Jayapura. The event was attended by representatives of the region, the Central Government, indigenous representatives, and academics. Among these are Menkopolhukam RI, the Governor of Papua, Papua Police Chief, Panglima Kodam 17 Cenderawasih (Military Commander 17 Cenderawasih), Bishop of the Diocese Jayapura, Chairman of the Muslim Council of Papua, Chairman of the Synod communion Baptist Churches in Papua and Chairman of Dewan Adat Papua / Papua Traditional Council(DAP) (JDP 2011). The conference participants were selected through some public consultations held by the JDP. Members of the conference can be said to represent the aspirations of the mainstream of indigenous Papuans. It is indicated by the presence of traditional and religious leaders, the Papuan Presidium Council, which is known to be critical of government policies. The result of the conference was Papua peace indicators in politics, security, law and human

rights, social, cultural, economic and environmental. Besides, KPP also chose negotiators who represent the people of Papua to engage in dialogue with the Government of Indonesia. They are Rumakiek Rex, John Ondawame, Leoni Tanggahma, Octo Motte and Benny Wenda. Those five persons are Papuan diaspora leaders in some countries: Australia, Vanuatu, the Netherlands, USA, and UK.

Reading the declaration of the Papua Peace Conference that contains the name of those five negotiators finally got good responses from some of the KPP participants, the Government of Indonesia and Foreign Affairs. Some representatives of the Indonesian government, however, were struck by reading the names, and since then, the confidence of the JDP government and the work of the dialogue has been reduced. This incident is an unplanned occurrence, suddenly emerging spontaneously from the conference participants so that the committee can not be prevented because the pressure of the members was very enthusiastic. Then trust in the government to JDP and the work of the dialogue began to wane. However, based on experience during the decades in which the opinions of Papua were always silenced, now they are always trying to express a view on every occasion.

3. JDP Campaign through exploratory meetings

Based on the initiatives of the Sekretariat Wakil Presiden (Vice President Secretariat, "Setwapres" for short), Pusat Penelitian Politik Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia (Indonesian Institute of Science's Political Research Center, "P2P LIPI" for short) in coordination with PPN have held a series of explorative meetings. The meetings took place six times in six different cities, namely Denpasar, Manado, Lombok, Yogyakarta, Semarang and Jakarta, and were attended by civil society representatives and also the Indonesian and Papuan government. The local governor of North Sulawesi, Yogyakarta, and Central Java attended and opened three out of six meetings.

The explorative meetings were held to build effective communication and identify the root of the Jakarta-Papua conflict. The meetings were vital to bridge the gap of understanding between the Indonesian government and Papuans. In a meeting in Lombok, the Papua Tanah Damai indicators were discussed thoroughly, which resulted in an action plan and future meetings scheduled to be held in Yogyakarta and Semarang. All processes were done under the ruling of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.

Since 2013, the LIPI team has sought to initiate meetings that bring together leaders from Papua and Jakarta. The meeting between the two sides started with the First Explorative meeting held in Bali in February 2013. The meeting is supported by the Secretary of the Vice President of Indonesia and was attended by 26 representatives of ministries and agencies in Jakarta as well as representatives from Papua. Mayor Jenderal TNI (Purn.) Sudrajat, acted as a facilitator in this meeting. This explorative meeting to discuss issues that can help the parties to create a shared vision that is acceptable to all stakeholders for the future of Papua and to build mutual trust between participants representing various stakeholders from Jakarta and Papua. The first explorative meeting was very tense. Each representative from both ministries and agencies of Jakarta and Papua were still suspicious of each other. Nevertheless, this session is an excellent opportunity to bring the two warring factions. At the end of the meeting, all participants agreed to meet again in the next explorative meeting.

The second explorative meeting was held in Manado in April 2013. As previously explorative meetings, this meeting also aims to build confidence and understanding of the problems in Papua, as well as the search for a solution acceptable to all parties. Discussions on this second explorative meeting specifically focused on three aspects: the socio-cultural issue, economy, and political and security laws. In this session, the government has committed to providing a solution to the problem of political conflicts, security, socio-economic and other development aspects, although the government also has obstacles in the coordination and implementation of the program. The Government also emphasized that they would have discussions with various interest groups in Papua, including Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM).

In August 2013 a meeting was held back in the third explorative in Lombok. At this third session, participants began to be divided into three different groups, namely politic, legal, and security (Polhukam) teams, social, economic team and socio-cultural teams following the educational background and their professions. The result of the meeting is Papua Peace Indicators which are divided into three groups as described above. In addition, the meeting also produced two strategies, namely the short-term strategy refers to the process of lobbying to the Ministry and Government agencies in order to create a breakthrough on the issue of Papua at the end of the government of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and long-term strategies and

advice that can be followed up by the Government after Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.

Furthermore, the fourth explorative meeting was held in January 2014 in Yogyakarta. Governor of DIY was opened and supported this session, and advised the Government of Indonesia to acknowledge the issue of West Papua as a political issue. The opening of the office Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM) in the UK and the sympathy of the international non-governmental organizations is evidence of the problems in Papua. Governor of DIY encourages the Indonesian Government to consider wisely dialogue with Papua in 2014 and also warned that dialogue could not happen if both sides remain adamant in their views to others.

The fifth explorative meeting held in September 2014 in Semarang and was opened by the Governor of Central Java. The event was attended by almost all participants in the meeting of Jakarta and Papua and local government officials. The governor supported this explorative meeting and stated that Papua is an integral part of Indonesia. The meeting is expected to be a new approach to building a stability and peaceful Papua through a dialogical approach towards reconciliation. The meeting was attended by about 41 participants from Jakarta and Papua, including representatives of the ministries and agencies to implement policies and programs in Papua following their respective responsibilities. This meeting resulted in a policy paper submitted directly to the President Joko Widodo on September 16, 2014.

Based on the policy paper presented by JDP, President Joko Widodo carried out some policies to increase the confidence of the people of Papua to the government, namely the liberation of political prisoners / detainees and providing access to foreign journalists to Papua. In May 2015, the President granted clemency to the five political prisoners in Papua: Apotnalogolik Lokobal (20 years' imprisonment), Numbunga Telenggen (lifetime), Kimanus Wenda (19 years' imprisonment), Linus Hiluka (19 years' imprisonment) and Jefrai Murib (lifetime). These five political prisoners were convicted of arsenal burglary Kodim 1710 / Wamena in 2003. This effort is the first step to building Papua with the approach of peace and prosperity. Granting clemency can be interpreted as a reconciliation policy to realize peace in Papua. Also, the provision of the widest access for foreign journalists to Papua is evidence of press freedom prevailing throughout Indonesia and in the absence of discrimination against Papuans. However, the reality of political institutions and

security does not fully support this policy, for example, they only allow foreign journalists who are not discredited by the Indonesian government.

In February 2015, the sixth explorative meeting held in Jakarta, attended by Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs (Kemenko Polhukam) and the Minister of Women's Empowerment. Kemenko Polhukam claimed to have a strategy of development in Papua and West Papua Provinces using a welfare approach. The presence of two ministers in the exploratory event showed high appreciation of the JDP government. It was productive at building the trust of Papuan representative because they believe that this forum can become a place for their aspirations. Furthermore, the seventh explorative meeting in November 2015 in Bogor, to discuss the urgency of the cessation of violence in Papua and Papua externalization issues. The meeting discussed the root causes of the political, legal, security and human rights (HAM) in Papua. It also considered the feedback from participants and speaker to realize Papua Peace. The focus of this meeting to anticipate the potential for political violence ahead of the elections simultaneously on December 9, 2015.

4. The results of the exploratory meetings

Based on the results of explorative meetings, PPN formulates 14 problems faced by Papuans. These issues are: (1) vertical conflicts include stigmatizing separatists, banning the use of regional symbols, violence committed by the TNI / Polri and armed groups, and to conflicts of Indonesian nationalism versus Papuan ethnonationalism, (2) political violence in local elections; division and corruption, (3) government policy inconsistent with its implementation less attention to local values, (4) the obstacles to the implementation of good governance, (5) the policy on state security and not on human security, (6) disharmonious implementation of modern economy and traditional as well as the rights of indigenous peoples to the natural resources that are not protected, (7) limited and uneven qualified teaching staff and infrastructure of education, and have not accommodated the cultural values of Papua in the school curriculum, (8) limited prevalence of qualified health personnel, limited health infrastructure quality, little community nutrition, high mortality rate of pregnant women and children, and high levels of Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) (TKP LIPI & JDP 2015, 3-4).

The exploratory meeting participants from Papua responded to the problem of stigmatization separatism, the use of symbols of Papuan culture, and violence in Puncak Jaya where the number of TNI and OPM were involved

in armed conflict. Another topic is the number of policies and regulations for Papua, but the people of Papua looked just a little bit of policies and regulations that have been implemented, such as UU No. 1/2001 on the Papua Special Autonomy likely to fail implemented. On that occasion, the Government said that has committed to provide a solution to the problem of political conflicts, security, socio-economic and other development aspects, although the government also has obstacles in the coordination and implementation of the program. The Government also emphasized that they will discuss with various interest groups in Papua, including Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM).

Security problems, law, and politics became a sensitive issue in the exploratory meeting. Some questions that need to be answered related to the safety aspects, law, politics, not just the problem of development in Papua. There are still different points of view on the roots of the problem, and the problem in Papua is based on a certain reality, namely nationalism Indonesian and Papuan nationalism. Also, there are different perceptions regarding restrictions on access to Papua especially for foreign journalists. The challenge is to find a new management method in Papua but remain within the framework of NKRI. Approaches in the fields of politics and security, among others, to build a common understanding of the root causes of Papua; accommodation Papua customary law into national law; briefing on the security forces to be assigned to Papua; and the settlement of the problem of human rights violations.

The socio-economic problems in Papua are getting a lot of attention from the participants in the dialogue, such as the need to improve coordination and synergies, enhance the quality of the management of natural resources, community empowerment, and Papua resource management by involving local government, communities and enterprises; and build infrastructure, especially for education and health services. In the sector of teaching services, it is recommended to create a specialized curriculum in Papua taken into remote areas considering the inability of some ethnic groups to communicate in Indonesian and given the fact that education levels are low compared to other provinces. Another recommendation is to open a boarding school in difficult to access areas, but there are fears that such boarding schools would be reserved for certain ethnic groups, which in turn would encourage or strengthen primordialism. In the health care sector it is recommended to do the following: improving health care and to combine traditional and modern

health care to remote communities in Papua. While the economic sector needs support for greater recognition of the land and ownership rights.

Social and cultural problems in Papua which were also discussed in the exploratory meeting are primarily problems of education. The focus of the discussion was on the need to view culture as a totality and for Papua to be a determinant factor in governance and social life. Another issue is the need to use local languages and dialects as part of the curriculum. Another thing discussed included customary land and customary rights over customary land mapping and organizing and setting back the Papua Traditional Council (DAP) (LIPI and JDP, 2015).

The results of exploratory meetings are limited to discourse on a personal level, namely the Indonesian government officials as well as leaders of Papua. The government delegation in the explorative meeting, in reality, do not have authority when they return to their institutions. It is caused by strong ideology in ministries and militaristic politics and law in Indonesia, which is a legacy of the authoritarian New Order regime. The political situation in Papua shows that the escalation of political violence committed by the military and police against the Papuans still occurs. Increasing violence in Papua plagues the government's commitment to the peaceful settlement of the Papua conflict. This force ranges from kidnappings, shootings, arrests, killings by state officials or by civilians in various regions of Papua and West Papua. Escalation of violence in Papua tends to increase with the internationalization of the issue of Papua.

Another problem is the increasingly smaller space for Papuan political expression. Freedom of speech is guaranteed by the UUD 1945, but has been reduced by the police in Papua since 2012. It can be seen in the fact that peaceful demonstrations conducted by the West Papua National Committee (KNPB) were dissolved, and its leaders have always been fined or arrested. The demand for the right to self-determination for indigenous Papuans by KNPB should not be taken with the approach of law and security, but should be responded with a dialogical approach. There is increasing security crackdown on demonstrations by the KNPB while there is growing campaign for independence abroad carried out by diaspora political movement in Papua. In fact, the security forces overreacted when they arrested the Catholic priest during a demonstration demanding a resolution of the Paniai case.

In December 2014, all Papuan liberation organizations, namely the West Papua National Coalition Liberation (WPNCL), National Parlement of West

Papua (NPWP), West Papua Federal Republic State, united in Vanuatu under the United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP). In June 2015, the ULMWP was accepted as an observer in Melanesian Spearhead Group, a cooperative organization of Melanesian states in the Pacific. However, the Indonesian government also established Melanesia-Indonesia (Melindo), which is represented by five provinces (Papua, West Papua, Maluku, North Maluku and East Nusa Tenggara), which was also included in MSG as an associate member. The ULMWP is more popular than Melindo in Papua, getting a stronghold in all districts and cities in the region. The works of PPN, therefore, are still needed to consolidate Papuans and to prepare the dialogue between Papuans and the Indonesian government. In such a dialogue, Papuan people may be represented by the ULMWP.

Conclusion

Based on the descriptions above, it is concluded that PPN has significantly contributed to building peace in Papua through campaigning for national dialogue between the Papuan natives and the Indonesian government. The campaign was done through a series of public consultations with Papuan natives and foreign inhabitants, holding a series of workshops with local Papuan communities, holding the Papua Peace Conference and a number of informal meetings between the Indonesian government and representatives of Papua natives. As a result, the idea of opening a national dialogue has been widely accepted both by Papuan natives and foreign inhabitants. The Indonesian government has also acknowledged the concept of holding a dialogue, although there is a slight difference of understanding, whereas the dialogue is seen as an effort to increase welfare in Papua.

In the peacemaking efforts, civilians have been involved, both in direct and indirect means. The first effort to include civilians was made by inviting them to express their hopes and problems regarding the peace-making mechanism in Papua. The second step was to encourage them to voice their aspirations indirectly by writing a letter, sent through several mailboxes placed in the local churches and institutions. The idea of opening a dialogue to settle the Papuan conflict received positive responses by both parties due to the belief that "dialogue will not kill anyone." However, it was also acknowledged that the people who died during the conflicted times were not able to attend the dialogue. Dialogue is one of the preconditions for reconciliation and peace

in Papua. In the future, the talks concerning the question of Papua-Indonesia integration should be conducted in peaceable ways. The security approach is unacceptable for international communities, hence, will not contribute to peace-building and maintaining national integration, but vice versa, shall lead Papuans away from Indonesia.

This study contributes to the field of Papuan studies by showing that continuous communication between conflicted parties is not enough without an inclusive dialogue for reconciliation. Several exploratory meetings between the national government officers and Papuan leaders have not manifested in a dialogue for reconciliation between the national government and rebel organizations represented by the United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP). As a consequence, political violence and marginalization against Papuans still continues as does the exploitation of natural resources. Here, without dialogue, reconciliation between the conflicted parties has barely begun to be implemented. Therefore, conflict transformation is still far from reality, and the future of Papua in the Indonesian state remains fragile.

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Violence Monitoring and Political Economy

Can Chinese Investments Pacify Conflicts— A Case Study of Tasang (Mong Ton/Mai Dong) Dam, Myanmar

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Abstract

This paper examines the relationship between development and peace in the Shan State of Myanmar, where Chinese investors are planning the building of the controversial Tasang Dam. The proposed dam site is an area that has suffered increasing militarization and constant conflicts among the Shan State Army-South/Restoration Council of Shan State (SSA-S/RCSS), the Myanmar military and other ethnic armed organizations. Despite a ceasefire agreement that was signed between rival parties, clashes continue. Currently the Tatmadaw, which has close ties with Chinese government, controls important political and economic institutions in Myanmar. The rents brought by the Tasang Dam project are almost solely enjoyed by the Tatmadaw and its investors.

This paper seeks to discuss if Chinese investments under the context of the “New Silk Road Project” (or “One Belt, One Road”) which wishes to pacify conflicts by means of economic development can in fact do so in southern Shan State, Myanmar. By examining the Tasang Dam project in southern Shan State and analyzing the institutions under the analytical framework of “limited access orders” introduced by Douglass C. North et al. in 2013, I suggest that without transparent institutions that involve all stakeholders and more equal distribution of the rents, Chinese investments will not be able to pacify conflicts in northern Myanmar. China has the potential to mediate the conflicts in Shan State. However, by doing so, China’s authoritarian political attitudes may undermine Myanmar’s civil society.

Keywords, *Tasang (Mong Ton/Mai Dong) Dam, limited access orders, Chinese investments, conflicts, institutional transition, Shan State, Myanmar, peacebuilding.*

Introduction

This research aims to examine to what extent Chinese investments affect the peace process in Myanmar. It looks into Chinese investments particularly because China has been an influential partner of Myanmar since the late 1980s (Ganesan 2011; Haacke 2010; Lintner 1996, 433-4). In 2011 China became the largest foreign investor in Myanmar (Bissinger 2012, 23) and for China, Myanmar plays an important role in its geopolitical strategy (Li et al. 2015; Tsai 2004; Yu 2015). China has also had close business cooperation with the ethnic government of Shan State since the 2000s (Woods 2011). Having close connections with both the Myanmar government and the ethnic state, China's influence in this region is not to be neglected.

The first official agreement of the construction of Tasang Dam was signed by MDX groups and the Myanmar government in 2002 (Sapawa 2006, 5). China's Three Gorges Corporation¹ and Thailand's EGAT International Co., Ltd. are joint investors. The planning started in 1996 and since then the area has been under continuous threats from increasing militarization and constant conflicts between the Shan armed group, Shan State Army-South/Restoration Council of Shan State (SSA-S/RCSS) and the Myanmar army (known as the Tatmadaw) (Sapawa 2006; Salween Watch 2013).

SSA-S/RCSS and the Tatmadaw started peace talks and SSA-S/RCSS signed the ceasefire agreement in 2011 but it has not stopped clashes in the area² (Myanmar Peace Monitor 2013, 6). The clashes in the area do not only involve SSA-S/RCSS and the Tatmadaw but also the UWSA (United Wa State Army) (Myanmar Peace Monitor 2013, 6) and the Palaung State Liberation Front/Ta'ang National Liberation Army (PSLF/TNLA) (Wansai 2016).

The New Silk Road project is noted as the largest economic development scheme since that of the post-WWII US Marshall Plan (Wang 2016). The

1 Three Gorges Corporation is one of the representative enterprises that carry out the fore-mentioned policies. Up to 2014, Three Gorges Corporation has established its branches and constructed hydropower plants in nearly 20 countries in the "New Silk Road" region (Hu 2015, 39). Three Gorges Corporation takes the New Silk Road project as the guideline for its "Going Out" strategy and has implemented it well (ibid.). Therefore Three Gorges Corporation's investments in Tasang Dam can provide a direct insight into how Chinese investments under the context of "Going Out" and "New Silk Road" policies act in a conflict zone.

2 In 2014 SSA-S/RCSS claimed that they had 21 clashes (Burma News International 2015,, 10-12).

spirit of the New Silk Road project is “peace and cooperation, openness and inclusiveness, mutual learning and mutual benefit” (PRC 2015). The expected outcome of the project, is to bring development and prosperity to the regions along “One Belt, One Road” through cooperation based on inclusion, trust and respect to create a win-win situation for both the investor and the invested countries (ibid.).

China spreads its soft power in conflict regions by providing investments³ which can help boost economies and hopefully pacify conflicts at the same time (Wang 2016). Myanmar authorities have expressed their optimism about the peace and prosperity that the New Silk Road project will bring into the region (Yu 2015, 33).

Despite China and Myanmar’s wishes to pacify the conflicts with economic development in the conflict zones, evidence shows that Chinese investments in Myanmar have done otherwise⁴. The development projects Chinese businesses invest in provide the Tatmadaw incentive to ‘secure’ ethnic territory with the use of force (ibid.). Many contend that the Tatmadaw has used the government’s transition as a guise to circumvent international sanctions rather than make a genuine attempt for institutional transition (Wagley 2015, 2).

In the Tasang Dam case, the main actors in the conflicts are the SSA-S/RCSS and the Tatmadaw. There are also Chinese government, Chinese investors, local villagers, civil society organizations and the U.S. To understand how foreign direct investments (FDIs) affect peace processes in the case of Tasang Dam, the research will focus on analyzing the conflict events, the ceasefire negotiations between SSA-S/RCSS and the Tatmadaw, the 2008 Constitution, and relevant institutions in Myanmar.

Limited Access Orders

Researchers have developed various theories to explain why conflicts are repeated. One of them is the correlation between security and development, which is known as the security-development nexus. Such discussion focuses

3 Chinese investments focus on natural resources, transportation, infrastructure to a great extent due to China’s geopolitical strategic needs and energy hunger (Cheng and Lin 2008; Wansai 2016)

4 Chinese investments in Kachin State provided EAOs funds and electricity, instigating greater conflicts throughout the region (Smith 2015). The conflicts between SSA-S/RCSS and TNLA which occur along the area in Shan State where the Chinese invested gas and oil pipelines run are seen as competition for the exertion of control and influence in the area (Wansai 2016).

on “how conflicts can be prevented through greater focus on development” (Amer, Swain, and Öjendal 2012, 1). It is based on how security and development affect and interact with each other and on governments’ policy making. The World Development Report of 2011 suggests that to break the conflict cycles, it is essential to establish strong legitimate institutions and governance to ensure citizen security, justice and jobs (World Bank 2011, 2). Creating a trusted institution able to provide popular satisfaction with outcomes such as employment and improved living standards is important to break the cycles of repeated violence (North et al. 2013, 3).

However, in developing countries, it is not always easy to improve institutions and rule of law in order to provide good governance necessary to break the conflict circle. Douglass C. North et al. (2013) take the discussion to another level with their concept of “limited access orders” (LAOs) which describes the dynamics between power structure and “rents” of organizations. LAOs are political and economic arrangements in a society that discourage violence by means of organization. LAOs are a way developing societies organize themselves and function instead of indication them as “flawed or incomplete” societies (North et al. 2013). Developing societies are organized in a sense that powerful individuals and groups find refraining violence more favorable to their interests because the political system creates rents for the powerful by manipulating economic interests (North et al. 2013, 3).

As long as the “rents” generated from peacemaking exceed those they can earn from violence, organization leaders will choose to maintain peace (North et al. 2013, 4) and thus the rent creation can limit violence and make the behavior of powerful members in the coalition predictable (North et al. 2013, 3).

The spectrum of LAOs demonstrates the probability to violence derived from different interactions between political and economic organizations in societies. Myanmar is categorized as a basic LAO where there is a relatively well established government with nongovernmental organizations existing in the dominant coalition (North et al. 2013, 11-14). Basic LAOs create a more stable government organization structure compared to fragile LAOs. LAOs are not static and therefore societies can progress into better LAOs and even become open access orders but it is also possible that a society regresses to a worse LAO (North et al. 2013, 13-4). The LAOs framework does not criticize the political systems in developing societies i.e. that the social and political development of an LAO is not the main focus of the LAOs discussions.

Tasang (Mong Ton/Mai Dong) Dam

Tasang Dam (or Mong Ton/Mai Dong Dam), once built, will be the highest hydropower dam in Southeast Asia (Sapawa 2006, 5) with an installed capacity of 7000MW, generating 34.7 billion kW•h of energy annually (China Three Gorges Group Corporation 2013).

The planning for the dam started in 1996. The dam was to be constructed on Salween River in southern Shan State between Mong Pan and Mong Ton Townships, an area which has been suffering increasing militarization and constant conflicts (Sapawa 2006; Salween Watch 2013). Clashes continued even after the ceasefire agreement was signed between the rival parties (Myanmar Peace Monitor 2013, 6).

The project was launched in 2007 before obtaining a permit, but the construction was limited due to continuous armed conflicts and protests from locals. As former constructors failed to build the dam at the original site, the dam was shifted to Mai Tong a place closer to Mong Ton Township (Salween Watch Coalition 2016, 10; Salween Watch 2013), hence the ambiguity with the project name⁵. Three Gorge Corporation is the leading party of the Chinese consortium that signed a memorandum of understanding with the Thai company EGAT and the Myanmar company IGOEC in 2011 (China Three Gorges Corporation 2013). The project was resumed in 2012 after a ceasefire agreement was signed (Myanmar Peace Monitor 2013, 46-7). The Ministry of Electricity of Myanmar approved the permission to build Tasang Dam in 2014 (Shi 2014).

Due to local opposition and the lack of permission from the United Wa State Army (UWSA) to enter certain areas, the environmental impact assessment (EIA) done by the Australian consultant company, Snowy Mountains Engineering Corporation (SMEC), is considered incomplete by some NGOs (Salween Watch Coalition 2016; Mizzima 2015).

After nearly five decades of military rule, the military has control over all sectors of the country's economy (Myanmar Peace Monitor 2013, 14). After 1988 when the SLORC/SPDC regime took over power, in order to do businesses in Myanmar, foreign companies have to work with the military and their conglomerates, Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC) and the Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings, Ltd. (UMEHL) or local cronies without the

5 After the shift of the dam site, there are a few more investors joining in the project, China Southern Power Grid (CSG), Power Construction of China (Sinohydro) and International Group of Entrepreneurs Co. Ltd (IGOEC).

involvement of local ethnic armed organizations (ibid.).

In the Tasang Dam case, Chinese companies work directly with the Myanmar government which is responsible for providing the land. A Chinese author claims that Chinese investors usually have budgets for compensations to the locals, but instead of dealing the compensation directly, the Myanmar government receives the money and it is common that the money never reaches the locals (Ji 2015).

The Tatmadaw strengthened the militarization around the dam site after the abduction of four Chinese dam technicians in 2011 in order to improve the security of project personnel (Hui et al. 2012, 15; Ji 2015; Salween Watch 2013). Some locals think that the dam project will intensify conflicts between the Tatmadaw and the local ethnic armed organizations (EAOs)⁶ (Ji 2015).

The Chinese companies' investment policy is in favor of the military junta. Usually the serious environmental impacts causes increasing grievances from the locals (Li et al. 2015, 575; Yu 2015, 33). Villagers have suffered displacement, forced labor, pollution, deforestation, and human rights violations during armed conflicts (Hui et al. 2012, 16; Salween Watch 2013; Sapawa 2006). According to Salween Watch (2013), villagers were not informed about the dam project. Transparency of information is missing in the project⁷.

After a conference on Salween dam projects in September 2014, civil society organizations, scholars, and government officials issued a statement, stating that the projects should include local residents in the decision making processes, the government and investors should ensure the equality and transparency of the project's policies, and a social and environmental impact assessment is necessary (Shi 2014). However, protests from locals and civil society organizations continue in 2015 and the reasons of the opposition include the environmental and social impacts brought by the dam, forced displacement of the locals, and the destruction of historical heritage at the dam site (Ji 2015).

6 During the project planning period, the Myanmar government increased militarization in the neighboring area causing fatalities, sexual assaults, fear, forced labor and human rights violations to local villagers (Sapawa 2006, 13). At least 300,000 people were displaced during the 1990s due to this project and many of these people have not been able to return to their homes (Salween Watch Coalition 2016, 11).

7 The same problem is recorded in another report made by Sapawain (2006) which demonstrates the continuous local opposition the project faces.

The Role of NGOs and Opposition of the Dam Project

Serious opposition can lead to suspension of projects such as these. A recent example is the Myitsone Dam in Kachin State⁸. Some Chinese scholars consider local oppositions as the result of Myanmar's ethnic conflicts as well as the manipulation of the U.S. seeking to restrict China's influence in Myanmar (Hui et al. 2012, 17; Yu 2015, 32). Local protests are manipulation by "mass movement activists" who are not satisfied with the Myanmar government, this logic goes. Since the government fails to provide good governance and distribute the profits and benefits of development projects, local EAOs would also manipulate locals to protest (Ji 2015; Yu 2016, 38). The Myanmar government is the ultimate target of the protests instead of Chinese investments (Ji 2015; Yu 2016, 39).

In some Chinese scholars' view, the U.S. develops NGOs in Myanmar in order to strengthen its influence at the grassroots level as a way to hinder China's projects which would eventually lead to the greater modernization of China, hence become a threat to the U.S. (Li et al. 2015). It is supposed that the U.S. sustains the conflicts in northern Myanmar and at the same time develop NGOs in the region to contain China's power (ibid.). Other Chinese scholars suggest that the NDL and opposition parties work closely with NGOs which are supported by Western countries that wish to accelerate the democratization of Myanmar in order to improve their relations with the West; at the same time the Myanmar government uses NGOs as a bridge to the West, which competes with China and is willing to strengthen its influence in the region (Hui et al. 2012, 17).

China became more aware of the risks and the increasing resentment towards China in Myanmar. Chinese scholars suggested that future Chinese investments should enter sectors that directly benefit and involve the locals to improve China's public image in Myanmar (Li et al. 2015, 575-6). They also suggest that to improve China's popularity, China should improve communication about the investments and integrate better in the Myanmar society by interacting with NGOs, business investments and locals of Chinese ethnicity (Li et al. 2015, 576).

⁸ Myitsone dam is one of the dam projects that China has invested in Myanmar. The dam project encountered fierce opposition from the locals and thus was suspended in 2011, resulting in reductions of Chinese investments in Myanmar in the following three years (Ji 2015). The suspension of the Myitsone dam has been seen by Chinese officials as, "the toughest time for Chinese investment in Myanmar" (Mang and Yan 2013).

The 2008 Constitution

The 2008 Constitution is based on a draft written by SPDC in 2007. SPDC held a controversial national referendum⁹ in 2008 to gain “public support”. The 2008 Constitution has a “unitary-style” nature (instead of federalist) and neglected all the proposals made by ethnic groups in 2004 (Raghavan 2012, 100). The reasons why the 2008 Constitution is unwelcomed by ethnic leaders include, (1) many new state level structures are directly accountable to the prime minister instead of the assemblies; (2) state and regional governments have little control over industries which are managed at the union level; (3) strengthened centralization of natural resources; (4) the reserved proportion for military personnel has great influence over state leadership; and (5) the lack of financial autonomy of the state limits its administrative power (Myanmar Peace Monitor 2013, 19).

The Tatmadaw controls not only the parliament but also three major ministries of the Union¹⁰. Tatmadaw’s control over military, administration and economic interests makes it difficult for the elected government to address political charges made by civil society (Phuong Nguyen 2016).

Since the 2008 Constitution fails to meet ethnic groups’ expectations, in peace talks, EAOs have called for more state power and constitutional federalism, which would allow self-determination over economic and social development in ethnic states (Myanmar Peace Monitor 2013, 23). SSA-S/RCSS’s position about the 2008 Constitution aligns with other EAOs, the constitution should be amended in order to solve ethnic conflicts through political means and to guarantee equal rights according to the spirit of Panglong (RCSS 2015; Sein 2016).

Recognizing the importance of power-sharing and revenue sharing in terms of improving management and thus development at all levels, the Thein Sein administration expressed their consent to constitution amendments without a complete rewrite (Myanmar Peace Monitor 2013, 23). Thus, the

9 The referendum was controlled by the SPDC administration. Most people were not notified of the contents of the draft constitution and during the time, many regions in Myanmar were seriously affected by Cyclone Nargis. The military government rejected international monitors and assistance. Evidence shows that voters were intimidated by the state to vote in favor of the constitution (Human Rights Watch 2008; Myanmar Peace Monitor 2016). The referendum is widely considered “undemocratic” and the result not objective.

10 The institutions controlled by the Tatmadaw include Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of Border Affairs (MBA) and Ministry of Defense. Ministry of Home Affairs is responsible for police and decision to execute.

Constitution Joint Review Committee (CJRC) was formed in the parliament with 109 parliament members¹¹ in 2013 to assess the constitutional reform¹². In 2014 CRJC released a report and emphasized the fact that the 2008 Constitution was based on the consent of 92.48% public votes in the referendum and thus extreme issues should be avoided in the amendments (CRJC 2014, 8).

Issues that ethnic groups and international society are concerned about were not advised by CRJC for amendments¹³. The military continues to control the parliament, making any constitutional reform favoring ethnic minorities and equalities difficult to achieve. Therefore, ethnic leaders and organizations request to negotiate about the constitution during peace talks, outside of the parliament (Myanmar Peace Monitor 2016).

In addition, the 2008 Constitution allows elections for state and local political leaders, but the Tatmadaw appoints the military leaders. The military commander in the state controls the administration resources which the local government depends on in order to function, hence the elected leader's power is restricted (Ku 2015, 181-2). The Tatmadaw controls the General Administrative Department (GAD) which collects taxes, manages land and carries out registration processes that involve rules and compensation (Altsean Burma 2016). GAD is considered very powerful because it decides the extent to which Myanmar's bureaucracy is reformed (ibid.).

Myanmar and China Relations

The relations between China and Myanmar are dynamic. Before the democratization in Myanmar, China was Myanmar's most important international supporter. Some assume that China's support prevented Myanmar's economy from collapsing during the international sanctions (Tsai 2004, 304). From 1988, China started military cooperation with Myanmar and exported arms, technology and military training (Tsai 2004, 313-4). Additionally Chinese investors only interact with the central government in projects like

11 52 of the 109 are from the military-led Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) and 25 from the military.

12 The committee invited advice across the country and received 28,247 advice letters from political parties, legal experts and NGOs, departments and individuals (CRJC 2014, 2).

13 For example, Article 109 which guarantees 1/4 of the parliament seats for military members and Article 436 which requires 3/4 of the parliament member's approval to amend the most sensitive parts of the constitution (Polling 2014). Power division and revenue sharing are addressed in the constitution in general terms without details for implementation (Myanmar Peace Monitor 2016).

mining and hydropower plants. Therefore, it is widely recognized by EAOs and the public that China acts in favor of the Tatmadaw (Yu 2016, 39).

Myanmar was one of the first neighboring countries that supported China's Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence¹⁴ in the 1950s and was the first country that signed a Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Non-Aggression with China after the Chinese Communist Party obtained power (Tsai 2004, 308). The two countries cooperate closely in different ways from military training, transboundary crime prevention to trades and businesses (Tsai 2004).

However, after the government transition in 2011, Myanmar sought to lessen the dependence on China (Tsin 2014, 2; Wee 2015). As a result, Myanmar has rapidly increased issuing investment permits to domestic and foreign companies¹⁵. The Foreign Investment Law allows foreign investments that are beneficial to Myanmar's national interests in restricted areas. (Altsean Burma 2016) Under this law, foreign investors can lease lands from the state or authorized private owners for up to seventy years and therefore provide a motivator for seizing land (ibid.).

The central government of China encourages its provincial governments to carry out trades in the borderlands and therefore Yunnan Province plays an important role in cross border trades¹⁶. Trade between Yunnan and Shan State can trace back centuries because of the close ethnic and geographic ties. Shan State serves as an important "back door port" for China's southwestern region. The oil pipeline¹⁷, the highway and high speed rail projects¹⁸ that run

14 The five principles include, (1) mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, (2) mutual non-aggression, (3) non-interference in each other's internal affairs, (4) equality and mutual benefit, and (5) peaceful co-existence ("China's Initiation of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence" 2014).

15 Up to 2014, there are investors from 37 different countries and regions that have received permits to invest in Myanmar with a total investment of approximately 500 billion U.S. dollars (TAITRA 2014). In 2016 the number of foreign countries that invest in Myanmar has increased to 45 (TAITRA 2016).

16 In 2014 the trades between Yunnan and Myanmar made up 78% of the trades between the two countries; the same year 44% of the Chinese investments in Myanmar came from Yunnan (Yu 2016, 39).

17 The oil pipeline project was completed in 2015 and runs from Kyaukpyu in Rakhine State in eastern Myanmar to Shan State and into China. Clashes and protests took place along the pipeline in Shan State (Myanmar Peace Monitor 2013, 3).

18 China and Myanmar signed the contract to build a highway from Kyaukpyu in Rakhine State to Kunming in Yunnan in 2010 and the next year they signed a contract to build a high speed railway for the same route (Ku 2015, 35).

through Myanmar via Shan State and finally into Yunnan are some evidence for how important Shan State is for China's strategic plan in the region (Meyer 2015).

Such ties continue until today. In 1990, China established "Jiegao Border Trade Zone" which is the first trade zone that functions under a special customs mode, meaning that once Chinese goods enter this zone, they are treated as exports (Lou 2012; HKTDC Research 2016). In 2000, the establishment of Myanmar-China Border Economic and Trade Fair which takes place annually further strengthens the trades between China and Myanmar (Lou 2012).

To maintain the ties with Myanmar's elected government, China started to strengthen its influence among ethnically Chinese leaders in border areas by involving in the conflicts more. China has started to feel the needs to start or strengthen its communication and interaction with ethnic organizations which have control of most of the natural resources and have gained more influence through elections (Li et al. 2015, 575; Yu 2015, 33).

Peace Process: Ceasefire Agreements and Negotiations

From 1988 to 2011, the SLORC secured ceasefire agreements with 20 armed groups, leaving out at least 13 armed groups challenging the central authority (Dukalskis 2015, 842). These ceasefire agreements did not address political grievances (ibid.). The concept of "ceasefire agreement" during this period is "military truce" which meant agreements between rival groups aiming to terminate military operations (Dukalskis 2015, 845; Raghavan 2012, 99; Sherman 2003, 231). The military occupied insurgent areas or the insurgent groups yielded to renewed cooperation for de facto autonomy, resulting in more exploitation of natural resources in the militarized zones (Dukalskis 2015, 842).

Involving economic incentives is commonplace in Myanmar's intrastate conflict resolution since it was generally believed that development projects would improve conflict resolution and reconciliation before actual political talks would begin (Smith 2007, 42). Verbal and unofficial ceasefire agreements allowed EAOs to own arms, control territory and to receive business privileges from the government as "rewards" (Min Zaw Oo 2014, 8; Sherman 2003, 231). In addition, resistant armed groups sometimes received development promises from the SPDC. Business profits exchanged between armed groups and the Myanmar government hold the ceasefire together. Most ceasefire groups have

their business companies which make money laundering possible (Min Zaw Oo 2014, 8).

The Master Plan for the Development of Border Areas and National Races

The economic development promises accompanied by the ceasefires were backed by the “Master Plan for the Development of Border Areas and National Races (hereafter the Master Plan)” which was launched in 1989 with the acknowledgement of the government that to soothe the economic grievances which fueled the conflicts was essential in Myanmar’s “national reconsolidation” (Sherman 2003, 231-2).

The Master Plan is a 30-year plan starting from 2001 that is based on the “Development of Border Areas and National Races Law” (Myanmar Peace Monitor 2013, 54) and carried out by the Central Committee for the Development of the Border Areas and National Races and Work Committee which were established in 1989. The committee head was the chairman of the SPDC and the Work Committee was led by the military (Embassy of Myanmar in Brazil 2008). Due to limited information, it is unknown if the Master Plan supports or contradicts Myanmar’s peace plans and national reforms (Myanmar Peace Monitor 2013, 54).

In 1992 the Ministry for the Development of Border Areas and National Races was created and the commander of the North-Eastern Command was appointed the minister. The ministry was reorganized in 1994 as the Ministry for the Progress of the Border Areas and National Races Development Affairs (ibid.). The organization of the Ministry of Border Affairs¹⁹ (hereafter MBA) and the Work Committee is centralized with the president and the vice president as the chairperson and the vice chairperson. The rest of the membership is occupied by leaders from various ministries and military commands (Ministry of Border Affairs 2014).

Although economic development brought by the Master Plan was welcomed in the border areas and the ceasefires did lessen human rights violations and improve the education, health, trade and infrastructure sectors in ceasefire areas (Raghavan 2012, 99), there was still some skepticism

¹⁹ MBA is a military-led organization that is responsible for implementing development projects in border areas to ensure the peace and stability in borderlands (Myanmar Peace Monitor 2013, 53). During ceasefire talks, MBA is usually present but keeps a low profile in the peace process (ibid.). The outcomes of the MBA projects are unclear due to lack of information transparency (Myanmar Peace Monitor 2013, 53-4).

towards the objectives of the plan and the project design (Sherman 2003, 232). Furthermore, due to the slow progress or lack of social and economic development, more grievances were created during the ceasefire period (Raghavan 2012, 99).

National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA)

The NCA, comparing to the verbal and business-interest-based ceasefire agreements, focuses on conflict resolution through multilateral political dialogues (Institute for Security & Development Policy 2015, 1). The ceasefire negotiations were bilateral and were considered as a “divide and rule” strategy posed by the government and thus created mistrust. One of the significances of the NCA is that it was the first time in the history that the government agreed to have multilateral negotiations (ibid.). However, the government has since refused to have any kind of bilateral negotiations with individual armed groups (Burma News International 2015, 5). The exceptions are the bilateral negotiations with three armed groups to make sure certain conditions are met before the signing of the final NCA (Institute for Security & Development Policy 2015, 5-6).

The NCA addresses political rights, equality and inclusiveness of ethnic minorities (Institute for Security & Development Policy 2015, 3-4). Apart from disarmament, ceasefire, confidence-building schemes and clear codes of conduct, it also mentions that EAOs can implement “interim arrangements” which include international and national aid activities (Institute for Security & Development Policy 2015, 5). The interim arrangements amend the frustration from ceasefire groups which formerly complained about neither receiving aid from the West while fighting the authoritarian government nor after making peace with the government (Smith 2007, 54).

Although the NCA aims to include all armed groups in the country, the government refuses the participation of three small armed groups. As a result, mistrust continues to build and the NCA becomes less appealing to the EAOs. If the NCA is signed without including every armed group, conflicts will likely continue especially along the border of Shan State and China (Institute for Security & Development Policy 2015, 7).

However, even though a new government was formed, some EAOs suspect that the purpose of the NCA is to receive international aid and foreign direct investments (Sein 2016). The rapid influx of foreign aid has caused some tension in ethnic territories. EAOs feel pressured by international aid providers

to sign the NCA in order to accelerate the development project processes in local communities (ibid.).

SSA-S/RCSS

SSA-S/RCSS was founded approximately in 1995 after the Mon Thai Army (MTA) led by Khun Sa (aka. Chang Chifu) surrendered and had remained a non-ceasefire group until 2011. SSA-S/RCSS is not a member of the Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team (NCCT) but in 2011 signed a bilateral ceasefire agreement with the government (Institute for Security & Development Policy 2015, 9).

The territory SSA-S/RCSS controls is limited and not contiguous. The headquarters of the SSA-S/RCSS is situated in Loi Tai Leng (Dukalskis 2015, 857). To enter Loi Tai Leng, one has to take a detour from Thailand. According to Dukalskis (2015), the reason why SSA-S/RCSS hesitated to a cease fire before 2011 is their limited territory which they feared would become under control of the Tatmadaw after a ceasefire (p. 857).

SSA-S/RCSS was considered by the SLORC/SPDC a part of the already-surrendered MTA and thus was rebuffed by the regime for peace negotiations (ibid.). Soon after the elected government took power, SSA-S/RCSS signed the ceasefire agreement (ibid.). SSA-S/RCSS stopped insisting on independence from 2011 onwards and negotiated for autonomy instead (ibid.).

Many EAOs have asked for business concessions during peace negotiations with the government in order to participate in regional development (Myanmar Peace Monitor 2013, 27). SSA-S/RCSS is one of them but due to the blockade from the military, the businesses have not been successful (ibid.). The businesses SSA-S/RCSS demanded and received include, permitted mining, road construction, logging, agriculture, power distribution, tourism, trading, transportation and agribusiness, and the establishment of an industrial zone in southern Shan state (Myanmar Peace Monitor 2013, 29). SSA-S/RCSS was also permitted to establish and register a company 'shan Taungdan Cherry' in 2012 (ibid.).

SSA-S/RCSS in their negotiations with the government, demanded cooperation with the Union for regional development and a special industrial area near the Thai border which has not been designated (Myanmar Peace Monitor 2013, 50). SSA-S/RCSS is also permitted to request assistance from NGOs and INGOs²⁰ (Myanmar Peace Monitor 2016).

²⁰ SSA-S/RCSS has established partnership with UNODC and Myanmar Peace Support Initiative, Norwegian Refugee Council to tackle drug and development issues.

In addition to demands on economic development, in the ceasefire agreement, requests were made for social and political developments including culture preservation, legalization of Shan State citizenships, media registration²¹, resettlement of the displaced, release of political prisoners, trust building²² and rights to hold political consultation with individuals, groups and communities throughout the country (ibid.).

China's Involvement in the Peace Process

For over two decades, China maintained its non-interference policy in Myanmar's peace processes. However, in recent years, China has felt pressure from the U.S. in Southeast Asia (Tsin 2014, 2). China's strategic planning, border security and economic profits in Myanmar face challenges as the U.S. lifted part of its sanctions (Wee 2015; Parameswaran 2015).

China was an important ally of the military junta in the past and thus avoided close contact with EAOs upon the junta's request (Ji 2015). As Myanmar remains an important partner in China's geopolitical strategy, Chinese scholars suggest that China should be bolder and creative in the involvement of northern Myanmar's peace processes (Li et al. 2015, 575). China's presence in the 21st Century Panglong Conference in 2016 as an observer suggests China's ambition in supporting Myanmar's peace process (Lun Min Mang 2016). China's foreign minister Wang Yi recently suggests that Chinese diplomats should consider being involved in Myanmar's peace process as a test case for Beijing to assist in international conflict resolution through peaceful means (Phuong Nguyen 2016).

China has been an important observer in Myanmar's peace process since 2011 (ibid.). It was one of the two sole international witnesses (along with the United Nations) proposed by the Myanmar government for the NCA signing process (Institute for Security & Development Policy 2015, 6). However, senior Myanmar official Min Zaw Oo publicly accused China of intervening in the peace talks (Wee 2015; Parameswaran 2015). According to Min Zaw Oo, China pressured EAOs on not signing the NCA unless the pro-China armed group Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) is included in the negotiation (ibid.). He also claimed that China objected to the participation of other countries in Myanmar's peace process (ibid.). There is evidence showing

21 The government promised that after the new media law is implemented, SSA-S/RCSS will be allowed to register its own media "Tai Freedom" news agency.

22 SSA-S/RCSS is still listed as an "unlawful association" by the government.

that China provides weapons to both the Tatmadaw and its rival UWSA (Davis 2016). According to Davis (2016), the fact that China provides both conflicting parties arms makes China's role in the future peace negotiations vital.

The Contract and the First Exploratory Meeting

One of the hoped-for aims of the Tasang Dam is that it will provide low-cost electricity to neighboring countries. Over 85% of the power generated from Tasang Dam is to be exported (Klöpfer 2008, 336). According to a report prepared by Harvard Kennedy School in 2015, the contract of the Tasang project is a "90/10" contract (Ji 2015) meaning the company gets 90% of the revenues produced and the Myanmar government gets 10% that is usually paid with electricity (Dapice 2015, 10).

The same report states that Myanmar has an option to use a portion of the 90% production if it is paid for (Dapice 2015, 4). The contract is criticized for its colonial nature which provides Myanmar with disproportionate shares, neglects the locals in the flooded area and has no careful impact assessments that reflect the environmental costs of the dam project (ibid.). The unequal terms of the contract place Myanmar in an inferior position in future economic development (Dapice 2015, 7).

The first public scoping meeting of the project was held in Taunggyi, Shan State in March 2015 (China Three Gorges (Group) Corporation 2013). The attendees of the meeting included political parties, ethnic cultural representatives, government officials, UNDP representatives, state-run and privately owned media, developers, project designers, consultants, and NGOs²³.

Among the political parties present in the meeting, the RCSS and the Shan State Progress Party (or Shan State Army-North, the EAO that controls mainly northern Shan State) did not attend. UWSA which rejected the project consultant company SMEC to conduct the environmental impact assessment around the dam site was also absent. There were representatives from two

23 Among the NGOs, there is one company, ACHC, Upstream Ayeyawady Confluence Basin Hydropower Co. Ltd, which is the developer of the suspended Myitsone Dam project. Most organizations work on issues concerning culture, tradition conservation, peace, social development, democracy and justice. KRW (Karen Rivers Watch), KESAN (Karen Environmental and Social Action Network) and PHECAD (Pwe Hla Environment Conservation and Development Organization) are the only environmental organizations. However The only information about PHECAD is that they are a partner of UNDP's project in Inle Lake with no obvious connection to the dam project.

major Shan political parties, the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD) and the Shan Nationalities Democratic Party (SNDP). The current ruling party NLD was present, as well as the military-led Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). Government official participants included Mong Ton's representative in the parliament and local administrators (SMEC 2015, 1).

NGOs that have worked on human rights and environmental issues since the beginning of the project like Burma Rivers Network, Salween Watch and Shan Sapawa Environmental Organization were absent. It is possible that some NGOs that participated the meeting were members of the Burma Rivers Network or its alliance. There is no information about the members of Burma Rivers Network and Salween Watch on the internet so whether these two organizations were involved remains unknown²⁴.

SMEC claimed that they contacted a few armed groups (not indicated in the summary which) to ensure the safety of the staff and to include all stakeholders. They stressed that apart from the mentioned interaction necessary to the completion of the EIA and SIA, SMEC had no further contact with EAOs (SMEC 2015, 5).

The transparency of the EIA and SIA raised concerns. SMEC did respond directly as how to ensure transparency but promised to endeavor to include all persons affected by the project as well as the voice of ethnic minorities (SMEC 2015, 6). SMEC claimed that there would be public meetings at different levels, with the authorities as well as the locals (SMEC 2015, 7). However, there had not been a summary of those meetings on the project website by August 2016 (China Three Gorges (Group) Corporation 2013). SMEC provided information concerning the project and the EIA and SIA which was written in three languages, Myanmar, Shan and English which were promised to be available online, but by August 2016, the project website did not contain such documents (ibid.).

SMEC stated that the social impact assessment (SIA) would include the calculation of asset losses caused by the project to inform the developers for compensation decision-making in the future. SMEC was aware of legacy compensation related to the Tasang project (SMEC 2015, 8), but it did not state how the losses should be compensated. SMEC promised to include a

24 It is likely that networks and alliances do not reveal their membership openly due to the authoritarian nature of the previous government and the political environment in Myanmar.

local employment opportunities survey into the SIA and to employ locals in the assessment process and that the developers should prioritize local suppliers in order to support the local economy (SMEC 2015, 9). According to SMEC, the benefits locals would receive included affordable and stable electricity supply, employment opportunities, improved infrastructure and better social development measures (e.g. health care and education) (SMEC 2015, 8).

The distribution of the dam production was the major concern of this research. The 90/10 contract form was not confirmed in the summary. SMEC claimed that a proportion of the generated electricity would be provided to Myanmar free of charge, but the percentage was undecided (SMEC 2015, 7). The concession period of the project was not finalized either but tentatively scheduled for 40 years (*ibid.*). Myanmar would receive the hydropower project for free afterwards (*ibid.*).

Analysis and Conclusion

According to the logic of LAOs, in order to solve conflicts, organizations with access to violence should have access to resources or rents which motivate armed organizations to avoid violence. However, the distribution of resources is directly dependent on the transition of institutions, which can easily cause more violence in an LAO.

A better LAO or a better developing country can be summed up as better living conditions for the population through better management, better governance, opener access to resources and better implementation of the rule of law from the organizations and elites which create more reliability from the population towards all organizations (North et al. 2013, 32 9).

In Tasang's case, the ethnic armed group SSA-S/RCSS has access to and uses violence. SSA-S/RCSS receives no privilege in the project and no benefit from the project and so violence is repeated even after the ceasefire agreement. The Tasang project even causes loss of controlled territory. Even if the NCA was signed, the businesses SSA-S/RCSS was permitted to be involved failed and the special industrial zone requested has not been designated.

In the Tasang project, SSA-S/RCSS is not included and no representative was present at the project's first scoping meeting in Shan State. Chinese investors and the Australian consultant company SMEC avoid unnecessary contacts with the armed group in order to avoid upsetting the Tatmadaw. The project basically creates no rent for SSA-S/RCSS.

The Tatmadaw, on the other hand, holds access to violence and all the privileges and benefits from Chinese investments in the Tasang project. The huge imbalance of rents between two rival parties provides no incentive for SSA-S/RCSS to avoid violence. The rents derived from the project trigger more conflicts with local armed groups.

The story of repeated conflicts might continue like this if without the democratization in Myanmar which initiates the institutional transition. To break violence, the democratization in Myanmar should bring opportunities in terms of redistributing rents through institutional transition. Myanmar's market opened up after the democratization started, however the Tatmadaw controls the democratization process in Myanmar.

North et al. suggest that a transition to more open institutions is possible but may lead to more violence and the country may remain under the designation of LAO (North et al. 2013, 332). According to LAO logic, a more fragile LAO has more difficulties to overcome new challenges by adjusting policy through a self-correcting mechanism (ibid.). That is to say, a fragile LAO is less capable of adjusting its policy to deal with new challenges without assistance from external factors. When an LAO tries to redistribute the rents, elites with access to violence will likely fight to maintain the privileges; thereby creating more conflicts (ibid.). However, it is also likely that elites will maintain an LAO whilst opening part of the access for other organizations to settle the conflicts (North et al. 2013, 331).

Although Myanmar has elected a new government, the Tatmadaw still controls the LAOs. After opening up, the Tatmadaw started to receive pressure from the international community. China, once their most powerful ally, is now seeking to solve the conflicts through "creative means." On the other hand, Myanmar's new government is carefully reducing their dependence on China while maintaining a good relationship. China, holding course on its New Silk Road, will also be eager to maintain and even strengthen its influence in Myanmar. The connection between Chinese government and the Tatmadaw can be seen as an opportunity to change. Since it is difficult for a fragile LAO to adjust policy by itself, if China succeeds in influencing the Tatmadaw to open up part of the access to rents to other actors, it is likely that violent conflicts in Myanmar will be reduced gradually.

As Chinese investors encounter oppositions and conflicts in Myanmar, they try to avoid risks in high-cost businesses operations. Possible solutions

include shifting investment sectors to directly benefit the locals and inviting local participation. This may improve the relations between Chinese investors and the locals, but according to the logic of LAO, in order to avoid conflicts, rents must be created to the organizations with access to violence. Since the locals do not have such access, it is difficult to avoid conflicts by merely benefitting and involving the locals.

Chinese investments in southern Shan State are part of the New Silk Road project which plans out China's regional strategy. China's increasing and deeper involvement in Myanmar's peace process may have an even greater future impact. China will and is eager to continue to invest in Myanmar, so Chinese investments will continue to create rents. It is a matter of distribution. The extent to which Chinese investments and involvement in the peace process can change the distribution of rents in Myanmar remains unclear. In Tasang's case, China was not involved in the peace negotiation between SSA-S/RCSS and the Myanmar government. SSA-S/RCSS received no business promises relating to China from NCA. It is unknown if China will participate in future peace talks concerning SSA-S/RCSS in order to secure the dam project interests. So far I have not found evidence suggesting that China will get involved in the conflicts between SSA-S/RCSS and the Tatmadaw.

Therefore, the findings of this research demonstrate that Chinese investments under the context of the New Silk Road policy have great potential to pacify conflicts in Myanmar. However, in the Tasang Dam case, there is not enough evidence to prove that Chinese investments have pacified conflicts in this arena.

Whether or not Myanmar's democratization is beneficial to Chinese investors remains a question. Chinese scholars with a regional strategic perspective hold a hostile attitude towards civil society organizations. This attitude is noted by the absence of important environmental organizations at the first exploratory meeting of the dam project. Although some Chinese scholars see NGOs as a bridge to better communicate with the locals, they are aware of the Western support behind these organizations.

Chinese investors have been privileged in their businesses cooperating with the Tatmadaw. It is likely that Chinese investors would prefer a "disciplined democracy" in Myanmar, as suggested by the Tatmadaw when drafting the 2008 Constitution. This way, reducing armed conflicts in order to secure Chinese investments weighs more for China than Myanmar's transition from a basic

LAO to a mature LAO. In the short term, Chinese investments may be beneficial to the stability of Myanmar. However, in the long run, Chinese investments can hinder the democratization of the country.

Perhaps it is not necessary to feel so pessimistic about Myanmar's democratization because apart from China, there are other international actors such as Japan, the U.S. and the EU at play whose influences China cannot neglect. The interaction between the new government, international actors and the Tatmadaw are of vital importance for the country's democratization, and thus further research on China's involvement and its interaction with the Myanmar government, the Tatmadaw and international actors in Myanmar's conflict resolution and peace process will provide essential information about the transition of Myanmar according to the logic of LAOs.

In summary, the Tasang Dam case echoes the LAO logic that violence will be repeated if rents distribution does not reach organizations with access to violence. The findings of the Tasang Dam case indicate no direct evidence of whether or not Chinese investments under the New Silk Road policy can pacify Myanmar's conflicts. However, Chinese investments have great potential to achieve such a goal.

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Politics, Conflicts and Transition in the Deep South of Thailand

The Patani Peace Dialogue Process: From the Terms of Reference to the Safety Zones

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The Peace Dialogue Process for Patani/Southern Border Provinces of Thailand resumed with the first unofficial meeting on June 8, 2015 followed by the second one on August 25, 2015. By November of the same year the technical teams of both Parties A and B began discussion on the Terms of Reference (TOR).

The meeting of the Joint Working Group - Peace Dialogue Process (JWG-PDP), the name given to the unofficial peace talks between the Thai military and government (TMG) and the Patani liberation movements (MARA Patani) on April 27, 2016 in Kuala Lumpur was held after the technical teams wrapped up the TOR on March 23, 2016. The Head of Party A, Gen. Aksra Kerdpol informed the meeting that the TMG was not ready to endorse the TOR because the Thai Prime Minister had not yet approved it. The real reasons were however not disclosed.

On the following day, April 28, 2016, MARA Patani issued a statement, a brief update of the April 27 meeting which was widely circulated in the media. "Although we were disappointed with that decision, it was respected. The Safety Zones issue was not touched on at all," the statement said (Al-Hakim 2016). Mara Patani will give ample time for the TMG to review the agreed TOR and to inform the facilitator of its decision in due course.

The response by the TMG was equally harsh and swift. "Thailand cannot negotiate with law breakers. [Negotiations] must be based on a law and justice process," said Thai Prime Minister, Gen. Prayut Chan-O-Cha. "Why should we accept their demand of how they should be called? You know how many groups there are? You know why the talks were held abroad - because they could not be held in the country," he added (Thai PBS 2016).

Gen. Aksra was more diplomatic: "Talks with Deep South rebels are alive, but a limited ceasefire must be in place before Thailand can agree to

terms for advancing the peace process...If there continues to be violence on the ground, the public will not have trust in peace talks,” he said, two days after leading a Thai delegation in a meeting in Kuala Lumpur with negotiators from the Party B side. “Therefore, it is a must to cease violence in certain areas, and then we can join together to prepare a comprehensive TOR spanning over the trust-building stage”(Sisutcharit 2016).

Both parties are referring to the much mentioned but least understood document known as the Terms of Reference. The fact that the April 27, 2016 meeting in which the TOR was supposed to be endorsed ended after 75 minutes raised questions and speculations. What is the TOR? Why is it important?

Why has Thailand not endorsed it when it was wrapped up and agreed by both technical teams?

The TOR is nothing more than a set of rules and regulations where two or more parties agree to follow in their interaction with each other. It is a basic requirement for any engagement, be it a game, a race, a business, or any other transaction. In this case, it is the on-going peace dialogue between the TMG and MARA Patani. The main purpose of the TOR is that each party is aware of its position, role, responsibility, and limitations in dealing with its counterpart. The most important criteria for the TOR is that it must be agreed upon and accepted by both parties.

It is irrational to strike a deal and agree on some important ventures without any preset rules or guidelines that will bind the parties concerned in their future undertakings. It is futile, in a peace process, to make agreements on vital issues without a TOR. It is the TOR that will boost the mutual confidence of both parties. In the earlier peace process under the then civilian Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra, a general consensus was signed on February 28, 2013 and a TOR was easily approved in its first meeting on March 5, 2013 without much obstruction.

While it is inappropriate to reveal the detailed content of the current TOR when it is still classified as confidential, it would be useful for the public and other interested parties to grasp the general idea of what the TOR is all about and how it was discussed.

There are eight articles in this TOR. Without going into details, the overview of the TOR is as follows :

Article 1 outlines the background of the peace process.

Article 2 identifies the dialogue parties (A for Thailand and B for MARA Patani).

Article 3 details the role of the facilitator (Malaysia).

Article 4 touches on the formation of a technical working group

Article 5 determines the geographical area.

Article 6 covers administrative arrangements.

Article 7 deals with the sensitive issue of security facilitation and protection for Party B.¹

Article 8 closes with the amendments and modifications.

The TOR acknowledges the initial process that kick-started the peace process on February 28, 2013, which was facilitated by Malaysia. The newly defined TOR aims at starting a formal process, with Thailand prioritizing the peace talks by including them in its national agenda.

Both parties appointed technical teams to form a technical working group for the TOR. Lt. Gen. Nakrob Bunbuathong headed Party A while Ustaz Shukri Hari headed Party B. The proposed document was discussed, argued, debated, and scrutinized by the technical working group. After three rounds of meetings over a period of five months, it was finalized and agreed upon on March 23, 2016.

The agreed TOR could pave the way for formalizing the process since the three proposals of MARA Patani are incorporated into the TOR (Al-Hakim 2015). Again it needs reminding that the three proposals of MARA Patani are not demands. When the process is formal, more substantial issues could be discussed at a later stage, including the safety zones. The steering committee of MARA Patani approved the finalized TOR earlier in April 2016.

Out of eight articles of the TOR, the crucial ones are articles 2, 5, and 7. They were the hot and sensitive articles that dragged the exhaustive discussion and argument for hours. Article 2 involves the identification of who is Party B. The TMG proposed defining Party B as “people with different opinions from the State,” stopping short at mentioning the name “MARA Patani.” In the previous 2013 process Party B was the BRN, though similarly it was not formally recognized as the negotiation partner. This time around we want to be more specific. The movements are not just the BRN, but MARA Patani, which is an

¹ The controversial word “immunity” is nowhere to be found in the six-page document.

umbrella organization formed by six Patani movements.

To a certain extent, we understand the TMG's concern that to accept MARA Patani as its dialogue partner is like giving recognition and upgrading the status of Patani's movements, something the TMG has always avoided. However, refusing to accept your dialogue partner by not mentioning their proper name means disrespect and narrow-mindedness. It just shows that one is not truthful in the interaction with one's counterpart.

Gen. Aksra's claim that the on-going violence is a reason not to accept MARA Patani or the TOR is baseless and unacceptable. Peace and conflict transformation experts agree that violence does not stop immediately when a peace process starts. In some cases, the violence even escalates. It should go without mentioning that violence comes from both sides and from other unidentified groups, not from the Patani movements alone.

According to Gen. Aksra, it also is unclear whether MARA Patani has legitimate standing as an umbrella body negotiating on behalf of rebels and whether the rebel ranks are united behind it. "They do not have a clear status while we do have an order from the Prime Minister's office [to conduct negotiations]. So, we should continue to build mutual trust," he has stated (Sisutcharit 2016).

As far as MARA Patani is concerned, we request that Party A acknowledge, not necessarily recognize, that we are its de facto dialogue partner, i.e. that Party B is none other than MARA Patani. The pertinent question to be asked here is "How could one be considered sincere and truthful when one can't even mention his dialogue partner's name?"

The discussion on the geographical area as designated by Article 5 went fairly well. Initially MARA Patani proposed 5 provinces based on the definition of the Southern Border Provinces. Later it was settled as 3 provinces - Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat - and 4 districts in Songkhla. The districts of Satun and Sadao, though not included in the TOR, are to be recorded in the minutes of the meetings for future discussion. This would enable the people in both areas to determine on their own whether they want to be part of the political settlement in the future or to maintain the status quo.

The most touchy and fiery discussion was on Article 7, initially focused on "immunity". The word "immunity" was rather sensitive to the TMG, so we had to come up with an alternative word or phrase – "Security Facilitation and Protection for Party B". It implies giving safety guarantees travelling into/out

of Thailand and protection from detention and persecution during the passage and stay for purposes related to peace efforts.

This fair treatment, as in any other peace processes elsewhere, is to enable members of Party B to perform their political duties undisturbed and their missions uninterrupted. Although the word “immunity” is not found in any part of the TOR, the issue was agreed by both sides to be noted for future discussions. To establish safety zones or limited cease-fires in the future the immunity issue needs to be revived and debated because it will involve the exposure of Party B members in the designated zones.

Regarding the proposal of the peace process to be adopted on Thailand’s National Agenda, it was no longer an issue of contention. Both parties agreed to put that in writing in the TOR as a guarantee of continuity of the process in the event of a change of government. The TMG has affirmed repeatedly on several occasions and in several documents, including the commitment pledged to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in 2007, that resolving the conflict is prioritized in its National Agenda.

As mentioned already, there were some unfavorable statements from the Thai government regarding MARA Patani. The Prime Minister inaccurately labeled us as “law breakers” while Gen. Aksra indicated that we do not have a clear status, hence do not deserve immunity or safety protection. MARA Patani members consider both statements insulting and unwarranted.

“We don’t want to have peace talks,” said the Prime Minister. “Since they were initiated by the previous government, we are bound to continue, knowing that they could not solve any problems,” he added. “The previous government insisted on doing it, so now we are forced to follow up. I say no, I will not call them MARA Patani and will not recognize anyone. It is against the law” (IsraNews 2016).

We do not intend to be rude, but it is worth reminding the TMG that their status is equally questionable. The fact is that this government came to power illegally through a coup, which if failed, the perpetrators would be considered as rebels and subject to execution according to Thai law. We also would like to remind Prime Minister Prayut of his trip to Kuala Lumpur on December 1, 2014 to meet Prime Minister Najib Razak requesting the peace process be resumed and for Malaysia to facilitate the talk, which contradicts his negative statement above.

Amid the uncertainty of the peace process after Party A refused to endorse the TOR in the April meeting, the technical teams returned to the table on August 16, 2016. The head of Party A's technical team, Lt. Gen. Nakrob, who was removed from the post earlier for unspecified reasons, was replaced by Maj. Gen Sitthi Trakunwong from ISOC. Describing the "rejected" TOR he agreed that, "it was the most comprehensive TOR that reflected the views and aspirations of both parties."

Party A proposed a revised version of the rejected TOR, supposed to have Prime Minister's approval, that slashed some crucial issues agreed earlier on. Among them are the recognition of MARA Patani's name as its dialogue partner, the disputed geographical areas, and the issue of immunity or "security facilitation and protection". The adoption of the peace process on Thailand's National Agenda was however secured.²

Maj. Gen Sitthi also explained Party A's reasons and reservations regarding the revised version of the TOR and agreed that the crucial issues are not included in the document, but will be recorded for future discussions.

At this juncture, Party B - MARA Patani, has provisionally accepted the TOR and to carry forward the said issues for discussion at an appropriate time later on. This decision by MARA Patani reflects its flexibility, compromise and accommodating attitude with the goal of allowing the process to move a step forward. Both technical teams then agreed on a date for a full team meeting to endorse the TOR.

As expected, the JWG-PDP full team meeting convened on September 2, 2016 amid the much debated bombings and arson attacks in these seven provinces of the Upper South, and earlier on following the Thai Referendum. General Aksra specifically questioned the incidents. MARA Patani reiterated that it is a political coalition and is committed to resolving the conflict through peace dialogue.

The panels passed and adopted the TOR, agreed to move the process to the next level, while at the same time maintaining the meetings as "unofficial" and to continue with confidence building measures. Party B's suggestion that a media statement be released at the end of meeting by the Facilitator was declined by Party A, who proposed both parties make media statements separately.

² The peace process as a National Agenda is also clearly reflected in the "Administration and Development Policy in Southern Border Provinces 2560-2562 BE".

In the afternoon, after the meeting, MARA Patani made a media statement summing up the meeting to Thai TV3, Thai PBS, and Bernama Agency :

In the JWG -PDP meeting today the representatives of MARA Patani and the Thai government agreed on the following :

1. To accept the latest version of the TOR
2. To principally agreed on the discussion of Safety Zones in the coming talks,
3. To accept the proposals from Women's Agenda for Peace (PAW) for further discussion
4. The JWG-PDP meetings will still continue unofficially.

The next agenda of the peace dialogue is relating to the Safety Zones (SZ). Although this particular issue was one of the counter-proposals from Party A, MARA Patani sees it as a relevant and crucial agenda to discuss at this Confidence Building stage. While Party A's main objective is to test if Party B can curb violent incidences by maintaining control over the armed units in a designated area or zone, MARA Patani would also want to gauge the Thai government's sincerity and commitment to address certain issues that are being passed across the table. The SZ discussion is indeed an actual assessment of mutual trust, commitment, compromise and how both parties can cooperate when it is implemented.

The SZ is also an issue that has been voiced by many groups, people, and stakeholders on the ground, especially among the CSOs and NGOs working in Patani. Caught in between the fire-fights, in fact they are the people that are most directly affected by the violent incidences from armed groups and government forces. Thus far there was only one proposal pertaining to the SZ submitted to both parties at the dialogue table, i.e. from the Women's Agenda for Peace (PAW).

The CSOs and NGOs must come forward with proposals and recommendations on this vital issue because it is the people's agenda. Peace advocates and activists need to be empowered to enable them to play an effective role in supporting the process, to help drive it forward and at the same time to serve as a safety net. We are expecting more positive and constructive efforts from them.

On October 25, 2016 , which happened to coincide with the 12th anniversary of the Tak Bai tragedy of 2004, the JWG-PDP full teams met again

in Kuala Lumpur. The participants agreed to form a Joint-Technical Team (JTT) for the discussion of the SZ. The JTT meeting commenced on the following day and ended on October 27, 2016. During those two days both parties presented their respective views and concepts of the SZ. There were some similarities as well as differences. A preliminary Joint Framework on the Establishment of Safety Zones was drafted.

The second JTT meeting on SZ was on November 22, 2016 where both sides explored the definition, objectives and the mechanism of the SZ. The discussion was not without tension nor condemnation but it is observed that this time around, contrary to the meetings of the TOR, both sides are now more accommodative and tolerant of each others' views and proposals. The entire atmosphere was more cordial and relaxed. This could be attributed to improved interpersonal interaction since the representatives on both sides are more or less the same as the technical teams of the TOR. If anything, this goes to show that after two years talking the confidence building index between two sides is starting to bear its fruit. Still, the road to full cooperation and understanding is far ahead.

At the meeting, MARA Patani also submitted 3 proposals for Party A's consideration for trust building gestures prior to SZ implementation :

1. Comprehensive safety guarantees and protections for MARA Patani's representatives at the local level
2. Release of some political prisoners
3. Consider terminating the proposed controversial coal power plant in the Deep South

The JTT is scheduled to meet again somewhere in December to complete the SZ Framework. Other topics to be covered are the designated areas, time frame, parties involved at the ground/local level, known as the Joint Action Committee (JAC), their roles and functions, and monitoring mechanism. It will not be until the first quarter of 2017 that the Framework will be ready to be endorsed by the JWGPDP after which the SZ will be implemented in any mutually agreed area as the first trial at the confidence building stage.

It is worth mentioning here that while many are skeptical about the idea of "talking peace" with the military-backed regime, it was found that the dialogue process moves, though at a slower pace, the progress is surprisingly encouraging. There were not many interferences or external factors thus far that could hinder or affect the meeting schedules. With absolute power the

Thai Military and Government, through its dialogue panel, is straight forward in stating what it can and cannot deliver.

As far as MARA Patani is concerned, the expected outcome talking to the TMG is to consolidate the peace process via the SZ preparation and implementation. The military is the real authority of security and safety, while the remaining issues of development, justice, administration, and education are better kept aside for discussion with future elected governments.

In any peace process, reciprocal respect and sound diplomacy is important if both parties are sincere and want to succeed. We need to cooperate not to hinder. We need to be open-minded and flexible, not narrow-minded and rigid. We need compromise and be conciliatory, not unyielding and confrontational. We must continue exploring each others' needs and concerns, working together for the best possible way to accomplish a peace that is just, comprehensive, and sustainable for the people of Patani, regardless of their ethnicity, religion, or class.

Abu Hafez Al-Hakim - from outside the fence of Patani. 8 December 2016/8 Rabi'ul Awwal 1438 H

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Southern Border Provinces Conflict Resolution Policies

Capt. Jakapong Apimahatham

The Problem

Separatist Movements:

Separatism in this region is not a new issue. It originated from the annexation of Patani territory and its incorporation into the Kingdom of Siam in accordance with the Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909, which was signed during the reign of King Rama V. During this period, a centralized administrative structure was adopted in the Kingdom. Patani thus became a vassal state and its discontented rulers fought arduously to regain their former positions of authority. The Patani struggle started with the formation of small separatist groups engaged in diverse resistance campaigns against the Siamese and Thai authorities. The shared historical background, ethnicity, and religious beliefs remain central to the resistance movements and have alienated them from the country's wider society. The resistance movements aim to garner sympathy and support for their cause by instigating situations that they hope will lead domestic and international observers to consider them a minority group that is treated unequally and in a discriminatory manner by state officials. The shortcomings and wrongdoing of state officials are presented as contributing factors underlying their struggle and are used to promote hatred towards those officials. Social media is also used to stir up societal conflict. These tactics are employed to fulfill the objectives of the separatist movements.

Opportunistic Threats

Opportunistic threats adversely affect security in the Deep South and are linked to the separatist movements. Influential figures, drug dealers or illegal business operators are connected to the security problems in the southern border provinces because they provide the movements with the funds to carry out violent attacks on the ground.

Overall Situation

Violence has escalated since the 2004 insurgent raid on the Narathiwat Ratchanakarin Camp (Pileng Camp) of the Army Development Battalion Region 4 in Marue Bo Ork Subdistrict, Cho Irong District, Narathiwat Province. The

year 2007 saw the highest number of casualties from the violence. Now in its thirteenth year, successive governments have made every effort to set up policy frameworks and allocate government funds to address the violence. So far, the situation on the ground has calmed down. Although violence still occurs, it has decreased and remains confined to the area that is coterminous with the historical Patani territory. Securing a long-term and sustainable solution will take time and need unified management mechanisms. The people of the Deep South have expressed clearly that they want the state and dissident groups to engage in peace dialogue. They are sick and tired of the protracted violence. They are concerned about household economic difficulties, unemployment, drug abuse, and long to see the region as developed as Thailand's other provinces.

Southern Border Provinces Conflict Resolution Policies

To address the conflict in a sustainable manner, a political and administrative approach must be employed alongside operational tactics. People must be able to exercise their constitutional right to actively participate in the state's decision-making process to determine the direction of their own life and future. Law enforcement officials must abide by the rule of law, legal state doctrine, and practice loving kindness. They must adhere to an approach that respects cultural diversity and the identity of locals, who should not be made to feel mistreated or discriminated against. More importantly, people in the region should be secure in life and property, able to live a normal life and earn a decent living to support their families. The state must respond to people's needs and expectations, taking into account the social and cultural dimension of coexistence in a culturally pluralist society. To fulfil such a purpose, the following structure and guidelines to address the conflict are presented and considered:

Southern Border Provinces Conflict Resolution Management Structure¹

The Southern Border Provinces Conflict Resolution Management Structure operates on three levels: policy-making; policy implementation; and local operations.

¹ Announcement of the National Council for Peace and Order, No 98/2014 on solutions to the southern border provinces conflict

Policy-making:

- ▷ At the helm is National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) leader, the Prime Minister (PM), who is responsible for making policies and guidelines, and is supported by the National Security Council (NSC).

Policy implementation:

- ▷ The Southern Conflict Resolution Committee (*Kora Por Tor*) is chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister for security affairs; Royal Thai Army (RTA) Commander-in-Chief/ISOC Deputy Chief is deputy chair; committee member include permanent secretaries of core host ministries, central government agency chiefs, the ISOC Secretary General, and ISOC Region 4 heads. The NSC Secretary General is committee secretary and the Southern Border Provinces Administration Center (SBPAC) Secretary General is assistant secretary. The duties of the committee are as follows:

- Approve conflict resolution strategies, action plans, programs, and projects; draw up a budget, relevant guidelines and operational measures;
- Approve special development zoning, conflict resolution guidelines; administration and development of special zones; and referral to NCPO leader/PM for approval;
- Devise frameworks and guidelines on project plans and budget, integrate operations of concerned ministries, departments, and agencies into southern administration and development policies;
- Direct, accelerate, monitor and integrate implementation of the southern conflict resolution plan according to southern administration and development policies plus related strategies and preset action plans;
- Make recommendations for solutions to problems arising from implementation of the southern conflict resolution plan to the NCPO leader/PM

- ▷ Secretary's Office of the Southern Conflict Resolution Committee (Sor Lor.Kor Por Tor): The NSC Secretary General is designated as director. Representatives of ISOC, SBPAC, ministries and other concerned agencies are employed as full- and part-time staff. The office supports operations of the Southern Conflict Resolution Committee and has the following duties:

- Perform administrative work of the Southern Conflict Resolution Committee;
- Coordinate with government offices, state agencies, state enterprises and other concerned agencies to obtain information to support operations, and
- Carry out other work assigned by Kor Por Tor.

Local operations:

▷ The ISOC Region 4 Forward Command is the principal agency responsible for all security and development operations on the ground. SBPAC has also established a SBPAC Forward Post to cooperate with the ISOC Region 4 Forward Command.

National Security Policies²

Key policies are: promotion of a peaceful environment; restoration of trust and reduction of suspicion; promotion of peacebuilding and sustainable development; supporting continued peace dialogue; and promotion of proper understanding of the situation.

Southern Border Provinces Administration and Development Policies³

Policies are based on the late King's "Understand-Appreciate-Develop" approach together with Sufficiency Thinking. They are integrated into all aspects of security and development work and are based on peaceful conflict resolution principles, transforming a violent approach to conflict into a peaceful alternative through a process of inclusive and active participation of all stakeholders. Operations management takes into account society's cultural pluralism, the need to uphold human rights principles, rule of law, as well mindfulness and respect for international rules and regulations.

2015-2017 Action Plan for Southern Conflict Resolution and Development⁴

The plan integrates joint actions of the military, police and civilians to implement strategies for southern conflict resolution and is directed by the

2 2015-2021 National Security Policies, National Security Council

3 2017-2019 Southern Border Provinces Administration and Development Policies, National Security Council

4 2015-2017 Action Plans for the Southern Conflict Resolution and Development, National Security Council

Southern Conflict Resolution Committee (Kor Por Tor). There are seven action clusters to be implemented:

Security of life and property: The aim is to reduce the risk of violent incidents in seven key cities; Yala's Mueang and Betong Districts; Pattani's Mueang District; Narathiwat's Mueang, Su-ngai Kolok, and Tak Bai Districts; and Songkhla's Hat Yai District. Community/village areas under the control of insurgents must be reduced. Places of worship and religious and educational personnel must be protected. Insurgent numbers must be reduced. Other opportunistic criminal threats, such as drug abuse or illicit businesses and influential gangs, must be prosecuted rigorously.

Administration of justice and remedies for affected people: Injustice is one of the drivers of violence and is based on perceived mistreatment or discrimination by the state. State officials will be urged to conduct their duties efficiently and fairly using modern technology to support operations. In particular, prominent cases or incidents that are questioned by Thai people and the international community must be quickly investigated to establish the truth. Prosecution of security-related cases must be carried out efficiently in line with the administration of justice to reduce injustice. People adversely affected by insurgent violence or state officials' operations must be compensated for property, physical, psychological, and spiritual damages so that they can resume their normal lives in society.

Domestic and international promotion of understanding and human rights issues: Social media is widely used throughout Thailand and internationally. Distortion of facts on social media often leads to misunderstanding at both the local and national level. Therefore, the state's operations must be carried out in line with international rules and human rights principles and people must be fully informed to understand the real situation. The southern conflict must not be raised as an international problem. People of the Muslim world and the international community shall be made to understand and support the state's operations.

Promotion of education, religion, and cultural arts: Most parents send their children to privately-run religious schools and pondok institutions. Upon finishing these schools, few students continue their general education in government-run schools which would enable them to later earn a living to support their families. Consequently, their economic status is negatively affected, leading to other social problems. State agencies thus aim to upgrade

the standard of government and private educational institutions. By creating and enhancing educational opportunities to improve teaching and educational facilities, it is expected that more parents will be motivated to send their children to government schools. With improved professional standards, students and youth will have the opportunity for further education within Thailand and overseas. Those outside the formal education system shall be educated and equipped with professional skills. Locals shall be able to lead their lives according to local traditions, religious beliefs and culture. Linguistic, artistic, and cultural identities shall be developed and promoted on a continual basis. Educational service management shall be done in response to local needs and consistent with state policies so as to meet the state's education aims in a concrete manner.

Capacity building of the region and development of local quality of life: The aim is to bring about increased income and secure livelihoods by promoting government and private sector investment in the region. Such investment will focus mainly on national infrastructure and logistic projects—particularly those related to transport and public utilities—to increase the region's capacity for investment. People living in high risk areas shall be guaranteed access to land use. Natural resources and the environment shall be restored and conserved for the mutual benefit of the locals. People shall be provided with comprehensive and fair medical services and primary health care provision. The state shall improve the quality of such services to enable them to handle the situation in the southern border provinces appropriately.

Improvement of government efficiency and operations of southern conflict resolution: Government officials—civilian, police, and army personnel—will have their skills and knowledge improved. Emphasis shall be placed on attitude adjustment and awareness-raising so they understand government policies and relevant laws. They shall be educated about the conditions of the region and its problems, past and present. The focus will be to reduce the factors that exacerbate the conflict and to not create any new ones. Local government agencies shall be equipped with appropriate equipment and vehicles. A unified and efficient operational system must be put in place, which will need local participation. Government officials shall be entitled to service personnel benefits and moral support pertinent to their operational responsibilities.

Pursuit of non-violent conflict resolution: It is well known that conflicts taking place all over the world—whether caused by racial, religious,

historical social, cultural, and ideological disputes— are generally resolved through a peace dialogue process. As such, responsible government agencies must be well-prepared to facilitate dialogue to resolve the conflict between people in the region as well as between people and the state. Local forums are to be provided to create space for and an environment conducive to dialogue and exchange of opinions. All stakeholders will have a chance to participate in the dialogue process to seek non-violent solutions through relevant legal procedures. To make progress on the peace dialogue process, the government announced the appointment of the Committee for Implementation of the Peace Dialogue Process⁵ which consists of three-levels: 1) Committee for the Facilitation of the Peace Dialogue Process, 2) Peace Dialogue Team, and 3) Local Coordination Committee.

Development of the Situation and Resolution of the Southern Border Provinces Conflict (Road to Peace in the Southern Border Provinces)

- 2004-2006 (Improvement of the situation)

On 4th January 2004, insurgents fought openly against the state for the first time when they mobilized their forces to attack and steal weapons from the Region 4 Development Battalion. Since then, the situation on the ground grew more violent. Attacks continued on a daily basis. Attacks on army and police bases led to the Krue Se incident involving violent clashes between insurgents and state officials. Nasty rumours about the officials' operations were spread to arouse suspicion between officials and local people as well as hatred among people themselves, which culminated in the Tak Bai incident. This attracted the attention of academics and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) who widely criticized Thai officials' operations. People expressed anti-state attitudes by spraying text in Patani-Malay language on government sign boards. Locals refused to cooperate in investigations and refused to provide information. They showed hostility towards officials and did not welcome their presence in areas despite officials coming to clear up confusion and keep the situation under control. The government established ISOC Region 4 Forward Command as a central control and core coordination unit for operations while a Southern Border Provinces Peace-Building Command

5 Order of the Office of the Prime Minister No 230/2557 on the Appointment of Committee for the Facilitation of the Peace Dialogue Process

(KorOr. SorSorSor. JorChor Tor) was set up to address problems according to the framework of peace-building policies and security strategies.⁶ The 2005 Executive Decree on Public Administration in Emergency Situations was imposed in the region to prevent the situation from spreading to other areas. The Committee for the Implementation of Peace-Building Policies and Strategies in the Southern Border Provinces (KorBorChorTor) was put in place to coordinate and direct conflict resolution at the policy level. After the Tak Bai and Krue Se incidents, the National Reconciliation Commission (NRC) was created to find the root causes and truth about the crisis. Initially, authorities focused on operational tactics to counter insurgent strongholds and recover stolen weapons. Operations were eventually adjusted to search for and destroy insurgent networks. Owing to the achievements of official operations, the NRC report as well as studies conducted by academics and civil society, a common understanding began to form that the crisis was created by separatist groups using terror to bring about fear and undermine public confidence in the state authority.

- 2006-2007 (Controlling the situation)

Insurgent groups expanded their militia numbers and mobilized constituents in villages. They instigated hatred among people. Anti-state activities, such as protests and demonstrations to expel government officials, were incited. Women-only demonstrations were used to block and prevent government officials from conducting thorough searches. Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or 'pipe bombs' began to be used and insurgents increasingly used more brutal tactics. Consequently, mistrust between state officials and the people as well as among people themselves increased. People refused or were unwilling to accept any form of help from officials. The rift between Buddhist Thais and Malay Muslims was so deep that the former began to move out of the area. Religious excuses were made to prevent government officials from inspecting religious place such as mosques, pondoks, or Tadika schools under suspicion. To efficiently handle the complex, multi-faceted and intertwined problems, the government devised the peacebuilding plan based on the late King's strategic guidelines of "Understand, Appreciate, and Develop". The army established additional field units and recruited new ranger units. ISOC developed its strategies for southern conflict resolution,

6 Order of the Office of the Prime Minister No 68/2547 on the Improvement of the Administration in the Southern Border Provinces

covering both security and development. The agency deployed more security forces in the form of military company bases so as to take complete control of the areas. Such actions prevented the situation from spreading to other areas, an achievement reached in ISOC's first phase to resolving the crisis: controlling the situation and ending the problem.

- 2008-2010 (Ending the problem)

Insurgent groups developed a variety of methods and patterns of violence. Bombs became more complex as detonators came in various forms- mobile phone or radio communication. Insurgents adapted their strategy by launching political campaigns alongside violent operations. They sought cooperation from direct or unwitting allies within the region and outside of it. Human rights issues, enforcement of security laws, and various forms of autonomy for the region were used as a pretext to campaign for cooperation. Although insurgents made great efforts to use violence to keep the masses under control, people began to respond positively towards state officials, whose operations were met with increased confidence and acceptance. Cooperation, specifically by giving useful information to the authorities, became more forthcoming. When the situation eventually calmed down, security laws were lifted, leaving only the 2008 Internal Security Act (ISA) in place, in four districts in Songkhla Province as a pilot scheme to give a chance for misguided persons to reform and return to society in accordance with ISA Section 21. Security and development strategies became more equalized with a greater focus on development operations. A Development Plan for Special Zones in Five Southern Border Provinces was devised to improve people's quality of life. Operational bases at the platoon level were expanded to protect people in all areas. Government officials' understanding of the King's strategic guidelines enabled them to put the strategies into practice in a concrete manner. Media campaigns enabled officials to reach out to the people. Mutual understanding then followed and sustainable development could be realized. This, for the most part, deprived the insurgents of the liberty to carry out their operations. Intense pressure from military operations as well as strict enforcement of laws brought down the number of violent incidents to the extent that officials could access all place to do their job. Buddhist Thais started to return to the region. Most people were better informed of the situation and fairly confident of the officials' operations. There were neither demonstrations nor protests. Local volunteer militia groups were established to provide community protection. This was the end of the first phase in controlling the situation and ending the problem.

- 2010-2011 (Participation of all sectors)

Conflict resolution has progressed incrementally and entered the second phase of offensive operations and development work. Although the number of incidents dropped, insurgent groups continue their violent insurgency to create conditions that capture the international community's attention. They turned to improvised explosive devices (IEDs) use and 'pipe bombs' became more sophisticated. Ethnic identity issues and past injustices were used to rationalize their struggle, consistent with the ongoing trend in the Muslim world and human rights movements. There was opposition to the enforcement of the Emergency Decree in the region and a proposal for a special administrative zone similar to that of Bangkok and Pattaya. However, people's confidence in and acceptance of officials increased. Greater perception of security led to increased cooperation from locals and support in addressing the crisis. This was followed by the prevention of violent operations on several occasions. Insurgent shelters and training camps were discovered in many locations. Widespread anti-violence demonstrations were held. ISOC developed its (Six) Strategies for Conflict Resolution in the Southern Border Provinces and extended its revocation of enforcement of the Emergency Decree in Pattani's Mae Lan district. Such strategies were contextualised and integrated into security-related operations and development work in accordance with the government's 2012-2014 Policy on the Administration and Development of the Southern Border Provinces and 2010 Administration of the Southern Border Provinces Act. The government set up an integrated committee as an administrative mechanism, resulting in more systematic coordination of security-related operations and development work. Regular government agencies' participation played an important role in implementing the solution. Most importantly, village committees, subdistrict peace councils, and village security militias, effectively took part in solving the problem and taking care of their own localities/communities.

- 2012-2015 (Road to Peace)

The situation on the ground improved as the number of incidents and losses significantly decreased. More dissidents joined the 'Bringing People Back Home' project, going public to end their activities. Although insurgent groups were heavily pressured and their freedom to create violence restricted, they still conducted operations but modified their methods and patterns. They focused on targets that would create a wider impact, such as a city's economic

zone, state officials, and those who cooperated with officials to retaliate and destroy people's confidence. In light of such violence, OIC representatives expressed their explicit opposition to insurgent operations. People on the ground began to be sick of the violence and decided to cooperate and give more support to officials, particularly concerning protection of their routes and communities by forming security militias at village- and subdistrict-levels as well as voluntary civilian protection groups. People demonstrated their opposition to all forms of violence and a better relationship between Thai Buddhist and Malay Muslim communities began to be re-established. More joint activities based on local culture and traditions could be seen. Meanwhile, the government set up the Southern Conflict Resolution Committee (Kor Por Tor) to direct implementation of conflict resolution and integrate it into other government agencies' work. An Action Plan on the Conflict Resolution and Development of the Southern Border Provinces (2015-2017) was created. The plan has seven action clusters, divided and categorized according to priorities for implementation. A mechanism in charge of the dialogue process was created specifically together with an action plan for the peace process to be used as an operational framework. Local officials' capacity was further strengthened. Local police and people were prepared to carry out operations in place of the military, which started withdrawing core units. Concerned government agencies integrated their operations extensively. A peace dialogue process to resolve the conflict began. Six groups of dissidents: BRN, PULO MKP, PULO DSPP, PULO-P4, BIPP and GMIP, participated in the peace dialogue process, which gained strong support from people within and outside the region as well as the international community. All stakeholders took a more active part in conflict resolution while insurgent groups' structure was demolished and their forces defeated. Insurgents also lost allies because of military operations, law enforcement and the 'Bringing People Back Home' project run according to Section 21 of the ISA. Their freedom and capacity to carry out violent incidents was restricted and their legitimate claim to resort to violence was no longer backed by people on the ground. International organizations such as the OIC showed their explicit support for the dialogue process. Such promising results enabled development work, such as the construction of 37 routes, to be carried out in accordance with local people's needs. Land use problems in Budo-Sungai Padi National Park was solved. People and civil society on the ground were more enthusiastic about peace dialogue

than before. The region's social structure was somewhat developed so that society could function fairly well as a strengthened entity embracing cultural pluralism. Military forces deployed from outside were gradually withdrawn and control over the areas was handed to the Fourth Army Region, the Marine Corps, and local forces as part of the transition to the third phase promoting peacebuilding and sustainable development in 2017.

Conclusion

Good progress has been made in terms of security as the number of incidents and losses has dropped significantly. Regional development has been achieved to improve quality of life and competitiveness underpinning the country's entrance into the ASEAN community. Justice has been administered transparently according to the rule of legal state. The factors contributing to the feelings of mistreatment have been rapidly eradicated. Optimistically, people affected by the violence are having their grievances redressed. Persons that were misled or blind to the situation have been given a chance to repent. So can those with different opinions from the state be brought peacefully back to society. However, building sustainable peace, as expected by society, is not an easy task. The conflict in the southern border provinces has been going on for a long time. It is necessary that all sectors of society cooperate and support its resolution. In particular, people on the ground, who are the immediate stakeholders, must play an active role to end the violence and build peace for the sake of posterity. The following are key issues that need the concerted effort of concerned parties:

- **Development of Quality of Life:** This is essential to the creation of employment, hope and future of people on the ground. In the context of the southern border provinces, not only the development of infrastructure, government services, and quality of life, but the development of the region's social structure is instrumental to building a strengthened entity embracing cultural pluralism while the political structure should afford opportunities for people on the ground to have their active participation recognized, as provided by the country's constitution.
- **Administration of Justice:** It is important to promote fast and efficient law enforcement procedures and the prosecution of

offenders in a transparent manner. Fair remedial measures should be provided for affected people and Section 21 of the ISA ought to be applied as a tool of non-violent conflict resolution. Dissident groups, who want to end their violent fight should be allowed to have their cases handled by judicial procedures.

- **Creation of Safety Zone:** A safe environment must be created soon by taking control of certain areas and destroying insurgent capacity to cause violence.

Based on the government's commitment, strong political will, and dedication to the task, and with support from all sectors of society, sustainable peace can be built and returned to the region in the not too distant future.

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Appendix B: Organizing Institution and Partner(s)

Center for Conflict Studies and Cultural Diversity (CSCD), PSU, Pattani

The Center for Conflict Studies and Cultural Diversity (CSCD) is a research excellent center attached to Prince of Songkla University. It aims to promote conflict and peace studies, conducting research in different fields of social sciences to encourage peace processes and multicultural society. The resources for CSCD's operations have been pooled from different faculties in Prince of Songkla University, including Faculty of Political Science, Faculty of Communication Science, College of Islamic Studies, and Institute of Peace Studies. Another major source of fund is appropriated from the government's budget set aside in the Southern Border Provinces' Special Development Program. CSCD also works to academically support local civil society movements and media activities through the affiliated organization, Deep South Watch (DSW), which runs closely with and relates to CSCD's official structure. CSCD is an academic mechanism of DSW, while DSW is outreaching structure and media platform of CSCD's academic operations.

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Faculty of Communication Sciences, PSU, Pattani

The Faculty of Communication Sciences was founded in 2002. It places emphasis on the integration of "information and communication sciences" with programs of studies on "Information and Communication Technology", "Communication Arts" and "Media Design Innovation and Creation". The faculty aims to build up the body of knowledge and produce graduates for "knowledge- based society". The graduates must be communication literate, able to access information data base and capable of applying technology skillfully, creatively, as well as must be capable of applying knowledge to develop one-self to be a leader in the profession, in the academic and social matter in the future.

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Faculty of Political Science, PSU, Pattani

Initially, the political science study at Prince of Songkla University (PSU), Pattani Campus was a minor subject of Social Development major and Geography major programs of the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences. Later on, two plans of Political Science major program, General Political Science (Plan A) and Political Science for Southern Border Provinces of Thailand (Plan B) were offered in 1982, and they underwent a major revision in 1994. The Faculty of Political Science, PSU, Pattani Campus was formally established in 2005. It has the primary duty to produce qualified graduates, conduct research, provide academic services, preserve arts and culture, and bridge the gap which may exist between the government administrators' view points and local community culture on certain issues. The Faculty focuses on its study in fields of government, public policy (public administration) and international relations which are related to community culture and consistent with the politics, administration, economy and social condition of Southern Thailand.

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Institute for Peace Studies, PSU, Hat Yai

The Institute for Peace Studies (IPS) at Prince of Songkla University, Hat Yaicampus was established in 2004. It aims to build up a body of knowledge and skill in the development of society and human resources in a peaceful manner, employing processes of conflict management, contemplative

education, human right consideration and islamic way of peace management. The institute has been involved in undergraduate education by offering several elective subjects, and has now offered a graduate program of study in Conflict and Peace Studies for the first time in 2008. It also has collaborative academic agreements with several institutions within and outside the country, for example, Mahidol University, Kasetsart University, King Prajadhipok's Institute, Center for Peace and Conflict Studies Chulalongkorn University, Royal Road University, Canada and Universiti Sains Malaysia.

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Faculty of Management Sciences, PSU, Hat Yai

Faculty of Management Sciences focuses on administering education in management sciences, theory as well as application, of both government and private sectors in order to produce well qualified graduates. To strive for academic excellence through research works and academic services for the community. Initially in 1974 the Bureau of University Affairs had approved in principle the setting up of a Faculty of Social Sciences at Hat Yai Campus. However, according to the then prevailing university policy that Hat Yai Campus was to be the center of sciences and technology while the Pattani campus the center of arts, culture and social sciences; the University Council has agreed in 1975 that the new faculty to be established must have its name changed to Faculty of Management Science. At the present, the Faculty of Management Sciences consists of 2 departments, the department of Business Administration and the department of Political Sciences.

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Deep South Watch (DSW)

Deep South Watch (DSW), established in 2006, is a platform-like organization based at Prince of Songkla University, Pattani Campus in southern Thailand. The organization has worked through network organizations with an emphasis on creating a "common space" or "platform" for mobilization of peace in areas of violent conflict in the Deep South provinces of Thailand. Deep South Watch tries to create and facilitate political space for various parties in the conflict to present their diverse roles, while creating public discourses for all stakeholders to discuss and finding an exit from violent conflict through different academic and practice based instruments. The aims of these practices are not only creating a realistic and comprehensive understanding of the conflict situation, but also lessening the use of violence from all parties. In other words, the aim of Deep South Watch is to use non-violent means to constructively transform the conflict in the region. There are 3 modules of DSW activities, academic, media, and civil society module.

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Peace Resource Collaborative (PRC)

The Peace Resource Collaborative (PRC) for the conflict in the Deep South of Thailand/Pattani emerged in 2014 as part of a comprehensive effort to develop and sustain an effective multi-track peace-support process and structure. PRC uses the collective expertise available throughout both the local and international peacebuilding community. PRC aims to work, in collaboration with other like-minded partners to generate shared knowledge to promote multi-track peace initiatives, to enhance the effectiveness of Track-1 non-official and official talks, and to nurture opportunities and processes for key stakeholders and parties to support a peaceful transformation of the conflict. As such, PRC commissions experts (academics, journalists,

consultants, Ph.D. students from Thailand based abroad etc.) to draft issue papers, reports or policy papers.

Direct support may also be provided through capacity building; providing ideas, proposals; strategic planning sessions; and comparative studies. At present, PRC collects examples, experiences and lessons learned from peace processes elsewhere which can be useful for the particular challenges in negotiation efforts. To improve this kind of knowledge management, contacts with relevant initiatives, academic institutions and databanks are established and nurtured.

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Partnership

Southern Thailand Empowerment and Participation (STEP) Project

The UNDP in cooperation with the Prince of Songkla University have operated the projects since the year 2010 in the context of latest development and situation in the Southern provinces of Thailand. In line with the Guidelines for Cooperation Projects for the Southern Border Provinces issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the UN Partnership Framework with the Royal Thai Government (UNPAF 2007 – 2011), and the SBPAC master plan, the project's overall objective is to enhance community empowerment and public participation in local governance processes in Southern Thailand. This objective will be achieved by activities in two inter-linked areas focusing on capacity development of community-based organizations on the one hand and government on the other.

The development of communities capacity involves the four area of activities includes: strengthening institutional capacity of community-based organizations; enhancing awareness and understanding of media in promoting social cohesion; improving income generation and employment opportunities of communities; and enhancing legal awareness and capacity to access to effective dispute resolution mechanism for the improvement of relationship between state and communities.

On the side of government involves the activities that strengthening capacity of local government in participatory planning and budgeting; strengthening local level natural resource and natural disaster management; increasing knowledge of and exposure to a range of governance models and practices; and strengthening capacities of government officials at the provincial level to provide effective dispute resolution mechanisms.

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Appendix C: Organizing Team

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Awoot Yeesaman	Oratai Chruwised
Batrudin Kalee	Pawitchaya Chanakan
Bussabong Chaijaroenwatana, Ph.D.	Phatcharakon Yangpaknam
Chanakit Thanasuk	Phirakarn Kai-nunna
Chavanit Thanasuk	Pimchanok Pollawan
Chawanrat Bunkarn	Pindarica Malyrojsiri
Chidchanok Rahimmula	Rohanee Juenara
Dao Kaewmula	Romdon Panjor
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Duangrudee Mahattanaporn	Rusman Yusoh
Emma Potchapornkul	Saman Chema
Fareeda Panjor	Saneeyah Masa-aw
Hady Nilaeman	Sarawoot Jawisoot
Hatsan Todong	Saronee Duereh
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Ittdate Rattana	Srisompob Jitpiomsri, Ph.D.
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Mulyana Daumae	Wasinee Chantong
Navika Pengjun	Wichai Kanchanasuwon, Ph.D.
Nayuwa Laeni	Yupadee Udompong

Appendix D: Photo Gallery Opening Ceremony



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Welcome Dinner



Post-conference Field Trip







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